"Take any statement which is made concerning a matter of fact. It is caused or determined by the fact. The
fact has been observed & the perception of the fact which was caused by it in its turn causes the statement to
be made. Perhaps however the fact was not directly perceived. The statement may be a prediction. In that
case it cannot be said that that which follows after has caused that which precedes it, the prediction, but if the
event has been predicted it has been through some knowledge of its cause and this same cause which
precedes the event also precedes some cognition of the mind which gave rise to the prediction so that there
is a real causal connection between the sign and the thing signified although it does not consist in one's
being the effect of the other but in both being the effect of the same cause."

"... whatever your opinions, your expression of them is an appeal to some wider insight that you regard as
real, and that you view as a live insight which comprehends your ideas, and which sees how they are related
to genuine experience. This, I affirm, is the universal form which all opinion takes. A true opinion is true,
because in fact it expresses what the wider insight confirms. A false opinion is false, because it is refuted by
the light of this same wider view. Apart from such a confirmation or refutation in the light of such a larger view,
the very concepts of truth and error, as applied to opinions which are not wholly confirmed or set aside by the
instantaneous evidence of the moment when the opinions are formed or uttered, have no meaning. True is
the judgment that is confirmed by the larger view to which it appeals. False is the assertion that is not thus
confirmed. Upon such a conception the very ideas of truth and error depend. Without such a conception truth
and error have no sense. If such a conception is not itself a true view of our situation, that is, if there is no
wider insight, our opinions have neither truth nor error, and are all of them alike merely meaningless. When
you are ignorant, you are ignorant of what the wider view makes clear to its own insight. If you blunder or are
deluded, your blunder is due to a defective apprehension which the wider view confirms. And thus, whether
you are ignorant or blundering, wise or foolish, whether the truth or falsity of your present opinion is supposed
to be actual, one actuality is equally and rationally presupposed, as the actuality to which all your opinions
refer, and in the light of which they possess sense. This is the actuality of some wider insight with reference
to which your own opinion gets its truth or its falsity. To this wider insight, to this always presupposed vision
of experience as it is, of the facts as they are, you are always appealing. Your every act of assertion displays
the genuineness of the appeal and exemplifies the absolute rational necessity of asserting that the appeal is
made to an insight that is itself real."