Epictetus’s Discourses

Epictetus (c.55-c.135 CE) was a Stoic philosopher who taught in Rome until all philosophers were banished from Italy by the Emperor Domitian in 89 CE. Epictetus then moved to Nicopolis, Greece where he started a famous school of philosophy. His teachings were recorded by his pupil Arrian, and were collected as the Discourses (or Diatribai, in Greek). The Discourses were divided into eight books, four of which have survived, the other books having been lost. The Handbook (or Encheiridion) was another work which was recorded from the teachings of Epictetus, including a number of selections from the Discourses. These works had an important influence on the development of Stoicism as an ethical and social philosophy, advocating self-discipline, emotional detachment, obedience to reason, freedom from passion, indifference to pleasure or pain, and acceptance of any circumstances which are not within human power to control.

According to Epictetus, wisdom may include the capacity to correctly distinguish between what is within human control and what is not within human control. If we are to attain wisdom, then we must be able to correctly distinguish between those situations which are within our power to change and those situations which are not within our power to change. In order to attain harmony with the world, we may have to reconcile ourselves to various situations which are not within our power to change, but we do not necessarily have to reconcile ourselves to situations which are within our power to change. Wisdom and moral understanding may include the capacity to adapt ourselves to various situations which are not within our power to change, but folly or ignorance may consist of the refusal or lack of capacity to adapt ourselves to situations which are not within our power to change. If we are able to correctly determine those situations which are not within our power to change, then we may be able to make rational and appropriate decisions about how to respond to those situations.

Epictetus notes that many people would probably agree that it is better to enjoy pleasure than not to enjoy pleasure, and that it is better to avoid pain than to suffer pain. However, he also notes that many people would also probably agree that there may be other aims of moral conduct which may be more important than the enjoyment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, and that these other moral aims may include the aim to be virtuous and the aim to comply with moral duty. The capacity to recognize the kinds of situations in which the enjoyment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain may not be as important as other aims of moral conduct may constitute a form of wisdom or moral understanding.

Epictetus also notes that many people would probably agree that pleasure is preferable to pain, and that many people would agree that living is preferable to dying. However, there may be some situations in which people would agree that pain is preferable to pleasure, and that dying is preferable to living. Wisdom or moral understanding may include the capacity to recognize the kinds of situations in which such moral ideals as concern for others and compliance with moral duty may be more important than enjoyment of pleasure or avoidance of pain, and wisdom or moral understanding may also include the capacity to recognize the kinds of situations in which the preservation of an acceptable quality of life may be more important than the simple prolongation of life at any cost.

Epictetus argues that we should be willing to accept the consequences of our actions if these actions have been performed voluntarily. If we are unwilling to accept the consequences of our actions, then we may not be able to properly evaluate whether our actions are right or wrong. If we are willing to accept the consequences of our actions, then we may be able to more properly evaluate whether our actions are right or wrong.

Epictetus also argues that we should try to anticipate the consequences of our actions if we want to avoid causing unnecessary unhappiness or suffering for ourselves and for others. However, if suffering is unavoidable in some situations, then we should be ready to accept it. We should detach ourselves emotionally from the feeling of pain, since the feeling of pain may not be within our power to control. If we do not detach ourselves emotionally from feelings which are not within our power to control, then these feelings may hinder us from attaining equanimity and tranquility of mind.

Epictetus explains that if we surrender our emotional attachment to things which are beyond our power to control, then we may be able to maintain our equanimity and tranquility of mind when these things are lost or are taken away from us. Thus, we may be able to adapt ourselves to the loss of our friends, of our social standing, or of our property if such misfortunes are not within our power to avoid or prevent. If we cannot have all the things that we want, then we must try to be content with the things that we have, if we want to maintain our equanimity and tranquility of mind. We should also remember that there are some things which cannot be taken away from us (such as our ability to make moral choices and to define our moral priorities) unless we voluntarily surrender them.

Epictetus maintains that we may be able to exercise some control over our actions in many situations, but that we may not be able to exercise control over the actions of other individuals in the same situations. If we cannot exercise control over the actions of other individuals, then we should still be prepared to respond to those actions.

Epictetus also explains that if in some situations we are asked but not compelled to perform unpleasant tasks, then we should not complain if we voluntarily decide to perform those tasks. If we discover that the consequences of performing a task are too unpleasant to justify performing that task, then we should not voluntarily perform that task. However, we should be prepared to accept responsibility for having voluntarily decided not to perform an unpleasant task, and we should be prepared to accept the consequences of our actions.

According to Epictetus, wisdom and moral understanding may include the capacity to distinguish between whether things are as they appear or whether things are not as they appear. If some individuals inadvertently fall into error because they have false impressions of things, then we should not be angry with them for merely having had false impressions. Individuals who have false impressions of things may not always be responsible for making wrong judgments about whether their actions are right or wrong.

For Epictetus, reason is a moral capacity or power to use impressions correctly. To be good is to be rational and to be able to use impressions correctly to make proper judgments about whether actions are right or wrong. The correct use of impressions may enable us to act rightly, but the incorrect use of impressions may prevent us from acting rightly. We may not be able to act rightly unless we can use our impressions properly to determine whether our actions are right or wrong.

Epictetus insists that only those actions which can be voluntarily controlled can be described as good or evil. The quality of being good or evil consists of the moral choice which is involved in determining whether an action should, or should not, be voluntarily performed. Actions for which there is no aspect of moral choice regarding whether they should, or should not, be voluntarily performed cannot be described as good or evil.

According to Epictetus, the actions of an individual who has no capacity for moral choice cannot be described as good or evil. Actions which do not require or allow an individual to choose between good and evil are morally neutral and are external to the moral aims of that individual.

Epictetus explains that a Stoic is a person who knows that there are some things which are within his or her power to control, and who knows that there are some things which are not within his or her power to control. A Stoic is a person who can make constructive contributions to situations which are within his or her power to control, but who can reconcile himself or herself to situations which are not within his or her power to control. A Stoic is a person who can remain serene despite being criticized or ridiculed, who can remain cheerful despite having to suffer from physical illness or injury, who can remain contented despite having to endure deprivation, who can remain calm despite being in danger, and who can remain spiritually free despite being physically imprisoned.

According to Epictetus, we may not be able to control the actions of others in many situations, but we may still be able to control our own actions in the same situations. Even though others may not act rightly toward us, we should still act rightly toward them. We should practice controlling our own desires and aversions, so that we may successfully direct these desires and aversions toward what is within our power of control, rather than toward what is not within our power to control. To be able to maintain self-control and to be governed by reason is to be able to maintain equanimity and tranquility of mind.

Epictetus argues that we are responsible for our own fears and anxieties if we become attached to things which are beyond our power to control. If we remember that there are some things which cannot be taken away from us unless we voluntarily surrender them, then we will have no cause for fear or anxiety. If we become attached to things which are beyond our power to control, then we will become anxious about losing these things, and we will not be able to attain happiness and contentment.

A weakness of this argument is that it excludes the possibility that some kinds of emotional attachment may be good. Epictetus argues that if we become emotionally attached to other people, then we may become anxious and concerned about their well-being, and thus we may not be able to attain serenity and tranquility of mind. However, he fails to recognize that some kinds of emotion may be good and yet may not be within our power to control. He also fails to recognize that some kinds of moral virtue, such as faithfulness, loyalty, and devotion may be forms of emotional attachment which may not be within our power to control. He maintains that if emotional attachments hinder us from attaining serenity and tranquility of mind, then we should simply reject or discard them.

Epictetus argues that things which are within our power to control include our own impulses, desires, and aversions, but that things which are not within our power to control include our health, social status, reputation, and property. He also argues that we can retain our freedom to make moral choices only if we we do not become attached to things which are not within our power to control. If we become attached to things which are not within our power to control, then we will lose our freedom to make moral choices and we may be hindered in our attempts to maintain equanmity and tranquility of mind.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Epictetus. The Discourses of Epictetus. Edited by Christopher Gill. Translation revised by Robin Hard. London: J.M. Dent, 1995.

Copyright© Alex Scott 2004

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