Table of Contents

Introduction and Methodology 1
0.A. Introduction 1
0.A.1. What this thesis is about 1
0.A.2. Why write about living things? 2
0.A.3. Why write about animals? 3
0.A.4. What are animals? 4
0.A.5. Why write about the moral entitlements of animals and other organisms? 5
0.B Methodological proposals for this thesis 7
0.B.1 What does it mean to be alive? 9
0.B.2 Mental states in animals 10
0.B.2(a) Is there a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for having a mind? 10
0.B.2(b) What is the relationship between being alive and having a mind? 11
0.B.2(c) What are the most primitive mental states? 12
0.B.2(d) How do we identify the occurrence of primitive mental states? 17
0.B.2(e) Emotions 19
0.B.2(f) Phenomenally conscious mental states 19
0.B.2(g) Higher-order mental states 20
0.B.2(h) Drawing the Line 21
0.B.2(i) How generous should we be in assessing claims for mental states? 22
0.B.2(j) Appropriate Sources of Evidence 23
0.B.2(j)(i) Singular versus replicable observations 23
0.B.2(j)(ii) Laboratory versus natural observations 24
0.B.3 Interests of Animals and Other Organisms 25
0.B.3(a) Is my methodology ethically biased? 26
0.B.3(b) What constraints should we impose on an ethical theory based on interests? 26
0.B.3(c) How do we define and identify interests? 26
0.B.3(d) The "is-ought" gap 27
0.B.3(e) How do we resolve conflicts of interests between organisms? 27
0.B.3(f) A general account of goodness


Chapter 1 - What does it mean to be alive? 28
1.A. An overview of attempts to define "life" 28
1.A.0 Chapter summary 28
1.A.1 Why does the distinction between living and non-living matter? 28
1.A.2 A "conceptual map" of some historical positions taken in the debate about life 31
1.A.3 Is there a crisis relating to the definition of "life"? 42
1.A.3.1 Problems associated with the quest for single-attribute definitions of life 43
1.A.3.2 Can cluster definitions work? 47
1.A.3.2(a) Short cluster definitions 49
1.A.3.2(b) Long cluster definitions 52
1.A.3.3 Is it too soon to formulate a good definition? 57
1.A.3.4 The new crisis regarding the definition of life 58
1.A.3.5 What is wrong with the foregoing definitions of life? 63
1.A.3.6 Is teleology redundant? 66
1.A.3.7 Are there any good methodological reasons for rejecting teleological accounts of life? 67
1.A.3.8 Is a teleological account of life intelligible?


1.B. A proposed solution to the "problem of life": a "science-friendly" teleological account 71
1.B.1 What distinguishes living things? 74
1.B.2 Empirical formal and finalistic criteria for being alive 81
1.B.3 Is my account of life reductionistic? 73B
1.B.4 Strong emergence, downward and backward causation 77B
1.B.5 Is the possession of intrinsic ends a sufficient and necessary condition for being alive? 82B
1.B.6. Does my account of life explain and unify all of the necessary conditions for something's being alive? 90
1.B.6(a) Does my account of life unify the necessary conditions for something's being alive? 90
1.B.6(b) What are the necessary conditions for something's being alive? 95
1.B.7 What does it mean for a living thing to have a nature? 96
1.B.8 Do living things have a privileged ethical status?


Chapter 2 - What does it take to have a minimal mind? 114
2.A How should we look for intentional agency in organisms? 114
2.A.1. Preliminaries 114
2.A.2. Mental states - Aristotelian, Cartesian and modern positions contrasted 114
2.A.3. Conclusions reached - a note to the reader 116
2.A.4 Wolfram's neo-animism: Are minds nothing more than computational devices? 117
2.A.5 Dennett's intentional stance: Is mind a property of intentional systems? 129
2.A.5(a) Has Dennett mis-described intentionality? 129
2.A.5(b) Is Dennett's intentional stance a global theory of mental states? 132
2.A.5(c) Is Dennett's intentional stance tied to reductionism? 135
2.A.6 Why only living things can possess minds. Implications for artificial intelligence. 140
2.A.7 Different kinds of intentional stance? Narrowing the search for mental states in organisms 147
2.A.8 Biological processes that are best described using a goal-centred intentional stance 151
2.A.9 Philosophical arguments against the possibility of belief in non-human animals


2.B What does an organism need in order to possess a minimal mind? 157
2.B.0 The Tree of Life - major groupings and relationships 157
2.B.1 Sensory criteria for identifying mental states in organisms 163
2.B.2 Memory-related criteria for attributing mental states to organisms 177
2.B.3 Is flexible behaviour enough for having a mind? 188
2.B.4 Learning-related criteria for attributing mental states to organisms 203
2.B.4(a) Habituation and sensitization 207
2.B.4(b) Associative learning 218
2.B.4(c) Does associative learning qualify as learning, in the ordinary sense of the word? 229
2.B.4(d) Does associative learning require a mentalistic explanation? 231
2.B.5 Mind and movement - the significance of control in the identification of intentional agency 245
2.B.5(a) Why internal states are important 246
2.B.5(b) Does directed movement qualify as agency? 248
2.B.5(c) Does navigation qualify as agency? 253
2.B.5(d) Does having an action selection mechanism qualify as agency? 258
2.B.5(e) The importance of fine-tuning for intentional agency 266
2.B.6 Representations and mental states 275
2.B.6(a) Why there can be no representation without the possibility of mis-representation 275
2.B.6(b) Do Dretskean representations warrant the ascription of mental states to animals? 279
2.B.7 Getting it wrong: the centrality of self-correction to belief 287
2.B.7(a) Does associative learning require a mentalistic explanation? 287
2.B.7(b) Does the phenomenon of blocking enable us to identify which animals have expectations? 292
2.B.8 Synthesis: the ingredients of intentional agency


2.C. Four models of a minimal mind 298
2.C.1 A model of operant agency in insects 298
2.C.2 Spatial learning, agency and belief in insects 329
2.C.3 A model of tool agency in Cephalopods 333
2.C.4 A model of social agency in fish


2.D Higher kinds of learning in insects


Chapter 3 - Animal Emotions 338
3.0 Chapter outline 338
3.1 Methodological Considerations 340
3.1(a) Human Emotions cannot be defined apart from animal emotions 340
3.1(b) General Properties of Emotions 341
3.1(c) Animal emotions have intentional objects 345
3.2 What are the cognitive pre-requisites of animal emotions? 349
3.3 What are animal emotions "about", and what is each basic kind of animal emotion about? 358
3.4 How do we identify basic emotions in animals, what are they and which animals can be said to have them?


Chapter 4 - Animal Consciousness and Higher Mental States 374
4.A. Phenomenal Consciousness in Animals 374
4.1 What philosophers have to say about animal consciousness 375
4.1.1 Philosophical distinctions regarding consciousness 375
4.1.2 An outline of the current philosophical debate on animal consciousness 383
4.2 Scientific findings regarding consciousness 388
4.2.1 Primary versus "higher-order" consciousness 388
4.2.2 Behavioural criteria for consciousness 390
4.2.3 Neural pre-requisites for consciousness 402
4.3 Ethical implications of animal consciousness


4.B Evidence for rational agency in animals


4.C Are non-human animals capable of moral agency?


Chapter 5 - What are our duties towards other organisms? 436
5.0 Chapter outline 436
5.1 Which entities have moral standing? 436
5.2 What duties do we have towards living things, and what is the basis for them? 451
5.2.1 Duties owed to living things in general 451
5.2.2 Duties owed to animals with minds 453
5.2.3 Duties owed to companion animals (pets) 469
5.2.4 Duties owed to human beings 472
5.2.5 Duties pertaining to groups of organisms: greater wholes (e.g. ecosystems) and classes (e.g. species)


Chapter 6 - What are we entitled to do vis-a-vis other organisms? 482
6.0 Chapter outline 482
6.1 Instrumentalism rejected 483
6.2 The cardinal difficulty of biocentrism 486
6.3 The deficiencies of a holistic ethic 489
6.4 Vital, central and peripheral needs 493
6.5 A Telos-Based Account of Entitlements and Justifiable Harms 496
6.5(a) The Telos-Promoting Principle (TPP): which goods are we entitled to pursue? 496
6.5(b) The Telos-Promoting Harm Principle (TPHP): which actions are we entitled to perform? 498
6.6 Can harm done to other living things sometimes be justified on ecological grounds?




Appendices 620
Appendix to chapter 1 620
Appendix to chapter 1 part A: Is teleology redundant?


Appendix to chapter 1 part B: What are the necessary conditions for something's being alive?


Appendix to chapter 2 662
Appendix to chapter 2 part A: Wolfram's neo-animism


Appendix to chapter 2 part B: Criteria for having a minimal mind 669
Some Background Information on the Five Kingdoms of Life 671
1. Sensory criteria for identifying mental states in organisms 684
1.1 Which organisms have sensors? 684
1.2 Cotterill's arguments for denying true senses to bacteria 690
1.3 Different kinds of senses in various kinds of living things


2. Memory-related criteria for identifying mental states in organisms 704
2.1 The Simplest kind of memory: chemical memory 705
2.2 Problems relating to the definition of different kinds of memory 709
2.3 Which organisms possess procedural, semantic and episodic memory?


3. Is flexible behaviour enough for having a mind? 715
3.1 How indirect, modifiable stimulus-coupling can still be a fixed pattern of behaviour 715
3.2 Examples of so-called "flexible" behaviour which turn out to be fixed 717
3.3 Fixed behaviour is compatible with multiple functions determining the value of the output variable 720
3.4 Does flexible behaviour occur in bacteria? 721
3.4.1 Cellular regulation in bacteria 722
3.4.2 Phenotypic plasticity in bacteria 725
3.4.3 Gene-swapping in bacteria: flexible behaviour?


4. Is learning enough for having a mind? 733
4.1 Are there any forms of learning more basic than habituation? 733
4.2 Which organisms can undergo habituation and sensitization? 735
4.3 Which organisms are capable of associative learning? 742
4.4 Pavlov's model of associative conditioning compared with a contemporary model (Brembs, 1996) 768
4.5 Three cases of associative learning without a brain which challenge Dretske's account of belief


5. Mind and Movement - the significance of control in intentional agency 776
5.1 Why random changes are insufficient for intentional agency 777
5.2 Directed movement in organisms 779
5.3 How animal cells see and move 784
5.4 Case study: action selection in cnidaria 788
5.5 Agency in cnidaria? 792
5.6 Can cnidaria learn? 795
5.7 Case study: centralised action selection in flatworms


7. Getting it wrong: the centrality of self-correction to belief 798
7.1 Is the phenomenon of blocking evidence of expectations in animals? 798
7.2 Do higher-order forms of associative learning warrant an agent-centred intentional stance?


Appendix to chapter 2 part C: Case studies 812
1. Operant Agency 814
1.1 Operant Agency in Drosophila melanogaster 814
1.2 Merfeld's Model of Efference Copy 822
1.3 Definition of Operant Agency


2. Navigational Agency 829
2.1 Definition of Navigational Agency 829
2.2 Case study: Navigational Agency in Insects 834
2.2(a) Is path integration a form of intentional agency? 835
2.2(b) Is navigation by visual landmarks a form of intentional agency? 839
2.2(c) Do insects use cognitive maps? 846
2.3 Case study: Navigational Agency in Cephalopods


3. Tool Agency 853
3.1 Definition of Tool Agency 853
3.2 Case study: Tool Agency in Cephalopods


4. Social Agency 866
4.1 Definition of Social Agency 866
4.2 Case study: Social Agency in fish 872
4.3 Case study: Evaluation of the evidence for Social Agency in octopuses


5. A Special Case of Combined Agency in the Jumping Spider Portia


Appendix to chapter 2 part D: Case studies of higher-order learning in insects 891
1. Reversal Learning (an update on Gary Varner's claims regarding desire in animals) 892
1.1 Rapid reversal learning in honeybees: evidence for the acquisition of beliefs? 892
1.2 Is progressive adjustment in multiple reversal learning trials evidence for the acquisition of beliefs?


2. Concept Formation in Insects 897
2.1 Can honeybees form categorical concepts? 898
2.2 Can honeybees form the concepts of "same" and "different"?


Note: Higher-order learning in octopuses


Appendix to Chapter 3 - Animal Emotions
1. Should we stipulate consciousness as a requirement for having emotions? 916
2. Is emotion fundamentally distinct from cognition? 919
3. Do the basic emotions of fear, anger and desire presuppose a capacity for language? 923
4. Can emotions be explained as bodily states? 934
5. Deficient methodologies for distinguishing animal emotions 939
6. What kinds of emotions do animals have? 941
7. Which Animals Have Emotions? 951
8. A general strategy for identifying occurrences of basic emotions in animals


Appendix to Chapter 4 - Animal Consciousness and Higher Mental States
Appendix to chapter 4 Part A - Phenomenal Consciousness 963
1.1 Can access consciousness occur in the absence of phenomenal consciousness? 964
1.2 Persistent Vegetative State: a case of behavioural wakefulness in the absence of phenomenal consciousness 973
1.3 Evaluation of Carruthers' arguments against the occurrence of consciousness in non-human animals 975
1.4 How the welfare of animals lacking phenomenal consciousness can be objectively assessed


Appendix to chapter 4 part B - Higher-order consciousness and language in non-human animals?


Appendix to chapter 5 993
Appendix to chapter 5 part A - Marginal Animal Cases


Appendix to chapter 5 part B - Marginal Human Cases and their relevance for our duties towards animals


Appendix to chapter 6 1019
Appendix to chapter 6 part A - Do Animals and Other Organisms have Rights?


Appendix to chapter 6 part B - Practical Implications of TPHP 1043