Edmund Husserl’s Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (1931) defines phenomenology as a descriptive analysis of the essence of pure consciousness. Husserl defines pure or transcendental phenomenology as an a priori (or eidectic) science, i.e. as a science of essential Being. Husserl distinguishes between pure phenomenology and empirical psychology (and between transcendental and psychological subjectivity), saying that phenomenology is a science of essences, while psychology is a science of the facts of experience. Husserl criticizes "psychologism" (the theory that psychological analysis may be used as a method of resolving philosophical problems), saying that only an a priori science can define the essential nature of Being.

The Ideas are divided into four sections: 1) "The Nature and Knowledge of Essential Being," 2) "The Fundamental Phenomenological Outlook," 3) "Procedure of Pure Phenomenology In Respect of Methods and Problems," and 4) "Reason and Reality." The first section describes how the realm of essence differs from the realm of facts. The second section describes how phenomenological reduction may be used as a method of philosophical inquiry. The third section describes how noesis and noema may be defined as phases of intentionality. The fourth section describes the relation between consciousness and noematic meaning.

Husserl distinguishes between phenomenology as a science of pure consciousness and psychology as a science of empirical facts. For Husserl, the realm of pure consciousness is distinct from the realm of real experience. Husserl explains that phenomenology is a theory of pure phenomena, and that it is not a theory of actual experiences (or of actual facts or realities).

According to Husserl, essential Being must be distinguished from actual existence, just as the pure Ego must be distinguished from the psychological Ego. Essences are non-real, while facts are real. The realm of transcendentally reduced phenomena is non-real, while the realm of actual experience is real. Thus, phenomenological reduction leads from a knowledge of the essentially real to a knowledge of the essentially non-real.

Husserl explains that phenomenological reduction is the process of defining the pure essence of a psychological phenomenon. Phenomenological reduction is a process whereby empirical subjectivity is suspended, so that pure consciousness may be defined in its essential and absolute Being. This is accomplished by a method of "bracketing" empirical data away from consideration. "Bracketing" empirical data away from further investigation leaves pure consciousness, pure phenomena, and the pure Ego as the residue of phenomenological reduction.

Phenomenological reduction is also a method of bracketing empirical intuitions away from philosophical inquiry, by refraining from making judgments upon them. Husserl uses the term epoche (Greek, for "a cessation") to refer to this suspension of judgment regarding the true nature of reality. Bracketed judgment is an epoche or suspension of inquiry, which places in brackets whatever facts belong to essential Being.

Husserl argues that bracketing is a neutralization of belief. Doxic positing (i.e. the positing of belief) may be actual or potential. Doxic positing may occur in every kind of consciousness, because every consciousness may actually or potentially posit something about Being.

According to Husserl, facts or realities are the objective data of empirical intution, while essences are the objective data of essential intuition. Empirical intuition may lead to essential intuition (or essential insight), which may be adequate or inadequate in terms of its clearness and distinctness. Empirical or non-empirical objects may have varying degrees of intuitability, and empirical or non-empirical intuitions may vary in their clearness and distinctness. Non-empirical intuitions may apprehend objects which are produced by fantasy or imagination.

Husserl explains that consciousness is intentional insofar as it refers to, or is directed at, an object. Intentionality is a property of directedness toward an object. Consciousness may have intentional and non-intentional phases, but intentionality is what gives consciousness its objective meaning.

According to Husserl, the cogito ("I think") is the principle of the pure Ego. The pure Ego performs acts of consciousness (cogitations), which may be immanently or transcendently directed. Immanently directed acts of consciousness refer to objects which are within the same Ego, or which belong to the same stream of consciousness. Transcendently directed acts of consciousness refer to objects which are outside the Ego, or which belong to another stream of consciousness. The objects of consciousness (cogitata) are the embodied or unembodied things which are perceived or consciously experienced.

Husserl argues that the difference between immanent and transcendent perception corresponds to the difference between Being as Experience and Being as Thing.¹ Things as they exist in themselves cannot be perceived immanently, and can only be perceived transcendently. The difference between immanent and transcendent perception also reflects the difference in the way in which things are given or presented to consciousness. Givenness may be adequate or inadequate in terms of its clearness and distinctness, and in terms of its intuitability.

Husserl also explains that immanently-perceived objects have an absolute Being, in that their existence is logically necessary. The existence of transcendently-perceived objects is not logically necessary, in that their existence is not proved by the Being of conciousness itself. Consciousness itself is absolute Being, while the spatio-temporal world is merely phenomenal Being.

Husserl emphasizes that phenomenology is concerned with the essence of what is immanent in consciousness, and that it is concerned with describing immanent essences. To confuse the essences of things with the mental representations of these essences is to confuse the aims of phenomenology and psychology. Phenomenology is a descriptive analysis of Being as Consciousness, while psychology is a descriptive analysis of Being as Reality. The difference between Being as Consciousness and Being as Reality is the difference between transcendental and transcendent Being.

Husserl asserts that every actual cogito has an intentional object (i.e. it is a consciousness of something). The cogito may itself become a cogitatum, if the principle that "I think" becomes an object of consciousness. In the cogito, the act of thinking is itself an intentional object. However, in contrast to the Cartesian principle that "I think, therefore I am" (cogito ergo sum), the phenomenologically reduced cogito is a suspension of judgment about whether or not "I am," or whether or not "I exist." The phenomenologically reduced cogito is a suspension of judgment about the question of whether or not thinking implies existence. Thus, phenomenology examines the cogito as a pure intuition, and as an act of pure consciousness.

Husserl describes noesis and noema as two aspects of intentionality. Noesis is the process of cogitation, while the noemata (or cogitata) are that which is cogitated. Every intentional experience has a noetic (real) phase and a noematic (non-real) phase. Every noetic phase of consciousness corresponds to a noematic phase of consciousness. Noesis is a process of reasoning, which assigns meaning to intentional objects. Noesis and noema may both be a means to explain objective meaning. The noetic meaning of transcendent objects is discoverable by reason, while the noematic meaning of immanent objects is discoverable by pure intuition. Noetic meaning is transcendent, while noematic meaning is immanent. Thus, noesis and noema correspond respectively to experience and essence.

¹Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931), p. 133.

Husserl, Edmund. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931.