Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (1968, translated 1994) introduces the importance of a philosophy of difference by describing how difference may be internal to the nature of every Idea and how every Idea may have multiple elements that may be differentiated. Deleuze explains that difference and repetition have a reality that is independent of the concepts of sameness, identity, resemblance, similarity, or equivalence. Pure difference is neither a factor of negativity nor a negation of sameness. Rather, it affirms the actuality of an Idea.
According to Deleuze, complex repetition involves elements (or singularities) that multiply (or reflect) each other. Repetition may be variable, and thus it may include difference within itself. Perseveration, on the other hand, is an invariable form of expression that has a sameness rather than a difference in its mode of presentation.
Complex repetition may disguise its own difference and variability. A bare (simple) repetition is a mechanical, stereotyped repetition of the same element, while a clothed (complex) repetition is a repetition that has difference hidden within itself. Repetition may employ disguising and displacement of the difference that it conceals within itself. The difference that may be found within repetition is seen in the play of difference by which repetition may be bare or clothed, covered or uncovered, masked or unmasked, static or dynamic, extensive or intensive, horizontal or vertical, material or spiritual.
Difference may be internal to an idea or it may be external to a conceptual mode of representation. Difference may be extrinsic or intrinsic, generic or specific, essential or accidental, actual or virtual. Difference has extensity and intensity. According to Deleuze, difference in itself is intensity. Difference as intensity is explicated by a mode of inquiry that explores its extensity. Intensity is explicated by means of extensities that are "differenciated."
Difference may be mediated or represented by (1) a lack of identity of concepts, (2) a lack of resemblance of perception, (3) a lack of analogy of judgement, or (4) the presence of opposition of predicates.1 These four aspects (which combine to form a fourfold root) of representation are modes of subordination of difference to inadequate or faulty representational concepts.
Deleuze introduces eight postulates (or models) for the image of thought that portray thought as a mode of representation. These models of thought portray sameness rather than difference as the primary reality, and thus they do not provide an affirmative structure for a philosophy of difference. The postulates are (1) that everyone already knows how "thought" is to be defined, (2) that common sense and good sense guarantee this knowledge and understanding, (3) that recognition of an object is determined by the sameness of the object, (4) that representation can appropriately subordinate the concept of difference to the Same and the Similar, the Analogous and the Opposed, (5) that any error that occurs in thinking is caused by external rather than internal mechanisms, (6) that the truth of a proposition is only determined by whatever is designated by the proposition, (7) that problems are only defined by their solutions, and (8) that learning is only a means of gaining knowledge.2 Deleuze explains that these eight postulates are significant obstacles to the understanding of difference and repetition.
Deleuze also says that difference is distorted if it is forced to comply with the limitations of representation. Difference cannot be represented affirmatively by the identity of a concept. Representation affirms the mode of expression in which a concept or quality may be (1) identical, (2) similar, (3) analogous, or (4) opposed to another concept or quality. Representation thus considers difference to be a negation of sameness. Difference as divergence, disparateness, or dissimilarity cannot be affirmed by representation.
Difference and repetition may be objects of representation, but representation can only portray difference and repetition negatively in relation to a concept of sameness. Representation can only consider repetition as bare, mechanical repetition and not as complex repetition including difference, dissemblance, disguising, displacement, and variability.
Just as repetition implies a relation between the repeater and the repeated, difference implies a relation between the "differenciator" and the "differenciated." Deleuze uses the term "differentiation" to refer to the determination of the virtual content of an Idea, while he uses the term "differenciation" to refer to the actualization of the content of an Idea as divergent elements and parts. To actualize something is to "differenciate" it. "Differenciation" is an integration or solution of a problem, which is then integrated into the solution of more complex problems to form a more global and integrated solution.3
According to Deleuze, every proposition has a dimension of expression and a dimension of designation. Expression is the dimension of sense, while designation is the dimension of truth or falsehood. These two dimensions of logical function (expression and designation) are not independent of each other, because expression must establish the relation between a proposition and whatever truth or falsehood is designated by the proposition. Another way of saying this is that the truth or falsehood of a proposition must be grounded in the sense of the proposition.
Deleuze uses the term "signification" to refer to the relation between concepts and their objects in a given field of representation, while he uses the term "sense" to refer to the expressive content of a conceptual object that is not necessarily located in a representational field. Thus, a conceptual object that is self-contradictory may have sense without having any meaning or signification.
Deleuze also argues that sense is found in problems. Propositions are inspired by problems. Problems are not merely hypotheses or categories of uncertainty; they are ultimate questions that require answers or solutions. Problems may be singular or universal.4
Deleuze explains that problems are Ideas and Ideas are problems.5 An Idea is different from a concept insofar as it has internal differentiation and multiplicity. A concept, on the other hand, has a single identity that is determined by the four dimensions of representation (identity, similarity, analogy, or opposition).6
Concepts may be blocked from being fully comprehended. Blocked concepts are prevented from being fully comprehended, while unblocked concepts may be infinitely comprehended. Deleuze argues that a natural blockage may be due to a discrete extension or finite comprehension of a concept, while an artificial blockage may be due to a logical limitation in the comprehension of a concept.
Ideas express a form of difference that cannot be represented merely as a lack of resemblance between concepts. Ideas may also be distinguished from concepts insofar as they have a mode of internal differentiation that is not blocked by finite extension. However, the form of difference internal to every Idea may be displaced or disguised by repetition.
Deleuze describes Nietzsche’s philosophy as affirming the nature of pure difference. Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal recurrence of every event in the universe affirms that reality is in a continual state of becoming. Nietzsche’s philosophy affirms difference and repetition as expressing the nature of being. Deleuze compares Nietzsche’s concept of the Eternal Return to a circle in which difference is in the center and sameness is at the periphery. Difference is thus a divergence and decentering, and the Eternal Return leads to a plurality of centers that give depth to the world of difference.7
In contrast, representation is a form of mediation that has only a single center and that lacks the depth of the world of difference. If sameness is placed at the center of a circle, then difference is at the periphery. Even if an infinite number of representations of an object are produced, they will all converge at the same point, which is the identity of the object at the center of the circle of representation.8
Deleuze emphasizes the importance of describing difference and repetition affirmatively. Difference as intensity is explicated by defining its extensity. Intensity is implicated in the actualization of extensity. Extensity cannot be separated from intensity. Thus, the philosophy of difference has a diversifying as well as unifying influence on our understanding of reality.
1Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p.vi.
2Ibid., p. 155.
3Ibid., p. 211.
4Ibid., p. 163.
5Ibid., p. 168.
6Ibid., p. 288.
7Ibid., p. 55.
8Ibid., p. 55-6.
Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition. Translated by Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994
