1. The beginning of the National Struggle and its aims
Following the signing of the Mundros Truce Agreement the process of discharging and
disarming the Turkish Army began, in accordance with the conditions of the treaty.
The duration of the Truce can be considered as having been between 30 October 1918 and 15
May 1919. During this period, the French occupied the province of Adana, and the British
occupied Urfa, Marash, and Antep (later they would be transferred to the French). Italian
soldiers were present in Antalya and Konya, and British soldiers were in Merzifon and
Samsun. We no longer consider the provinces of Mussul and Syria, for they had been
relinquished before the treaty.
We have previously examined the situation in the eastern front when the treaty was
announced, and the new situation which arose following the treaty when the Turkish Army
retreated behind the borders of 1914.
When the Greeks occupied Izmir on IS May 1919, the period of the Armistice came to a de facto,
if not de jure, end.
Mustafa Kemal Pasha (the name Atatürk had not yet been adopted) landed in Samsun on 19
May 1919, and thus began the period which we call the National Struggle.
The aims of the National Struggle were announced to the world for the first time with the
resolutions adopted by the Sivas Congress on 11 September 1919. We quote below some
articles of this decision, which are of interest to our topic by virtue of their
historical importance:
1. The Ottoman Empire which is within the borders of October 30th, 1334 (1918], the date
when the truce between the Great Ottoman State and the Allied States was signed, and every
part of which has an overwhelming majority of Muslims, constitutes a whole, which will not
be divided for any reason. . .
2. It is necessary that National Independence is made effective, and the will of the
nation is made sovereign in order to ensure the integrity of the Ottoman community, the
independence of our nation, the protection of the sublime office, and the inviolability of
the Sultanate.
3. The principle of united defence and resistance to any interference and especially
invasion of any part of the Ottoman Empire, and to any movement directed especially to the
establishment of an autonomous Greece or Armenia within our country, as in the national
struggle along the fronts of Aydin, Manisa, and Balikesir, has been accepted as
legitimate.
4. Because all rights of the non-Muslim elements with whom we have been living for a long
time in the same country are entirely protected, these elements will not be given
privileges which infringe our political sovereignty and internal order.
Later, these principles were codified by a regulation during the last Ottoman Assembly
which met in Istanbul on 28 January 1920. Because of its historical importance, we quote
below the first article of this regulation, which is known in Turkish history as the
National Pact.
1. Because it will be necessary to determine the fate of the areas of the Ottoman State,
which are exclusively inhabited by an Arab majority, and which were occupied by the enemy
armies at the time of the conclusion of the truce dated 30 October 1918, through the votes
of the inhabitants of these areas, the area inhabited by the Ottoman Muslim majority,
within the aforementioned trucial border, united in religion and customs, saturated by
feelings of sacrifice and reciprocal respect towards one another, and entirely respectful
of their social rights and the conditions of their surroundings, is a whole which cannot
be separated for any reason.
After Istanbul had been occupied by the Allies on 16 March 1920, the Assembly dissolved,
and the deputies who had been arrested exiled to Malta, the Grand National Assembly which
opened on 23 April 1920 in Ankara elected Mustafa Kemal Pasha as its President at its
first session, and from that date onward the centre and nucleus of the National Struggle
was Ankara.
Let us hear from Atatürk himself about
the condition of the army within the borders of the truce when the National Struggle
began.
. . . . Mainly two army inspectorships had been established in Anatolia. As soon as this
truce became effective, the troops had been discharged, their weapons and ammunition had
been taken away from them, some cadres lacking combative value had been formed. The
situation of the troops belonging to the 2nd Army Inspectorship, whose base was in Konya,
was as follows:
The l2th Army Corps Headquarters were in Konya; one division (4lst division) was in Konya,
and one division (23rd division) was in Afyon Karahisar. The 57th division in Denizli of
the l7th Army Corps which surrendered in Izmir had been added to this Army Corps.
The 2nd Army Corps Headquarters were in Ankara, one of its divisions (24th division) was
in Ankara, one division (l1th division) was in Nigde; the 1st division which was in Izmir
had been added to the 25th Army Corps in Istanbul. The 10th Caucasus division
was in Istanbul.
The 6lst and the 56th divisions, which were in the vicinity of Balikesir and Bursa, formed
the l4th Army Corps, whose headquarters were in Bandirma, and which depended on Istanbul.
I was the Inspector of the 3rd Army Inspectorship. I had landed in Samsun with my
headquarters. I would have directly under my command two Army Corps. One of them was the
3rd Army Corps, whose base was in Sivas. . . the base of a division (5th
Caucasus division) belonging to this Army Corps was in Amasya, the base of the other
division (l5th division) was in Samsun. The other was the l5th Army Corps which was based
in Erzurum. . . . One of its divisions (9th division) was based in Erzurum, and the other
(3rd division) was based in Trabzon. Of the other two divisions of the Army Corps, the
l2th division was at the border near Hasankale, and the l2th division was in Beyazit.
The 14th Army Corps which had two divisions in the vicinity of Diyarbekir was independent.
It was attached to Istanbul. One of its divisions (2nd division) was in Siirt, and the
other (5th division) was in Mardin.
In his memoirs, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, the Commander of the l5th Army Corps, has stated
that this Army Corps, which would execute the operation in the east, totalled 17,860
soldiers.
The National Struggle began with these forces at hand. First the eastern front was
cleared, followed by the southern front. Subsequently the western front was cleared, the
enemy soldiers were driven out of the country, and the Struggle ended with the signing of
the Mudanya Truce on 11 October 1922.
The Struggle, which began on 19 May 1919, and whose aims were announced on 11 September
1919, lasted for 3 years, 4 months, and 22 days. We shall now examine these three fronts
in turn.
2. The eastern front
In my opinion the person who best knew the eastern front operation in Turkey was the late
Kazim Karabekir Pasha, who led this operation from the first day to the last as a
responsible commander. Because of this, the best way to explain this subject would be
through quotations from his book entitled Our War of Independence. The documents
which would leave no doubt in one's mind would be the orders of the front. (We do not
refer to communiques, but rather to orders given to the units.)
Colonel A. Rawlinson, of the British Army, had been charged with supervising the
implementation of the truce conditions in the eastern front. We shall also quote from
Rawlinson, who later published an account of his activities in the region.
After the truce had been signed, Kazim Karabekir Pasha went to Istanbul. For some reason
it was decided that he should return to lead his Army Corps, and he left Istanbul on 12
April 1919, arriving in Erzurum on 3 May, to resume his duty. On the day he arrived,
Rushtu Bey, the Commander of the 9th division, who assisted him, showed him an order sent
by Rawlinson. In this order it was stated that Lieutenant-Colonel Halit Bey, the Commander
of the 3rd division was to be arrested and sent to Trabzon, because he had retaliated
against the Georgians.
The first meeting between Karabekir Pasha and Rawlinson was interesting. We quote from p.
23 of his book. This meeting is significant in that it shows just how limited, in
practice, was the power of an army corps commander in the east during the period of the
truce.
Today Rawlinson, the British colonel, came to visit me. A summary of our discussion is as
follows: I asked him what his duty was. He said that it was to supervise the
implementation of the treaty conditions in the East. I asked why in that case he had
written as if he was giving orders to the divisions and the Army Corps. We were speaking
in French. He said that such situations would not recur from now on. Communicating through
an interpreter was creating misunderstandings. I said, from now on you will tell me your
wishes, but any decision will be implemented absolutely by an order from the Ministry of
War. Your note stating that if Halit Bey, the Commander of the 3rd Army Corps, is not
arrested, the Assistant to the Army Corps, Rushtu Bey, would go, created very negative
reactions among the people. I only arrived yesterday, and many people and officials came
to see me. I stated, if the situation is out of control on the first day, we both can be
in danger. Rawlinson reftected for a while, and thought that my statements were
reasonable. He said that from now on he would act more politely. I said "Mr
Lieutenant-Colonel, if you wish, let me send an officer to accompany you. However, we do
not have someone who speaks English. I will find someone who speaks French. Rawlinson was
very pleased. (I sent an officer who also spoke English, with the instruction that he did
not disclose that he spoke English, and I benefited a great deal from this. I would have
been informed much earlier of the conversations and correspondence in his office.)
The next day he acted very sincerely when I returned his visit. He brought the
conversation to the Bolsheviks. He stated that the situation was a difficult one because
their administration was now in order. I mentioned that there was no reason to be
concerned about the Caucasus, because the Cossacks supported the Czar. He said,
unfortunately they, too, have changed. When I stated that the opposition would take care
of the situation with a strong army, he said impossible, impossible, it is impossible to
summon new forces, besides, the Bolsheviks have many armies, the thing to do is to prevent
Bolshevism spreading to other countries, they are sending their propagandists everywhere.
Today, Rawlinson did not mention Halit Bey or the arms. I felt that he was trying to push
me to take action, claiming that the Bolsheviks were in the Caucasus, when I was making
plans so as not to hand over a Commander or arms.
Rawlinson and Karabekir Pasha met again on 29 June 1919. We shall also quote this meeting
(pp. 62-3):
June 29th was the Ramazan holiday. Rawlinson, a Russian lieutenant-colonel from the
Denikin Army, and an American lieutenant (he was one of the councillors of Admiral Bristol
in Istanbul) came to visit me. It is apparent that the Russian lieutenant-colonel is
searching for the materials of Russian armies, but emotionally he is very weak. When I
returned the visit, the American was in Rawlinson's room. At one time, Rawlinson, as a
joke, touched slightly the American's side pocket, and said: `The concern of Americans is
to fill their pockets with dollars.' The American replied somewhat seriously: `And the
concern of the British is to swallow the entire world, what are you doing here?' Rawlinson
became angry, he stopped talking French, and said something in English. And the American
replied. Their attitude made me think that Rawlinson said `You have acted improperly,' and
that the American replied: `You acted improperly in the first place.'
I also invited the foreigners to the Gymnastics Day at the Kars Gate on June 30th. The
cheerfulness and agility of all Erzurumites filled our hearts. The foreigners watched with
awe. After a white, the Airierican requested permission to leave, stating `I will go
tomorrow'. He was followed by Rawlinson who did not leave the American alone. We were
alone with the Russian officers. The Russian colonel approached me. He stated that the
Bolsheviks had also successfully occupied Lengeran (to the south of Baku on the shores of
the Caspian Sea), and that it was true that Enver had arrived at Kerus. He seemed quite
sincere. I realised this truth: the American and Russian officers were not pleased with
the sovereignity of the British, especially in the East, and described the general
situation to us in glowing terms. From this point I probed the Russian officer's thoughts
and I told him: `It is of no importance to us whether the Bolsheviks have come or not,
whether Enver has come or not. The nation has made its decision. Turkey shall live
independently. These areas, too, belong to the Turks. No one else may reside here.' The
eyes of the Russian colonel sparkled. His speech became more agitated. He aid: `What are
these British doing here? Our governments are responsible for the mistakes. The sincere
agreements between the Russians and the Turks should not have allowed these misfortunes to
happen. At least from now on, this must be ensured and these men must be driven away. The
British are very much afraid of the Bolsheviks, and they are gathering their soldiers from
everywhere to Iran.'
The Russian officers have made statements here and there against the British. Rawlinson
was informed, the men could not stay for more than one or two days, they went outside the
borders. A few days later, when Rawlinson mentioned this, he grumbled and said, `Are these
rascals also Bolsheviks? I brought them in order that they might do a useful job; that
they find ammunition for the Denikin Army, but they are doing other things. The officers
of the Denikin Army are only for show, they are not an army but a herd, the Bolsheviks are
better then they are.' It was stated in the information which arrived from the Beyazit
Commander on June 30th, that because the Armenians had occupied the area of Nahjivan, and
they wanted the Muslims to hand over their arms, the people had sent men asking what we
can do. I had protested to Rawlinson. He had stated that there were no British troops left
in the Caucasus, and that there was nothing he could do. I wrote the following coded order
to the 11th division command in Van in Beyazit, to which he belonged:
'The atrocities which the Armenians have begun in the area of Nahjivan are the result of
their enraged actions, as they realise these are their last days. Consequently, they will
gain time if the intelligent people of Nahjivan mediate and suggest to those Armenians who
are reasonable, the point of view regarding the reconciliation of the Armenians and the
forces which have come to Shush and Kerusi, and which includes Armenians. This would be
very beneficial. However, the principle of any agreement should be not to hand over arms,
and not to relinquish strong positions. This has been written to the Commanders of the
l1th division and Beyazit. July 1,1335, Kazim Karabekir.'
The American to whom Kazim Karabekir referred was Robert Dunn. He too, has written his
memoirs. The passage concerning the above-mentioned conversation is on p. 311 of his book.
It is useful to record a conversation which took place before these two individuals
arrived at Erzurum. Robert Dunn gives the account of this conversation on p. 309 of his
book:
. . . Next I was drinking Scotch with British `I' officers in Erzurum, in what had been an
American mission school for girls. Now it housed Colonel Toby Rawlinson from
Donsterville's hush-hush army. They put me up and I heard, in Oxford English, more stories
of Armenians murdering Turks when the czarist troops fled north. My hosts told me of their
duty here: to keep tab on brigands, Turkish troop shifts, hidden arms, spies - Christian,
Red or Tartar - coming in from Transcaucasus. Then they spoke of the hell that would break
loose if Versailles were to put, as threatened, the six `Armenian' vilayets of Turkey
under the control of Erevan.
`We sit on the edge of a volcano, Dunn,' said Rawlinson.
`So you want us to take a mandate over it all,' I said, `as buffer to your Iraq.'
`America'd never be so mad. I've been in America. Your people are too damned
level-headed.'
`If the President's behind it-
`An Armenia without Armenians! Turks under Christian rule?' His lips smacked in irony
under the droopy red moustache. `That's bloodshed - just Smyrna over again on a bigger
scale. If you touch that business you're bigger fools than I've ever taken you for.'
There are many interesting passages in Dunn's book about the atrocities committed in the
east by the Armenians. We shall not mention them, remaining loyal to the principle we have
started at the beginning of our book.
On 3 June, Karabekir wrote as follows (p. 66):
Today the Information Department of the General Staff reported the following summary of
the Istanbul newspapers: an Armenian delegation of twelve members has returned to our city
from the Caucasus where they examined the Armenian demands and assertions. The said
delegation will submit to the Peace Conference the report it has prepared based on
documents whose rejection is unacceptable.
Summary of the report:
1. Because there is no Armenian population left, it is impossible that an important and
extensive Government, as conceived by the Armenians, be formed.
2. The lack of money in Armenia is perceptible in that proportion. If there is no
financial aid, the Government will not be able to survive for long.
The information we have received from Armenia is the following:
`On July 5th and 6th , the Armenians attacked the town of Büyük
Vadi (a large Turkish village) in the vicinity of Erivan, but retreated when they were
defeated. It seems there were 800 dead and 1,200 wounded. The Turks seized much, including
two cannons and six machine guns. A secret order given by the general charged with the
operation was also obtained. It states that the Muslims will be destroyed and thrown into
the Aras river. The Commander of the force which attacked was General Mayor Sholkonikof,
who signed the order.'
Following the incident, two British officers came from Erivan. They stated that they would
reconcile the Armenians and the Muslims, and that the cannons belonged to the British.
They took the cannons and left. The Muslims tater realised that these officers were two
Armenians wearing British uniforms. The Armenians obtained reinforcements and again
surrounded the town. This shows that despite the fact that Armenia, which has no money or
population left, and has occupied the three provinces with the guidance of the British, is
uncontrollably ambitious. The Armenians who are very much covered with the support of
America, England, and France, became almost intoxicated with their own dream of conquering
Sivas. It seems that the Armenians who have previously occupied our three provinces with
the same trick wish to shake hands in Kizilirmak with the Greeks who have occupied Izmir,
and that they dream of making the Kizilirmak flow red with Turkish blood. It seems that
the Armenians and Greeks have sworn and are swearing in churches that they will drown the
Turk. It seems that the civilised world will celebrate this red day.
The record for 8 July (p. 71):
On 8 July we received some information about the Armenians. Apparently they have begun to
pillage and massacre the Muslim villages all along the border. Tonight Rawlinson was in
Hasankale. The information was documented. Without any doubt, these attacks by the
Armenians occurred with the order of the British. I told him on the telephone that he
should immediately go to Sarikamish and see the situation for himself. I wrote to him as
follows:
`To His Excellency Rawlinson, the British Representative,
1. Those individuals who have escaped in order to save their lives, have reported that the
Armenians have begun to destroy by massacres the Muslim inhabitants of Kaghizman and its
vicinity.
2. The Armenians have attacked Kurudere, have killed 5 men and 3 women, and have taken
along 33 men,1 bride,1 girl, and 440 head of cattle.
3. It is known that on July 4th, they attacked four villages under the jurisdiction of
Akchakale between Kars and Oltu, and have killed all the inhabitants of one, and have
taken 60 men from each other village, and butchered them. The Armenians who attacked these
villages made use of five cannons, and seven machine guns. The Commander of this force was
someone named Arshak.
4. In the village of Yüzkush, the Armenians abducted the sister, wife, and daughter of a
Muslim.
5. The Armenians are continuing to massacre Muslims in the vicinity of
Karakut. I request that this distressing
situation, which is occurring outside the border, and which is creating deep effects on
the people in general, be stopped, that the responsible ones be punished, and that we are
enlightened on this matter. Respectfully, Kazim Karabekir.'
On 26 July, Kazim Karabekir received the following telegram from Rawlinson (p. 85):
To the Commander of the 15th Army Corps.
You are not doing your best. The train is held in Sarikamish guarded by gendarmerie. The
field train came to the border with the British guard officers. Your gendarmerie does not
allow the passage of the train so it can pick up the cannon parts. The Commander in Ziyon
does not assign soldiers to transfer the cannon parts through quarters where the road has
been destroyed. Recently the individuals at hand have proved insufficient to clear the
road. For this reason, if there is no other prompt means by which they may be transferred,
it is my duty to inform the High Commission in Istanbul that the transfer of spare cannon
parts they requested is being intentionally delayed by you.
Karabekir Pasha writes as follows concerning this telegram: `The Armenians are firing guns
at the border. They are screaming "to Sivas". At a time when everywhere there
are attacks on my area, any person other than Rawlinson would realise the foolishness of
his acts.'
On 27 July the Ministry of War in Istanbul requested information about the situation. The
following correspondence took place (p. 94):
To the office of the Acting Inspector of the 3rd Army.
The General Gendarmerie Command informs us, basing on the communication of the Erzurum
Gendarmerie Regiment Commander, that the Armenians in Sarikamish are gathering large
forces, weapons, and ammunition, that they will attack with this force from the direction
of Chakirbaba-Soghanli, and that they are destroying the Muslims in the area of Kars by
seizing and arresting them. I request that I be informed of the situation.
To the Ministry of War.
The Armenians are inflicting all sorts of cruelties on the Muslims in the Caucasus, and
are sending forces to quarters which resist them. To achieve this aim, they are sending
forces to the areas of Nahjivan, Sherur, and the vicinity of Kaghizman and Oltu, and are
constantly following the policy of destroying Muslims. We have been informed that recently
approximately five hundred cavalrymen and infantrymen and four cannons have arrived in
Sarikamish, as part of the reinforcement troops of the Armenians, that the Armenians are
requisitioning from the inhabitants of Sarikamish and its western district military taxes
together with carts and vehicles; and it was not assumed that they will engage in any
operations against the Muslims in the direction of Oltu. The rumours spread by the
Armenians that they will occupy the six provinces and that they will soon go to Sivas, and
their activities and operations near the border, are having adverse effects on the people
who are uninformed of the general situation and the political conditions, and are
spreading all sorts of rumour and increasing existing fears. As long as we possess the
arms which we have today, we are in a secure position against any attacks of the
Armenians. Kazim Karabekir.
There are successive reports about the attacks made by the Armenian bands in the three
provinces outside the truce borders. It is of course impossible to record every one of
them. During this time, Kazim Karabekir Pasha was making preparations against any possible
attack against the Truce border. He gives an account of the situation on 23 September (p.
284):
I was ready with my four divisions against an attack from any direction. One division (3)
was aligned against the Pontic Greeks along the shore in the vicinity of Trabzon; two
divisions (9 and 12) were against the Armenians in the valley of Pasinler, and ready
against all sides; another division (11) was against the Armenians in the area of
Van-Beyazit-Karaköse. My main plan was to attack the Armenians, in the event of the
beginning of an attack, and thus eliminate the danger. I am spreading the rumour that my
forces have a hundred thousand bayonets. The foreigners who come and go, the British
officials, and even Rawlinson believed that I could gather such a force and that the
people had this quantity of arms in their possession.
On 24 September the delegation of General Harbord came to Erzurum. On 25 September,
Karabekir Pasha submitted a report to Harbord about the situation. The following passage
concerns the Armenians (p.292-304):
The weapons of the army which we had demobilised in Batum were placed in warehouses in
Batum, guarded by officers and soldiers. These weapons have all been taken and given to
the Armenians, the Greeks, and the Russians. They have confiscated the gasoline, kerosene
and fuel oil we had purchased from the Government of Azerbaidjan in Batum, and they have
seized the provisions and the railway cars brought by our troops. . . . After the Ottoman
soldiers had retreated from the areas of Kars, Ardahan, and Kaghizman on January 1,1335
[1919), following the truce, the Muslims, who constituted the great majority of this
region, formed a national council in Kars. They began to administer the area. The council
administered the said region and maintained public security and order in a praiseworthy
way. During the administration of the council no incidents occurred. Peace and order were
excellent. When the Ottoman soldiers had retreated, British soldiers arrived in Kars. The
British representative accepted and approved the council and was pleased with the
administration of the council. The council's efficiency in maintaining public order was
appreciated.
However, after a short period of time, the British occupied the Council in April 1335 with
the troops they had brought, and exiled or arrested some of its members. They took control
of the administration and one night they brought Armenian soldiers from Gumru to Kars
without the knowledge of the Muslims. They increased the Armenian forces with the
influence of the British, and handed power over to the Armenians. After the Armenians had
settled in this manner in all parts of the region with the support of the British, they
began to destroy the Muslims and thus were in a majority. They began to inflict much
cruelty and oppression. For this reason tranquillity and order in the area disappeared.
Every day, the blood of hundreds and thousands of Muslims was shed. The support and
protection of the British spoiled the Armenians, and increased the cruelties of the
Armenians against the Muslims. The Armenians obtained Sarikamish, Kaghizman, and Ardahan
from the British. They settled in this region with the support of the British. On
September 5th 1335, a British officer, accompanied by Ahmet Bey, a member of the Kars
National Council, and two Armenian officers, as well as eight Armenian gendarmes, visited
Eyyup Pasha, the leader of a tribe in the vicinity of Bardiz, offered him the opportunity
to surrender to the Armenians and threatened that they would be punished severely, because
working against the British Government was a serious crime. Although they made suggestions
that they submit to the Armenians, they did not say anything as they listened to the
atrocities inflicted by the Armenians. As the Armenians attacked on July 5,1335 several
Muslim villages near Karakurt and engaged in massacres, the Muslims united and put up
resistance. On July 7,1335, a British officer came and ordered that cannon shots be fired
on the Muslims (it is possible that this man was an Armenian officer wearing a British
uniform). The British representative in Erzurum, Rawlinson, on the basis of the
information he received on July 4,1335 from the Kars representative, that 40,000 Muslim
refugees had gathered in the area, and that it was possible for an incident to occur,
stated that he was going to go to the area to examine the situation. And he went. As a
result, he confirmed that the Armenians had committed atrocities and massacres against the
Muslims in Kars, Sarikamish, and Kaghizman. On June 5,1335, a British lieutenant came from
Ighdir to Beyazit, accompanied by an Armenian interpreter, and met with the governor of
Beyazit. They communicated that the area of Beyazit was given to the Armenian Government
which was formed under the protection of the British Government, they notified that the
Conference possessed this communication, that they would be bringing 15,000 Armenians,
protected by Armenian soldiers, within one month. On the same day they left for Baku and
Iran. The British representative Rawlinson has confessed that this officer wearing a
British uniform was in fact an Armenian, and that this offer had no real basis.
Confirmation of these passages we have quoted from Karabekir Pasha's report may be found
on pp.198-216 of Rawlinson's book.
On 22 October news was received that the Armenians were preparing to occupy Oltu, and
correspondence was found concerning Armenian preparations to unite with the tribes of the
region. An Armenian named Hatchador Agha had sent letters to various tribal leaders, Hamit
Bey, Ali Merze Bey, Ahmet Hasan Bey, and Yusuf Bey (pp. 344-5).
The following message sent by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Karabekir Pasha on 22 January 1336
(1920) is important, as it concerns the Malta exiles (p. 426):
Should the British in Istanbul continue to fail to observe the truce, and arrest some
persons among the ministers and deputies, particularly Rauf Bey, in retaliation, the
British officers present in Anatolia will be arrested. Consequently, I request that
measures be adopted to prevent the escape of Rawlinson in Erzurum. Mustafa Kemal.
Istanbul was occupied on 16 March. At that time Rawlinson was in Erzurum. We give below
the texts of the order sent by Karabekir Pasha to the Commandant of the Erzurum Fortress,
and the message he received from Rawlinson (p. 502):
To the Commandant of the Fortress.
It is possible that the people of Erzurum will become agitated and mistreat Rawlinson, the
British representative here, because of events such as the seizure of the Istanbul
Government by the British, and their arresting various persons. Consequently it is
necessary that the residence of the aforementioned man be protected by soldiers and an
officer, that the weapons and arms in his possession and in the possession of his staff
are taken and placed temporarily in a suitable place, and that the attention of the said
man is called to the fact that this procedure has the aim of protecting his life and
honour. Kazim Karabekir.
My Pasha: I express to you my deepest regrets as I have been informed by you of the
events. At the same time, my staff and I are at your orders. I regard it as a duty to
present my gratitude in the face of your courtesy and your gracious and well thought
treatment you have considered in the presence of this sinister situation. I request the
acceptance of my feelings, my Pasha. Rawlinson.
Rawlinson was freed in exchange for the Malta exiles.
The occupation of Istanbul, and the fact that the Assembly was closed, and the deputies
were arrested, necessitated a different strategy. On 16 March, Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent
the following telegram to Karabekir Pasha (p. 505): `We request, Sir, that we be informed
about the time and place of the implementation of the idea which has been discussed for a
long time concerning an attack in the East. In the name of the Representative Delegation,
Mustafa Kemal.'
On 16 March, Kazim Karabekir Pasha replied to the telegram (p. 505):
The situation in Istanbul and the form the Government will take have not been entirely
determined. The Bolshevik armies did not arrive in the Caucasus mountains, and no
communication has arrived from any front. The Bolsheviks will not be able to bring their
fleet into the Caspian Sea via the Volga river before the end of April, and will not be
able to begin any operations before that time. Because there is much snow within my area,
and especially between Erzurum and Sarikamish, the realization of the serious operation
will be quite difficult at the beginning and even before the middle of April. Kazim
Karabekir.
Kazim Karabekir Pasha wrote on 22 March (p. 523):
With the occupation of Istanbul, the Armenians have increased their audacity. In the days
preceding the occupation, the British were engaged in a world-wide propaganda effort
claiming `the Armenians are being massacred everywhere'. Taking this as a good pretext,
massacres of the Muslims began. I thought it was necessary that I write an official
protest to the military commander of the Armenian Republic, and that the Representative
Delegation send a letter of protest to the civilised states. I sent their texts to the
Representative Delegation. It was considered appropriate and it was done. The letter I
wrote to the Armenians:
`The atrocities and massacres which have been committed for a long time against the Muslim
population within the Armenian Republic have been confirmed with very accurate
information, and the observations made by Rawlinson, the British representative in
Erzurum, have confirmed that these atrocities are being committed by the Armenians. The
United States delegation of General Harbord has seen the thousands of refugees who came to
take refuge with us, hungry and miserable, their children and wives, their properties
destroyed, and the delegation was a witness to the cruelties. Many Muslim villages have
been destroyed by the soldiers of Armenian troops armed with cannons and machine guns
before the eyes of our troops and the people. When it was hoped that this operation would
end, unfortunately since the beginning of February 1336 (1920) the cruelties inflicted on
the Muslim population of the region of Shuraghel, Akpazar, Zarshad, and Childir have
increased. According to documented information, 28 Muslim villages have been destroyed in
the aforementioned region, more than 2,000 people have been killed, many possessions and
livestock have been seized, young Muslim women have been taken to Kars and Gumru, hundreds
of women and children who were able to flee their villages were beaten and killed in the
mountains, and this aggression against the properties, lives, chastity and honour of the
Muslims is still continuing. . . . It is the responsibility of the Armenian Government
that the cruelties and massacres be stopped in order to alleviate the tensions of Muslim
public opinion due to the atrocities committed by the Armenians, that the possessions
taken from the Muslims be returned and that indemnities be paid, that the properties,
lives, and honour of the Muslims be protected. At a time when we were most threatened and
weak, our Government and nation provided the Armenian nation, like all nations, with the
right to exist, and with administrative freedom and self-determination. As you will
remember the justice and compassion I showed to the existence of your nation when I was
there with my troops during the operation which followed the recovery of Erzurum two years
ago, I hope that this expession of my good faith will be received with sincerity. I
present my respects. Kazim Karabekir.
On 28 March Kazim Karabekir Pasha sent the following telegram to Mustafa Kemal Pasha (p.
549):
1. The information is documented. The Armenians, who were very much confused during the
recent victories which put an end to the survival of the Denikin Army in the Caucasus,
have engaged in surprise attarks against the Muslims in the areas of Ordubad, Nahjivan,
and Vedibasar since March l9th. These Armenian attacks have been repelled in these three
Muslim areas, determined to defend their rights and honour with much courage and
sacrifice, and the Armenians suffered many casualties. The Muslims in the area of
Vedibasar have defeated the enemy of superior strength who attempted to attack them
without any reason, and took as war booty four machine guns and other weapons. Later, they
followed the defeated Armenians up to the mountain 7-8 km. to the east of the city of
Revan, which is the capital of Armenia, and approached the barbed wire on this mountain
which the Armenians have fortified to protect Revan. The Muslim forces which demonstrated
their determination as they stayed one night on this mountain and cut the barbed wire with
daggers and knives, returned victorious to their area. Kazim Karabekir.
Karabekir Pasha had prepared the operation plan on 26 April. He wrote (p. 624):
My plans against the Armenians. Because the weather was favourable I began to have the
troops approach the border since April 26th. It is now possible to begin the operation
against the Armenians in two weeks, that is in May. The weather and the terrain are
propitious. Only there is a small British force in the area of Batum. But they lack
mobility. Because the Georgians are in contact with the Bolsheviks, it is clear that they
will be neutral in an operation we mount against the Armenians, if we do not attack them.
If Greek troops land on our shores, and join the local Greek population of Trabzon which
is already inflamed, they will suffer great material and moral damage. However, it cannot
be expected that the Greeks who are engaged in occupations here and there in the west will
be able to send significant forces to our eastern shores. But it is possible that
detachments belonging to any one of several states will land on Trabzon when the Armenian
operation has begun, in order to exert pressure and to have an effect on the morale of the
army and the people. For this reason, I will evacuate our shores so as not to encourage
them. Should our operation continue within Armenia, if I see any activities against us by
the Georgian Army, the Bolsheviks having freed the Georgians, I will have the area of Oltu
occupied by the 3rd Regiment, which is the strongest, and its two artillery batteries, and
leave for the present the two regiments of the 3rd Detachment which is based in Trabzon,
on the shores. I will gather the 9th and l2th divisions in the area of Horasan-Hortum, the
border against the area of Sarikamish, I will also gather the regiments of the Army Corps,
the Battery, and Cavalry and the regiments of several tribes in this area, and execute the
operation with them. In the right wing I will gather the llth division, which is based in
Van, in the area of Beyazit. One detachment of this division will reinforce the local
Turkish forces (the detachment of Captain Halil Bey) in the area of Shahtahti-Nahjivan and
will threaten the direction of Erevan, and will draw some Armenian forces on themselves. I
will gather another detachment which forms the nucleus of the tribal regiments in
Karaköse. I will gather the tribal regiments of the areas of Beyazit-Karaköse and the
south in Beyazit and Karaköse according to their distance. I will occupy the region up to
Aras with the 11th division, and I will also threaten the direction of Erevan,
and surprise the Armenians while engaged in fighting the Kars stronghold. This is a
summary of my plan according to the most recent situation. With the occupation of Kars, we
will recover the area up to our'93 [1878) border. The rest will be continued according to
the condition of the Bolsheviks and the Georgians. I think that we will be engaged in
three important battles, in the mountains of Soghanli, the line of Yeni Selim, and Kars,
based on our experience of the past year and the nature of the terrain. Despite the fact
that among these, Kars is the most important, because its barbed wire and fortifications
are numerous and quite strong, I have great hopes that we wilt take Kars with manoeuvres
against the Armenian army which we will weaken before then. To attack the Kars fortress
would be the greatest error. As we have many mobile tribal regiments, I am convinced that
we can destroy the Armenians by surprising them, by attacking between Kars and Armenia,
and having my entire forces attack from east and north-east of Kars. Of course what will
determine the final outcome of the Kars battle will be the Armenians' activities. The
battle of Kars will constitute the second stage of the Armenian war, and its last stage
will be the battle to the east of Gumru. This is the stage shown by my experience of the
past year.
Karabekir Pasha, in the telegram he sent on the same day, 26 April, to Mustafa Kemal,
stated this situation and requested instructions:
The concentration of the Army Corps has begun. It is expected that it will be completed in
two weeks. Our food supplies will not enable us to stay longer after the completion of the
concentration. . . . I request permission again that military instructions be sent
immediately. If it is considered inconvenient for the decision to be made by the National
Assembly at such short notice, or if the National Assembly is unable at this time to take
such a decision, I request that we have freedom of operation in order not to lose this
last opportunity.
On 28 April he received the following answer (p. 627):
The message dated April 26, 1336 has been received. The copy of the instructions you have
requested has been presented on April 26, 1336 after modification. We request that the
situation be maintained. It is certain, Sir, that in any case the decision about the
border operation will be communicated from here. M. Kemal.
The reason why the order to begin the operation was not given is found in this telegram to
Karabekir Pasha, dated 10 May:
1. The point of view of the National Assembly is that a military operation outside the
borders must not begin before contact has been made with the Bolsheviks and before a
concrete agreement has been reached. For this reason, as this been communicated before, it
is necessary that the operation is postponed until an agreement.
2. Bekir Sami Bey and Yusuf Kemal Bey will leave Ankara tomorrow in the direction of
Erzurum. I request that the soldiers who will join them there are summoned. The president
of the Grand National Assembly. Mustafa Kemal.
The opinions of the Army Corps Intelligence and Karabekir Pasha were stated in the
circular sent to the units on 26 May (p.750):
1. Wounded Georgian soldiers are constantly arriving at Poti. Bolshevik activities have
considerably increased in the areas of Poti, Sohumkale, and Camciri. The Greeks are
continuing to escape in motor boats.
2. An Armenian detachment formed of infantrymen, cannons, and machine guns, which wanted 3
million manat (local money) and 200 horses from the village of Chakmak to the north west
of Kars, has demolished the village, and has pillaged the properties and possessions of
the inhabitants.
3. The Armenians demanded ninety thousand manat as ransom from twenty-seven Muslim
villages in total in the region of Yukari Kotanli, A?agi Kotanli, Kemerli, Tuzluca,
Bocuklu, Subhanazat, Kars Ighdyr, Cavlak, Pasli, Karacayir, and said that if they did not
give in, they would meet the same fate as the village of Chakmak.
4. The Muslims who are being oppressed by the cruelties of the Armenians are they began to
invade the are constantly asking our border commanders with the Malakan villages for help.
Finally,0n 20 September They tell of the attacks and atrocities of the Armenians which
have increased begin the operation. He in considerably in recent times, and plead that
their lives and honour be protected. It
September 1920 that the ope has been
confirmed that they are making preparations to murder all the Muslims outside the border,
and to pillage their properties. Kazim Karabekir.
After this date extensive correspondence took place concerning thebeginning of the
operation. It appears that Ankara did not consider it suitable to invade the borders of
Brest-Litovsk again before making contact with the Russians. With this aim, the delegation
of Bekir Sami Bey when to Moscow.
Finally, on 6 June, the following instructions for Karabekir Pasha arrived from Ankara
(p.727):
The suggestion dated June 4,1336 of the Commander of the 15th Army Corps concerning the
advance of the troops to invade the Soghanli passes in order to improve our defensive
position, has been examined and approved by the Council of Ministers. Because the right to
occupy the three provinces has been given by the Grand National Assembly to the Executive
Committee, the Council of Ministers has decided that the suggestion be implemented, based
on this authority. The necessary documents for the administration and announcement of the
political aspect of the decision will be communicated to your Excellency. It is requested
that until then no political attempt be made, and that we are informed as to when this
operation may begin. Mustafa Kemal.
The following is Karabekir Pasha's reply dated 7 June (p. 728):
I gave the order to mobilise the 305th through the 316th detachments of conscripts in
order to double the forces available for the military operation. This mobilisation will
not affect all areas of the Army Corps, and is restricted to the areas of the provinces of
Erzurum, Van, and the sub-district of Erzincan. On June l2th the rest of the headquarters
will be transferred to the hills of Horum. I am having explorations made. It is requested
that the operation begin according to the situation, not before the l6th of June. Kazim
Karabekir.
As Karabekir Pasha was about to begin the operation, the operation was postponed by
instructions that he received on the night of 22 June.
On 27 June, the Armenians attacked Tuzca near Oltu, but retreated because these areas were
held by troops. On 30 June the Armenians fired cannons at Oltu. On 1 July there was an
Armenian attack in the region of Bardiz; eight private soldiers died. On 8 July the
Armenians organised two attacks on Dughun Tepe.
The Armenians developed their operations in the region of Nahjivan. On 22 and 23 July they
attacked the area of Kaghizman, and on 9 September they began to invade the area of Kulp.
Finally, on 20 September 1920 Karabekir Pasha was given permission to begin the operation.
He instructed the troops with an order dated 26 September 1920 that the operation would
begin on 28 September 1920 at 3 a.m.
The matters we have recorded here in detail, which can be considered as unnecessary, were
aimed at emphasising one point: the Armenians often spread rumours that the Turks had in
fact attacked them in the east throughout the two-year period from the time the truce was
signed until 28 September 1920, when the actual offensive began. We can find a typical
example of this in the French Archives. Aharonian, who went to Paris for the Peace
Conference, stated in a letter dated 11 September 1919 which he sent to Clemenceau, the
French Prime Minister, that:
The regular troops of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, the Turco-Tartar bands and the Kurdish hordes
have begun to surround the Armenian Republic.
Our troops were forced to abandon the province of Nahjivan, after a fierce battle, because
of a lack of ammunition, and retreat before the enemy forces which are numerically far
superior.
Two divisions of Mustapha Kemal Pasha are attacking Sarikamish and Kaghizman. . . .
In the presence of the advancing Turkish troops, the Armenian population of the Kars area
and the Armenian refugees are escaping towards Erevan.
The occupation of this district by the Turks is imminent.
The letter ended with a request for intervention.
How can one reply to such a flagrant lie?
As can be seen, Karabekir Pasha did not find it appropriate to engage in an operation
before the middle of April 1920, and waited until 28 September because he did not receive
the order before then, and the Turkish soldiers did not attack the truce border. On the
other hand, the Armenians created many sad incidents on the other side of the border.
We can now summarise developments after the beginning of the operation.
On the morning of 29 September, Sarikamish was recovered; in the evening Chalak, Divrik
and the Bezirgan Pass were recovered. Merdinik was taken on 30 September. On 1 October
Kaghizman was taken.
On 13 October the Armenians began their counter-offensive. They were driven away. Bashkaya
and the outer localities were taken.
On 24 October, Karabekir Pasha announced the order to attack Kars. On 27 October the
offensive began. The hills of Yahniler and the hill of Vezirköy-Üçler were taken. On 30
October, the day when the offensive against the Kars fortress was begun, the fortress and
the city were recovered. Karabekir Pasha recorded the number of individuals who were
captured on that day (p. 841):
The number of prisoners who were gathered in the station in my headquarters until the
evening included: 3 generals, 6 colonels, 12 majors, 16 captains, 59 lieutenants, 16
civilian officials, 12 officers, 4 cadets. The number of captured soldiers was 1,150. The
number of confirmed Armenian casualties was 1,100. There were 337 cannons, 339 cannons
which needed repair, an abundant number of machine guns, all kinds of bullets and other
war equipment, projectors, etc. Among the prisoners were Vekilof, the President of the
General Staff, Aratof, the Minister of War, Primof, the commander of the Kars fortress,
and a civilian minister.
The offensive I organised, using counter
front strategy, gave us a great victory, and resulted in the defeat of an important part
of the enemy army, and in return for taking a modern fortress we had few casualties: 9
dead and 47 wounded.
In my order to attack Kars, I had stated
that `The aim of the offensive operation is to destroy the Armenian army within Kars and
by pursuing them after Kars.' As a matter of fact, my soldiers had showed that the Turkish
Army was far superior in force to the most civilised armies, and more humane. Despite the
fact that they attacked like lions such a modern fortress as Kars, they did not commit
even the smallest cruelty against the Armenian inhabitants. This was witnessed also by the
American delegation there and stated in the telegram they sent to Admiral Bristol on 31
October: `All the Americans in Kars are well and the Turkish Army gives us excellent
protection and all consideration. We have permission as before to continue our
organisation. The Turkish soldiers are well disciplined and there have been no massacres.
Edward Fox, District Commander, Near East Relief. Kars.'
On 3 November the Gumru operation was
begun. On 6 November the Armenians requested a truce. They were notified that their
request would be accepted if they relinquished Gumru. On 7 November Gumru surrendered. On
8 November the terms of truce were communicated from Ankara to Karabekir Pasha, as
follows:
1. The delimitation of the
Turkish-Armenian border will be a simple matter of statistics and general vote. All
inhabitants of the disputed areas will be invited to determine their own political destiny
according to the principles announced by the Bolsheviks and by President Wilson, which
stipulated that nations should determine their own destiny. This population will vote in
full freedom for their right to form an independent government or to be subject to one
government. We agree that the gendarmes of various governments shall be employed until the
completion of the voting in disputed areas in order to ensure that the votes are given in
absolute freedom. Of course the collection of the votes must be done as soon as possible.
The Ankara Government is convinced that this solution is just, that it is in the interests
of humanity and consequently conforms to the interests of the Turkish and Armenian groups
and of the people who reside in the disputed areas.
Unfortunately we are afraid that the
Erevan Government refuses this solution in order to present a good image to the Western
imperialist and especially to England. This situation will be in contradiction to the
political principle applied by their western protectors to the people of Asia and Africa.
2. Turkey engages itself to take all
steps within its power in order to provide the secure development and the complete
independence of its neighbouring community. Within our powers, we shall help Armenia and
the establishment of the economy of that country.
3. The Governments of both sides agree
that they will not prevent the passage in absolute freedom of persons and possessions
belonging to the other side, using their roads, and will in no way prevent transfer
between any country or population centre of the other side.
4. Turkey is engaged to ensure that the
Armenians who left their lands during the World War may return and resettle in their
original places of residence, and that these people shall enjoy the same rights as
minorities in the most civilised countries.
5. Turkey demands that Armenia give a
guarantee for its security. Our delegates expect the Armenian delegates authorised to take
part in and sign the peace negotiations in Gumru.
6. The Commander-in-Chief of our eastern
front will communicate to you the terms of truce which will end hostilities during the
peace negotiations.
The Armenians announced on 10 November
that they refused the armistice terms. On 11 November the operation began again. On 15
November, the Armenians were defeated in Shahtahti, and once again requested an armistice.
A cease-fire was declared on 18 November, and on 25 November peace negotiations began in
Gumru. Hatissian presided over the Armenian delegation. The Gumru Agreement was signed on
30 November.
Later, the regions which the Georgian had
occupied after the Mundros Treaty were recovered. Ardakhan was taken on 23 February,
Ahiska on 9 March, Batum on 11 March and Ahilkelek on 14 March.
On 16 March 1921 the Moscow Agreement was
made with the Russians in Moscow. The first article of the Moscow Treaty determined the
TurkishRussian border. We give below the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and l5th articles.
Article 1. Each of the contracting
parties accepts as a principle not to recognize any peace treaty or any international
contract which may be forced on the other party. The Federated Soviet Republics of Russia
recognize by the term `Turkey' all the areas which were announced on January 28th 1336
(1920] by the deputies of the Istanbul Assembly [National Pact) and which has been
communicated to all the Governments and to the Press. Turkey is represented by the Grand
National Assembly. . . . [Then the border line is designated as the present-day border.)
Article 2. Turkey agrees to relinquish to
Georgia the right to rule over the city and harbour of Batum and the area which is to the
north of the border set forth in the First Article of this Treaty, and which is part of
the kaza of Batum, with the conditions set below. . . .
Article 3. Both sides. . . agree that the
area of Nahjivan constitutes a sovereign region under the protection of Azerbaijan, on
condition that Azerbaijan does not relinquish this protection to a third state.
Article 15. Russia engages itself to
ensure that the Caucuses Republics accept the articles which concern them in this
Turkish-Russian Agreement, and in the agreements to be made between Turkey and these said
Republics.
The Moscow Agreement was approved by the
Grand National Assembly on 27 March. The certificates of this agreement, which was also
approved by the Russians, were exchanged in Kars on 22 September 1921.
On 26 September the Kars Conference
began, concerning the agreements to be made with the Caucasus Republics. The chief
delegates were: Ganetzki (Russian Soviet), Behhud Shahtahtinski (Azerbaijan), Ilyava and
Shvanidze (Georgia), Muravian and Makinzian (Armenia).
We wish to record the speech made by
Muravian, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, when the Conference began (p. 943):
The Republics of the Caucasus have
entrusted me with the responsibility of submitting to you the feelings shared by our
population and us, delegates, on the occasion of the first Conference in Kars between the
delegates of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the delegates of
the sister Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia of Transcaucasus.
We have not come here with antagonistic
feelings, and we have no intention of . presenting here the controversial issues which
have been rejected because they created arguments, and which we have inherited from the
former nationalist governments. No, now we are not concerned with these matters, and
feelings of antagonism. We are only admirers of the brave struggle which the persevering
people of Turkey engaged in. We carry a sincere wish, and we are absolutely convinced that
a nation which defends its country will be victorious and the enemy will be defeated.
We are certain that this conference will
strengthen the feelings of friendship of the Republics of the Caucasus in regard to
Turkey, and that Turkey will learn that there are no enemies behind her, and that her
neighbours are inclined to her in the struggle she engaged in against the imperialism
which wanted to destroy the aspirations of the Turkish nation.
Honourable delegates! We have not come to
this conference as victorious, or as vanquished. We have come to you, who are the
representatives of a nation which has defeated Imperialism, and we are happy to give you
the good news that our country will come victorious out of the struggle.
Great Russia was able to defeat her
enemies, because the workers and the peasants who are interested in protecting the
victories of the great November Revolution rose with great zeal in order to defend Russia.
We are absolutely convinced that the revolutionary combat of the Russian nation
constitutes a great example to the Turkish nation who will be able to defeat the paid
mercenaries of the Allied Powers which fight now on Anatolian lands to serve their own
interests and in order to destroy the Turkish nation.
The nations of the Caucasus are certain
that this conference will prepare a solid foundation for friendship and sisterhood with
the Turkish nation, and will be able to settle easily the disputed matters which are
easily settled between the Soviet Republics. The Delegates of the three Soviet Republics
who have deep and noble feelings for the Turkish nation salute the Conference.
The treaty negotiations ended on 10
October. The agreement was signed on 13 October at 2 p.m. The 1st, 2nd, 4th (only the
first paragraph), 5th, 6th (only the first sentence), and l5th articles of this agreement
were:
1. The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the
Governments of the Socialist Republics of
Armenian, Azerbaijan and Georgia have annulled the agreements which were concluded between
the governments which previously exercised their right of sovereignty in the area of the
governments of the agreement, and which concerned the said area, and the agreements which
were concluded with the three states concerning the Trans-Caucasian Republics. It is clear
that the Turkish-Russian agreement which was concluded in Moscow on March 16,1337-1921, is
an exception to the content of this article.
2. Each of the signatory governments
accepts the fact that they will not recognise any peace agreement or international
contract which is forced upon the other. In accordance with this agreement, the Soviet
Socialist Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia accept that they will not recognize
any international contract which the National Turkish Government represented by the Grand
National Assembly does not recognize.
3. The Government of the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey accepts that it will not recognize any international contract which
concerns Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia but which is not recognised by the Governments of
the countries represented by the Councils of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
4. The border of North-Eastern Turkey is
the border (according to the 1:210,000 verst scale map of the Russian War Staff) which
begins in the village of Sarp on the shores of the Black Sea, which goes through the
mountain of Hedismena and Shavshat mountains and the waters of Kanlidagh, and which
continues until the former northern border of the sanjaks of Kars and Ardahan, and
until the estuary of the rivers of Nijni Karasu Ashagi Karasu and Arpachay, and which
follows the thalweg of the river of Aras.
5. The Governments of Turkey and
Azerbaijan agree that the area of Nahjivan is an autonomous area, defined by enclosure No.
3 appended to this agreement, and protected by Azerbaijan.
6. With the conditions stated below,
Turkey agrees to relinquish to Georgia the harbour and city of Batum, and the area which
is to the north of the border which is set forth in the fourth article of this agreement,
and the rest of the kaza of Batum.
15. The Governments signatory to the
agreement are engaged in declaring a general amnesty restricted to the citizens of the
other side about the murders and atrocities committed as part of the war in the Caucasian
front, following the signing of this agreement.
The eastern front was thus eliminated.
Kachaznuni reports as follows about the
conclusion of this front.
The Turkish-Armenian war began at the
beginning of autumn and ruined us totally. Probably it was impossible for us to escape
this war. In 1918 Turkey was left alone for a period of two years. Measures which would
take into consideration the fact of its defeat, and which would introduce new systems,
were not taken. During these two years the Turks had been relieved. Their wounds had
healed. Young, patriotic, enterprising officers appeared, and began to reorganise the Army
in Anatolia. . . . Something cannot be refuted, that is we did not make any effort to
avoid the war. There was a simple and inexcusable reason for this. We had no idea of the
strength of the Turks, and we were too sure of our own strength. This was the main error.
We were too sure of our own strength. This was the main error. We were not afraid of the
war, because we were sure that we would win. Just as we had no idea of the strength of the
Turks with the insensitivity peculiar to ignorant and inexperienced people, no preventive
measures had been taken at the border. On the contrary we invaded Oltu, as if we were
engaging in a duel. It was as if we wanted war. When confrontations at the border began,
the Turks offered peace negotiations. We refused in a haughty manner. This proved to be a
great error. The reason was not only that we were sure of our victory, but the fact that
it was impossible for us to be reconciled. It might not have been realised, but it was not
impossible. In spite of everything, we did have an opportunity to agree with the Turks. .
. . We did nothing to avoid the war, on the contrary we gave a reason for the war. The
fact that we had been unable to estimate Turkish strength and that we did not have a clear
idea of our own strength were inexcusable errors. Our army, which was well clad, well fed
and welt armed, did not fight, it retreated constantly, it left its fortifications, it
abandoned its arms, and scattered to villages. . . . When Karabekir Pasha arrived at
Alexandropolis in the second half of November, the Bureau-Government submitted its
resignation to Parliament. It had been defeated and humiliated, it could no longer stay in
power. The peace negotiations would begin, and it was preferable that these negotiations
be made by new individuals. After a short period of indecision, it was decided that a
government should be formed with the social revolutionaries and the Dashnaks, under the
leadership of U. Vrassian. . . . The Turks had occupied Alexandropolis. At the same time
the Armenian Bolsheviks entered Ichevan and Telijan in the direction of Aghistaf led by
the Red Army. Was there an agreement between the Turks and the Bolsheviks? At the
beginning we believed such a possibility. But now I think that we were wrong, because no
evidence to this effect has been found. It was probable that the Bolsheviks wanted to
destroy our army from within, and an agreement with the Turks was not necessary for this.
. . . On December 1st or on November 30th, our representatives signed an agreement with
the Turks in Alexandropolis. The articles of this agreement were as harsh as in Batum.
Again on December 1st, the Vrassian Government resigned and transferred power to the
Bolsheviks.
Because the events which occurred in the
Republic of Armenia are outside our topic of discussion, we shall not report them.
3 The southern front
The Mundros Truce stipulated a withdrawal
in the east of Turkey behind the pre-war borders. However, in the south it did not give
the victorious powers the right to occupy areas to the north of the armistice line. It
only stipulated the occupation of the Taurus tunnels, with article 10.
The fifth article of the Truce stated
that `The troops which are in Hejaz, Assyria, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq will surrender to the
nearest Allied Commander, and parts of the forces in Cilicia, which are more than the
required amount for the maintenance of order, will be discharged.'
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in the second
article of a telegram dated 3 November 1918 which he sent to the Commander-in-Chief,
stated that `While we recognize as the border of Syria, the north of the border of the
province of Syria, it is necessary that we are informed if there is another point of view.
There are no troops we have left in Syria, and with which we have contact. We have a
campaign force in Hejaz. But we do not even have radio contact with it. Despite the fact
that the region of Cilicia contains an important part of the province of Adana, its
borders are unknown. It is necessary for this, too, to be specified.'
In the answer of the Commander-in-Chief dated 5 November 1918, it was stated that the border of Cilicia would be announced should it prove necessary.
The answer of Mustafa Kemal Pasha of the
same date is a very clear example of far-sightedness:
. . . My humble intention in asking about
the border of Cilicia was to explain that in the British map which officially recognized
its border, Syria lies to the east of the region of Cilicia, while its northern border
passes through the north of Marash, because there is no doubt that the British Government,
which puts the name Cilicia instead of Adana, considers that the Syrian border extends to
the east of the northern part of the Cilicia border. . . . For a few days the British have
been talking about landing soldiers at Iskenderun, because in the map which shows the area
of Cilicia, Iskenderun is on the borders of Syria and Cilicia. The aim is to invade
Iskenderun, and to cut the line of retreat of the 7th Army which is on the
Antakya-Diricemal-Ahterin line, by moving on the Iskenderun-KirikhanKatma line, and to put
this army in a position which would not enable it to refrain from surrendering, just as
was done in Mussul. The fact that the British have incited Armenian bands to act today in
Islahiye strengthens this opinion. . . . I ordered that the British, who may attempt to
send soldiers with whatever reason and pretext to Iskenderun, are opposed with fire, that
the equipment of a very weak advance outpost be left to the 7th Army, and that it draw the
main part within the Cilicia border in the direction of Katma-Islahiye.
The answer sent by the General Staff,
again on 5 November, stated: `Although the Armistice provisions do not give the British
the right and authority to invade Iskenderun. . . . the fact that they wish to use the
harbour of Iskenderun is a justifiable request. . . .
Thus the British were granted the right
to land on Iskenderun. After this, the French and the British did not pay any attention to
the Armistice conditions, and began to occupy the south.
On 11 December 1918, a French battalion
formed of 400 Armenians entered Dörtyol. . . . `On December 17, 1918 a French unit led by
Lieutenant Colonel Romieu landed in Mersin. In the 1,500-man unit there were only 150
French soldiers. The others were Armenian legions. On December 18, 1918 General Hamlin,
the Commander of the French Occupation Army of Syria, entered Adana in great pomp.
The British occupied Antep on 1 January,
Marash on 22 February, and Urfa on 24 March. These areas were actually areas which had
been given to the French through secret agreements. Because of this, serious disputes
arose with the French, and finally an agreement was reached and these provinces were given
to the French on 15 September 1919. We shall not dwell on the British-French
disagreements. The interested reader may refer to the books mentioned in the previous
chapter by Lloyd George and Evans.
Let us summarise how and for what reasons
the southern front appeared from the work of Kasim Ener, who has written the history of
this front (pp. 30-40):
The Turkish people were left face to face
with the Armenians under the administration of an administrator without any influence,
because the Ottoman Government had not sent someone to replace the governor Nazim Bey, who
had resigned. However, General Hamlin, too, was worried about the situation of the legions
and the revolutionaries, because the French soldiers, who were numerically few, had
succumbed to luxury. Armed confrontations occurred first in Iskenderun, then in Belen,
because of the Armenians' exuberances and their harmful activities. The Armenian
detachments who were on leave were attacked by the Turks in Ozerli on January 1, 1919. The
Armenians began to kill any Muslims they could lay their hands on, to avenge those who
were killed. On January 10, 1919 they attacked the farm of Abdo Agha near Kahyaoglu
(Shehitlik). They killed Abdo Agha and 14 of the workers. During the confusion, one of the
workers hid inside an oven, and escaped death. The next day he came to the city and told
of the atrocity. A few Armenian soldiers were arrested, but were later freed. On February
10,1919 the Armenians pillaged the Turks' shops. On February 25, the house of a
money-changer named Vanli Ahmet Efendi in the Saracan quarter was pillaged during the
night by his neighbour Agop and Kamvorlar. The poor man's body was full of bayonet wounds.
The Muslims were agitated. Suphi Pasha, the former deputy of Adana, went to the Government
and was promised that the aggressors would be punished. Although Agop and his companions
were jailed, they were pardoned as it was claimed that they were innocent. On March
14,1919 Dellal Ahmet was found dead in his house in the orchards. Of course the assailants
were not found. Similar incidents occurred in our other bujaks, counties and
villages. Facing this situation, the Turks began a guerilla war beginning from the area of
Kirikhan-Kilis, following the cities which began to implement defensive measures. Upon
this, Commander-in-Chief General Allenby divided the areas under French occupation in two.
He gave the civilian administration to the French, and the military control to the
British. He appointed Colonel Bremond as the governor-general of the Northern area, its
centre being Adana. . . . The attitude of Bremond, who told the Armenians that he brought
the greetings of Bogos Nubar Pasha, encouraged the revolutionaries further. . . .
According to Allenby's instructions, the officials who were appointed would have to be
approved by the British general headquarters. For military aid, one would refer to the
Cilicia occupation command. But Bremond went even further and:
l. He appointed officers who were not on
the permanent staff to the gendarmerie, he confiscated the depots.
2. He dismissed the Turkish teachers,
officials whom he considered patriotic.
3. He changed the uniform of the police
and the gendarmerie. The crescent on the caps was removed. .
4. Teaching of the German language was
forbidden in schools. The command language was changed to French.
5. He forced travellers to obtain a
travel document, and to pay for their train tickets with silver and gold coins.
6. He had the Cilician seal put on the
Ottoman postage stamps.
7. He subjected letters and telegrams to
severe censorship.
8. He transferred the sentences given by
the Adana courts to the court of appeal in Beirut.
9. He forced the Turkish people to obey
his orders. He severely fined those who did not.
10. He gave all the contract rights to
the French. In this manner he tried to enrich even the lowest-ranking French officers
through official and private means. The Armenians who were encouraged by Bremond's
attitude increased their pillages and aggressions. . . .
On February 15-18,1919, 3 infantry
regiments,1 Indian cavalry regiment, and 1 British regiment arrived led by the British
General W. S. Leslie, and fears were dissipated. On February 19,1919 the war committee met
and decided that part of the Armenian legions should be discharged. In return, General
Leslie, in response to Bremond's insistence, had Hashim Bey, the Gendarmerie Commander,
arrested with the approval of Marshal Allenby, in his office on March 3, 1919. Hashim Bey
was sent to Egypt. . . . Captain Luppe was appointed as the gendarmerie inspector.
Armenians were brought in to replace the Turkish gendarmes. On March 8,1919 Captain
Taillardat and First Lieutenant Suby were sent to Kozan, and Captain Arrikhi was sent to
Ceyhan. They were followed by the forces of occupation. The Armenian refugees were
encouraged by this, and began to torture the Muslims of that area. They shot Yunus Hoca in
Ceyhan, as he was reciting the ezan (call to prayer). On April 28, 1919, Bremond announced
this communication: `Within the next 24 hours, everybody will surrender their weapons to
the Government. At the end of this deadline, all the houses will be searched, and if we
find any arms, the owner will be hanged.
A day after the announcement was
published, the houses were searched. Sherif the quilt-maker, Mustafa the police-man, and
Imam Ziya were beaten because meat knives were found in their houses. . . . During those
summer months the Turks were able to go to their orchards and summer camping grounds,
thanks to the Muslim Indian soldiers, but then the scene changed. . . . During the
discussion which took place in London, it was decided that French soldiers should replace
the British. As a result, two infantry battalions arrived in Adana on July 13, 1919 led by
First Lieutenant Thibault. Other French troops landed in Iskenderun. Thus the French
forces had settled in Cilicia, the command of Colonel Piepape was established, and trust
began to disappear again, because many soldiers of these two infanty battalions were
Armenians wearing French uniform. . . . Marshal Foch reserved the 156th division led by
General Dufieux for Cilicia, in accordance with the agreement of September 15,1919. Major
Hassler was the Chief-of-Staff of the division. . . .
When the British forces left Chukurova,
the French had three infantry battalions and two cavalry detachments there. The situation
was critical for the French administrators, owing to the fact that they had few forces.
Their situation was improved when the Algerian soldiers led by General Dufieux arrived in
Adana on November 1, 1919. They were followed by the Senegalese regiment. Thus the Eastern
First Division led by General Dufieux was modernised in regard to weapons and equipment.
The headquarters, the band company of this division, its 2lst and 22nd regiments, its
cannon regiments, its heavy cannon battalions, and its fortification battalions were in
Adana. Moreover, the headquarters of the 7th cavalry regiment, and the cavalry, tank, and
aeroplane detachments were also there. They had also armed the legions as well as the
civilian Armenians.
After having ensured absolute security in
the centre, the French began to organize their activities. Colonel Piepape was entrusted
with replacing the British units in Urfa, Antep, and Marash.
General Gouraud, who was appointed
Commander-in-Chief in the Near East, came to Adana on December 11,1919. When he was
passing through the Turkish quarters, he asked `Doesn't anybody live here?' as he saw that
everything was closed. Bremond then replied, `My General, the Turks live in these
quarters, but they do not leave their houses as they are wild in comparison with the
Christians.' The shrewd general realised the situation when he saw that the students
refused to applaud for him when he visited the Boys' High School, and they refused to sing
the French national anthem in spite of pressure to do so, and at that time he understood
that the situation in Chukurova was a hopeless one for them. . . . On November 12,1919
General Gouraud concluded his inspection and left Adana, and, as Du Veou stated in his
work La Passion de la Cilicie, `he left Bremond alone with the hundred thousand
Armenians he had settled in Chukurova'. Again Du Veou informs us that of these Armenians,
70,000 had been settled in Adana and in its villages, 12,000 in Dörtyol, 8,000 in
Saimbeyli, and the rest in Osmaniye, Kadirli, and Kozan. Moreover, 50,000 Armenians were
brought in from Istanbul and Anatolia to Antep, Marash, and Zeitun.
Before we give any information about the
strength of the southern front, it is necessary to look at the French documents.
G.Picot, the French High Commissioner who was in Cairo at that time ,
sent the following telegram to his
Ministry on 19 November 1918: `The commander-in-chief to whom I insisted, on the
instructions of Your Excellency, that the Armenians be entrusted with ensuring the
occupation of the Taurus passages, assures me that his intention was to send them to this
area as soon as possible. The measure seems to me very urgent as they have recently
provoked most unfortunate incidents in Beirut.
The following note submitted by the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs to his Prime Minister on 19 November 1918 is also
significant.
...I consider, like you, that there is
good reason to anticipate that the Armenian forces which are at the present time in Persia
will be gathered in Armenia, or more exactly in the three Turkish provinces of Bitlis,
Van, and Erzurum. However, one must take into account the fact that among the Armenian
volunteers who are under Andranik's command a large part are originally from little
Armenia, that is from the northern districts of Cilicia. As this region is within the
French sphere of influence according to our agreement with Great Britain, it would be
advantageous if the volunteers who are from Cilicia can be sent to Antep and incorporated
in the Armenian battalions of the Eastern Legion.
There is good reason for these
contingents to be officered by energetic European officers, in order to prevent the hatred
which has accumulated by their sufferings driving the Armenian volunteers to make
reprisals. If they feel that they are under surveillance, it is probable that they will
behave as civilised men.
It is not possible to determine as of now
the boundaries of an Armenian nation. Even before the massacres of 1895, the Armenians
were not in a majority in the so-called Armenian provinces. In the provinces of Bitlis and
Van, they formed compact communities, but the statistics, which were not based on any
serious census, varied from the real numbers to double the actual total, in accordance
with the inclinations of their authors. In the three other provinces of Diyarbekir,
Elaziz, and Trabzon, the Armenian population was much less dense, and constituted only a
meagre percentage of the population.
We can therefore conceive of the
unification of the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzurum and Trabzon, with the districts
separated from Elaziz, and Diyarbekir, and maybe also the district of the Russian
Transcaucasus around Mount Ararat, in order to found a state of mixed nationalities, which
would enjoy autonomy under the guarantee and supervision of the Allies. . . .
As the region of Ottoman Turkey, which
has fallen under French influence, will extend up to the borders of this heterogeneous
state, it would be natural that France should receive the mandate from the Allied Powers
to ensure the maintenance of order and good relations. The French possessions would then
border the petroliferous regions of the Caspian Sea, where French capital has already been
invested, and Persia, in order to attain the districts of the Transcaucasus and profit
from their diverse resources.
As can been seen, the French did not
conceive of establishing an Armenia in Cilicia, but were planning to border with an
Armenia which would be established in the east (that is in regions which were once
relinquished to Russia), and to exert their influence in that area. In 1920, when the
Armenians claimed that they were promised an Armenia in Cilicia, referring to Bogos Nubar
Pasha, the French openly accused Bogos Nubar of lying. Let us look at the following letter
sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Foreign Affairs Commission
of the French Senate on 28 December 1920:
. . . You have asked me whether in 1916,
or since that date, the French Government had engaged itself in regard to Armenia, to
constitute an autonomous Cilicia.
. . . I have the honour of informing you
that no engagement of this nature ever took place.
. . . Bogos Pasha claims that M. Geroges
Picot assured him in London that France had engaged herself to give, after the victory of
the Allies, autonomy to Cilicia under her protection.
This so called engagement was apparently
the counterpart of the recruiting of the Armenian legion, which had been formed at the
suggestion of M. Georges Picot, to help to drive the Turks from Cilicia.
To strengthen his claim, Bogos Pasha
cites a telegram he sent to his son in Cairo, through the mediation of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, in order to take the necessary measure for the establishment of the
Armenian legion. He adds that, Commander Romieu, charged with this formation, confirmed to
the Armenian notables the agreement reached in London, and read them a letter written by
M. Briand, who was then the President of the Council, in which he declared that he was in
agreement with the national Armenian delegation.
M. Georges Picot has never informed the Ministry of the discussion he had with Bogos Pasha in London:' As a matter of fact, he had no authority which would permit him to engage the French Government.