The New Georgia Patrols
BY
Frank J. GUIDONE
Captain USMC (Ret.)

COASTWATCHERS

“Ferdinand” was the code word for coast watchers, their program was initiated by Australia before the World War II. They were experienced bushmen who were commissioned either in the Australian navy or air force. In the Central Solomons they were under the immediate direction of Hugh Mackenzie. He had stationed, flight officer J. A. Corrigan in the vicinity of Rice Anchorage, sub lieutenants Henry Josselyn and J. H. Keenan on Vella Lavella, A.R. Evans, on Kolombangara and lieutenants Dick Horton and R. R. A. Robinson on Rendova. To these men and others like them fell the responsibility of reporting enemy movements by land, air and sea. This intelligence was invaluable in countering Japanese domination of the Solomons. Their exploits are legend. Vital information on estimating time of arrival of enemy air and sea attacks was greatly appreciated by the defense forces on Guadalcanal.

Coastwatcher Dick Croften Horton was with the 1st Raiders on Tulagi as was Henry Josselyn who later led the1st Raiders in a patrol on Florida Island.
From their vantage points within enemy-held territory the coast watchers also reported the enemy’s progress in building airfields and boat refuges. Moreover, they conducted raids from time to time on the enemy’s encampments or ambushed their patrols. By virtue of the information they passed to allied commanders on Guadalcanal, American airmen compiled record scores in the gigantic air battles fought in he skies above Henderson airfield.
Sometimes shortly after the landing forces had secured a contested beach, groups of friendly natives at the heels of a nearby coast watcher would come smiling into the newly won beach head, to assist the Americans in driving the hated enemy from their island.
Air and naval task group commander reports had finally led Admiral Halsey, after seizing Russell Island, to initiate a series of amphibious reconnaissance patrols into the New Georgia area, to determine what action he could take to counter the Japanese threat. At this time the long-range planning of Brigadier General De Witt Peck USMC to take the New Georgia Islands was well under way, and it met Halsey’s desire for information for future use when South Pacific forces undertook execution of the New Georgia “Toenails Operation.”
For three weeks the patrols scouted beaches, reconnoitered trails, contacted coast- watchers, friendly natives and closely observed Japanese activities in and around Munda Island. Lieutenant William Coultis, USN a participant in the patrols returned to Halsey’s Noumea headquarters just after the Joint Chiefs issued their 28 March 1943 directive and stated that an assault against New Georgia was entirely practicable.
At this time Brig. General Peck’s plan envisaged a division landing at Segi Point on the southeast tip of New Georgia. The force would then sweep westward, destroy the Japanese garrisons on New Georgia, and seize Munda airfield. A landing at Segi would be unopposed, because allied coast watchers there had friendly natives firmly under their control and no Japanese dared to enter his area. Toward the end of February ’43, the first of these patrols landed at the Rovianna Lagoon. The patrol was composed of Captain Clay Boyd, from the First Raider battalion and Lieutenant William Coultis,USN, a ComSoPac staff officer (1) at the beginning. More would join later.

FIRST RAIDER BATTALION

I was not privy to the opinions and expectations of the top “brass.” At this time the operating plans for the attack on New Georgia were top secret. I was a platoon sergeant in “A “Company of the 1st Raider Battalion. I had survived the Tulagi and Guadalcanal engagements. My information was limited to the world within my unit. My knowledge was based on my experience. I can relate accurately what I saw, where I went, and what I did during that period.
The 1st Raider Battalion had just returned to Camp Saint Louis, New Caledonia Island after a great R&R break in New Zealand. We had been rewarded for our victories against the Japanese on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The troops were re-energized and were in the process of training new replacements, while being re-supplied with new weapons and ammunition. The battalion was now up to full strength, physically fit and blessed with the combat experience of the many veterans on the rolls. There were considerable rumors floating throughout the company about the next campaign. Kavieng or Rabaul were two possibilities. Little did we know how powerful those two areas were, loaded with thousands of enemy troops and many warships. In any event, we had helped to defeat the Japanese at Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Our egos were swollen and we felt that we had the enemy on the run. We had a new platoon leader, Warrant Officer Charles James. He had been in the Corps for quite a while and his instructions to us were loud and clear. We were quite pleased and most of the platoon accepted him. He was no Johnny come lately second lieutenant.
Before the next campaign, advance information would be required as to suitable landing beaches, tides and the location of Japanese defenses. Not many special units were available to obtain information of this type except the men of the Raider battalions. We were available and the most qualified. Our regular training made us a hit and run type of unit. The First Marine Division was in the last phases of their Guadalcanal battle and was heading for Australia and R&R. So at this time we were positioned at the front of the line.

HOW I BECAME A MEMBER OF THE FIRST NEW GEORGIA PATROL

One day, as I was returning to my quarters, I was crossing a small road that led through our camp. A jeep was approaching, driven by Captain Clay Boyd, the commander of Company “D”. He stopped the jeep in front of me and waved for me to approach him. We saluted each other. I had never spoken to him before, and I did not know him well. He asked me if I had any boxing bouts scheduled. (I had done some boxing on the island that he apparently knew about.) I responded that I had none planned. After talking a bit about other battalion boxers, he then asked me point-blank if I would be interested in going north for some “fighting”. I saw this as a chance to get some temporary duty away from my boring training schedule. I indicated my interest, at which point he started the jeep, telling me he would get back to me when he had more information. About two days later my 1st Sergeant contacted me and told me that I was to meet Captain Boyd at battalion headquarters the next morning. A jeep would be sent to pick me up. That was a surprise!
At 09:00 I met Captain Boyd, who asked me to follow him. We entered a large tent that had many officers and NCOs milling around. We were then ordered to take a seat. I located myself well to the rear, very uncomfortable in the presence of some high ranking officers and thinking, “This can’t be all about boxing!!” Soon a full colonel entered the tent and we all leaped to our feet as attention was sounded. It was Colonel Liversedge, the regimental commander. He made his way to the podium and addressed us, introducing some of the Navy and Marine officers. For the first time, I heard the name of the objective, New Georgia, which I only knew was to the north of the “Canal” and certainly was occupied by the Japanese. At this point I knew the “fighting” was not about a boxing agenda.
Captain Boyd then revealed to me that he was forming a patrol, to make a reconnaissance on the New Georgia Island and asked if I would volunteer to go. When I asked him who else was on the patrol he replied that he could not reveal that information at that time. I then asked him why he selected me. He replied that he had read my record, including my past experience as an NCO, the work that I had done on the Tulagi and Guadalcanal campaigns, and that my company commander had recommended me. Realizing that I had been the one selected from the whole battalion I realized it was quite an honor so I made my decision. I would go.
In February 1943 word revealed that New Georgia Islands, 160 miles from Guadalcanal, could be our next mission. The South Pacific Command at Nouméa realized that Japanese were building an airfield at Munda, the key island, which would be a great threat to our base on Guadalcanal. They would have an easy air jaunt from Munda to Guadalcanal to attack us. It was also a good relay station for the enemy troops from Rabaul and Kavieng on their way to fight us. If we permitted them to build an airfield on Munda, our holdings on Guadalcanal would be in jeopardy.
At the time I had been selected by Captain Boyd to be a member of the patrol, I didn’t know that other patrols were also being formed. Boyd, of course knew, but never shared this information with me. I am certain he was more concerned with his responsibility to the upper brass and the reports he had to make to them. After all, there was a whole campaign riding on his shoulders.
As far as I knew at the time, there were no special requirements to become members of these patrols. We were simply volunteers. Patrol leaders were allowed to select their crews who were NCOs or officers with experience and good performance reports within their units. Company commanders usually selected from their own company. I found out that Captain Ed Wheeler, a patrol leader, required that the members of his group be capable of swimming a certain distance, be knowledgeable of weapons and would take short courses on map and compass readings.
During the patrols our principal mode of travel was by native war canoes. Being over deep water, with all of the equipment we carried, we needed to be capable of swimming. Though I had been raised near the Ohio River and was an avid swimmer, I did not relish struggling in the water with the weight of all of my gear. I witnessed this problem when we were crossing a river in the approach march to Enogai and several Raiders had to be rescued, when they fell into deep water.

John Miller Jr. was a former marine and a Guadalcanal Campaign veteran. After the war he became an army historian who wrote this “…The Solomon Islands were some of the least known and underdeveloped areas in the world. One of the worst possible places to fight a war. The islands had much in common, and much that is common is unpleasant. The islands were mountainous, jungle covered, pest ridden, and possessed a hot, wet tropical climate. There were no roads, major ports or developed facilities. New Georgia was all of this and more.
The New Georgia Islands were a terrible place with few clear beaches. All of its inhabitants were exposed to thick jungles, steep ridges, and many streams and swamps. The native trails followed the low ground in and around swamps. The only good trails were those that were adjacent to the coastline. In this environment the coast watchers generally lived on the high ground with no trails to their abode. In case of an emergency he and his natives would dismantle their radio, pack their personal gear and move to another selected area. Our mission was finding a suitable landing beach, making contact with the coast watchers, and determining the location of the Japanese strong points. Munda and Kolombangara were known to base a large number of Japanese troops. Hopefully, the patrols would provide all necessary information, in the event that New Georgia Islands would be our next campaign.

PATROLS WHICH WERE MADE ON THE NEW GEORGIA ISLANDS

To better understand the New Georgia patrols the following excerpt is included:
From: Rentz, Major John M. USMCR, USMC Historical Monograph, Marines in the Central Solomons Chapt. 2, pgs. 18-19. (4)
As soon as the Japanese revealed the magnitude of their Central Solomons undertakings, South Pacific planes and ships had struck the area with repeated blows. But these seemed ineffectual and did not appear to hamper the progress of the Japanese labors. Pilot and naval task group commander reports finally had led Admiral Halsey, after seizing the Russells, to initiate a series of amphibious reconnaissance patrols into the New Georgia area to determine what action he could take to counter the Japanese threat. At this time General Peck's long-range planning was well under way and Halsey desired information for future use when South Pacific forces undertook execution of the TOENAILS operation.
About the end of February the first of these patrols--six Marines led by Lieutenant William Coultis, USN, a ComSoPac staff officer--landed in Roviana Lagoon. For three weeks Coultis and his men scouted beaches, reconnoitered trails, contacted coastwatchers and friendly natives, and closely observed Japanese activities in and around Munda. Coultis returned to Halsey's Noumea headquarters just after the Joint Chiefs issued their 28 March directive and stated that an assault against New Georgia was entirely practicable.
At this time General Peck's plan envisaged a division landing at Segi Point on the southeast tip of New Georgia. The force would then sweep westward, destroy the Japanese garrisons on New Georgia, and seize Munda airfield. A landing at Segi would be unopposed because Allied coastwatchers there had the friendly natives firmly under their control and no Japanese dared enter the area. When presented with this plan, General Harmon expressed serious doubts as to the feasibility of landing on Segi's limited beaches or of moving overland through the jungle with such a large body of men. To determine the validity of Harmon's objections, Halsey directed the I Marine Amphibious Corps (IMAC) to send small amphibious reconnaissance parties into the area. This mission was undertaken and action initiated even before Coultis had made his report and Halsey had departed for Brisbane.
“On 21 March 1943, four small patrols, made up of personnel from the Marine Raider Battalions and native guides, landed at Segi in PBY's. For the next three weeks, on foot or in native canoes, they reconnoitered the coasts of Kolombangara, New Georgia and Vangunu. The information they gathered proved beyond question that General Harmon's doubts were well founded, and that a new plan would have to be devised.
As a result of the Brisbane decision that a landing would be made in New Georgia, coupled with the IMAC patrol reports indicating the difficulties faced by a division landing at the eastern end of New Georgia, Halsey directed IMAC to redouble its efforts to gather information for use in further planning.
For the next three months, therefore, still other amphibious reconnaissance patrols probed the jungle coasts of the New Georgia group in search of landing beaches and areas suitable for the construction of airfields and boat bases. One group, led by Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Currin, made two trips along New Georgia's south coast, surveying beaches and gathering hydrographic information in Roviana Lagoon. A party under Captain Edwin B. Wheeler scouted the shores of Kolombangara; another followed Captain Clay A. Boyd around islands offshore from Zanana Beach and overland by trails and tracks to the vicinity of Rice Anchorage.
Gunnery Sergeant Frank Guidone headed a patrol that landed in Grassi Lagoon to locate a site for a PT base. A unit under Captain Lincoln Holdzkom operated up and down the western shores of Kula Gulf. Second Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier twice went to Vangunu in June to seek out and mark beaches for a landing projected there, and Captain W. C. Givens reconnoitered Rendova. Another group accompanied Commander Wilfred Painter, USNR, into Segi Point to survey a site for an airstrip. Each patrol received invaluable help from coastwatcher (FERDINAND) units in the areas in which it operated. Each brought back information upon which to base further planning.7 For example, amphibious reconnaissance patrols, operating out of coast watcher Kennedy's hide-out at Segi Point, shoved off for Wickham Anchorage, Viru Harbor, Rendova Island and Zanana Beach on 14 June. After operating in their respective areas for approximately 10 days, they returned to their base with information that eventually led to last-minute changes in the plans. The Wickham Anchorage patrol discovered that it would be impossible to move wheeled vehicles off the beaches. Another patrol observed that it would take a minimum of two days--maybe longer--to move troops overland from Nono to Viru Harbor. No new information could be obtained at Rendova, for the patrols there were unable to enter the Rendova Plantation area, where the projected landing would take place.
As those patrols operating in the Wickham, Zanana and Rendova areas withdrew, they left behind small parties to serve as guides for the assaulting troops on D-Day.
One New Georgia patrol was led by Captain Edwin B. Wheeler, the Commander of “B” Company, 1st Raider Battalion, which scouted the shores of Kolombangara Island with Sergeant George Lewis, later a major, and Lieutenant Phillip Oldham ,later KIA on New Georgia. This patrol completed a trip of 350 miles in native war canoes in order to scout the island of Kolombangara, one of the larger islands of the group. They reported several thousand combat troops on the island and that the beaches were not suitable for landing . Captain Wheeler, would retire as a Lt. General and would command the First Marine Division as one of his last assignments. A more detailed account of the Wheeler patrol is appended to this account.
Captain Boyd’s first patrol scouted islands offshore from Zanana beach and overland by tracks and trails to the vicinity of Rice Anchorage. This would later become the battlefield of the 1st Raider Bn. I was a member of this patrol with James and Laverty. Gunner James and I patrolled the grassy lagoon area for a possible PT boat basin - no site was selected.
On Captain Boyd’s second patrol during June 1943 were two gunnery sergeants Harry F. Erickson and Joseph Sciarra. They were both outstanding linemen in the 1st Raider’s. The patrol scouted out the Munda airfield area and they gathered the necessary information to advise and assist the planners who were developing the operation plan.
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Currin the commander of the 4th Marine Raider Battalion made two “Look see” trips along the New Georgia coast, surveying beaches and gathering hydro-graphic information regarding the Roviana lagoon area. Colonel Currin would later lead the 4th Raiders in the victory at Viru Harbor and the final battle at Bairoko.
Another patrol led by Captain Lincoln Holdzkom would operate up and down the western shores of the Kula gulf, this gulf would be a battle scene for Japanese and the U.S. Navy warships during the campaign. Kula Gulf would be the grave for the USS Helena in one of the night battles.
Second Lt. Harold G. Schrier’s patrol would scout the Vangunu area, to seek out and mark beaches for a projected landing there. Raider Schrier would later lead a patrol to Mt. Surabichi and raising the two flags on Iwo Jima. ,He was a member of the former 2d Raider Battalion. Schrier's regimental commander on Iwo Jima was Colonel Harry B. Liversedge, during the New Georgia Campaign he commanded the 1st and 4th Raider Battalions and two army battalions.
Captain W.C. Givens would reconnoiter Rendova. He was not of the Raider Battalions, but was probably a staff man from regiment.
Commander Wilfred Painter, USNR, surveyed Segi point as a possible site for an airfield. It was a site favored by the Japanese for their airfield.
Each patrol received invaluable help from the coastwatcher units in the areas in which they operated and each brought back information upon which to base further planning. None of the patrols were ever detected by the Japanese. We held the high ground in the interior of the island, while the Japanese patrolled the beaches and rarely ventured into the interior. It was only when we traveled by canoe that there was danger, since the Japanese were continually patrolling the coast. The rare times that the enemy ventured into the interior was when they suspected the location of a possible coastwatcher camp in the vicinity. They would receive this type of information listening to our radio traffic. With the natives on our side and their skills of living and traveling in the jungle, there was slim chance that they could capture a coast watcher. Of course, there were some close encounters when a coast watcher was forced to leave a camp site. This would simply entail packing all their gear and radios and moving farther into the interior.
Reconnaissance patrols, operating out of coast watcher Kennedy’s hideout at Segi Point, shoved off for Wickham Anchorage, Viru Harbor, Rendova Island and Zanana Beach on 14 June . Kennedy was a former District Officer of the British Solomon Islands. Coast watchers operating in their respective areas for approximately 10 days, they would returned to their base with current information, that eventually might lead to last minute changes in our plans. The Wickham Anchorage patrol discovered that it would be impossible to move wheeled vehicles off the beaches. Another patrol observed that it would take a minimum of two days, to move troops overland from Nono to Viru harbor. Actually two companies of the 4th raiders landed at Nono on 28 June and secured Viru Harbor. That was quite a feat. No new information could be obtained about Rendova since the patrols there were unable to examine the Rendova Plantation area, that was the projected landing place. When patrols operating in the Rendova Wickham and Zanana areas withdrew, they left small parties to serve as guides for the assaulting troops. These parties were invaluable to troops who later landed in their areas.
The Raider battalions responded in a very short time to select patrol leaders and members. They were rapidly placed on New Georgia . The information submitted by these patrols, played an invaluable part in the subsequent victory. There never could have been a troop landing on those jungle islands, without the assistants of the patrols, the coast watchers and the islanders. There were only four Raider Battalions available that were trained for such special missions. I know that COMSOPAC was thankful and most certainly used us to the fullest extent. Most of the Raiders selected for the patrols had been trained in scouting and patrolling in Cuba, Quantico, Samoa and New Caledonia. Our training had consisted of exercises in mapping, compass readings, weapons operation, nomenclature, terrain appreciation and physical conditioning. With the assistance of the coast watchers and friendly natives, we were confident of success.

ONWARD TO NEW GEORGIA WITH FRANK GUIDONE

The members of my platoon smelled a rat. They were certain I was going to go somewhere. I was getting too much time off and was seen in the presence of Captain Boyd too often. They constantly pumped me for information, so I lied and told them I was going to New Zealand to box. They believed me and got off of my back for a brief period of time. Captain Boyd selected Corporal Robert E. Laverty of the intelligence section, Warrant Officer Charles E. James and I. James had jungle experienced in Nicaragua, plus a couple of cruises in the Corps. He was currently a platoon leader in “A” Company. Another member of our patrol was Lieutenant William Coultis, USN, and a COMSOPAC staff officer, who had made several tours of the Solomon Islands some years before and was familiar with the islands. There was another officer a meteorologist whose name I do not recall.
In early February 1943, Captain Boyd and I arrived at Guadalcanal for a brief overnight stop. That morning we had boarded a PBY plane and were sky-bound. I had been thoroughly briefed by Captain Boyd, since I had volunteered for the task. By map at least, I was familiar with the terrain features of the New Georgia Islands, some of its trails and villages, the locations of coast watchers and known locations of Japanese outposts and their strength. I was protecting myself. If I were to become separated from the group I wanted to know how to survive and control my destiny. I dreaded the thought of being in enemy territory, especially on this island. I was amazed at the stamina of the coast watchers and the many radio stations they maintained from Rabaul south. Messages were generally sent from the stations to Pearl Harbor and then to the area concerned. All were informed of any pending enemy action and had ample time to find the nearest shelter before the enemy’s aircraft or surface vessel had arrived.
On our PBY arrival at Segi point, the southern point of New Georgia, we climbed into waiting canoes. Our paddlers, husky, well muscled islanders, who moved swiftly in handling our equipment and we were moving smoothly and rapidly toward the beach. As we debarked from the canoes, I noticed a man in khaki shorts and polo type shirt wearing a large Anzac hat, who seemed eager to meet us. Captain Boyd introduced me to coast watcher Lieutenant Donald Kennedy of the Royal Australia Navy. He was the district officer for the western sector. The other members of the patrol were present except Robert Laverty who would arrive a few days later.
Segi Point was well defended by Kennedy’s native troops. He had approximately 70 natives who carried weapons, many captured from the Japanese, and manned two 50 caliber machine guns on both sides of the point. The Japanese were well aware of this position, but were not prone to attack the fortress. He had two schooners manned by native sailors. Kennedy’s dwelling was a typical plantation house with a tin sheeted roof and a veranda front. When I got Kennedy’s attention, I asked him where the nearest Japanese outpost was. He answered that it was Viru harbor, an estimated 12 miles from Segi point. I was a little startled by this information, until he assured us that he had those Japanese under constant observation. Captain Boyd went into the house with Kennedy while we stowed most of our gear under the veranda, which would become our bivouac. Laverty and I found the outside washing area and changed our khakis and equipment. Just at dusk, James, Laverty and I were invited to join Kennedy and Boyd on the veranda. They were sitting in comfortable straw chairs. A couple of islanders brought more chairs and soon, to our amazement, also large glasses of tea. We had been drinking warm water out of canteens and now this! The tea was delicious and the native boy refilled my glass from a large jar. After a while, we were invited inside. There before us was a large table covered with a white tablecloth and unbelievable food, including salads, chicken and vegetables. We all sat after Boyd and Kennedy seated themselves. The native boys served us, while one of them waved a large fan-type leaf to keep the flies and mosquitoes away. That night, while I lay on my poncho, looking up at the stars, I wondered to myself how I had ended up on an island replete with enemy outposts and they were nearby. I thought about my family and my friends back home. I soon fell asleep, looking forward to the next day.

OUR TRIP TO VIRU HARBOR

The following day, it was apparent that Boyd had a lengthy meeting with Kennedy. He met with us to discuss our next move. We were to proceed to Viru Harbor and scout the area for two days or more and return with a report. Gunner James, being the senior member, would be the patrol leader. Two native guides would assist us. We started in two canoes, making excellent time in a very smooth ride. We debarked at a small village called Nono. I wondered if this was an omen. Hiking the rest of the distance, we moved rapidly since the trail was dry and firm. Though we were very alert, I was aware that for the first time since Guadalcanal, that we were in enemy jungle. The native guides moved with assurance. While we were still about 1000 yards from the harbor, it was getting dark and we entered the confines of the village called Tombe, It rested on the high ground across the Roviana Lagoon from Viru. It would be an ideal position from which to scout out the Japanese. We were able to see our target across the harbor.
At dawn we began observing the village across the bay with field glasses from our positions. We heard a bugle sound off. It was their wake up call. Then numerous soldiers made their way down to the water to wash up, laughing and kidding each other. Little did they realize that they were being watched by the enemy. For the rest of the day we noted the locations of their mess hall, the headquarters office, the sick bay and the guardhouse. They had no sentries on the beach. They were defending the jungle side of their position only. There were two landing boats tied up, they had machine guns on their bows. Two or three of them were on the boats, probably house cleaning. At one point a Japanese soldier came down to the beach and moved his bowels into the water, took out a handkerchief, dipped it into the water and then wiped himself. All of this time I had my 03 sights lined up on him, but remembered our orders. After spending the day observing we decided to spend the night at the same position and leave at dawn in the morning. At evening we could hear loud Japanese voices, laughing and singing. About midnight they simmered down and we had peace the rest of the night and so did they.
In the morning we cleaned up our position, leaving no evidence of our presence in that area and made the trip to Segi Point, in record time, without any mishap,. That night we made our report to Captain Boyd and Kennedy. They seemed pleased with our information. I remember that Boyd asked me a pointed question “Would troops make the trip in a day?” I told him yes if they could avoid the swamps and stick to the trails, for sure for one or two companies, but maybe for a battalion. Unfortunately, I did not mention the weather which was a factor for the 4th Battalion. On the way to Viru the rear tail of the column was ambushed and a firefight took place. We had underestimated the time for the troops to get to Viru. Rain, muddy trails and the enemy ambush slowed them down. Unfortunately, we had not, or could not forecast the weather or enemy contact at the time we made our report. On 4 June 1943 the two companies of the 4th Raider Battalion made the attack on Viru. They used the same trails we had and did attack the jungle side of the village. The raiders succeeded in occupying the village with minimum casualties.
After about twelve days, our patrol left New Georgia and returned to New Caledonia. To the best of my knowledge we returned aboard on of the “Yippee boats” after a short stop at Guadalcanal. I do not have many clear memories about the trip except that it was not a joy ride.

BACK TO NEW GEORGIA

The 1st Battalion was training and re-organizing double time. Rumors were that New Georgia would be our next mission. I was being carried on the muster rolls of the headquarters battalion on a temporarily basis, but Boyd had advised me not to unpack. I made several visits to “A“ Company and visited my former platoon. I would not confirm their guesses as to our next battle station. On a day in early June ‘43 Boyd contacted me and gave me a day of departure. I did not have to guess as to our destination. From Guadalcanal we took another “Yipee boat”. I remembered that I had landed earlier from one of these same boats on the same Tasimboko beach. They were really tug boats but they came in handy. As an aside, Colonel Griffith asked me if I had a sleeping bag. I replied no and later he handed me his own sleeping bag all rolled up and told me to make sure the Japs didn’t put any bullet holes in it.
Pulling into Segi Harbor was like coming home and Kennedy was glad to see us; however, we did have a different crew. They were our leader Captain Boyd, First Lt. William R. Gleason, Platoon Sergeant, Frank Cutter from regimental HQ., Gunnery Sergeants, Joe Sciara and David Ericson, all from the 1st Raider Battalion. During the time we were back with the battalion, Captain Boyd was busy making his reports to Lt. Colonel Sam Griffith and Colonel Liversedge. By now members of our Battalion tentatively knew where they were going and who they would be fighting. The members of the patrol awaiting the landing of our battalion, knew where it would be landing and the location of the Japanese strongholds that we would be attacking. Rather than a beach landing the troops would proceed in rubber boats, into the Pundakoona river for about a 100 yards in a night landing and then debark onto the river bank. After which they would make a forced march to Enogai, enabling them to dispose of the Japanese force lodged there. Then in a day or two the troops would advance to the Bairoko harbor and make a final attack on that position. This was the intended scheme but we had to wait and see the results of our planning.
CUTTING THE TRAILS PRIOR TO D-DAY

One of our missions was to cut three trails from the river landing site to the Japanese Enogai outpost, reducing the time of the approach march. Additionally, we would cut 4 or 5 bivouac areas where the companies could assemble, square away their gear and prepare themselves for the approach. Problems that would be out of our control would be the weather and the disposition of the enemy.
The jungle was so dense that we needed trails in order for our men to make the approach. Since the trails had to be cut over territory which actually belonged to the Japs, we would have to patrol ahead of the native laborers, who were cutting the trails. Six of us were selected to do this patrolling. No one had to tell us how much danger there was in the assignment. Once you start out you are on your own. You get used to that kind of business after a time. The most important thing was not to be discovered by the Japs. That wasn’t just because we wanted to get out alive. If the enemy spotted us, the surprise value of the task would be lost. Fortunately, the Nips were not in our area.
We pushed off after dark out to open sea. There wasn’t anything to do in the boats except sit and ride. No smoking. We gave orders to the native in Pidgin English, but most of the time we did not talk. About two hours out we passed within 150 yards of a point where we knew there was a Nippon patrol. We all had our automatics in hand, because if they spotted us our only chance would be to fight it out. They did not spot us. Everybody relaxed a little after we got past. I would have given a lot for a cigarette just about then and so would the others. There wasn’t a chance.
We were on the trail two days. We kept patrols ahead and from time to time the native boys would climb trees to spot possible sons of heaven in the offing. At night the boys would build wickyups–a kind of grass and leaf lean-to behind which we slept. Here we ate our cold rations and had the boys “cookim' tea.” Tea which is more stimulating in the bush than coffee. After we got to sleep, the native boys took our clothes down to a nearby creek and washed them. When we put them on in the morning they were wet and clammy, but clean.
Finally we found the spot we wanted for a base. We set up a lookout in a banyan tree. Then the boys got work and built us houses, with walls and a roof of leaves to keep out the rain. If we had to set up housekeeping in no man’s land, this was the way to do it. Now we came to the tough part of the job. We had to get a good picture of the lay of the land, location of streams and similar information. Only in this way could we learn where to build the trails over which our troops could swoop down on the enemy. If we succeeded, it meant almost certain victory for the campaign just ahead, if we failed, it meant almost certain failure.
One patrol – it was Sergeants Frank Guidone and Joe Sciarra who got a tough assignment. We were to sneak down near enough to see how close we were to the main Jap base. Silently we crept down in the darkness. We had no way of knowing how near we were to their camp. We had gone some miles when we saw a shadowy form a few yards ahead. We realized this was a Jap sentry. The sentry had heard a noise. He turned sharply, barked out the word “tomare!”. the Jap command to halt. We froze. The sentry was standing still, peering into the foliage. Guidone and Sciarra took a few steps back, fell flat on their faces. For some time we lay there, not daring to move, hardly daring to breath. Discovery would have meant sure torture and death and ruin the job we were trying to do. The Jap sentry poked around in the darkness, then evidently decided he had been hearing things and went back to his post. When we figured we were safe, we inched silently back into the foliage . We stayed in that secret base for some days.”(5)
TRAIL CUTTING

We knew that there were Japanese units defending the Enogai inlet and that they had at least one 5 inch naval gun mounted and facing Kula Gulf. This position was the first objective of the Northern Landing Force. We had to cut a route, and cutting a jungle trail was an extremely difficult task and tiring. I’d not know how far toward the enemy we could go. Native labor was insufficient - the jungle was very dense. Ericson, Sciarra and Guidone took turns at the trail cutting. We assisted the coast watcher who was in charge of native management. It was a boring detail and it was obvious that we were not going to make much headway before the 4th or 5th of July.
Captain Boyd and I made a trip to an observation point that over-looked the Munda airport. We had two natives with us who knew the trail. I have no idea what the mileage we covered was, only that we had traveled two days. The observation site was a very comfortable position and was active with some natives and a coast watcher. I think his name was Corrigan. In the middle of the camp was a large banyan tree. At the top of the tree, about at 100 foot high, was a platform and large scope. Through the scope you could observe the total airport and all its activity. You could read the numerals on the Japanese planes. The highlight of this trip was that we received word that the navy would arrive off-shore that Night and distribute some of their shells around the airport.
Boyd, Corrigan and I took our places on the platform that night and awaited the fireworks. It started about 2100. First you would see the flame from the guns at sea and then in due time the explosions on the airfield. I was absolutely awed! This tremendous sight lasted for all of 45 minutes but I still think about it today. Native intelligence reported the airfield was in shambles and so were many of their aircraft. It was pleasant for me, as I had been on the receiving end on the ‘canal, when the Japanese ships had poured it on us. That night it was their turn.
The war canoes mentioned by Boyd played an important part in helping us to complete our mission. They moved swiftly and quietly thanks to the husky natives. Without the canoes we would have been unable to cover the distance on the trails. Once seated in the canoe it was important to remain still as much as possible - a shift here and a shift there, would tilt the canoe alarmingly. I remember vividly one time I was in a canoe with Gunner James sitting immediately behind me. For some reason, I had cause to shift frequently. James would repeatedly order me to stop moving so much. He complained quite a bit, I told him I could not help it and the others were not complaining about my frequent moves. Many years later, passing through San Francisco, I made contact with the Gunner and we had dinner together. While we were eating, the canoe incident came to mind and I brought it up to Jim. I asked him why he was so concerned about my shifting in the canoe. He replied, “Frankee, I can’t swim” At the Bairoko battle, I had a platoon on the company’s right flank and I was connected to “B” company’s platoon, whose platoon leader was Jim James. To our front there was a lagoon and we were awaiting word to move out when James came over to me. I asked him if he had ever learned to swim in view of the water to our front. He grinned.
THE ENGAGEMENT

I think that the night of 4-5 July might have been the blackest black of all times. The patrol was on the landing site the Pundakona river. The three trails went as far at the Giza-Giza River, which was as far as we could manage. The bivouac areas were cleared and designated. The mouth of the river was about 75 yards across and we had planned on positioning a canoe with a blinking light just off the left and right shore of the of the river mouth. The boats would enter the river between the two lights and paddle up stream to the landing site. That was our plan.
The raiders would debark in rubber boats and then make their way to a LCVP, on which Ten rubber boats would be on a toggle line. The landing craft, the LCVP, would head for the mouth of the river and some distance from the mouth of the river, they would release the rubber boats, which would be paddled between the lights and into the river. Captain Boyd was more than pleased to see the first rubber boat enter the river. Each boat had to be paddle up-river to a designated landing area about 600 yards up stream. There was no sloping beaches and when the boats banged into a river bank, troops on the bank would grab the lines, the men in the boat jumped over the side into 7 or 8 ft of water, then swim or struggle their way toward troops, who would haul them in. It soon became a mess. It was pitch black and there was Japanese gunfire from the naval gun at Enogai. It was firing at us, but we were to close for a 5 inch gun, which could not be lowered enough and the shells exploded beyond our landing. To add to the confusion, it was raining.
Daybreak found most of the units in their respective bivouac areas. The troops had to ready themselves for the approach march through a very wet jungle on slippery trails. The raiders had not slept for two nights and were not happy warriors. Ordinarily they would be at the top of their game in the approach march phase of the game. They had spent the night in the rain, getting into position. They were already tired and still had not yet faced the enemy. It took some time to get the them into the line of battle. Of course, the Raiders were the leading troops. They still had to travel eight miles to the southwest and then north to capture Enogai and Bairoko.
At this time I was still acting as a member of the patrol, even though Captain Boyd had assumed his regular duties as the commander of “D”company. I was generally located in the CP and handy to Sam Griffith. Although the trails extended to the Giza-Giza River, we would still be considerably short of making an attack. The enemy was about five or six miles from our position. We should, at this time already have been attacking the Japanese defense at the Enogai Inlet. We crossed the Giza-Giza River which was now about waist high. I was quite surprised, since on our patrol of the river had only been about foot high. I informed Colonel Griffith that the depth of the Tamoko River might be a problem. The column was moving slowly. The raiders were tired and hungry and repeatedly sliding and falling on the muddy trail. Fortunately, we had no heavy weapons, only our machine guns and mortars. The army battalions, well to the rear, with 90mm mortars and water-cooled machine guns found it difficult to keep pace.
I was with Captain Boyd and his company, when we got our first look at the Tamoko River. It was at flood stage and flowing rapidly. We went up and down stream to find a fording opportunity, but to no avail. Captain Boyd then sent patrols up and down the river find a crossing. Then we had some luck! One of the patrols had found a large tree, which had fallen across the river and could be used as a bridge. Captain Boyd had one of his platoons prepare the tree for our crossing by clearing the log of branches. There were now about 3 or 4 feet of space available for the troops to walk on; additionally, a rope was strung from shore to shore to be used as a hand hold in crossing. This crossing would not have been a problem were we not carrying any gear; however, we were loaded with cartridge belts, canteens, magazine pouches, steel helmets, packs and weapons. The slippery tree, fatigue and gear would pose problems. Company “D”, the first to cross made the crossing in single file in good fashion. Afterwards, the tree was slippery and the rope was no longer available for assistance. While the raiders and many of the other units managed to cross this log, several raiders fell into the river and were rescued by other marines. Lieutenant Kemp and Sergeant Walsh were cited for rescuing several of the marines.
The condition of the troops worsened as they approached the attack line. I recall standing by a lean-to near the trail. Lt. Col. Griffith and Col. Liversedge were in it watching the troops march by. Liversedge said “Sam, these men will not be able to fight when we get there.” Griffith replied, “ you’re wrong, sir. These men will fight when we get there.” At dusk, after crossing the Tamoko we found ourselves in a swamp, where we were to make a right turn and march about four or five miles to the enemy. It was too late to reach the adversary during daylight and we did not want to make a night attack. We remained in the middle of the swamp for the night to make our attack march in the morning. It was a miserable night, with the dampness, mosquitoes, fatigue and hunger. We had only one comforting thought. The enemy would never make a night attack in a swamp.
In the morning we looked forward to getting out of the swamp. The enemy would be waiting at Maranusa 1 and 2, two separate villages with the same name, and Triri. These were villages occupied by the Japanese. More were waiting along the Enogai inlet. While the marines were waking up and getting their gear squared away, I was ordered to report to Sam Griffith. I found the colonel and reported. He was with Lieutenant Colonel Schultz , the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion, 148 Infantry. Griffith asked me if I knew where the Munda-Bairoko trail was. I told him I was not certain but that I could find it as I knew the general area. I met Colonel Schultz, who was from Findlay, Ohio and since I was from Ohio, we had some discussion about that. His unit was in their first action and I felt sorry for him. His battalion was moving single-file on the trail. He had his scouts on the flanks and a strong point at the head of the column. Progress was slow and there was random shooting by the GIs. The flanking troops were shooting at an unseen enemy. This was expected of green troops, but we knew it would signal to the Japanese that we were in the immediate vicinity, word was sent out to the flankers to cease their firing.
We arrived at the intersection of two trails an ideal site for an ambush. It was evident that these trails were more heavily traveled by the Japanese than by natives, showing heavy boot prints whereas the natives traveled barefooted. One of the trails led to Munda and the other led to Bairoko. The enemy could enforce Enogai from Munda or Bairoko. It was like killing two birds with one stone, we were fortunate to have such a site to ambush. Colonel Shultz immediately ordered his company commanders to set up the ambush. For green troops, the placement of the ambush was very professional. All they needed were some Japanese to shoot. I remained in the CP with the colonel as his advisor but only as limited to my expertise. I respected my rank as a sergeant and he as a Lieutenant Colonel. He had his S2s, S3s and S4s and I was ready to return to my unit.
Early the next morning, it was reported that there were Japanese on the trail entering our area. Unfortunately, some of the troops in the ambush made some movements that were dectected by the Japanese scouts and the surprise were gone. A firefight started and I noticed that some of the wounded were being brought into the CP and being cared for. The seriously wounded would be receiving first aid only. At this time there was no way to get them to the hospital. The Japanese moved back into the jungle and the firing ceased. I informed the colonel that they would be back when it was dark. The Japanese were now letting us know that they were still around, by making insulting remarks in broken English, banging pots or pans, etc. Schultz’s battalion was in trouble with more wounded and KIA and shortages in food and ammo. For green troops they were learning fast. The only way to receive supplies was by an air drop but this required some very good coordinates. Later that afternoon, they sent their coordinates and the air-drops were made, but it was a disaster, because most of the chutes had landed in the Japanese area.
RETURN TO MY BATTALION

On the third day I requested permission to return to my unit, which had already fought and had taken over the Enogai Inlet. Their next objective was Bairoko. The colonel agreed to let me go, but he could not send anyone with me. I told him that I could make it alone. He fixed me up a mail pouch for Sam Griffith and about noon, I went back on the trail. It was about 10 miles to the swamp from where I had started. I practically jogged the whole trip, not knowing whether I would meet some Japanese scouts. The only incidence I remembered on this trip was that I was jogging downhill when I tripped and tumbled down to the bottom. I lay there awhile to see if I was hurt. I had a pain in my side, but there was only a small bruise where the bolt handle on my carbine had dug into my side; however, I was able to continue. I next saw a shack near a small stream. I approached it carefully and heard English being spoken, so I made my appearance. Inside were two soldiers with a radio. They were a relay station for their unit. They gave me some food and water and then they contacted our regimental headquarters and reported their position. From there I continued my trip and finally made it to our headquarters.
I made a report on Lieutenant Colonel Schultz’s condition and their exact position. I hoped that by studying the sketch, they could see that the colonel and I had been sent on a wild goose chase. I had gotten out of it, but Schultz and his battalion never got out of this position on the far left flank of the campaign for the entire Bairoko Harbor operation. Thus ended my experience as a member of the patrols on New Georgia. I was reassigned to “D” Company and served as a platoon leader in the battle at Bairoko. After Bairoko, I was near the battalion headquarters when Lt. Colonel Griffith was dictating a message to someone with a pad in his hand. At the time we were loading a PBY with causalities. Griffith saw me standing nearby. While dictating, he said “Put Frankie on the list - he’s been here long enough.” That’s how I got my orders to leave the island as a person having combat fatigue. I had no baggage, only myself, my weapon, my cartridge belt and my world of memories.
I could not tell my story about the patrols without mentioning Captain Kennedy and giving him due credit for the part he played. Captain Donald G. Kennedy, British district officer of the western Solomons, had begun operations in the New Georgia area even before the invasion of Guadalcanal. From his hidden jungle post near Segi point, Kennedy had performed almost miraculous feats as a coast watcher, harrying the foe in every possible way and at every opportunity. With a small but faithful band of native followers, he had kept Japanese outposts in eastern New Georgia under continuous and close observation. Occasionally he launched sudden and audacious attacks against their positions, achieving such a degree of success that the enemy casualty toll exceeded the total strength of his own small force. Downed allied aviators and ship-wrecked sailors often found a haven in the Kennedy-controlled area. Kennedy’s reports of enemy ship and plane movements proved of incalculable aid to the defenders of the southern Solomons, who, thus alerted, could take immediate counteraction even before being reached by the enemy.
After more than 60 years, most members of the New Georgia patrols are now deceased. George Lewis was an enlisted Marine during his tour with Captain Wheeler, but later was commissioned and retired as a major. Philip Oldham was also a member of the Wheeler patrol and was commissioned prior to the patrols. He was killed in action on New Georgia at Enogai. Gunnery Sergeant Joe Sciarra was with Boyd’s second patrol. He was flown out of New Georgia with a bad case of malaria. Joe was promoted to Gunnery Sergeant on Tulagi for his heroic actions under fire. In subsequent action on the ridge, he was also recommended for an award of the bronze star. I stayed in contact with Joe after the war, he lived in San Francisco and was a head-waiter in Scomo’s, a fancy seafood café located at Fisherman’s Wharf. Joe suffered a severe stroke that rendered him paralyzed. His daughters cared for him to the end. He died several years ago. Gunnery Sergeant David Ericson was a member of Boyd’s second patrol; also a veteran of the Tulagi-Guadalcanal campaigns. When our patrol ceased operation, Ericson returned to his company within the battalion as leader of the machine gun crews and was killed in action at the Enogai Inlet. Years later his body was located and returned to his home where he was given a full military burial by his family. I have previously mentioned the officers involved in the patrols. They were all selected for the patrol duty by the commanding officer of the Raider battalion - Colonel Griffith. They had proven themselves at Tulagi and Guadalcanal as leaders of the troops as they also did on in the Western Solomons. Most of them would be elevated in rank in time to come.
Footnotes: 1. D. S. Horton and R.R.A. Robinson on Rendova
2. Major John Rentz, USMC® Central Solomons – Historical Division, USMC.
3. [Book source]
4.Rentz, Major John M. USMCR, USMC Historical Monograph, Marines in the Central
Solomons Chapt. 2, pgs. 18-19.
5. Quote - Boyd’s interview by Will Oursler, True’s Pacific, correspondent

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