The years between 1914-1917 witnessed the culmination of two great movements which
had plagued Russia and its neighboring countries for decades. The first of these
forces was the increased levels of militarization and frustration which was engulfing
many European countries. With improved weapons and larger armies, Germany, Austria
and France felt prepared for war and were looking for the justification to test
their might. Russia however, had not become involved in this trend. Nicholas II
disliked the prospect of conflict and was tied up primarily with his family and
the revolutionary trends which were becoming a strong characteristic of his people.
It was this revolutionary spirit which caused the second set of events for Russia.
In 1917, years of frustration and neglect at the hands of the government caused
the Russian people to overthrow their Tsar and install in his place, for the first
time in its history, a government run by the people. However, before a revolution
could take place the Russian population needed a catalyst, in the form of an outside
threat, which would reveal the ineptitude of their leader.
By 1914, the political tension in southeastern Europe, between the Austrians and
the smaller Slavic nations had already reached dangerous levels. Austria held
portions of land in the area of Bosnia which the Serbians felt to be theirs and
conflict over this territory had created tremendous animosity between the two
nations. In June 1914, Serbian nationalists assassinated the heir to the Austrian
throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, ensuring conflict with the Austrian Empire.
While this might have remained a localized affair, both sides immediately turned
to their allies for help. In Austria's case this was the German Empire and its
kaiser, Wilhelm. The Serbs turned to their Slavic brothers, the Russians, who
according to tradition had always come to the rescue of less powerful Slavic nations.
"Traditionally, Russia regarded herself as the protector of all Slavic peoples.
Therefore, when Serbia appealed to the Tsar for help, Nicholas ordered mobilization
of Russian troops, along the Austrian frontier. The kaiser responded to the struggle
by coming to the aid of Austria's Emperor Franz Joseph." During the next month
and a half Russia, Germany, Austria and to a lesser extent Serbia, discussed the
inevitability of war. Although each country declared its desire for peace, they
all had reasons for promoting war. Almost every European power a the beginning
of the twentieth century could mobilize more than a million men, and they had
the means to move them rapidly to the front.... Nations so girded for war grew
increasingly restless with peace. A fatalistic acceptance of war's inevitability
began to consume many of Europe's monarchs and statesmen.
Unfortunately for Russia, Nicholas was probably the only ruler in Europe who truly
shuddered at the thought of war. Nicholas by nature did not like conflict, and
instinctually withdrew from the decisiveness which a war would require. As Catherine
Radziwill said, Nicholas was "annoyed" by having to listen to "unpleasant" things.
It was this dislike of complication and the pressures of war which caused Nicholas
to deal so poorly with the events of the summer of 1914. The question of whether
Russia should enter the war required a careful examination both of Russia's condition
and the state of affairs in Europe. Nicholas however, did not do this. He may
have been aware on some level of what was soon found out after the war began;
Russia was entirely unprepared for a war of these proportions. Whether he was
entirely aware or not, Nicholas clearly did not see this as a determining factor
in the decision for war. Instead he allowed himself to be easily swayed by outside
influences, despite the critical nature of the situation. Following the assassination
of the archduke, Nicholas and Wilhelm of Germany began a telegram correspondence
in which they discussed, often threateningly, the pressures pushing for war. Although
it is clear from his writing that Wilhelm was prepared to go to war, Nicholas
continually held out hope against it. When Kokovstov visited Wilhelm in Berlin,
the Kaiser repeated the following to him about the possibility of war: I must
tell you directly: I see an imminent conflict between two races - the Romano-Slavic
and the German - and I cannot help but warn you about it... You assume that Germandom
will be the first to begin hostile actions. If war is inevitable, then I consider
it totally unimportant who begins it... I am very concerned by events and I am
telling you quite definitely that war may simply become inevitable...Believe me,
I am exaggerating nothing. In response, "The Tsar listened rather indifferently
to Kokovstov's report of this matter." Wilhelm's statement leaves little doubt
about his intentions and willingness to undertake a war. However, several weeks
later Nicholas stated to the French ambassador, his belief that "Notwithstanding
appearances, the Emperor Wilhelm is too cautious to launch his country on some
wild adventure and the Emperor Franz Joseph's only wish is to die in peace." Nicholas'
desire to avoid war made him blind to the motivations of those around him. Austria
had begun mobilization against Serbia after enumerating a list of demands which
were almost impossible to comply with, and then ignored the small nation's response.
Serbia for her part was also preparing for war but was obviously overmatched and
continued to push Russia for their support. In mid-July Wilhelm sent a telegram
Nicholas saying that he wished to mediate a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
The tsar did not see the trap he was walking into and accepted Wilhelm's offer,
changing general mobilization in Russia to a partial one. However the next day,
on July 18, Wilhelm again telegrammed the tsar saying the following,: "If Russia
mobilizes against Austria (that is if Russia begins partial mobilization) then
my role as mediator, which you have so kindly given me, will be placed in danger
if not totally destroyed. The whole weight of the decision now lies only on your
shoulders, which now bear the responsibility for war or peace." Wilhelm, an able
statesman, had maneuvered events so that Russia was forced to either demobilize
in the face of increased Austrian mobilization or take responsibility for beginning
war. Nicholas was still not convinced of what had become painfully obvious to
the rest of Europe. He held on to the hope that war could be avoided. "Wilhelm's
secret plans were thus exposed; but the Tsar continued to believe in the possibility
of pursuing peace and was disturbed by the direct threat of responsibility." Despite
his continued hesitation, Nicholas was eventually convinced that war might become
a necessity. This was largely due to the influence of his war advisors who feared
the time it would take to bring Russia to full military readiness. General Iurii
Danilov warned that "'Any partial mobilization... would have been an improvisation
at best,' and would have seriously threatened Russia's ability to launch a general
mobilization successfully if that were needed later." . Nicholas' General Staff's
chief Nikolai Ianushkevich wrote him warning that: "war has already become inevitable
and we are in danger of losing it even before we have time to draw our sword from
its sheath." Finally after continued pressure and no options in sight Nicholas
agreed to a general mobilization. The result was, of course, three days later
Germany declared war on Russia. Although, Nicholas' indecision cost Russia precious
time that could have been used to move soldiers and supplies to the front, his
intentions seem to have been respectable. At one point he responded to the push
for general mobilization by saying : "Everything possible must be done to save
the peace, I will not be responsible for a monstrous slaughter." Sadly however,
Nicholas was not strong enough to fight off his ministers and protect what may
well have been Russia's best interest. The decision between protecting the Serbs
and staying out of a war for which Russia was not prepared, was a difficult one.
Nicholas could have prevented the war had he called off his mobilization against
a country which had not taken any aggressive action against the Russian Empire.
But a sense of honor and duty, as well as pressure from his military advisors,
acted to force the tsar to come to Serbia's aid, which in turn forced the inevitable
conflict between the powers.
Nicholas was not capable of being the strong and decisive leader which his country
needed to defend it from war. Even more importantly he was unable to be the kind
of leader who would be necessary during the next two and a half years to protect
Russia from the tremendous hardships which she would endure.
The outbreak of war in Russia brought, ironically, that which everyone had been
hoping for. For the first time in a decade, peace reigned over Russia's domestic
scene, if only for a short time. On August 1, 1914 Germany declared war on Russia,
siting Russia's unwillingness to demobilize as the reason. At the highest levels
the war was responded to with a great deal of sadness and remorse. Nicholas and
Alexandra treated the subject with an air that was almost reminiscent of mourning.
"Later the same day, the Tsar appeared, looking very pale, and told them that
war was declared, in a voice which betrayed his agitation, notwithstanding all
his efforts. On hearing the news the Tsarina began to weep, and the Grand Duchesses
dissolved into tears on seeing their mother's distress." In contrast, the reaction
of the Russian people was markedly different. They immediately rallied to the
Tsar's side in defending their nation and its Slavic brothers against the universally
despised Germans. On the day following the declaration of war Nicholas appeared
on the balcony of the Winter Palace and was greeted by hundreds of thousands of
enthusiastic supporters. "When Russia's emperor and empress appeared on the palace
balcony, the crowd knelt as one. A few moments later, the well-known words of
Russia's national anthem burst from a quarter of a million throats... As one,
their voices rose in a mighty crescendo of supplication, calling once again upon
their 'Russian God' to stand with them in their hour of need." For Nicholas and
Alexandra, this was their first experience with the kind of loyalty and enthusiasm
which the Russian people had been known for. The growing degree of dissatisfaction
with the government seemed, for the moment, to have been forgotten. "To say simply
that it (the war) was 'popular' is not enough...Especially at the beginning, of
course, there was no lack of displays of enthusiasm... Workers''s strikes ceased
- for the moment-not to mention street and public demonstrations." In the words
of the liberal Duma member and later Soviet Leader, Kerensky,: "about 150,000
men had been on strike, there had been barricades in the poorer quarters... But
behold, war was declared; and all at once not a trace was left of the revolutionary
movement. The workmen of St. Petersburg returned to their factories." One Duma
member was so surprised by this sudden change in attitude among the common people
that he approached a group of workers to inquire about their beliefs. He asked:
"What's happened to your strike, to your demands addressed to the Duma?" (to which
they replied): "That was a quarrel in the family, but now all Russia is involved.
We have rallied to our Tsar and we shall follow him to victory over the Germans."
At almost all levels of society there was the unanimous belief that the time had
come to put aside 'personal' differences and focus on the defense of the country.
"No matter what our attitude toward the government's domestic policy, our first
duty is to preserve the unity and integrity of our country," In part this enthusiasm
was due to changing factors within Russian society, including increased literacy
and political involvement. However even among the rural peasant population where
literacy levels were lower, there was a strong sense of loyalty and patriotism.
Many of these people had little understanding of why the war was being fought,
despite the fact that they would be expected to bear most of the weight of fighting
it. Nevertheless, when war was called they went by the hundreds of thousands to
defend their country. "Had they been asked why they went, they could have given
no answer except that the Tsar had called them to defend Russia." In part what
makes these demonstrations of patriotism so amazing are the events which surrounded
it. That the Russian people could put aside their differences and support a man
who had done so much to oppress them is a strong statement about the character
of the nation. The question which naturally arises is how, in a period of only
two and a half years, this population moved from such fervent loyalty to revolution
and displacement of their 'beloved' Tsar. Despite appearances in August of 1914,
the lessons of the previous two decades had not been entirely forgotten and it
was the events of World War I which served as the reminder.
Russian military status left her ill prepared for the start of war. The fears
which had been held by many of Nicholas' war ministers, were soon realized as
Russia began the slow process of preparing itself for a modern war. Russia faced
difficulties which smaller countries did not have to contend with. Men heading
for war had to travel hundreds of miles before arriving at the front. This took
time and unfortunately it was not aided by Russia's desperately inferior rail
system "All that Russian had in their favor was men. To every yard of railway
track in Russia, German railways had ten; the Kaiser's factories outnumbered the
Tsar's by hundreds" The severity of the situation soon became known to many of
Russia's generals and ministers. Only a couple of weeks after warfare had begun,
Russia was already running low on weapons, ammunition and other supplies. In anger,
Mikhail Baleav confessed to the French ambassador, Maurice Paleologue, how serious
the situation really was: 'Our losses in men had been colossal,...Our original
reserve was 5,000,000 rifles; at least we thought so. The Grand Duke Nicholas
Nikolaevich thought so; I thought so myself. We have been criminally deceived:
our magazines are nearly empty... The position is hardly less difficult as regards
gun ammunition. The consumption has surpassed all our calculations and anticipations.
What made these circumstances even more serious was that Russia's economy was
in no condition to remedy the situation. Recent strikes in all of the major cities
had slowed the process of industrialization and modernization which was still
taking place in Russia. "Russia's technological and industrial base, decisive
in twentieth century warfare, was much inferior to that of Germany... The comparatively
weak Russian private industry was unprepared for conversion to military needs,
and the output of state owned plants was insignificant in comparison to wartime
needs." Amazingly, Nicholas had engaged Russia in a war for which they were entirely
unprepared. Sadly, this news sounded vaguely familiar. The Russo-Japanese War
almost a decade before had also been characterized by Russia's unpreparedness
for battle. Yet despite the painful lesson of the losses to the Japanese, nothing
had been done to remedy the situation. "Absurd and unbelievable as it might seem,
Nicholas had left his army, the pride of every Russian Emperor since Peter the
Great, in such hands during the decade since the Russo-Japanese war that, in less
than a week of fighting, it was running out of ammunition!...- the lessons of
the Russo-Japanese War had gone unlearned," .
The guilt for this situation lay, unsurprisingly on Nicholas and the ministers
he had put in place. Clearly Nicholas had no desire for war, and this fact had
caused him to ignore the approaching storm clouds until they were actually upon
him. This denial was compounded by the problem that neither the Emperor nor his
advisors seemed capable of properly evaluating either Russia's capabilities or
the realities of a modern, continental war. The result was an interesting blend
of arrogance and willed obliviousness. For instance, it was commonly believed
that the 'Great War' would be over quickly, and thus calculations were made based
on the idea that the war would last only a few months. As the months wore on there
was increasing alarm at a problem which had not been accounted for. "In Russia,
as elsewhere, it had been assumed that the war would be a short one. It was found
that, tragically, the stocks of shells were sufficient only for a campaign of
twelve weeks, and the factories could meet only a third of what was needed." The
people who suffered for this oversight were the millions of Russian peasants turned
into soldiers who died by the thousands each day, often without proper weapons.
To deal with the problem, soldiers fought under brutal conditions. "These poor
devils (the infantry) had to wait patiently until their comrades fell before their
eyes and they could pick up their weapons." At one point, the minister of war
went as far as to suggest that: "...the soldiers should be armed with axes; at
another occasion, he deemed it necessary for the Tsar to issue an edict rationing
Russian soldiers to only three shots a day." Nicholas reacted to his army's shortages
in the most bizarre manner. At several points he inadvertently mentioned the subject
in his letters to his wife. However, at no point did Nicholas deal with them directly
or explain possible methods for remedying it. In late December, 1914 he wrote:
"At the front everything is quite satisfactory. N. (Nicholas Nikolaevich) is in
a good humour and as usual demands rifles and ammunition. The question of supplying
our railways and factories with coal has assumed alarming character...Only imagine,
if the manufacture of military supplies were to cease! And this because of a lack
of coal... I am convinced that energetic measures will pull us out of these difficulties."
This passage reveals a great deal about Nicholas' attitudes. He begins by saying
that "everything at the front is quite satisfactory" but then goes on to discuss
a very serious set of problems. As he relates the problem to his wife it sounds
more like he is telling a suspenseful story than relating a grave military problem.
At the end he says that he is sure "energetic measures" will pull them out of
the situation. Not only does he not discuss what such measures might be, there
is also an air of removal in his writing, from the question. In another letter
he writes: "But again there crops up this damnable question of the shortage of
artillery, ammunition and rifles." Again there is no mention of a practical solution.
His manner of writing suggests that he did not feel directly responsible for solving
the problem. He acknowledges that it is there but declines to offer his energy
to fix it. In fact, there is no mention anywhere in his writing of a proposal
by Nicholas or his advisors for how to deal with the weapon and ammunition shortages.
Slowly, as the war rolled on, the situation did improve slightly, particularly
under the diligent care of the Chief of Staff, Alekseev, but it was more than
a year before the situation improved and in the mean time hundreds of thousands
of Russians died without weapons to defend themselves. Fifteen days after general
mobilization the First and Second Corps of the Russian Army attacked Eastern Prussia.
Paleologue, the French ambassador, had begged Russia for immediate action in order
to alleviate the attack on France along Germany's western front. Russia complied
although their army was far from fully mobilized. Lacking total readiness they
became disorganized and were decisively beaten losing 92,000 prisoners and more
to death. These losses did not come as a complete surprise to those in charge.
In fact, Sazonov had specifically requested that the Tsar not take personal command
of the army because: "It's to be expected that we may be obliged to retreat during
the first weeks of the war. Your Majesty ought not to expose yourself to the criticism
that such a retreat would be bound to cause." During the next year the military
situation did not improve. The German forces repeatedly beat their Russian adversaries
with superior weapons and organization, killing and taking prisoner millions of
Russians. There were some Russian victories for example, in defense of the city
of Warsaw. However, the German and Austrian armies continued to transfer increasingly
large proportions of their armies to the eastern front and eventually Russia lost
Warsaw and Poland.
Austro-German forces broke through the Russian frontline between Tarnow and Gorlice,
and the painful retreat of the Russian army from Galicia began...During the rest
of the summer all of Russian Poland, Lithuania, and parts of Belorussia and Volhynia
were taken by the advancing German and Austro-Hungarian armies... The line of
the Russian fortresses along the western border of the empire proved to be entirely
useless.
The Russian army was continually forced to retreat. Disorganization and unsuccessful
military attempts demoralized the army and many soldiers chose to desert the cause
altogether. Nicholas however, seemed unaffected by the difficulties at the front.
During the first year of the war, before he took supreme command, he made only
mention of some of the most serious losses of the war. Part of the explanation
for this lies in the fact that Nicholas spent the first year of the war traveling
across the countryside away from the fighting, inspecting troops , hospitals and
Russian villages. In fact, at one point he wrote to his wife: "I agree with you,
my darling, that my chief work is the inspection of troops." Although troop inspections
and visits had the profoundly important effect of raising troop moral, it also
meant that Nicholas stayed primarily detached from the uglier aspects of the war.
His commentary on the troops and the villages which he visited, illustrates the
separation between the Tsar and his people's suffering. During one tour of the
countryside, the Tsar stopped at several small towns to greet the local people.
His impressions of their situation are extremely skewed given the reality of the
number of deaths suffered throughout the country. Nicholas writes: "But I repeat
again: all our impressions are delightful. What the country is achieving and will
go on achieving till the end of the war is wonderful and immense... At each station
the platforms are crowded with people, especially children; there are thousands
of them, and they are charming with their tiny papaleha on their heads. Naturally
the reception in every town were touchingly cordial." Nicholas' life during the
time that his country was locked in mortal combat resembled more closely the life
of a modern day constitutional monarch. He was, for the most part, uninvolved
in the logistics necessary for running the war, but instead spent his time on
showy presentations and parades. It is true that using his person as a symbol
of hope to the army was an important facet of his role as Tsar however, Nicholas
made it his only contribution. While generals at the front were desperately trying
to solve supply problems, Nicholas, who might have been the one man to unite the
government in ending these crises, remained uninvolved.
There are other examples of Nicholas' psychological removal from the realities
of war. Once again the Tsar's letters to his wife reveal a great deal about his
attitudes about which events were important and which were less so. On April 19,
1915 Nicholas wrote: "divine weather. Yesterday I went halfway to Yalta; saw the
big landslide. It is much cooler here. The old man seems well, send his thanks."
The telegram is seemingly meaningless however, the editor notes that the day before
German soldiers had made major advances, crossing farther into Russia and reaching
the Carpathian Mountains. "But here again, as at the time of the Masurian battles,
the tsar, makes no comment on the disastrous course of events. It is inconceivable
that he was not informed." There are several explanations for why Nicholas failed
to write of these serious events in his correspondence with his wife. While it
is possible that he did not wish to burden her with the sad news, it seems unlikely
as husband and wife shared almost everything, particularly their difficulties
related to the running of the country. Since Nicholas must have known of the losses,
it seems more likely that he either considered them to be less important than
the details he did relate to his wife, or he was in some sort of denial about
their significance. The later seems probable since it fits Nicholas' pattern of
behavior. He repeatedly down played the importance of serious events, preferring
to believe that they would go away on their own. This tendency is also present
in Nicholas' letters to his mother. In November, 1914, at a time when the Russian
Army was suffering tremendously under the weapon shortages and continual losses
to the German Army, Nicholas made a short visit to the front where several divisions
of troops were stationed in preparation for German advances. On his return, Nicholas
wrote to his mother the following: "I have come back in very good spirits indeed
and deeply impressed by everything I saw and heard at Ivangorod." These type of
reflections are common among Nicholas' correspondence and in fact make up the
bulk of his commentary of the subject of war. The Tsar's relationship to the war,
particulary during its early years, is perhaps best summarized by his attitude
toward his soldiers. Nicholas did, in fact, feel very close to his soldiers, as
he had always felt close to the Russian people as a whole. The problem was that
Nicholas clung to a romanticized view of his role with respect to the troops and
their functions. This was not helped by the fact that Nicholas rarely saw the
war as it really was. He was miles away from the fighting, and visits to the front
were always preceded by preparations to present the army in the best possible
light. The Tsar did little to dispense with ritual and to investigate the true
condition of the soldiers. He spent the first year of the war performing troop
inspections, where officers put on their best dress and soldiers knelt in perfectly
formed lines in front of their leader. In this way, Nicholas was able to maintain
his delusions about the war. Nicholas' letters again provides small clues. He
writes in one letter, dated March, 1915, about a visit to the camp of the 4th
Army Corps: "On the huts occupied by the officers their surnames are inscribed;
they are surrounded by little gardens, with benches, gymnastic apparatus, and
all sorts of amusements for the children. I thought with sadness of those who
will never again return here." Here we see a romanticized description of a small,
abandoned town which had been turned into an army camp. The Tsar comments offhand
about his sadness toward the deaths which would strip the village of its inhabitants.
This picture is representative of the Tsar's understanding of war. He is saddened
at the death of his countrymen, but has not real understanding of the suffering
or significance related to these events. Sadly Nicholas' detachment from the reality
of war was to continue until his abdication. This desire to view events through
a positive lense, even at the expense of distorting the truth was an integral
part of the Tsar's personality. Unfortunately, when he chose, in 1915, to take
charge of the army he brought his distorted view of reality with him.
From the moment that war was announced the question of Nicholas taking supreme
command of the army was of great concern to the Tsar and his wife. Alexandra wanted
Nicholas to take charge because she believed that he needed to exercise comprehensive
control over the government and the war it was waging. Nicholas however, desired
the position because it appealed fiercely to his notion of the Tsar as leader
and father to his people. Despite this fact, Nicholas was convinced by his ministers
initially not take command. Although the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire
made Nicholas Supreme Commander of Russia's armed forces, his ministers and particularly
his foreign minister, Sazonov, urged him not to exercise that aspect of his imperial
authority. 'Its to be expected that we may be obliged to retreat during the war's
first weeks, You Majesty ought not to expose yourself to the criticism that such
a retreat would be bound to cause'...After some hesitation, Nicholas bestowed
command of Russia's armies upon his uncle, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.
Nicholas Nikolaevich remained as commander-in-chief for one year. Alexandra disliked
the Grand Duke for many reasons and immediately after his promotion began to urge
her husband to replace him as general. She wrote frequently about her lack of
trust in his abilities and about the importance of Nicholas staying in control.
Be firm, Lovy mine, show your own mind, let others feel you know what you wish.
Remember you are the Emperor, and that others dare not take so much upon themselves
- beginning by a mere detail, as the Nostitz story - he is in your suite and therefore
Nikolasha has absolutely no right to give orders without asking your permission
first,
On June 16, Alexandra wrote: "I have absolutely no faith in Nikolasha - know him
to be far from clever and having gone against a man of God's, his work can't be
blessed, not his advice good." Over the next two months Alexandra made continual
references to Nicholas Nikolaevich's removal from office, pointing out his mistakes
and most of all reminding Nicholas that his Commander-in-chief had gone against
Rasputin on several occasions, indicating in her mind that the Grand Duke was
not in God's favor. The Tsar admired his uncle, associating him strongly with
his own father. However, that summer Nicholas went home to spend two months with
his family, and by August, upon his departure he had been convinced to replace
his uncle as commander. Before leaving for the front to inform his uncle, the
Tsar told his war minister Aleksei Polivanov of his intentions. The next day at
the Council of Ministers, Polivanov made an announcement. "There is a far more
horrible event which threatens Russia, I feel obliged to inform the government
that this morning, during my report, His Majesty told me of his decision to remove
the Grand Duke (Nikolai Nikolaevich) and to personally assume the supreme command
of the army." The Council was devastated by this news. All of them understood
that Nicholas was not the right man for the position; "the majority were shaken
by the news that they had heard - the latest stunning blow in the midst of the
military misfortunes and internal complications which were being suffered." Nicholas
was indecisive and easily influenced, while the country in a state of defense
from without and turmoil from within, needed a strong leader. "The magnitude,
complexity and danger of the struggle in which Russia was involved called for
a strong leader, with broad and flexible political views and an intimate feeling
for the needs and sentiments of his country. Despite his personal integrity and
patriotism, Nicholas II was not such a leader." Nicholas' decision to take command
of the Russian Army had disastrous consequences both for the country and for the
Romanov Dynasty. Not only was he ill- equipt to handle the rigors of managing
an enormous army, but more seriously his removal from the domestic political scene
in St. Petersburg meant that his wife, Alexandra, was left with a tremendous amount
of control. In a short period of time she became involved in every aspect of Russian
domestic policy. Lacking in experience she relied upon her 'intuition' and the
advice of her limited group of friends, headed by Rasputin. 'When the Emperor
went to war, of course his wife governed instead of him' explained Grand Duke
Alexander Michailovich. From the moment the Tsar stepped aboard the imperial train
and steamed off toward headquarters to take supreme command, Alexandra began to
preside over his government. In the two and a half years that followed, it deteriorated
with a shocking rapidity that is without parallel in modern history.
While Nicholas allowed and in fact supported his wife's interference, it would
ironically be Alexandra and her actions which would bring about the final destruction
of Imperial rule.
From the time of Nicholas' accession, Alexandra had been involved in many of the
most important political decisions that her husband made during his reign. However,
when he departed for General Headquarters in August, 1915 the nature of her involvement
changed drastically. During the next year and a half, Nicholas made only short
visits home to see his family in Petrograd. This meant that Alexandra became the
functional head of the government. "When the tsar left for Mogilev in September,
1915 to assume supreme command of the fighting front, he entrusted the tsaritsa
informally to be his agent of representative in the civil government affairs."
, Nicholas wrote, "you ought to be my eyes and ears there in the capital while
I have to stay here.". Nicholas effectively gave up control of his government
to his wife's discretion. During this time Alexandra wrote letters to her husband
to ask permission for various decisions. However, the majority of the information
he received went through her and in most cases he deferred finally to her opinion.
The arrangement worked conveniently for both; it allowed Alexandra to have the
involvement she had long been trying to attain through her husband, and for Nicholas
it meant less responsibility . When he took charge at headquarters, the tsar described
his new position as a: "new, heavy responsibility on my shoulders" , turning then
to his wife and saying: "Think, my Wify, will you not come to the assistance of
your hubby now that he is absent? What a pity that you have not been fulfilling
this duty for a long time or at least during the war!" Unfortunately, while this
system worked well for the Imperial couple, it wrecked havoc on the nation and,
in particular, the domestic government. In a relatively short period of time the
Russian government, as an active body, was brought to an end, leaving only a series
of ministers who catered exclusively to Imperial whim. Nicholas' old tutor Pobedonostev,
once said of Alexandra: "She knows nothing, but she thinks she knows everything,...
Hers is the small mind that believes it harbours a great intelligence!" It was
with this confidence in herself and her 'women's instincts' that Alexandra turned
to govern the nation of Russia. Undeterred by the concerns of the ministers around
her, Alexandra plunged ahead, hacking away at the government's leaders, changing
policy and promoting her supporters. When her husband went to G.H.Q. and she took
upon herself the direction of affairs of state, the Empress proceeded by trial
and error on her own initiatives instead of following steadily and intelligently
along the lines indicated by her husband, she tried to coordinate her own ideas
with those of 'our friend' (Rasputin) and made it impossible for those ministers
who took their office seriously to get anything done.
Intolerant of anyone who disagreed with her, Alexandra set to work removing those
ministers who showed any resistence to her or enthusiasm for ideas which went
against the autocracy. In order to achieve this, Alexandra set up the government
inside her apartments. Ministers who wanted to discuss matters with her were forced
to go through her personal group of friends. During this time, Alexandra wrote
her husband constantly, explaining her opinions and forcefully suggesting the
changes she believed were needed. "Her correspondence testifies that she was into
everything: she suppressed appointments, consulted and issued orders. The 400
letters she sent on a daily basis, to the Tsar are reports of the affairs of court
and the government" Through these methods Alexandra made some of the most disastrous
decisions of the war period. She continually promoted men who were entirely inept,
almost to the point of dangerousness. One of the best examples of this pattern
was the appointment of Boris Sturmer to the position of prime minister. Sturmer
was incompetent, inexperienced and hated without exception by the rest of the
government. "In his (Goremykin's) place she suggested Boris Sturmer, an obscure
ultra-conservative with one important asset: Rasputin liked him." The French ambassador
Maurice Paleologue once described Sturmer as: "worse than a mediocrity... third
rate intellect, a mean spirit, low character, doubtful honesty, no experience
and no idea of state business." Sturmer also ironically carried another bed characteristic,
he had a German last name and at a time when almost every Russian held a vehement
hatred for the Germans. Sturmer's appointment created tremendous resentment. Sturmer
was only one example. During the year and a half that Alexandra was running domestic
affairs, ministers came and went so quickly that it became impossible to conduct
business. "Between July 1914 and February 1917 Russia had 4 premiers, 6 ministers
of internal affairs, 3 ministers of foreign affairs, 4 ministers of war, 4 ministers
of agriculture, 4 ministers of justice and even 4 overprocurators of the Holy
Synod!" Perhaps the worst example of the ministerial ineptitude sponsored by the
Imperial couple was the promotion of Alexander Protopopov to the position of minister
of Internal Affairs. Protopopov was a long time supporter of Rasputin, and through
him received the promotion. However, it soon became clear that Protopopov was
entirely incapable of performing his job and was probably also suffering from
insanity. Britain's Ambassador Buchanan also characterized Protopopov as "mentally
deranged" and went on to say that, after Rasputin's death, Protopopov 'would,
in his audiences with he Empress, repeat warnings and messages which he had received
in his imaginary converse with Rasputin's spirit.
Protopopov was once caught talking to an icon on his desk and responded to an
inquiry by saying that: "He helps me do everything, everything I do is by his
advice." It is clear that the presence of such incompetent men in Russia's government
created a formidable impediment to those people who were actually interested in
the affairs of state. Alexandra however, did not seem to understand the destructiveness
of making such frequent changes. In August, 1915 she wrote to Nicholas about a
new choice for Minister of the Interior. Her words indicate a complete lack of
understanding of how the absence of stability affected her government. "I do hope
Goremykin will agree to your choice of Khvostov - you need an energetic minister
of the interior - should he be the wrong man, he can later be changed - no harm
in that, at such times," Amazingly, Nicholas did seem to understand the effects
of these constant changes. In one letter to his wife, Nicholas tried to express
his concern: "All these changes make my head go round. In my opinion, they are
too frequent. In any case, they are not good for the internal situation of the
country, as each new man brings with him alterations in the administration." His
concerns however did not keep him from continually conceding to his wife's suggestions
for the purification of the ministry. For Alexandra, the idea of continuity was
not even a consideration. She had much larger concerns to protect. The majority
of ministerial changes were made in order to get rid of those people who were
not completely supportive of her and her new found power. Finally she had an outlet
with which to protect her husband's reign and her son's inheritance. Married to
a weak man Alexandra felt it was her duty to provide the firmness which he lacked.
Alexandra once told Pierre Gilliard, the children's tutor, that Nicholas, "suffered
from crippling shyness which made him agree with all opinions presented to him.
He could not take charge in a situation." It was for this reason that Alexandra
felt it necessary to gather such complete control into her own hands. This power
was not only limited to domestic affairs. Through her letters to the Tsar she
extended her grasp to the front lines of the military and the decisions made there.
It is unclear exactly why Alexandra chose to become so closely involved in Nicholas'
decisions at the front. Most likely, it was simply the result of her knowledge
that Nicholas was easily influenced and an opportunity presented itself for her
to gain further control. This was compounded by the fact that Alexandra was convinced
that she alone had an understanding of what Russia needed, she relied on her instincts
to guide her, often in the face of great opposition. "It is important to remember
that Alexandra believed she herself knew what was best for the country." Alexandra's
beliefs led her to write over 400 letters to he husband while he was off at war,
many of which included instructions and nagging advice which almost always succeeded
in wearing away any resistence from her husband. "Over the course of the war,
her letters to the tsar were increasingly filled with requests, political judgements,
and in many cases, outright orders." With her minute amount of political knowledge
and armed with the advice of the peasant Rasputin, Alexandra audaciously proceeded
to advise her husband. "He (Rasputin) begs you very much to send a telegram to
the king of Serbia, as he is very anxious that Bulgaria will finish them off -
so I enclose the paper again for you to use it for your telegram - the sense in
your words and shorter of course...." Not only had she asserted the opinion of
a man with no experience in politics or war, but she had the audacity to dictate
how Nicholas should write the telegram. Not even trusting him to perform the smallest
duty correctly, she gave him precise instructions on how to enact her 'suggestions'.
In another letter, Alexandra's suggestions became almost humourous. She proceeded
to suggest that casualties related to German bombardment might be reduced if the
commanders realized that: "one must go quickly under their (the German's heavy
guns) range as they are for great distances and cannot change quickly" Alexandra's
advice reads like the suggestion of a school child, and the fact that she seems
to think that the army's generals whom she was so quick to criticize, had not
already realized this point reveals a tremendously overactive idea of her own
self importance. Only two months before Nicholas abdication, Alexandra wrote yet
another letter to her husband, this one proportionally more autocratic in it tone.
The difference in tone between this letter and the previous ones shows how Alexandra's
influence had become an accepted part of the Imperial couple's correspondence.
December 14, 1916 she wrote: With a clean conscience before all of Russia, I would
calmly send Lvov to Siberia; I would strip Samarin of his rank (Nicholas signed
this paper in Moscow), and I would also send Miliukov, Guchkov and Polivanov to
Siberia. A war is going on, and in such a time an internal war is state treason,
why you do not see it that way, I truly cannot understand. I am only a woman,
but my heart and mind tell me that this would be the saving of Russia.
The significance of these letters lies in the fact that at a time when Russia
was at war with several European powers, the tsar's most respected advisor was
a woman with no military experience and her illiterate peasant companion.
When examining Alexandra's actions and their impact on the Russian government,
it is important to factor in the role of her accomplice, Rasputin. By 1914, Rasputin
had won the Tsarina's complete devotion through his aid with the Tsarevich and
also through his support of Nicholas' autocratic regime. This devotion led to
a mutual relationship in which Alexandra received support and verification of
her beliefs in exchange for giving Rasputin power of the ministry as well as freedom
to conduct himself however he chose. The relationship worked particularly well
because Rasputin understood the Tsarina's mind set and her need to support the
idea of absolute autocracy, thus his advice was focused on maximizing Nicholas'
power and glorifying his position. "He (Rasputin) spoke much and beautifully about
what a Russian Emperor is. Though other Sovereigns are anointed and crowned, only
the Russian one has been a real Anointed for the last 3 hundred years!" With Alexandra's
new access to control and Nicholas' devotion to her, this relationship took on
dangerous proportions. Alexandra's steady stream of advice to her husband was
often framed in suggestions made by Rasputin. These suggestions ranged from appointments
of ministers to military advances and advice on how the Duma should be dealt with.
Alexandra always managed to word her letters in a manner that suggested that denial
of her orders would surely bring about Russia's ruin. In a letter to her husband
Alexandra wrote,: "I must give you a message from Our Friend prompted by what
he saw in the night. He begs you to order that one should advance near Riga, says
it is necessary, otherwise the Germans will settle down so strongly through all
the winter..." What is perhaps even more amazing than Alexandra's willingness
to pass along these suggestions is the frequency with which Nicholas responded
positively to them. While there were some cases in which Nicholas did resist Rasputin's
influence, (he once wrote Alexandra that he thought: "Out Friend's opinions of
people are sometimes very strange, as you know yourself - therefore one must be
careful, especially with appointments to high offices." ), the majority of the
time the combined power of his wife and her 'holy man' was enough to overcome
any resistance from the Tsar. "Her letters to Nicholas day be day contain the
instructions which Rasputin gave on every detail of administration of the Empire...
and a simple comparison of the dates with he events which followed shows that
in almost every case they were carried out." This pattern worked quite well for
Alexandra. She was able to induce Nicholas to agree with many changes in government
which he might otherwise not have. Nicholas trusted his wife completely, but it
was Rasputin' connection with God that gave her requests their needed validity.
"Her interests concerned the preservation of the autocracy. When confronted with
opposition from her husband, Alexandra would invoke Rasputin's name, thereby forcing
Nicholas to make either a choice based on his own beliefs or a choice blessed
by God." This connection between Rasputin and God was important to Nicholas and
Alexandra because it strengthened their resolve in the face of major opposition
from many of those around them. Alexandra was equally diligent in following Rasputin's
advice in her own actions. In fact, the great majority of her decisions were influenced
by Rasputin's opinions. "Her rule amounted to personal preferences for some persons
over others, depending on whether or not these persons were friends or enemies
of 'our friend'." Alexandra's reliance on Rasputin was not simply based on his
help with healing the Tsarevich's illness. She believed that her thoughts were
guided by God, and as the Empress of Russia, had greater insight into her country's
best interest. Rasputin's reassurance affirmed this notion by continually agreeing
with her views. "She (Alexandra) was not so smug as to think that she could discern
His will unaided, she needed Rasputin to interpret it for her, but conviction
came first then endorsement." Rasputin's effect on Alexandra and their combined
power over the Tsar and his government had a devastating effect on Russia. With
the country at war, losing thousands of men each day, Russia needed stability
and organization. Alexandra provided neither and during the year and a half that
Nicholas was absent, the government deteriorated both in effectiveness and esteem
among the people. As time went on these inadequacies became glaringly apparent
to the people who waited impatiently for a successful end to the war and a return
to better living conditions. This was not destined to happen. The lack of direction
and order in Russia grew out of control.
There was no one to put things in order. The authorities were everywhere, supposedly
giving orders, and there were a lot of them. But there was no directing will,
no plan, no system; and there couldn't be given the general discord among the
executive authorities, and given the absence of legislative work and genuine control
over the work of the ministers. The supreme authority...was imprisoned by harmful
influences and harmful forces. It provided no motivating force.
This state of affairs was well known to Nicholas at the front. Many of his uncles
and cousins were exceedingly worried about Alexandra's role in the government
and the degree to which she was causing it to be weakened. In fact, in their diaries
both Nicholas' favorite uncle Nicholas Nikolaevich and his cousin Alexander Michailovich,
whom he had grown up with, mention speaking to Nicholas about the subject of Alexandra's
unpopularity and the government's ineffectiveness. In response they received only
blank stares and the tsar's reply that he "trusts only his wife". This trust proved
stronger than the warnings of his relatives, and the destructive arrangement continued.
Nicholas refused to take into consideration a more significant element than his
uncles' disapproval. By 1916, the people of St. Petersburg and Moscow were fully
aware of the status of the government. They knew about Rasputin's notorious behavior
as well as his influence at Court and they were furious that he was being allowed
to hold such authority over their country. "At the time, the term camarilla was
applied to the little group of persons in the know who, with Alexandra, Rasputin
and Vyrubova and the ministers who owed their appointments to Rasputin, were pursuing
a policy that, it was thought, was leading the country to ruin." Resentment towards
the government and the Imperial family grew as they began to feel betrayed by
those people who were supposed to protect them from harm rather than embracing
it. "As the country became aware of who was really ruling it, the prestige of
the supreme authority fell. In place of the traditional respect for the throne,
indignation and contempt spread through the country toward that handful of people
who were really responsible for the situation which had come about." In February
1917 this anger finally came to a head when the people decided that they had enough
of disorganization and betrayal. In their attempt to preserve the autocracy Nicholas
and Alexandra tried to do the impossible, to control a people who wanted freedom
through the means of oppression. The deterioration of the government under the
control of Alexandra and Rasputin served as the final piece of evidence that the
government was interested not in governing them but only in ruling over them.
