From the staff college graduation
thesis of Major Ivan Ivanovich Ivanov.
Frunze Military Academy.
"The actions of the Army of Catherine in the European
war of the 1740's - A Re-assessment."
'.......the hastily assembled Austro-Russian forces drew themselves up before Vienna to face the Prussian forces. Although they enjoyed a healthy numeric superiority (14SP of Austrians, 8SP of Russians, 2 Austrian militia to 16 SP of Prussians) their forces were hampered by number of issues:
Adding further to the allied woes was a mishap crossing the flooded Sava river in Slovenia. As F.M. von Lacy and his forces hastened back the threatened capitol a bridge collapsed, decanting most of his staff and all his documents into the raging torrent. Though permanent casualties were negligible, the usually organised Lacy faced the first major confrontation of the war with his staffwork in complete disarray, carried out by inexperienced officers drafted from either the HofKriegsamt or regimental duty. The shortfall was to be evident in the Austrian conduct of the battle.
The Russian forces were in somewhat better shape, but it is symptomatic of the supply problems involved in the long march from Kiev that the infantry were to fight in the snow wearing summer dress, without their green coats.
Lacy's staff work may have been dubious, but his insight did not fail him. He realised that it would be difficult for the allies to match the Prussian cavalry, and that given enough time Frederich would use his superiority in the Arme Blanche to crush his opponents cavalry and sweep up the army. He was also faced with the need to protect the Russian forces from being split away and driven from the field while the larger Austrian force was being screened. The plan he created met his needs. The cavalry would hold their opponents for as long as possible, while a general advance of the infantry would bring the Allies greater numbers to bear. The Russian force was embedded in the centre left of the allied line, making it impractical for the Prussians to focus upon them. (As Frederick was present, the Allies had to deploy first, somewhat constraining their tactical possibilities).
While the operation plan was good, the execution reflected the rawness of Lacy's staff. The Austrian brigade deployed on the left of the Russian forces was too far from the enemy to enter the action. In fact they suffered no casualties at all. The centre of the Austrian line, which was to advance toward the enemy infantry, was too thinly supported for success. The absence of these troops on the left flank was to be deeply felt.
Also important was
the absence of cavalry support on the left flank. This was to
plague Russian General's Toomitov's developing enveloping assault
on the Prussian right. The advance was considerably slowed not
only by the snow but the single unopposed Prussian hussar regiment.
Frederich, presented with a long line of troops, took the only option open to him. He massed his cavalry on the left and his infantry in the center. His right was refused. The plan was to drive the Austrian cavalry off the rise on his left (the Pferdhof) with his own and to roll down the Austrian line. The infantry centre was to advance in support of the cavalry. Having broken the Austrians he could crush the Russians with massively superior forces.
Given his parlous supply state it was impossible for Frederich to undertake a siege and so he was driven to look for a swift resolution. (As it was a winter turn, with snow, no siege could take place. Also the battle was limited to 12 turns)
The Russian General, Toomitov, approved the plan while sober (an unusual occurance for him). Fortifying himself with a flask of schnapps, he prepared to lead an assault on the refused Prussian wing. He summoned the Russian Dragoon regiment from the behind the centre, sent the Yellow Hussars to support the Austrian horse on the right, and drove his infantry and artillery forward with his customary verbal abuse, swinging an infantry brigade to flank the Prussian line and to prevent the Black Hussars who were lurking on the left from becoming a more of an obstacle. Col. Smirnoff, in charge of the detachment of the Nizhegorodski Dragoons was singularly sluggish in his movements. For this, and subsequent failures which will be discussed later, he was cashiered.
