Plato’s Cratylus is a dialogue between Socrates (an Athenian philosopher), Hermogenes (the son of a wealthy aristocrat), and Cratylus (a young scholar who subscribes to the philosophy of Heraclitus that all things are in a state of permanent change). The dialogue is mainly concerned with the methods and purposes of assigning names to things.
Hermogenes tells Socrates that Cratylus has been saying that the truth or correctness of the names which are assigned to things is not merely a matter of convention or of general agreement but is a matter of the nature of the things which are named. Hermogenes says that he disagrees with Cratylus, and explains that there is no natural or necessary connection between the truth or correctness of names and the nature of the things which are named.
Socrates persuades Hermogenes to admit that names may be assigned to things either correctly or incorrectly, but Hermogenes argues that things which are the same may be given different names by different individuals and that therefore the truth or correctness of the names which a particular individual assigns to things may be determined by the perceptions of that particular individual. Hermogenes realizes that to make this argument is to agree with the teachings of Protagoras that truth is relative to the perceptions of each individual, and he thus begins to doubt the validity of his own argument, because he actually disagrees with the teachings of Protagoras. Socrates then persuades Hermogenes to agree that the true essence or nature of things may be independent of the perceptions of each individual, and that the essence of things may be different from the appearance of things.
Socrates argues that the best method of performing an action is the most natural method of performing that action, and that the best method of assigning names to things is the most natural method of assigning names to things. He also argues that the naming of things may be a method of distinguishing between the natures of different things. If different names are assigned to different things, then we may be able to distinguish more clearly between the natures of those different things.
Socrates also argues that to name things is to decide which words are the most natural names of things. The best names for things may be the most natural names for things. The most natural names of things may be the names which by nature are best adapted to indicate the nature of those things. Socrates thus concludes that Cratylus may have been correct in arguing that all things by nature have proper names.
Socrates explains that the names of things may differ in form but may in some cases share the same meaning. More than one name may be assigned to the same thing, and names may vary in the degree of their similarity or difference in form and meaning. However, Socrates argues that all names are intended to indicate the nature of the things which they designate. The names which are used to indicate the nature of things are not merely imitations of the physical attributes of those things, but are imitations of the essence of those things.
Cratylus argues that the names of things always indicate the nature of the things which they designate, and thus that all names are assigned equally correctly. If the supposed name of an object does not indicate the nature of that object, then it is not actually the name of that object, and it must actually be the name of some other object. There are no incorrect names for things.
However, Socrates argues that the assignment of names to things may be performed either correctly or incorrectly. If names are correctly assigned to things, then the nature of things is indicated by the names of those things. If names are incorrectly assigned to things, then the nature of things is not indicated by the names of those things.
Cratylus insists that names which are improperly assigned to things are not really names of those things. However, Socrates argues that the names of things may vary in the degree of correctness or accuracy with which they indicate the nature of things. The correctness of the names of things may thus be a matter of convention rather than a matter of the nature of those things. According to convention, names which are unlike the things to which they are assigned may be as correct as names which are like the things to which they are assigned. Socrates explains that the use of conventional rules for naming things is necessary because names cannot always be transformed into perfect likenesses of the things which they designate. The names of things are not identical to the things themselves, but are only representations of those things.
Cratylus again argues that the purpose of naming things is to indicate the nature of things, but Socrates explains that merely understanding the names of things is not the same as understanding the nature of things. In order to assign names to things, we must already have attained some knowledge of those things. We may attain knowledge of things either directly by investigating the things themselves or indirectly by investigating the names of things.
According to Socrates, direct knowledge of things is superior to indirect knowledge of things. Cratylus agrees, but does not accept as valid the argument by Socrates that knowledge cannot be attained of things which are transitory and always changing or the argument that knowledge can only be attained of things which are eternal and unchanging.
As the dialogue ends, Cratylus and Socrates agree to continue to reflect on these matters and to meet again to try to answer the question of whether knowledge can be attained by learning the names of things.
Plato. "Cratylus," in The Dialogues of Plato, Volume II. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1875.
