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(Published in IS Canada's Internal Bulletin, Jan. 9, 1996. Document is a statement of the Political Reorientation Faction and was written by David Camfield)

I. From the Russian Revolution to Today

Revolutionary socialist politics develops when socialists are able to learn from the struggles of the exploited and oppressed. Marx learned from the Paris Commune of 1871 that the working class must shatter the capitalist state and create new forms of socialist democracy in order to take power. The Russian Revolution made this clear again, as Lenin reminded the world in STATE AND REVOLUTION. The success of the Russian Revolution and the failure of the revolutionary upheavals in Europe between 1918 and 1923 proved that the working class cannot take power without an experienced mass party of the revolutionary vanguard to lead it.

At the close of the 20th century, the lessons of the Russian Revolution remain the necessary -- but not sufficient -- foundation of socialism from below. These lessons formed the basis of the programme of the Communist International (Comintern) between 1919 and 1923. From them Trotsky generalized his theory of permanent revolution and developed a critique of Stalinism. The tiny and isolated Trotskyist movement sought to preserve these politics ("Bolshevik-Leninism") in the "Midnight of the Century", the years of Stalinism, fascism and imperialist war between the late 1920s and 1945. It succeeded -- but at the cost of hardening into dogmatism and inflexibility.

After the Second World War a new current (in Britain, the Socialist Review group around Tony Cliff, later called International Socialism; in the U.S. the Independent Socialist Clubs around Hal Draper) emerged. By criticizing orthodox Trotskyism from the standpoint of the self-emancipation of the working class and a commitment to developing Marxism to explain the postwar world it made important theoretical contributions (the analysis of state capitalism, permanent arms economy and deflected permanent revolution; insights about class struggle in advanced capitalist countries during the postwar boom; the concept of socialism from below). This current kept classical Marxism alive as a small but dynamic force in the struggles of the upturn of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It survived the downturn that began in the mid-1970s.[1]

Serious problems in the Canadian I.S. and, more generally, the I.S. Tendency, have made it clear that this "reoriented Trotskyism" (Alex Callinicos's term in TROTSKYISM) needs to be critically evaluated, much as it began to reevaluate the Trotskyist movement and the early Comintern. To begin, we need to go back to the roots of Western European and North American Leninism.

II. Bolshevism Exported

In the wake of the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks formed the Comintern and attempted to export their politics to the millions of workers (and others) who rallied to the powerful call for "Soviet Power" and world revolution. Many of the men and women drawn to the Comintern were the cream of the working class movement, self-educated socialist worker-intellectuals and experienced militants. Politically, they were a varied lot: "centrists" whose revolutionary aspirations had not been freed from the gradualist parliamentarism of the Second International, revolutionary purists who suffered from ultra-leftism, sectarianism and abstract propagandism, and syndicalists who believed in organizing revolutionary industrial unions.

The Bolsheviks' aim was to build new mass revolutionary parties by winning leftward-moving workers to the Comintern while separating them from non-revolutionary labour leaders pulled in behind their radicalizing rank and file. At first the Bolsheviks thought that the West was on the brink of revolution. With the failure of the German and Hungarian Revolutions in 1918-19, it became clear to the Bolsheviks that the Western Communist Parties (C.P.s) had to do more than call for soviet power and prepare for insurrection. They set about winning the new parties away from ultra-left attitudes to unions, parliamentary elections and alliances with the peasantry. At the same time they battled centrism. But both ultra-leftism and centrism persisted. Ultra- left directives from Russian Comintern leaders led to the disastrous "March Action" putsch in Germany in 1921. The 3rd Comintern Congress later that year recognized that revolution was not imminent in Europe (although the Comintern leadership still had an overly optimistic evaluation of where the working classes in the Western bourgeois democracies were at). It proposed the united front policy to win majority support for the C.P.s among workers, but covered up responsibility for the German disaster. A comprehensive transformation of the C.P.s into "parties of a new type" was demanded. As a Canadian Communist argued, the revolutionary party must be "a party of action... a party of the workers, and with them in their daily struggles against capitalist oppression" (in Angus, 103).

As Tony Cliff argues in one of his best books, the third volume of LENIN (3 vol. ed.), the Bolsheviks failed to "graft Bolshevism" onto the C.P.s outside of Russia before the Comintern leadership succumbed to Stalinism in late 1923. Mass vanguard parties were built in Germany, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Norway and France (although centrists led the latter two parties until 1923). However, strong, independent- thinking revolutionary leaderships could not easily be developed in the time available. Incompetent Comintern intervention in foreign C.P.s made this task even more difficult. Even in the most important Western section of the Comintern, the German C.P. (K.P.D.), after the murder of Rosa Luxemburg a leadership up to the task of leading the struggle for power was not formed. Paul Levi, around whom such a leadership might have developed, was expelled after he criticized the "March Action" in public. The revolutionary situation in Germany in October 1923 tested the K.P.D. and Comintern leaderships and found both lacking.

In many countries revolutionary mass parties were not built. While the K.P.D. fell to under 150 000 after the "March Action" but built itself up to over 218 000 by late 1922, the Communist Party of Great Britain was not formed until 1920, and had but 3000 real members (while claiming 10 000). In the U.S., a united, above-ground C.P. only emerged at the end of 1921, with some 10 000 members. Likewise in Canada: the C.P. formed in May 1921 had 4800 members, "the great majority" (Angus 80) of whom belonged to semi-autonomous Finnish and Ukrainian "language federations". These three parties were formed after the height of the post-war radicalization, which peaked in 1919 in Britain, Canada and the U.S. Although their "rooted" worker members gave these C.P.s an influence larger than their small size suggests, they only became the leading force in small pockets of the working classes in their respective countries (e.g. in Canada among Cape Breton and B.C. miners).

The 1921 Comintern Congress drew up a detailed organizational scheme ("The Organizational Structure of the Communist Parties, the Methods and Content of Their Work: Theses") that has become the model of a democratic centralist vanguard party for most socialists. But at the 1922 Congress, Lenin said it was "almost exclusively Russian: it is wholly derived from a study of Russian developments. This is the good side of the resolution, but it is also the bad side... if by rare chance a foreigner could understand it, he could not possibly carry it out" (in HARRY WICKS, 25).

Harry Wicks, worker militant and founding member of British Communist and Trotskyist movements, had this to say about the 1922 reorganization of the C.P.G.B. along the lines laid down by the Comintern (agitational newspaper, small neighbourhood or factory groups replacing branches etc.): "The first casualty... was the political discussion among the membership. Despite the declared desire for monthly aggregate meetings, the demands of the group meetings on members' time meant less and less opportunity for the exchange and clash of opinions. The membership felt the loss of political life that the old style branch meetings gave them. Were these growing pains or the conservative clinging to past forms of organization? Two points are clear from this period. The party became much more dynamic, and its press... was soon revealed in its new role, that of agitating and leading on the day-to-day issues" (24-25). It is fair to say that the impact of the changes was mixed.

Comintern leaders only partially understood the specific difficulties involved in building revolutionary parties in advanced capitalist countries where bourgeois democracy existed and working class reformism was much stronger than in Tsarist Russia (even if labour bureaucracies were weak by today's standards). Italian C.P. leader Antonio Gramsci made an effort to come to terms with the differences between Russia and the West in his PRISON NOTEBOOKS. But he did not work out an adequate explanation of these issues, despite insights about workers' consciousness, the greater importance of popular consent in maintaining bourgeois rule in the West as compared with Russia, and the role of a revolutionary party in the process through which the working class becomes conscious of its interests and forges a revolutionary bloc with other social forces (peasants etc.). There is still no adequate Marxist theory of how workers' experience in advanced capitalism generally produces a fragmented non-revolutionary consciousness that fits with reformism.

III. The Trotskyist experience: marginalized Leninism

The rise of the Stalinist bureaucracy in the U.S.S.R. and the Stalinization of the Comintern produced resignations, expulsions and splits in C.P.s around the world during the 1920s. The International Left Opposition (from 1930, International Communist League) formed by Trotsky opposed Stalinism and its politics of "socialism in one country" from the perspective of the Marxism of the 1919-1923 Comintern. Although it was the only coherent anti- Stalinist revolutionary socialist current, it was extremely marginal. The "Fourth International (World Party of the Socialist Revolution)" founded prematurely by Trotsky in 1938 had a membership of only a few thousand. Its largest section, the American Socialist Workers Party (American S.W.P.), then numbered 1520. Many of the sections were tiny internalized grouplets. Few had more than handfuls of worker militants. In most countries, most workers who considered themselves revolutionaries were in the Stalinist C.P.s, despite massive losses of those who had joined in the 1920s. Although there are a few positive and rather more negative lessons to be learned from the Stalinist C.P.s in the 1930s, the C.P.s ceased to be revolutionary parties in any sense after the Popular Front line of alliance with the "progressive bourgeoisie" against fascism was adopted in 1935. Many then grew substantially, recruiting from the working and middle classes.

The strength of the Trotskyist movement lay in Trotsky's political analyses (of the Russian, Chinese and Spanish Revolutions, the struggle against fascism in Germany, permanent revolution etc.). But it also had major political weaknesses. Trotsky's analysis of the U.S.S.R. as a "degenerated workers' state" was one. Others, set out in the Transitional Programme in 1938, included the belief that capitalism was in its "death agony" and that "The historical crisis of mankind is reduced to the crisis of revolutionary leadership." The first claim was not based on any serious Marxist economic analysis. The second would only have been true if revolutionary situations existed everywhere but workers were being misled by non-revolutionary leaderships (as in Spain 1936-37). In 1938, this was a fantasy.

It gave Trotskyism:

a fixed model of society in which the working classes were continually straining at the leash, or about to strain at the leash, held back only by the betrayals of their perfidious leadership... from it derived one of the characteristic traits of post-war Trotskyism: a systematic blindness to the actual consciousness and concerns of the working class" (Molyneux 180).

To this model was added the belief that tiny Trotskyist groups were "revolutionary parties" because they and they alone possessed the programme for revolutionary leadership. Only in Sri Lanka and Bolivia in the 1950s did Trotskyists come anywhere close to forming mass revolutionary parties.[2] But in 1946 American S.W.P. leader James Cannon wrote that "The revolutionary vanguard party destined to lead this tumultuous revolutionary movement in the U.S. does not have to be created. It already exists, and its name is the Socialist Workers' Party." At the time, the American S.W.P. had only 1470 members.

This kind of ridiculous self-importance and failure to understand the real tasks for groups with few if any roots among workers generated sectifying pressures to which many orthodox Trotskyist groups succumbed.[3] The material basis for this was isolation from the struggles of workers and the oppressed. But sectification also had a theoretical source inherited from the pre-Stalinist Comintern.

The problem lay in a confusion between revolutionary socialist groups as they actually existed and the mass vanguard party required to lead a socialist revolution. According to the Comintern theses on party organization discussed earlier, "At every stage of the revolutionary class struggle... the Communist Party must be the vanguard, the most advanced section of the proletariat" (234). This equation of party with vanguard led many a Trotskyist group to consider itself a vanguard party. But what if the group in question was not in fact the vanguard, a substantial layer of revolutionary workers? Only a few groups both realized that their organizations were not and drew the appropriate conclusion. Three years after Cannon proclaimed the American S.W.P. the party of the American Revolution, the Workers' Party (the other significant Trotskyist group in the U.S.) changed its name to Independent Socialist League in recognition of the fact that it was a propaganda group, not a party (the initiative came from Hal Draper).

IV. Critical Leninism

After the Second World War the fundamental issue became clear: there was no working class vanguard. The task of Marxists after the Russian Revolution had been to organize and expand an existing vanguard, or elements of one, into a party. By the 1950s, the vanguard layers in North America and Europe had been destroyed by repression, years of working class defeat, the twists and turns through which the C.P.s degenerated into bureaucratic reformist pawns of the Kremlin, and the recomposition of the working class in postwar capitalism.

In the late 1960s, Duncan Hallas of the British I.S. wrote:

Not only has the vanguard, in the real sense of a considerable layer of organised revolutionary workers and intellectuals, been destroyed. So too has the environment, the tradition, that gave it influence... The crux of the matter is how to develop the process, now begun, of recreating it ("Towards..." 16).

Vanguard and revolutionary organization are not identical. In most of the world today there is no vanguard. It is absolutely vital to understand this and draw appropriate conclusions about how socialists should orient and organize themselves if a current of socialism from below is to flourish in the 21st century.

Hallas also laid out other features of "critical Leninism" that distinguish it from most of the Trotskyist tradition -- including, sadly, many groups in the I.S. Tendency today:

a party cannot possibly be created except on a thoroughly democratic basis... in its internal life, vigorous controversy is the rule and various tendencies and shades of opinion are represented... Internal democracy is not an optional extra. It is fundamental to the relationship between party members and those amongst whom they work...

The self-education of militants is impossible in an atmosphere of sterile orthodoxy. Self-reliance and confidence in one's ideas are developed in the course of that genuine debate that takes place in an atmosphere where differences are freely and openly argued. The "monolithic party" is a Stalinist concept. Uniformity and democracy are mutually incompatible" (21).

This critical Leninism remains a very important contribution to the tradition of socialism from below.

V. The I.S. experience

It is not enough to have a critical understanding of Leninism. Socialists also have to understand what Leninist ideas about revolutionary organization mean for their activity in the actual situation in which they find themselves.

One of the greatest strengths of the Socialist Review/ International Socialism group in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s (and the American I.S.C.) was that they realized that the Leninist model of party-building was irrelevant for such a small organization. S.R./I.S. realized that it would be foolish to set itself the task of building a revolutionary party.[4] Its members had a healthy sense of proportion. As the official Socialist Workers Party (British S.W.P.) history puts it, "Indeed, one of the things that distinguished I.S. from most other revolutionary groupings at the time was an ability to look at itself with a sense of humour, at times a self-deprecating one" (Birchall 8).

At first, S.R.'s few dozen members concentrated their efforts on spreading their ideas within the Labour Party. Later on they were active in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Although S.R. had only a few unionists, they were active and the group paid close attention to British working class issues as well as international politics. This perspective was a counterweight to the dangers of total isolation and "falling into a complete fantasy world" (6) that afflict tiny Marxist groups. In 1960 S.R. launched INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM as a quarterly journal, and in 1961 began to publish a monthly paper aimed at industrial workers. From 1961 S.R. also worked through a Labour left paper. In 1965 I.S. (the name changed in 1962), by then over 200, began to withdraw from the Labour Party.

The events of 1968 pushed I.S. membership from 447 to over 1000 (mostly students). After heated debates at two conferences, I.S. reorganized itself along the kind of lines that Hallas advocates, those of critical Leninism. Then followed a "turn to the class". This eventually produced a group that peaked in early 1974 at close to 4000 members (mostly workers) and a paid sale of 35 000 copies of its weekly paper. Yet in Sept. 1976 its leadership still insisted that with 3000 members it, like the 300-strong American I.S., was "basically a propaganda organisation striving to transform itself into an interventionist organisation" even if it was "somewhat further along the road" than the U.S. group. ("To Members of the NC of ISUS" 2). Critical Leninism was still alive, despite the many mistakes and internal debates of the early 1970s.

Almost twenty years later, there is little evidence of critical Leninism in the leadership of the British S.W.P. or any of the other groups in the I.S. Tendency (I.S.T.). How exactly this came about is a question that remains to be answered. The downturn that set in in the mid-1970s and the British S.W.P.'s response to this difficult period are part of the explanation. Like orthodox Trotskyism before it, the I.S.T. is losing sight of its marginal position and real tasks. On the basis of the idea that the 1990s are "the 1930s in slow motion", the current I.S.T. perspective pushes the rapid transformation of propaganda groups of a few hundred into agitational organizations. There is little sense of proportion left. The gap between the analysis of the period and the "party-building" perspectives on the one hand and the reality of the world on the other produces sectifying pressures.

At least one leading member of the Canadian I.S. has stated publicly that the group is in transition from a propaganda group to an agitational organization.[5] This is simply false, and raises the question of how to understand different kinds of socialist organizations and their appropriate tasks. Although groups take many different forms, and what they should do differs depending on the conditions in which they operate, it is helpful to think of four basic kinds of socialist organization. However, in looking at socialist groups in this way it is important not to make the mistake of thinking that a group will automatically grow through these various stages in a linear way.

Study circles learn and clarify basic Marxist ideas, with little attention to non-members. Propaganda groups use Marxist ideas to explain what is happening in the world and recruit because they are able to do so. They may or may not also have some capacity to agitate and intervene in struggle. Propaganda involves explaining many ideas to relatively few people (e.g. arguing why cutbacks are caused by capitalism, not misguided politicians). Agitation involves spreading a few ideas to many people (e.g. arguing to build a general strike called by union leaders). Agitational organizations or parties are able to lead mass struggles and recruit on that basis. Mass revolutionary parties organize a significant portion of a working class vanguard.

Between 1987 and 1993 the Canadian I.S. went from being a fairly loose and passive organization with elements of both a propaganda group and a study circle whose propaganda was usually quite general to a more active propaganda group making more concrete propaganda and capable of a little bit of agitation and involvement in struggle. It had a healthy sense of how small it was. Objectively, the I.S. today is a sectifying propaganda group with little understanding of its tasks. Most I.S. members are students and university-educated workers. Yet the I.S. tries to organize as a miniature version of a group more than thirty-five times its size, the British S.W.P., which is best described as a hybrid propaganda group/agitational organization of over 9000 members (including many union activists) and a real capacity to intervene. That is why the Political Reorientation Faction has been formed.

VI. Looking forward

What can we learn from this history? Revolutionary socialists are building on sand unless they have a reasonably accurate answer to three questions: what is going on in the country in which they are active, where are they located within that, and what are their appropriate tasks? Getting one or more of these wrong will sooner or later cause problems for an organization (the Canadian I.S. is wrong on all three).

There are no short cuts to building stronger revolutionary socialist groups. It is a fact that since the end of the 1920s most revolutionary socialist organizations have been small propaganda groups with weak implantation in the working class. Yet the early Comintern, on which Trotskyist politics are based, had very little to say about such groups. The Comintern in Lenin's day seems to have assumed that C.P.s would be at least agitational organizations able to lead a layer of vanguard workers in struggle. Trotskyists have by and large failed to understand the distinction between working class vanguard and revolutionary organization. Nor did many see that by the 1950s working class vanguards no longer existed in most countries and that the task was to help recreate them in the mass struggles of the future.

The Marxists who best understood all this were in the British S.R./I.S. It survived and grew not only because of its state capitalist analysis of Stalinism but because it put the "working class at the centre of its analysis and activity, as opposed to the parliamentary vanguard of the Tribune left [in the Labour Party] and the revolutionary vanguard of the comic opera bolsheviks [orthodox Trotskyists]" (Higgins, 8). It explicitly recognized its size and tasks, did not pretend to be building a Leninist party, and in an open-minded manner paid close attention to the British working class as well as developments in world politics. It developed a critical Leninism and after 1968 made a transition from a largely student propaganda group to one rooted in the working class with a real ability to intervene in struggle.

In many countries, elements of a new vanguard, or possibilities for creating them, emerged in the last international upturn in struggle (c. 1965-1975). However, these gains were eroded in the subsequent downturn. We should remember that the biggest revolutionary socialist group built in English Canada since the C.P. degenerated was the Revolutionary Workers' League, a Fourth International affiliate which had between 350 and 500 members (largely students and ex-students) in the late 1970s. Quebec-based revolutionary Maoists were several thousand strong (including many union activists) slightly later. These groups were wrecked by the downturn, politics that at best only partially rejected Stalinism, and by unrealistic perspectives for building.

The development of a new layer of revolutionary workers in North America and Europe will not happen without an upsurge of class struggle greater than anything seen in this part of the world for many years. Contrary to what Trotsky wrote in 1938, the working class in the advanced capitalist countries and much of the rest of the world today has a crisis of self-mobilization: there are few or no networks of worker militants to organize resistance, and weak political traditions in the working class. Of course, revolutionary socialist leadership has a vital part to play in addressing these problems. However, workers will have to devise new forms of class organization on a rank-and-file, class struggle, internationalist basis. Without a sharp increase in the level of class struggle new vanguards cannot be even partially recreated (although many workers will be radicalized by the ongoing ruling class offensive). Without revolutionary politics, workers are finding it difficult to successfully fight back in a world economy where capital is highly mobile and economic restructuring is wreaking havoc on their lives.

Today, socialists need to learn from the S.R./I.S. example when considering the years ahead. While the period in which we live is very different from the years in which S.R./I.S. built, our situations do have real similarities. What we can take from them is more than the politics of socialism from below plus a commitment to learn from and analyze the working class as it really is and not as we might wish it to be. It is also a question of how to organize and build: there is no point in pretending to organize along the lines of a Leninist party. It is a dangerous mistake for small groups of socialists to believe that if they adopt a highly centralized ("Leninist") form of organization they can propel themselves into becoming genuine agitational groups, with the necessary roots in a vanguard layer of workers. To apply the methods of Leninist party-building to small propaganda groups creates pressures that push such groups towards becoming sects.

Although the working class needs to build parties along the lines sketched out by critical Leninists, socialist groups of a few hundred or even thousands of members are not parties. A socialist group in Canada that could honestly call itself a party would have to be an agitational organization of many thousands of workers. We cannot predict exactly how the kind of parties that we want to see will emerge. However, they can only be built if larger groups of open-minded, honest and self-critical revolutionary socialists merge with larger new forces: groups of radicalizing workers and the oppressed that do not exist now but which will emerge in future struggles.

It is a mistake for a small group of Marxists to say that it is trying to build itself into a party. Instead it should commit itself to making a serious contribution to the development of such a party. The alternative to pretentious "party-building" is not a loose group in which revolutionary socialism and identity politics coexist[6] but the kind of organization the Political Reorientation Faction argues for in its Declaration.

David C.
for the Political Reorientation Faction


[1] Despite the many weaknesses of what is now the I.S. Tendency, its politics shine in comparison to orthodox Trotskyism (see Alex Callinicos, TROTSKYISM, 23-54). The largest orthodox Trotskyist current, the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (whose best known figure was the late Ernest Mandel), is now divided between a disoriented majority that has adapted heavily to non-Marxist politics and advocates regroupment with non-revolutionaries, and a minority that clings to the party-building approach of the 1970s. Most other orthodox Trotskyists are stuck in the late 1930s.

[2] The Sri Lankan L.S.S.P. espoused Trotskyism verbally but was in practice a left reformist party, while the Bolivian P.O.R.'s support for a middle class radical nationalist government prevented it from taking advantage of a revolutionary situation.

[3] Although Marx used the term sect to refer to small socialist groups in general, as opposed to "an independent historical movement" (Marx to Bolte, 253) of the working class, in this document the term is used to refer to a group so cut off from reality that it can no longer contribute to advancing the class struggle. A sect in this sense is not necessarily a cult (e.g. the "Sparts") or sectarian in the sense of counterposing its own narrow interests to those of the struggle. Today the Canadian I.S. is not yet a sect, but it is pulled in this direction by its "party-building" pretensions, the gap between the real world and the leadership's analysis of the world and perspectives, and its bureaucratic centralist internal regime.

[4] Before 1968, many members of S.R./I.S. actually thought of a revolutionary party in terms that were closer to those of the early Rosa Luxemburg than of Lenin. This is clear in Cliff's essay "Trotsky on Substitutionism" and the first edition of his ROSA LUXEMBURG.

[5] Abbie Bakan in a talk, "Leninism: Theory and Practice," at the Toronto cadre school held Aug. 12, 1995.

[6] Such as the American group Solidarity.


Ian Angus, CANADIAN BOLSHEVIKS (Vanguard, 1981).


Alex Callinicos, TROTSKYISM (Open University Press, 1990).

Central Committee ISGB, "To Members of the NC of ISUS." (Unpublished letter, 1976).

Tony Cliff, "Trotsky on Substitutionism." (1960). Reprinted in NEITHER WASHINGTON NOR MOSCOW (Bookmarks, 1982).

________, LENIN, vol. 3, REVOLUTION BESIEGED (Bookmarks, 1987).

Duncan Hallas, "Towards a Revolutionary Socialist Party." Reprinted in PARTY AND CLASS (Pluto, 1972). HARRY WICKS: A MEMORIAL (Socialist Platform, 1989). Jim Higgins (ed.), A SOCIALIST REVIEW (International Socialism, 1965).

Karl Marx to Friedrich Bolte, Nov. 23 1871. In Marx and Engels, SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE (Progress, 1975), 253-255. John Molyneux, LEON TROTSKY'S THEORY OF REVOLUTION (Harvester, 1981).

"The Organizational Structure of the Communist Parties, the Methods and Content of Their Work: Theses." THESES, RESOLUTIONS AND MANIFESTOS OF THE FIRST FOUR CONGRESSES OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL (Pluto, 1983), 234-261.