In the following sections you will find:
Early in 2001, I decided to try to find a way I might contribute to the reduction of organized violence. My first thought was to look for worthy research projects to fund. However, after funding such projects and immersing myself in the peace and security world, I observed that much was already known about the causes and cures of violence. Promoting the more effective use of resources already available seemed to merit more support than adding to the large amount of existing knowledge. Moreover, preventing violence can be much more cost-effective than trying to deal with situations in which violence has already erupted, to say nothing of the lives and suffering saved. So now I am initiating and funding activities aimed at the prevention of mass violence in fragile states.
The Guinea-Bissau Project
In 2003, I convened a group of ten well-qualified people to explore what concrete actions I might take that would contribute to the reduction of political violence. The group developed a promising approach and decided to initiate a “test case” to verify its effectiveness. Research indicated the West African country of Guinea-Bissau would be an appropriate place to begin. Observers expected the kind of widespread violence that had occurred there in the late ‘90s to erupt again.
Work there was begun in 2004 and continues today. In spite of several national elections and several high-level assassinations, the country has remained peaceful. An independent evaluation determined that during the period of our work there, the country’s stability had improved and that our work had contributed to that progress.
Early Response Mechanism
Several capable organizations monitor all or parts of the world and issue reports warning of the likelihood of the outbreak of violence in specific places. Occasionally, one or more organizations may take action to head off the violence, but until now there has been no established mechanism to provide prompt, effective responses to these warnings. The problem is widely recognized, but for the most part, no effective preventive actions have followed the warnings.
To address that problem I, along with two colleagues, convened a group of international experts to address the problem. Our aim was to find a way to establish an effective mechanism to respond effectively to reliable warnings of impending violence. The first meeting of this group took place in Ottawa on Oct. 2, 2006. By early 2008, we had established an organization now called BEFORE, headquartered in Bern, Switzerland, with a second office in Washington, DC. It has assumed responsibility for the continuing work in Guinea-Bissau.
BEFORE has two major objectives. The first is to provide effective help to leaders in fragile states anywhere in the world to prevent widespread political violence there. The second is through its work on the ground to add to existing knowledge about how to prevent political violence and to share it with others in the peacebuilding field.
BEFORE plans to set up regional advisory committees to identify countries most in need of help and then to recruit in-country project teams to help prevent violence. A committee for West Africa was formed in 2008. Its members include several experts from developed countries and several leaders from West Africa.
The West Africa Advisory Committee selected Guinea (Conakry) as the best candidate to be the next country in which to engage. An initial assessment mission, headed by a former US ambassador to Guinea, verified that Guinea needed the kind of help BEFORE could provide.
The death of the president and assumption of power by a group of army officers delayed the start of the actual engagement. However, in May, 2009, BEFORE convened a meeting of 51 local leaders representing various governmental and other organization. The participants analyzed the situation, devised a strategy, and established plans of action on several fronts to consolidate peace and to build stability and began work.
On Sept. 28, peace was threatened when a group of soldiers killed over 100 people who had been staging a peaceful demonstration in the capital. At this writing, the participants in the May meeting are working intensively to avert further violence.
Much has already been learned about preventing political violence through the work in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea. As additional funds become available, BEFORE will engage in other countries and regions. As the organization grows, it will contribute to a reduction in political violence in the third world, where most wars have taken place in the last half-century. Ultimately, the developing knowledge about violence prevention will lead to continuing the already existing trend toward a less violent world.
More information about BEFORE is available at
www.BEFOREproject.org.
November, 2009
When as a young man, I read Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, I was impressed at how similar the motivations and actions of ancient leaders were to those of today. Apparently, man had learned almost nothing about how to refrain from participating in groups that engage in killing those in other groups. That has bothered me all my life.
With time and money available to devote to the task, in early 2001, I decided to try to contribute to solving that terrible problem. I now define my mission as follows:
My objective is to contribute to the prevention of the suffering and death associated with organized political violence. I intend to do this by collaborating with well-qualified professionals to:
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Promote, initiate, and fund effective collaborative actions to prevent political violence.
- Promote local leadership and control of these violence prevention activities.
- Fund local initiatives likely to prevent violence.
- Widely disseminate information on the results of our activities, both positive and negative, to add to man's knowledge of what is and is not effective in preventing violence in at-risk countries.
I am seeking to provide long-term continuity of this effort by enlisting others to participate in leading it and by arranging for my family to continue the funding for years after I am no longer able. I want to initiate and to fund useful activities that might not have taken place without my involvement.
As of 2009 year-end, the main elements of my activities to implement the mission include:
- Continuing to support BEFORE, the projects in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, and in additional places as funds become available.
- Supporting the development and dissemination of knowledge about how best to prevent wars in fragile states.
November, 2009
Professionals in the peace and security field generally agree that:
Violence prevention is much more cost-effective than trying to put the pieces back together after it has broken out.
To be effective, prevention requires an integrated, multi-faceted, multi-year program.
This rarely happens.
Various organizations working independently are often ineffective and sometimes work at cross-purposes.
One of the basic problems is that NGOs compete for funding and resist "being coordinated" with each other. As the source of funding, foundations and donor governments are in a position to promote more coherent and more effective violence prevention activities. Some specific actions they could take include:
Refuse to accept grant applications from any organization that does not have an explicit policy for cooperating with others.
Require that any grant application identify others doing work in the same area and describe how the applicant proposes to cooperate with them.
Encourage applications for multi-year proposals (subject to annual or semi-annual review).
Encourage joint applications by consortiums representing the spectrum of capabilities needed to get a job done.
Promote the formation of a group of grantees pledged to cooperate with others.
Collaborate with other donors to support long-term, multi-faceted projects needed to establish stability in unstable states.
Give preference to applications that include a clear, credible scenario according to which the proposed project will lead to a reduction of organized violence.
Support institutional initiatives such as the Packer/van der Stoel program to establish offices in five regional multinational organizations parallel to the OSCE office of High Commissioner on National Minorities.
Form an organization to find ways for donors to collaborate for greater effectiveness (or have PSFG do it).
November, 2009