From Our Delhi Bureau

NEW DELHI: Pakistan's military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf,
reportedly told a high-level meeting of defence officials in
Islamabad barely a day after United States President Bill
Clinton left Islamabad that the troops should maintain "high
level of confrontation" with the Indian forces along the Line of
Control and international border in Jammu and Kashmir.

Learning about this development, the American intelligence chose
to tip off the Indian External Affairs Ministry that Clinton's
advice to Musharraf seems to have fallen on deaf ear and hence
India should be fully prepared for any eventuality.

The tip-off has come with an advice to alert its defence forces
on the possibility of the Pakistan Army undertaking "limited but
powerful strikes" into India in order to seize and hold
territory in one area or another, the sources in the External
Affairs Ministry said.

The sources said the American tip-off have also talked about the
"possibility" of a marked increase in activity by Pakistan-aided
militants and subversives in Jammu and Kashmir involving hard
target attacks on security forces' headquarters and patrols, and
further exchanges of heavy weapons' fire across the LoC.

According to a set of classified intelligence inputs made
available to New Delhi, a further major eruption of fighting
along the LoC may not be confinable to Kashmir but could spread
to the border, probably with "very serious consequences".
FEED-BACK FROM INDERFURTH: The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Karl Inderfurth, who flew to New Delhi from Islamabad, shortly
after Bill Clinton's departure, told Indian national
security adviser Brijesh Mishra that the message delivered to
Pakistan by President Clinton privately in the talks was much
harder than his address to the people of Pakistan.

The sources said while India was happy with the unambiguous and
consistent message that was conveyed by Clinton to General
Musharraf, they had no expectation that Pakistan would quickly
fall in line and end its cross-border terrorism.

Inderfurth told Mishra whom he met on Sunday that the president
had clearly indicated to Musharraf that after Kargil, "it was up
to Pakistan to make the first move in restoring trust between
Islamabad and New Delhi."

In response to Clinton's demand to end violence, Gen Musharraf
had apparently insisted that the steps towards that goal had to
be "reciprocal, but the US apparently rejected this idea,"
Inderfurth was quoted telling Mishra.

The External Affairs Ministry sources said neither Clinton nor
India expected any formal announcements from Islamabad that it
was ready to abjure its use of force across the Line of Control.

"But if Gen Musharraf does indeed move seriously in that
direction, New Delhi and Washington would want to assess the
hard evidence on the ground. India and the US are likely to
discuss further steps only after coming to a judgment in the
coming weeks on the course Islamabad has chosen to adopt," the
sources added.

JANE'S REPORT: At a time when the US President highlighted the
need for the resumption of bilateral dialogue process between
Islamabad and New Delhi, Jane's Intelligence Review brought to
the fore some significant details about Pak armour and war
strategy.

According to this publication, which is highly respected in the
matters of defence, as Pakistan has no strategic depth, one
"practical solution to this limitation" is to concentrate on the
eastern border with the intention of penetrating into India "on,
probably, to widely separated axes to swiftly take and hold
comparatively small areas of territory".

The advance, Jane's Intelligence Review has calculated, would
probably be limited to 80-100 km on single divisional front,
with commanders refraining from flank exploitation, at least
initially.

This, the publication says, would "tally with Western
assessments of the ability of the logistics system to cope with
movement forward from easily accessed border dumps". The
publication has conceded that there is a significant numerical
paper disparity between Pakistan's forces and those of India,
much in India's favour.

However, the publication has pointed out that the realities on
the ground, especially in armour capabilities, forward air
defence, troop morale and leadership, and basic equipment such
as radios, small arms and ancillary material "indicate severe
defects in the Indian defence spectrum, to the extent there is
near-parity between the armies".

This, the publication has noted, also applies to the air
forces.

The quoted combat aircraft strength of over 700 in the Indian
Air Force is some half that number in effective strength, Jane's
Intelligence Review says and adds: "Lack of competent pilots is
the most serious deficiency. There are, however, problems in
higher command and control in Pakistan Army". The Pak Army, the
publication has revealed, is short of officers.

This, it is explained, is largely due to competition from more
lucrative careers and because the social structure of Pakistan
is changing. According to the publication, the `old Army
families' who supplied their sons as officers and soldiers can
no longer be relied upon as a guaranteed source of recruits. The
shortage is likely to continue for the foreseeable future,
although the recent military takeover improved enlistments.

It is reported that following the 1989 Zarb-e-Momin exercise it
was made clear to commanders that logistics mattered, that
re-supply was not to be treated as `out of exercise' or
`notional' and that all exercises were to have a credible
logistics plan. The analysis of Zarb-e-Momin resulted in
considerable restructuring, including the creation of the Air
Defence Command and the Artillery Division.

Jane's Intelligence Review has also revealed that cessation of
overseas training arrangements by developed countries as a
result of their disapproval of Pakistan's nuclear tests has not
seriously affected professional knowledge or standards, but
officers "are now denied exposure to the wider horizon offered
by such nations.

Equally significant revelation: Increased anti-Western feelings
have been manipulated by a small number of zealots within and
outside the Pak armed forces in an attempt to attract adherents
to more rigid forms of Islam than is desired by senior officers
and the West. END.