Introduction
After 17 days
of fierce fighting between the Hizballah and Israel during the April 1996
Operation Grapes of Wrath, killing 200 individuals after reciprocal bombardments
of civilian areas by both sides, the Lebanese Shi´ite movement emerged
relatively undamaged and confident, significantly strengthened as the unrivaled
protector of Lebanese sovereignty against Israeli occupation as well as
the effective provider to the local South Lebanese residents. ”I promise
and threaten this enemy”, said Hizballah´s Secretary-General Sheikh
Hassan Nasserallah at an 1996 election rally in eastern Lebanon, ”that
any new aggression against Lebanon will drag the occupying Israeli army
back into mud and into a quagmire where bombs are not made of iron but
of human bodies”(Reuters, 13 September 1996). Despite Hizballah´s
performance and bulliant mood, riding on a wave of public support following
Israel´s ill-fated killing of 105 Lebanese civilian refugees at the
village of Qana, Hizballah´s continuing ”war of liberation” against
Israeli forces failed to translate into any political inroads in Lebanon´s
September 1996 parliamentary elections. In fact, Hizballah´s representation
in the new 128-member parliament amounted to seven members of parliament
(MPs) and three supporters compared with the previous eight MPs and four
supporters who had represented the movement effectively as opposition to
the Hariri government and Amal during the last four years (Usher, 1997:59-67).
In many ways, the inability of the Hizballah to convert its popular resistance
struggle against Israel in southern Lebanon into political currency was
largely the outcome of Syria limiting any expansion of the movement´s
influence through meddling with electoral districts which served to disadvantage
the movement and the fact that Rafiq Hariri based his electoral campaign
around the slogan ”Moderation Against Extremism, raising fears within Hizballah
ranks that perhaps new legislation would be instituted to curb its activities
(Trendle, 1996). Hizballah´s political status quo has meant that
the movement is forced to concentrate all its energies towards the struggle
to liberate Lebanon from Israeli occupation, as evidenced by the increased
number of resistance operations from 99 in 1991 to 750 attacks in 1996,
including the 489 Katyushas launched alone during April 1996 (Jerusalem
Post, 7 January 1997). Despite Hizballah´s belligerence in physical
violence as well as in bellicose rhetoric, refusing to accept Israel´s
existence and calling for ”the liberation of Jerusalem”, the movement has
shown a remarkable degree of pragmatism, flexibility and sophisticated
awareness of the requirements of the internal Lebanese, as well as regional,
environment. This limits as well as expands its maneuverability in highly
fluid situations given the complexity and multiplicity of actors as well
as agendas at work. This tightrope has not always been easy for the Hizballah
to balance with its ideological goals as the movement confronted the challenges
posed to its survival, role and even growth as a movement by a post-civil
war environment.
Hizballah´s
transformation from a small rag-tag militia, skillfully combining terrorist
and guerrilla warfare techniques with effective social action on the local
level in the chaos of Lebanon´s civil war, towards establishing and
even reinventing itself as a formidable, as well as legitimate political,
military and social force on the Lebanese scene in the 1990´s, in
what has been described as the movement´s ”Lebanonization” process,
(Chartouni-Dubarry, 1996:59-62) has been a difficult but highly successful
process played out in different stages. This current three-pronged strategy,
which is designed to preserve Hizballah´s uniqueness and source of
power within Lebanon, rests largely on the continued ability of the movement
to credibly confront its enemies and pursue its ideological objectives,
whether as a legally based and uncompromising anti-establishment opposition
to Hariri´s government and policies, or as the provider and protector
of the residents of southern Lebanon against the continued Israeli occupation.
The latter occupy a central place for the Hizballah, stating that its primary
goal of its ”resistance project” is to force the withdrawal of Israel from
southern Lebanon at all costs ”by exhausting the enemy on the human and
material levels through daily military operations” (Monday Morning, 3 March
1997). Unlike Hizballah´s previous challenges, a fundamental dilemma
facing the movement at the present is that the successful achievement of
an Israeli withdrawal would without doubt represent one of the greatest
victories in alignment with its ideological objectives but, at the same
time, it would remove its underlying revolutionary character and identity
as well as momentum in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Lebanese
Shi´ite community. ”We are not only a military movement”, proclaimed
Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah, ”we have popular roots everywhere. No one will
be able to uproot us, no matter what happens”(AFP, 24 February 1994). Yet,
at the same time, Sheikh Nasserallah acknowledges that ”the upcoming battle,
the battle for normalization, is much tougher than the military battle
and will require greater efforts and capabilities” (Voice of the Oppressed,
3 October 1993).
The question
is not whether the Hizballah would survive as demonstrated by its skillful
”Lebanonization” process but rather the way it will be able to grow as
a movement without the ability to confront its Zionist enemy in practical
terms and the manner in which it intends to project itself to its
socio-political constituency over the longer term. This double-edged sword
for the movement represents one of the last yet perhaps one of the most
difficult unwritten chapters of the current ”Lebanonization” process of
the Hizballah. It is clear that the movement pursues its ideological struggle
to ”liberate Jerusalem” in incremental stages over a long timeframe, firstly
in a Lebanese context and then towards liberating Palestine, which it views
as primarily as a Palestinian responsibility (The Independent, 10 November
1993). Yet, becoming primarily a political party would dilute its revolutionary
character and identity, moving it towards becoming another version of the
Amal movement while possibly threatening to produce factionalism within
the movement (al-Shira, 27 September 1992). Eventhough it is clear that
the Hizballah´s command leadership and chief ideologue has gradually
introduced, in their mobilization speeches, the necessity to actively confront
Israel on the economic level in southern Lebanon if a withdrawal occurs
and the movement faces disarmament, (Voice of the Oppressed, 3 October
1993) it remains to be seen whether the movement would become absorbed
by the process of peace if the movement only retains a political and social
dimension to its activities. It is clear that the Hizballah is preparing
itself for the prospects of disarmament once the Israelis withdraw as part
of a settlement between Syria and Israel, by confidently proclaiming that
it has developed contingency plans for the outbreak of peace with the Islamic
Resistance adopting new methods including ”the use of cold weapons (not
firearms) in order to confront the Zionist regime”(IRNA, 13 January 1996).
Deciphering clues of the dynamics of this process towards effectively ”disarming”
the Hizballah and its future as a movement is inherently difficult given
the multidimensional complexity of internal and external factors affecting
the movement´s behaviour and prospects, ranging from converging as
well as conflicting Syrian, Iranian and Israeli agendas. Apart from the
necessity to contextualize these multifaceted dimensions affecting the
movement´s behaviour, it is equally necessary to recognize that any
fuller understanding of the movement´s current or future political
strategy cannot be achieved without deciphering the interrelationship between
its military, political and social components. In many ways, Hizballah´s
political participation continously serve to assist and reinforce the other
spheres of the movement´s activities as long as the Israeli enemy
remain on Lebanese territory and as long as the Lebanese political system
remain unchanged, limiting the movement´s ability to translate grassroots
support into political seats.
The Influence of Hizballah in the Local and Regional Context
The Hizballah
is one of the most feared militant enemies of the West yet among the least
understood organisations which is quite surprising given that the movement
is part and parcel at the heart of peace negotiations between Israel, Syria,
and Lebanon. In a worst-case scenario, uncontrolled Hizballah violence
could trigger a wider confrontation between Israel and Syria. In the past,
the Hizballah has also often been characterized as a terrorist group which
is loosely organised. Such misleading characterizations ignores the fact
that the organisation´s main activity has been on the social welfare
front, fulfilling a legitimate role as a provider of a vast network of
services to the politically marginalized and economically disenfranchised
Lebanese Shiite community. While the Hizballah lobby for the increased
redistribution of resources to the ”dispossessed” Shi´ite community
through its parliamentarian representatives and while the effectiveness
of social services machinery was most visible during and after IDF Operation
Accountability in 1993 and Grapes of Wrath in 1996, Hizballah´s hearts-and-minds
campaign has been an integral component of its strategy and success from
the movement´s genesis. In fact, the Hizballah repaired over 1,000
homes damaged by Israeli attacks during 1988-91. Similarly, the Hizballah
is not composed of loose radical Islamic groupings but has developed a
highly sophisticated hierarchial organisational structure, where decisions
are taken from the top command leadership, who themselves have formal and
informal channels to both Iran´s and Syria´s civilian and military
establishments. This web of relationships have been difficult to uncover
but fundamentally impacts on Hizballah´s behaviour in all spheres
of its activities (Ranstorp, 1994). Equally within the organisation itself,
the shifting roles and positions of individual clergymen, either in charge
of command leadership functions or portfolios or ”attached” to the Hizballah
in advisory or affiliate capacity, have been fluid and complex in character
yet crucially determines the way in which the movement behaves in response
to present and new situations as well as challenges. This complexity is
perhaps best illustrated by the enigmatic role of Sheikh Muhammad Hussein
Fadlallah, who occupy a central role for the movement as its spiritual
guide and, at the same time, transcends the movement and Lebanon in terms
of religious stature and following (Kramer, 1997:83-181). Fadlallah also
serves as a bridge for the movement in its contacts with other parties
(al-Diyar, 19 December 1993). As explained by Sheikh Fadlallah himself,
”I live in a warm atmosphere surrounded by the youth of ”Hizballah”, whom
I consider my sons. However, and since the inception of Hizballah, I was
never part of its organizational structure” (al-Majallah, 17 June 1995).
A second reason
for examining Hizballah more closely is that the organisation´s violence
has often been considered to be random in nature, either against the West
or against Israel. On the contrary, there are well-defined mechanisms and
reasons why the Hizballah turn on and off the violence, most often in alignment
with changes in its environment or in alignment with carefully calibrated
strategies. This is evident from the movement´s statements, repeatedly
outlining the conditions regulating martyrdom operations (Kramer, 1992:30-47).
The Hizballah is an extraordinarily sophisticated organisation which is
not only attuned to the environment within which it operates in Lebanon
but has consistently demonstrated that it is well-attuned to Iranian, Syrian,
and even Israeli politics. On the most basic level, there seems to be a
close correlation between an escalation of Hizballah guerrilla activity
against Israel either in response to breakdowns in Syrian-Israeli negotiations
or in response to the curbing of Hamas activity on the West Bank and Gaza
by the Palestinian Authority or Israel. Although the actual spark that
ignited Grapes of Wrath was related to the Israeli detonation of an explosive
charge, killing a child and wounding three, in the south Lebanese village
of Bira´shit on April 8, there had been a preceding gradual escalation
of Hizballah resistance activity in relation to a downturn in Syrian-Israeli
negotiations and the crackdown on Hamas following its spate of suicide-attacks
inside Israel, killing 136 people between 24 February and 4 March 1996.
The correlation between the situation in Lebanon and Palestine in alignment
with Hizballah´s ideological struggle to ”liberate Jerusalem” was
evident by the accidental detonation of an explosive device at an East
Jerusalem hotel on 12 April by a newly recruited Hizballah operative, revealing
that the movement had retained its terrorist capability despite the reorientation
of the movement during the 1990s (The New York Times Magazine, 10 November
1996).
A third reason
for examining Hizballah is to understand why it has been so difficult for
either Israel, Beirut, or Syria to find either a military or diplomatic
solution to the problem of Hizballah. As Operation Grapes of Wrath, which
cost US400 million, proved Israel cannot militarily defeat the Hizballah
through airstrikes or conventionally on the ground without sustaining mass
casualties or risking a wider confrontation with Syria. Similarly, the
Lebanese government cannot act against the Hizballah without Syria´s
consent and, in turn, Damascus cannot move militarily against Hizballah
without seriously jeopardizing its relationship with Iran or the stability
of Lebanon´s political and economic rehabilitation under Syrian supervision.
While the Hizballah is no military match for the Syrian military and intelligence,
who currently invest over half of its intelligence resources tracking and
mapping Hizballah arms depots in the event of a disarmament of the movement,
any Syrian confrontation with Hizballah could seriously jeopardize Lebanon´s
rehabilitation process as the movement is formidable enough to cause a
lot of trouble.
At the same
time, it is important to recognize that Hizballah leaders are aware of
the fact that the organisation does not function in a vacuum but within
an environment that imposes certain restrictions on its freedom of action.
Firstly, Hizballah is restricted by the fact that it cannot act against
Syria´s agenda and control over Lebanon nor directly against the
wishes of the Beirut government. To do so would risk direct confrontation.
Secondly, Hizballah realizes that it cannot seek to dominate other communities
due to the sectarian composition of Lebanon, which imposes limitations
to its quest of establishing an Islamic Republic (Journal of Palestine
Studies, 1997:67). Thirdly, while Hizballah has scored notable successes
on the battlefield and in the social sphere, its actual support within
the Lebanese Shiite community is still limited in relation to the strength
of its competitor Amal, though some observers advocate that Hizballah would
win in the Biq´a and would achieve over 60 percent of the vote in
the South in a straight Amal-Hizballah electoral battle (Usher, 1997:67).
Fourthly, Hizballah´s concentration on social services requires vast
financial resources and in order to sustain it and even expand it over
a longer period of time is largely dictated by the continued injection
of Iranian aid, which has steadily decreased over the years amidst growing
political and economic difficulties in Iran (Foreign Report, 4 May 1997).
Apart from identifying
factors restraining Hizballah´s freedom of action, it is essential
to bear in mind that the movement in its actions and messages operate simultaneously
towards an internal and external audience. In the first week of January
1997, Hizballah´s TV-station al-Manar (the Beacon) announced that
the movement considered 1996 to be ”the year of the resistance”, qualifying
it to be a major success as its Islamic Resistance fighters had carried
out more than 750 operations in southern Lebanon in which 29 IDF soldiers
and 47 of its own men were killed (Jerusalem Post, 7 January 1997). While
it is clear that the Hizballah has scored notable military gains past year
in terms of the quantity and quality of its resistance operations in the
South, it is less clear in other areas. In a limited sense, Hizballah did
attain some achievements following Grapes of Wrath such as the written
understanding which de facto recognized its right to attack Israeli forces
in security zone (an improvement from understandings following Israel´s
July 1993 Operation Accountability). Additionally, Hizballah´s continued
military struggle against Israel enables it to portray itself as the defender
of the population of southern Lebanon, the opposite effect intended by
the Israeli operation. In fact, Hizballah leaders repeatedly stress that
the movement has never taken the initiative ”in attacking or acting against
civilians in northern Palestine”, rather it has ”always fought back in
defence and in reaction to the occupation army´s actions against
civilians in south Lebanon” (SWB, 11 April 1996). However, when Sheikh
Hassan Nasserallah proclaims 1996 to be an unqualified success for the
organisation as the year of the resistance, it only provides a partial
picture as it has not translated into any significant or tangible military
or political advantages for the organisation. Nor does it provide any clearer
picture of the means and methods the Hizballah aims to employ in relation
to the present and future realities of the Lebanese environment. An area
where the Hizballah can proclaim unqualified success during 1996 is its
achievement of a psychological edge against its conventionally more powerful
enemy Israel and its proxy militia the South Lebanese Army (SLA). This
psychological edge is not limited to its military activity but must be
seen in alignment with Sheikh Nasserallah´s incremental and broader
strategy of making the movement more open and acceptable to other Lebanese
confessional communities and to the world at large.
Hizballah´s psychological warfare
Symbolism and
the projection of messages to internal and external audiences have occupied
a central place for the Hizballah throughout its evolution. This has been
most visible in the centrality and steady growth of Hizballah martyrology
reminding followers of sacrifices already made, ranging from posters of
Musa al-Sadr, the assassinated Hizballah leader Abbas al-Musawi to Islamic
Resistance combatants who sacrificed themselves in military operations
against IDF or SLA. The latter is reinforced on a daily level as each Islamic
Resistance unit is named after previous or present martyred fighters. At
its most basic and visible level, Hizballah´s logo, set against a
yellow background signifying captivity, reinforces daily to its followers
the religious legitimacy and historical authenticity of the movement, as
the martyr Husayn´s raised arm wielding an automatic rifle is integrated
into the name Hizballah while the Quranic verse the movement derives its
name from is depicted above its logo. The mere fact that weaponry occupy
the central place raises the issue of how the movement will project itself
in the event of a disarmament as it would seem its main raison d´etre
revolves around the ability to confront. Apart from reinforcing its sacred
legitimacy by distinguishing itself from other groups in Lebanon, Hizballah
also reminds its followers through its logo of the future direction of
the movement towards the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon.
This awareness of symbolism and the projection of messages to a variety
of audiences have extended into the realm of psychological warfare through
its media apparatus as an auxiliary instrument which amplifies and reinforces
Hizballah´s physical violence against its enemies. Although the Hizballah
has traditionally utilized its newspaper al-Ahd or its TV-station al-Manar
to provide commentary and news coverage of its activities, the movement
has been extraordinarily adept at using and exploiting new technologies,
such as the Internet, which simultaneously serves to further legitimizing
the movement, to reach a broader audience both within and beyond Lebanon
on a daily basis, to raise additional funds from within and outside Lebanon,
and to intensify its psychological warfare options against its enemies
(The Daily Star, 4 November 1997). In fact, the Hizballah has utilized
the Internet as an intelligence gathering tool, whereby it collects information
and retrieves articles from the Hebrew press about Israeli undercover units
operating in southern Lebanon.(The MidEast Dispatch, 18 February 1997)
It also represents an enhanced way in which the movement without using
violence manages to engage the enemy, as evident by their claim that Israel
attempted to interfere or block the newly-established Internet site. (al-Manar,
14 March 1997) At the same time, the use of new technologies present a
new form of platform for the movement in projecting not only itself in
a new and controlled fashion but also the position and influence of key
ideologues, most notably exemplified by the establishment of Sheikh Fadlallah´s
own official web-site covering his Friday sermons and related issues to
the Lebanese Shi´ite scholar´s line of thinking to a broader
audience.
In the first
days of January 1997, the Hizballah announced the establishment of al-Manar´s
own home-page on the Internet dedicated to ousting Israel´s occupying
forces in southern Lebanon, providing daily news in Arabic, English, Hebrew
(and soon French), utilizing high-quality of graphics with extensive pictures
of so-called ”Israeli terrorism” and military operations of the Islamic
Resistance. Al-Manar´s site will also soon be offering video-clips
of guerrilla ambushes of the IDF taped by Hizballah cameramen. The way
in which Hizballah has quickly and skillfully exploited this new technology
to amplify its operations against its enemies reveal the extent of which
the movement considers this as an auxiliary weapon in efforts to sow fear
and dissent among enemy military ranks as well as continuously raising
awareness and debate over the costs of Israel´s continued occupation
of southern Lebanon. Whether the Hizballah uses new and old propaganda
techniques in tandem with its resistance operations, this is skillfully
and simultaneously employed by the movement against the South Lebanese
Army and the Israeli Defense Forces as well as Israeli public opinion.
Firstly, Hizballah´s
vast media apparatus has been active against the 3,000-man strong South
Lebanese Army, which acts as a buffer between Israelis and its enemies
in the north. This psychological warfare has been waged innovatively in
conjunction with improved armed operations against SLA units with a steady
rate of bombings, ambushes, mortar and rocket attacks and hit-and-run raids,
causing at least 19 SLA casualties during 1996. A serious breakdown in
SLA security with the recent handover and execution of its security chief,
Ahmed al-Hallaq, has had a demoralising effect, exacerbated by a series
of defections within its ranks (Venter, 1996a). Infiltration within SLA
ranks has been exploited by Hizballah who capitalize on increasingly deteriorating
SLA morale by regularly publicising and distributing the names of SLA officers
with promises of punishment. With SLA´s intelligence-gathering activities
effectively undermined, the Hizballah also entice defections with promises
of financial inducements coupled with pardons (Foreign Report, 17 April
1997) but insists that a return ”must take place before the Zionist withdrawal”
(al-Manar, 14 March 1997). In fact there is a special information unit
within Hizballah which highlights SLA soldiers returning to their people.
(Ha´aretz, 15 December 1996) As such, Hizballah continue to sow fear
within SLA ranks what will be their fate in the event of a concluded Syrian-Israeli
peace treaty or a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
”We call on all those who have joined Agent Lahd´s militia”, broadcasted
Sheikh Nasserallah through the Voice of the Oppressed, ”to withdraw, seek
forgiveness, and return to their homeland and people. This is the chance
of a lifetime for them to become humans again instead of being worn out
defensive barriers which will soon be crushed under the feet of the mujahidin”
(Voice of the Oppressed, 26 May 1992). The effectiveness of Hizballah´s
strategy surfaced amidst SLA fears of an imminent unilateral Israeli withdrawal
when SLA leader Antoine Lahad threatened its ally that over half of SLA
fighters would join the Hizballah should Israel pull-out of Lebanon (al-Manar,
13 October 1997). In an effort to further demoralize the SLA and institutionalize
in political and local terms the legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance,
Sheikh Nasserallah announced in early November 1997 the creation of the
Lebanese Brigades of Resistance to Israeli occupation (LBRIO), open to
any Lebanese irrespective of their religious or political affiliations
though it remained operationally subordinate to the regular Islamic Resistance
units. This move further undermined the economic attractiveness of remaining
with the SLA, whose salaries are permanently indexed against Hizballah,
especially as future martyrs of the LBRIO and their families were promised
to receive full Hizballah support, namely a house, medical care, education
and monthly pensions of at least 350 US dollars (The Daily Star, 4 November
1997).
The Hizballah
is also waging effective psychological warfare against serving IDF soldiers
in southern Lebanon. It has increasingly utilized its own camera-crews
to record the efficiency of its attacks against IDF soldiers and posts,
which it regularly broadcasts on its TV-station al-Manar from Beirut and
al-Fajr from Biqa and, at times, distributes to foreign media (Venter,
1996a/b). These media outlets has become increasingly important for the
movement given the Hariri government´s limited award of licenses
to Lebanese broadcasting stations and these will remain untouched as long
as the movement continues to focus on publizising its resistance against
Israel (Christian Science Monitor, 21 October 1996). In particular, daring
resistance operations boosts the morale of its own fighters and undermines
the morale of IDF soldiers, who recently in some instances have been seen
fleeing from advancing Hizballah fighters (Ha´aretz, 15 December
1996). The movement also regularly publicize the aquisition of new and
upgraded weaponry in a concerted effort to instill a degree of uncertainty
for IDF units without actually using them. This psychological warfare,
combined with qualitative improvements in Hizballah tactics with more IDF
casualties, demonstrate that the Hizballah is very aware of the real effect
of dead IDF soldiers on Israeli public opinion, as it raises criticism
about Israel´s need to stay entangled in Lebanon. This was evident
following the February 1997 crash of two IDF CH-53 helicopters on mission
over southern Lebanon, leaving 72 Israelis dead, to which Hizballah Deputy
Secretary-General Naim Qassem responded ”will strengthen internal
debate and the struggle inside occupied Palestine about the presence of
Israeli troops in Lebanon, and it will increase the opinions calling for
withdrawal” (APS Diplomat Recorder, 15 February 1997). Similarly, the Hizballah
exploited the so-called al-Insariyah operation, when the movement ambushed
an Israeli commando landing and killed the 11-man strong team on 5 September
1997, through publishing pictures of the dead soldiers through its media
outlets. As such, Hizballah has concentrated its efforts to improve its
intelligence-gathering and steadily maximize IDF or SLA casualties by varying
operational techniques, which in 1996 resulted in the highest level of
IDF casualties in Lebanon since 1985 (The Independent, 2 January 1997).
At the same time, the Hizballah has minimized its own casualties by adapting
themselves to Israel´s increasingly technological warfare. This has
led the Israelis to frequently raid Hizballah´s radio-station, Voice
of the Oppressed, and to strive towards a psychological edge by publicizing
at the end of last year the existence of an elite Israeli unit, Egoz designed
exclusively to combat Hizballah units (Jane´s Defence Weekly, 11
December 1996:17). It was allegedly Egoz units on a reconnaissance mission
near the Qana UN-headquarters that came under Hizballah fire, triggering
Israeli support-fire which killed over 100 civilians (The Independent,
14 December 1996). Despite the accuracy of this, Hizballah´s radio-station
quickly exploited this by stating ”that it knew how to crack walnuts (Egoz)
as they were hard on the outside and soft inside” (ibid). Equally, the
Hizballah is cognizant that its war of attrition against the IDF is a serious
drain on Israeli resources, estimated to cost Israel over one million US
dollars every day (according to a UNIFIL source) while the continued Israeli
presence has caused so far over 400 IDF casualties with nearly 750 wounded
since 1985 (Venter, 1996a; Blanche, 1997). The Hizballah faced, according
to its operational chief Nabil Kaouk, ”an enemy terrified of every house,
tree, bush or boulder” (The Guardian, 4 March 1997).
Thirdly, Hizballah´s
recognition of the importance of psychological warfare was highlighted
by Sheikh Naim Qassem, who recently explained that it was not the military
use of suicide-bombers that led to the Israeli withdrawal in 1985 but its
deterrent effect on Israeli public opinion (Ha´aretz, 14 August 1996).
This was evident during the Operation Grapes of Wrath, when Hizballah broadcasted
on al-Manar news of a contingent of 70 suicide-bombers ready to be dispatched
against Israel, (SWB, 16 April 1996) and when Sheikh Nasserallah made a
direct appeal to northern Israeli residents: ”you have the power to prevent
Katyushas falling on your heads”(Ha´aretz, 14 August 1996). Equally,
Sheikh Nasserallah took the opportunity to reinforce the same message to
Hizballah followers at a commemoration ceremony for a martyred fighter
in the village of Al-Ain, reminding them that ”the day Israel will come
to make the mistake of initiating a new adventure in Lebanon, it should
know that the bodies of our combatants will be transformed into human bombs
against its tanks” (Jerusalem Post, 12 January 1997). The effectiveness
of Islamic Resistance operations in comparison to its enemies is projected
and reinforced through its media outlets and public statements as well
as by its newly-established Internet site operating under the auspices
of the Islamic Resistance Support Association, which provides detailed
and daily chronological information about Hizballah´s military operations
and Israeli ”terrorist” actions with monthly charts outlining the casualty
rate on both sides. This web site illustrates the depth of Hizballah´s
strategic and tactical thinking of the underlying motivations behind Israel´s
decision to launch Operation Grapes of Wrath, while projecting back to
its constituency reasons for Israel´s failure. Both Hizballah and
Iranian clerics take great pride in the fact that the movement is the only
force that has ever accomplished the defeat of Israel in 1985 as well as
the United States the preceding year (al-Nahar, 5 June 1985; MidEast Mirror,
14 February 1997). At the same token, Hizballah leaders are deliberately
vague in public about revealing its position in the event of a unilateral
Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon. Sheikh Nasserallah has continuously
reaffirmed that Hizballah ”is keeping its position secret (on) what will
happen at the Lebanese-Israeli border. It is not up to Hizballah to provide
security guarantees. Let them move and then we´ll see” (APS Diplomat
Recorder, 13 February 1997). This ambiguity serves a number of purposes
not only for the movement itself but also for Syria´s agenda in negotiations
with Israel. As admitted by Nasserallah himself, revealing its position
publicly vis-a-vis an Israeli withdrawal would be ”wasting a powerful card
of Lebanese and Syrian negotiators because the enemy is demanding security
guarantees” and it remains concealed in order to prevent any attempts of
seperating the Syrian-Lebanese tracks.
Fourthly, Hizballah´s
broadcasts projects an image of the movement being a true defender of the
Lebanese people and the only effective spearhead against Israel´s
continued military occupation. This image is enhanced by broadcasts, announcing
that it moved in with its al-Jihad al-Bina´a (Holy Struggle for Reconstruction),
a Hizballah-charity, and its vast social services networks, rebuilding
5,000 homes in 82 villages in the aftermath of Operation Grapes of Wrath
while repairing the infrastructure damaged by Israeli fire (Venter, 1996c).
This boosts Hizballah´s position vis-a-vis the Beirut government
and its popularity with the local population, especially as the movement
usually provide emergency aid and rebuild war-damaged homes to local residents
well before the arrival of any UN-assistance (Harik, 1994). This well-oiled
social services machinery is firmly entrenched at the grassroots level
to muster political support, as evident by the movement´s slogan
”we will fight poverty as ruthlessly as we will resist the Israeli occupation”
proclaimed on banners throughout villages across southern Lebanon (Christian
Science Monitor, 11 September 1996). In fact, the Hizballah capitalized
on the overwhelming support it received from all segments of the Lebanese
population during Operation Grapes of Wrath by placing advertisements in
local papers urging financial support either through general funding contributions
or partly financing the cost of bullets, Katyushas or the equipment of
an Islamic Resistance fighter (Jaber, 1997:196-7). However, a majority
of Hizballah´s social contributions occur without fanfare or publicity,
especially its continued financial compensation to the families of the
1,145 martyred fighters killed fighting Israel since 1982 (Mideast Mirror,
11 November 1996).
Finally in a
broader sense, the Hizballah has cultivated a gentler image towards the
West in an effort to reinvent itself as a legitimate political, social
and cultural organization through a variety of means especially in the
Beirut and the Biq´a area. Hizballah banners in Arabic, French, and
English at the entrance of Baalbek, welcoming foreign tourists, while allowing
the sale of alcohol in restaurants (Christian Science Monitor, 29 April
1996; Wall Street Journal, 19 November 1991) is in sharp contrast to its
previous attitudes of banning anti-Islamic behaviour (Harris, 1985). The
movement has also continuously projected reassurances that Americans ”have
nothing more to fear” in Lebanon (AFP, 5 January 1995) and that Hizballah´s
problem is not with the American people but with its leaders and administration
(Christian Science Monitor, 21 May 1996). Hizballah clerics, most notably
Sheikh Fadlallah, has also toned down the issue of violence, exemplified
by his criticism of Islamist´s actions in Algeria and the issue of
self-flagellation during Ashura (al-Safir, 9 September 1994; al-Majallah,
17 June 1995). Equally, Hizballah´s projects a new ”openness” as
an organisation and has publicly toned down its call for an Islamic
revolution, realizing the limitations imposed by the multi-confessional
political system although it continues to advocate its abandonment. In
a way, the decision to participate in the elections, explained Sheikh Nasserallah,
served ”to prove to friends and foes alike that Hizballah is not a group
of combatant youths, but a popular trend with a vast base in Lebanon” (Ettela´at,
13 February 1993). Similarly, Hizballah´s tone down of its rhetoric
in pursuing the establishment of an Islamic Republic is an integral part
of a process of cultivating a gentler image and improve relations with
the internal non-Shi´a audience whilst recognizing the unique sectarian
composition of Lebanese society and difficult conditions surrounding the
near achievement of its ideological goal. As publicly outlined by Sheikh
Nasserallah, the movement recognizes that it cannot impose Islam by force.
Hizballah leaders have publicly advocated that its vision of a post-sectarian
Lebanon would guarantee freedom of thought and expression and the freedom
to chose any system of government (al-Hayah, 17-18 April 1992). In fact,
the call for the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon is nowhere
to be found in Hizballah´s 1996 electoral programme. Similarly, Sheikh
Fadlallah and other Hizballah clerics have been deliberately vague over
the exact contours of an Islamic Republic in pluralistic Lebanon (Fadlallah,
1992). ”We have become convinced”, explained Hizballah legislator Hussein
Hajj Hassan, ”that the Lebanese people do not want an Islamic republic,
and that this system cannot be enforced amidst sectarian diversity” (AP,
9 January 1997). In a wider sense, Hizballah can distinguish itself from
other Lebanese parties through its unique military, political and social
activities which allows the movement to project itself as the moral force,
defending the dispossessed and downtrodden segments against ”humiliation
and slavery to the Zionists” (Voice of the Oppressed, 21 August 1993) and
corruption and favoritism within Lebanese regime in an effort to achieve
”equality and establishing the just state”(al-Manar, 20 June 1997), as
well as freedom and dignity to all citizens. This moral superiority is
amplified by periodic criticism of the Hariri government of failing to
provide for the poorest segments of Lebanese society or involving itself
seriously with the Islamic Resistance in southern Lebanon (al-Sharq al-Awsat,
11 March 1996). In a broader sense, the Hizballah projects broader justification
for its guerrilla activity to a wider audience, invoking the historical
examples of the French people´s resistance against Nazi occupation
and the resistance of the American people against the colonialists in order
to illustrate that the Islamic resistance is ”a legitimate, legal, and
ethical right” (al-Manar, 20 June 1997; FBIS, 1 September 1993).
The inherent
sophistication of achieving a psychological edge through various techniques
by the Hizballah as an auxiliary instrument to amplify its violence is
symptomatic of the way in which the movement has adapted and transformed
itself in organisational, tactical and strategic terms in order to confront
profound changes posed by the post-civil war environment in Lebanon. Almost
overnight, the Hizballah shed its orientation from holding hostages towards
pursuing a dual track policy of focusing its efforts in resisting Israeli
occupation in southern Lebanon while deciding to integrate into mainstream
Lebanese politics. This process of transformation from revolutionary purity
towards pragmatism has been difficult for the movement yet necessary in
order to it safeguard its position and even guarantee its long-term survival
as a major force in Lebanon.
The Transformation of Hizballah´s Political and Military Strategy
Prior to Hizballah´s
decision to participate in the first post-civil war Lebanese parliamentary
elections in August-September 1992, Muhammad Fannish, a leading member
of the newly-instituted Politbureau, encapsulated the movement´s
inherent awareness of the need to adapt itself to changing circumstances
without compromising its ideological objectives. Instead he stated, ”the
movement is driven, through such an understanding, to change the present,
develop capabilities, surmount obstacles, and define the means appropriate
for continuing on the road towards objectives” (FBIS, 15 May 1992). While
Hizballah´s mastery of political violence served as an essential
ingredient in its rapid and calibrated transformation from a small rag-tag
revolutionary militia into a major military and social actor during the
chaos of the civil war, it gradually became a handicap to the movement
as the Lebanese environment moved towards peace with the conclusion and
the impending implementation of the Taif accords. This accord in itself
effectively undermined the vacuum in which Hizballah had operated, especially
as the movement faced disarmament along with other militias by April 1991.
In the eyes of the Hizballah, the Taif accords also served to legitimize
and institutionalize a Maronite-Sunni dominance under Syrian patronage
in the resuscitation of the Lebanese state and political system, effectively
marginalizing the Shi´ite community (Zisser, 1996:90-110). For the
Hizballah, the Ta´if accord failed to eliminate the shortcomings
of the old system as it maintained a sectarian character and ”the factors
that caused the wars and riots and rendered the fatherland prey to occupation
forces” (al-Majallah, 15 August 1993). Yet, given the fact that Hizballah´s
creation and its remarkable growth could not have been achieved without
its strategic allies, Iran and Syria, and given the reality that the movement
could not effectively confront the extension of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon,
either politically due the Taif accord or militarily due the existence
of 35,000 Syrian troops, the Hizballah gradually realized that accommodation
rather than confrontation was the only answer to these new realities. This
realization had been already reinforced during the 1987-1990 Amal-Hizballah
confrontations, ending with joint Syrian-Iranian intervention, when a series
of incidents demonstrated that Syria would not hesitate to use military
force against the movement if it refused to bow to al-Asad´s agenda
and hegemony over Lebanon. Although Hizballah leaders urged in consultation
with Iran to actively support confrontation against the Ta´if accords,
the movement was gradually convinced by Iranian officials that it could
only safeguard its hardwon gains by coexisting and accepting the rules
as laid down by the Ta´if accord to avoid being marginalized and
pressured as a movement. Instead, Iran urged the movement to actively participate
in molding the future Lebanese regime through party representatives and
confront the Ta´if accords from within.(Ibid)
At the same
time as the conclusion of the Ta´if accords disadvantaged Hizballah´s
position, the movement was simultaneously hit by a series of challenging
events towards the end of the 1980s which threatened to undermine its hardwon
success as a formidable military and social organisation. A first
major crisis for the movement occurred with the death of Ayatollah Khomeini
in 1989 which resulted in the marginalization of the Iranian revolutionist
faction and attempts by Rafsanjani to make Hizballah more pliable in his
efforts to rehabilitate Iran from political and economic isolation (Mideast
Mirror, 11 December 1996). The latter could be seen by the fact that Rafsanjani
tried to assert control over Hizballah by replacing Pasdaran units in Lebanon
more pliable to official Iran and by the fact that he appointed his brother
Mahmud Bahramani as the director of the Syria and Lebanon desk at the Iranian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (al-Majallah, 15 August 1993; The Echo of Iran,
February 1990). This produced political factionalism within the Hizballah
over the direction of the movement with the visible emergence of several
trends divided over how to handle several issues, such as Amal and the
Western hostage issue, along more moderate or militant lines. In addition,
the death of Khomeini and later the demise of Sayyids Abolqasem Kho´i
and Reza Golpayegani, the two most supreme Shi´a religious authorities
in Iraq and Iran, produced also sharp political differences over the supreme
leadership of the Shi´a community within the Hizballah, especially
as Sheikh Fadlallah skillfully challenged Khameini´s religious credentials
in an effort to project himself beyond the Lebanese arena (The Middle East,
February 1995:12; al-Shira, 27 September 1993). This illustrates that the
Hizballah is not a monolithic body with total subservience to Iran but
rather a coalition of clerics, who each had their own views and networks
of followers as well as ties to Iran´s clerical establishment. The
main differences between leading Hizballah clergymen are over methods rather
than aims, as evidently displayed by the 1988 dispute between Sheikh Subhi
al-Tufayli and Sheikh Fadlallah over the question of the feasibility of
the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Lebanon (La Revue du Liban,
30 January 1988; Ha´aretz, 22 February 1988). The acceleration of
political differences within Hizballah´s command leadership threatened
the movement´s cohesiveness following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini
and increased political factionalism in Iran.
A second crisis
came with the conclusion of the Syrian-sponsored Taif peace plan which
confronted the organisation with the prospects of being disarmed, losing
its military ability to confront Israel which served as a major source
of legitimacy and power for the movement. This was also problematic for
Iran as it too faced the prospects of losing its only and indirect ability
to participate militarily in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This fear of disarmament
coincided with peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors
which due to Syrian participation not only safeguarded the movement as
a bargaining card but also threatened to potentially sacrifice Hizballah´s
military presence in the process and cast the movement in direct confrontation
with the Syrian as well as the Lebanese authorities. The willingness by
Lebanese and Syrian authorities to use force against the Hizballah was
illustrated both in September 1993 when the Lebanese army killed 9 Hizballah
members in defiance of a ban demonstrating in West Beirut against the Oslo
accords and in March 1994 when Syrian military arrested eleven Hizballah
fighters during the course of violent demonstrations to mark Jerusalem
Day, handing them over to Lebanese authorities (FBIS, 9 May 1994). As such,
the Hizballah faced limited maneuverability under the Ta´if framework
and had to avoid direct confrontation with either Syrian or Lebanese authorities.
Thirdly, Hizballah´s
success had partially been based on its penchant for secrecy and organisation
but it would be difficult to remain an underground movement in the post-civil
war Lebanese environment (AbuKhalil, 1991:392). At the same time, there
was also a increased realization that the Western hostages held by the
Hizballah had outlived their usefulness and it needed to get rid of them
prior to the end of Perez de Cuellar´s term of office expired towards
the end of 1991, partly to bolster Iran´s position with the UN Secretary-General
regarding the findings of UN Resolution 598, in particular the question
of responsibility for starting the Iran-Iraq war, but also as both Iran
and Hizballah distrusted the incoming Boutros Ghali because of his close
relationship with Egypt´s Anwar Sadat and his involvement with the
Camp David peace process (The Independent, 11 & 20 December 1991).
Shedding its terrorist image by engineering the release of Western hostages
in return for tangible rewards for the movement, Iran as well as Syria
would ultimately require re-organisation of the movement´s organisational
structure and a re-orientation in order to meet the new challenges and
demands imposed by the post-civil war Lebanese environment in order to
guard its gains and extend its growth.
Changes in the Organisation
While Hizballah´s
national Majlis al-Shura was established in 1986, no particular leading
cleric emerged as undisputed leader until the ascendancy of Sheikh Subhi
al-Tufayli in late 1987, a noted radical with particularly close personal
ties with Ali Akbar-Mohtashemi in Iran. Sheikh al-Tufayli´s position
as leader of the Hizballah remained uncontested until the death of Ayatollah
Khomeini in 1989, when the organisation faced unprecedented challenges
within Lebanon and, consequently, displayed intensified rivalry between
Hizballah clergymen over the position and direction of the movement. As
a result of meetings held in Teheran in October and December 1989, Hizballah
submitted to a major structural changes, as evident by the establishment
of an Executive or Supreme Shura (al-Hayat, 27 November 1989). While the
composition of the new Executive Shura corresponds with the Majlis al-Shura,
the former decision-making body assumed the second highest authority of
the Hizballah and set mainly strategic matters in the overall administration
of the movement. It also led to the establishment of a ”Politbureau”, a
supervisory committee composed of fifteen clergy in charge of Hizballah´s
coordination of recruitment, propaganda and support services on the regional
and local level (Foreign Report, 13 June 1991; The Lebanon Report, 1993:6).
These changes has meant a Lebanonization of the Hizballah where the control
of the movement has been made more open and expanded (al-Majallah, 15-21
August 1993). Yet the main clergymen who exercise control over the movement
are the ones responsible for a specific committee or portfolio. As such,
the position of the Secretary-General and his deputy, elected every two
years, are fundamental to monitor as they directly control all the affairs
of the movement and are ex-officio in charge, and have direct access to,
clerical commanders of the regional Majlis al-Shuras (The Lebanon Report,
1993:6). For example, the Deputy Secretary-General is in charge of the
financial and military affairs of the movement (Foreign Report, 13 June
1991).
In 1991, Hizballah
stood at a critical juncture and the election of Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi,
the former head of the Islamic Resistance, came in response to a quid pro
quo arrangement between Hizballah and Iran and Syria which permitted the
movement to maintain their armed presence (SWB, 2 May 1991). As it claimed
to be a resistance movement rather than a militia, the Hizballah focused
much of its energy towards southern Lebanon and escalated its attacks against
Israel to justify its existence. Unlike his predecessor, Sheikh al-Musawi
appeared to be more pragmatic as evident by the fact that he presided over
Hizballah through the denouement of the Western hostage crisis while he
readjusted the movement´s grand strategy from creating an Islamic
Republic of Lebanon through armed struggle to a willingness to participate
in mainstream Lebanese politics. In order to engineer this readjustment
through increased control of the movement´s cadres, Sheikh al-Musawi
reduced the number of members on the Majlis al-Shura to eight clergy, compared
to over twenty members under al-Tufayli´s reign. Although his pragmatism
was a reflection of Hizballah´s effort to confront the challenges
posed by a post-militia phase of Lebanese politics and that the position
of Sheikh al-Musawi was closer to the line of Iran´s Hashemi Rafsanjani
than that of his clerical colleagues within Hizballah, it was also the
result of increased Iranian influence and pressure (The Independent, 10
September 1991; Los Angeles Times, 22 February 1993). Unlike his predecessor,
Sheikh al-Musawi had previously voiced his explicit opposition against
Ayatollah Montazeri while pledging close allegiance to Ayatollah Khameini
and Rafsanjani. However, al-Musawi´s process of transforming the
Hizballah to meet the new requirements of the Lebanese environment was
abruptly curtailed on February 17, 1992, when he was assassinated by Israeli
missile-firing helicopters after attending an annual memorial service in
the village of Jibshit in order to mark the eight anniversary of the death
of Sheikh Harb. In an attempt to assure its own cadres that al-Musawi´s
death had not seriously affected the organisation, Hizballah immediately
announced the election of Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah as its new leader.
The Role and Influence of Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah
Despite the fact
that the Hizballah command leadership is composed of high-ranking clergy,
it is Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah that has skillfully led the difficult transformation
of the revolutionary movement into a major political, social and military
player within a post-civil war environment. In many ways, Sheikh Nasserallah´s
reign represents a gradual generational shift within the Hizballah´s
command leadership away from the radical old guard, who founded the movement,
to a younger circle of cadres, who are more adept and attuned to the changes
necessary to survive within Lebanon after the civil war (al-Majallah, 15
August 1993; al-Shira, 27 September 1993). His rapid rise through the ranks
have been extraordinary, given his young age as well as his undistinguished
religious stature within the movement compared to Sheikhs al-Musawi, al-Tufayli,
and Yazbek. Unlike his predecessors, Sheikh Nasserallah comes from southern
Lebanon rather than the Biq´a area, highlighting the movement´s
renewed resolve in combating Israel. Hailing from the south Lebanese village
of Bazuriyah, he served as the mobilization officer within Hizballah in
the Biq´a and led its fierce fighting with Amal between 1987-1990,
which he initiated and spearheaded over the control of the Iqlim al-Tuffah
area (al-Shira, 8 November 1993). However, the seriousness of the challenges
confronting the organisation within Lebanon meant that Nasserallah has
undergone a transformation during his tenure as Secretary-General in terms
of pragmatism of his ideological views. Having been noted for his hard-line
views with previous links to Iran´s revolutionist faction while vocally
opposing Syria and fighting with Amal, Sheikh Nasserallah´s reign
has been marked by closely cultivating the movement´s relations with
Syria and even cooperation with Amal at times while projecting a more ”obedient”
image in his dealings with official Iran (al-Safir, 4 August 1993; Yediot
Aharanot, 19 April 1996). This awareness of internal Lebanese requirements
has been evident from the fact that he appointed Hussein Khalil as his
personal counsel in 1995 and the other leading positions he appointed have
notoriously good relations with Syria (Intelligence Newsletter, 17 June
1993). In many respects, he is also considered to be more independent than
previous leaders, having recently been appointed Khameini´s personal
representative in Lebanon, and in touch with the dispossessed Shi´ites
and their concerns.
Nasserallah´s
reign as Secretary-General of the Hizballah has led to a number of changes
within the organisation in order to assert his full control over its affairs
(Intelligence Newsletter, 16 March 1995). Although Sheikh Nasserallah was
only elected after the 1992 assassination of al-Musawi, through Iranian
influence and intervention, he had shrewdly waited in the wings within
the leadership ranks. Despite the fact that Nasserallah received a majority
vote in the Malis al-Shura elections in May 1991 to the post of Secretary-General
of the movement, which he yielded to Sheikh al-Musawi out of ”humility”,
Sheikh Nasserallah bolstered his own position within the Majlis al-Shura
as he held control over finances and military matters, thereby restricting
the maneuverability of Sheikh al-Musawi and turning himself into the real
de facto leader (al-Hayat, 21 May 1991; al-Qabas, 20 July 1989).
Under Nasserallah´s
reign, the organisation was forced to step up its resistance activities
against Israel. This meant stockpiling weaponry and employing new guerrilla
tactics to confront the IDF and SLA in the security zone, especially in
infiltrating villages and cultivating local support. Hizballah also decided
to separate the Islamic Resistance in July 1993 from the political framework,
a move instigated for operational expediency and for security reasons following
a series of assassination attempts of key leaders (The Independent, 1 April
1995). Nasserallah stressed his commitment to the armed strategy of the
Islamic Resistance, most notably through the creation of a new organ, the
al-Jihad Council, bringing in all various factions under a central umbrella
to coordinate all anti-Israeli activity, headed by Sheikh Hachem Safieddine
(The Lebanon Report, March 1993:6). This meant he could skillfully control
any dissident factions, most notably al-Tufayli´s Biq´a valley
wing, both as a means to prevent any attempts of independent action against
Israel through bringing this hard-line faction´s fighters and commanders
strictly into the fold and, at the same time, demonstrate resolve to the
organisation´s cadres of his resolve in combating Israel in southern
Lebanon. This had become necessary as Sheikh al-Tufayli and his hard-line
followers had vehemently objected to Hizballah´s decision to participate
in the 1992 Lebanese parliamentary elections which translated into independent
resistance attacks against Israel in an effort to undermine Nasserallah´s
position and control over the movement (The Foreign Report, 5 November
1992). The failure of Sheikh al-Tufayli to regain the leadership post of
the Hizballah in its leadership elections in May 1991, February 1992, April/May
1993, and July 1995 have led to an erosion in the influence of the radical
camp of the movement, most apparent by the relegation of Sheikh Tufayli
to a position as a mere member of the main Majlis al-Shura without any
specific portfolio (Intelligence Newsletter, 17 June 1993). As admitted
by Sheikh al-Tufayli in a July 1994 interview with L´Orient Le Jour:
”I am an ordinary militant, and I do not participate in decision-making.
This has been true since the time of the (1992) legislative elections”
(L´Orient-Le Jour, 30 July 1994). In fact, Hizballah officials (in
interviews with the author in November 1997) have recently disassociated
themselves from Sheikh al-Tufayli, whom they describe as being a ”former
Hizb´allah member”. Sheikh Nasserallah´s control over the Hizballah
was further bolstered following the September 1997 IDF killing of his 18-year
old son, Hadi, who served in an elite Islamic Resistance unit, and he is
expected to maintain in charge of the movement after the April 1998 Hizballah
congress, despite ”unwritten” internal leadership regulations barring the
same Secretary-General from serving three consecutive terms in office.
The Hizballah
under Nasserallah also skillfully expanded its social services sector in
several steps in order to extend its political and social powerbase, especially
through increased lobbying in parliament on behalf of the Shia community
and by Iranian infusion of humanitarian aid to the movement. Hizballah´s
role as a provider to the often poor and illiterate Shia population in
the midst of the civil war and continued neglect by Lebanese authorities
has been an essential ingredient to its social and political popularity
and in entrenching as well as extending its position as a social protest
movement (Trendle, 1993:12-3). In many ways, Hizballah´s social undertakings
have eclipsed the Lebanese governments own efforts for the local Shia community.
In fact, the Lebanese Ministry of Interior have granted official recognition
and legitimacy to several of the movement´s social services institutions,
most notably by registering the Relief Committee, the Islamic Health Committee,
and Jihad al-Binaa in 1988 (Jaber, 1997:145-68). The sheer nature and scale
of Hizballah´s investment in its social networks, ranging from building
and running schools, clinics, pharmacies, digging wells to repairing war-damaged
houses, underlines the primary reason why the movement has been able to
rapidly attract grassroots support and grow as a movement while translating
it into political support during the 1992 and 1996 Lebanese parliamentary
elections. The centrality of social activities was manifest in the movement´s
1996 political manifesto, tackling vast social and educational issues.
Yet, Hizballah´s skillful compensation for the shortcomings of the
state in filling the social vacuum is marginally threatened over the long
term by the current process of Lebanon´s economic rehabilitation,
especially in financially maintaining its current level of social networks
and programmes. Although the Hizballah finances these social institutions
and programmes through firmly established internal collection procedures,
ranging from khums and zakat, and has been making recent efforts to become
financially self-sufficient without external support, (FBIS, 6 May 1996;
al-Shira, 4 January 1993) the scale of Hizballah´s social activities
could not be possible without external Iranian support, either through
the Relief Committee of Imam Khomeini, the Martyr´s Foundation or
the many independent Iranian bonyyads, operated by more radical clergy
(IRNA, 4 May 1996; Mideast Mirror, 12 August 1993). Despite Iranian financial
aid to the movement, it is worthwhile to note that Sheikh Fadlallah administrates
independently an orphanage and provides aid to the poor Shia community
in Beirut (The Times, 12 May 1990; al-Shira, 18 January 1993). At the same
time, he is careful to point out that Iranian charitable contributions
”does not represent a sidelining of the Lebanese state” (al-Safir, 7 June
1996), a statement made in connection with overt tension in the Lebanese-Iranian
relationship over Iranian infusion of aid prior to the 1996 Lebanese elections
(Foreign Report, 13 June 1996). However, Hizballah´s reliance on
Iranian aid is perhaps most significant in the military sphere in the continued
provision of military equipment and humanitarian aid. For example, after
Israel´s 1993 Operation Accountability, Sheikh Nasserallah pledged
his movement would repair war-damaged houses and infrastructure, conducted
under the auspices of Jihad al-Binaa and costing an estimated 8.7 million
dollars (Jaber, 1997:168). Yet, the Hizballah leader is careful in countering
claims of Iranian military shipments through Syria, stressing publicly
that ”Syria has not allowed a single weapon to pass through its territories
to Hezbollah´s bases since its participation in the Madrid peace
conference in 1990” (MENA, 3 May 1996; al-Majallah, 15 August 1993). Equally,
the Hizballah points out that the Iranian Pasdaran does not fight in southern
Lebanon, rather its presence in the Biq´a area revolves around education
and training (FBIS, 9 May 1994; AFP, 28 June 1991).
Finally, perhaps
Sheikh Nasserallah´s most important contribution as a leader has
been his role in steering the Hizballah into the political arena through
parliamentary participation, a move which initially threatened to openly
divide the movement. Having skillfully out-maneuvered al-Tufayli and other
internal opposition while securing the firm backing of both Khameini as
well as Sheikh Fadlallah, (FBIS, 30 October 1992) Hizballah radically shifted
its focus when it entered the political game in September 1992.
Hizballah´s Political Agenda and Maneuvering
In many ways,
Hizballah´s entry in the first Lebanese post-civil war political
elections in September 1992 was a carefully calibrated strategy on several
fronts. Firstly, Hizballah´s presence in politics with eight representatives
meant it could become legitimized in order to guarantee its survival and
would protect it against any external or internal efforts to dissolve it.
For example, Hizballah´s fear of external retaliation figured prior
to the complete closure of the Western hostage file in December 1991 as
it repeatedly sought official US assurances against any moves against it
in revenge. More importantly, Hizballah recognized that defending its ”resistance
project” in southern Lebanon required political backing which could only
be mustered from within through its own representatives (Ettela´at,
13 February 1993). As explained by Sheikh Fadlallah, ”we know full well
that a number of senior political figures within the Lebanese government
are totally opposed to the resistance. They plan, work, and pray for any
opportunity to undermine the resistance and to foil its objectives” (FBIS,
1 September 1993). As such, the movement could publicly and practically
prevent any Lebanese government moves to restrict its military activities,
an issue made harder by the fact that Hizballah´s legitimacy as a
resistance movement was significantly enhanced following Operation Grapes
of Wrath with the April 1996 understandings (Christian Science Monitor,
29 April 1996). The movement could also effectively and officially prevent
any attempts by Israel to modify the April 1996 understandings, banning
both parties from attacking civilians (Monday Morning, 3 March 1997).
In many ways,
Hizballah´s integration into mainstream politics meant also that
the movement´s was not solely dependent on its military for its identity.
Equally, Hizballah´s parliamentary representatives provided it with
a legitimate means to vigorously campaign to abolish confessionalism and
with an opportunity to mold a future deconfessionalized political system
with a long-term view to resuscitate the project for an Islamic Republic
of Lebanon (Los Angeles Times, 22 February 1993). This project strives
to end political confessionalism one day in order to present the movement
with an opportunity ”for a Muslim to be president of the Lebanese republic”
(Hamzeh, 1993:334). Viewing confessionalism as the root causes of all evil
in Lebanon, Hizballah´s post-sectarian vision of Lebanon also embraces
the establishment of a state with a freely chosen government where a distribution
of power is allocated ”on the basis of competence” and according to the
”will of the people” in an effort to guarantee freedom of expression and
religious belief (al-Hayah, 18 April 1992). This political vision was originally
elaborated in Hizballah´s publication of its manifesto in 1985 (Norton,
1987) and does not signify a significant departure from its underlying
principles but represent rather a gradual effort to ”remove obstacles to
Islam´s peaceful application to the lives of people through discussion
and debate, without coercion or the use of force” (The Times, 12 May 1991).
As such, Hizballah´s political platform has temporarily abandoned
its calls for the creating of an Islamic republic to avoid provoking sectarian
prejudice and fears as ”conditions may not be ripe for reaching that goal
and accomplishing its desired purposes at the present time” (al-Hayah,
18 April 1992). Towards these ends, the Hizballah views the Ta´if
accords as a bridge to transfer ”Lebanon from a stage of bloody conflicts
to a new stage of internal peace” (al-Manar, 20 June 1997).
At a minimum,
Hizballah´s anti-establishment position, campaigning against government
corruption and economic policies, reinforces its image as the champion
for the oppressed and dispossessed. Countering the perception of endorsing
confessionalism through participating in its institutions as the movement´s
deputies rejected acceptance of any positions in the Lebanese government,
Hizballah deputies periodically distance themselves from the Lebanese government
by refusing to twice to pass a vote of confidence in Hariri´s government,
initially as it avoided to endorsing armed resistance in southern Lebanon,
and by rejecting the 1996 budget (Chartouni-Dubarry, 1996:61). Hizballah´s
political astuteness is evidenced by the fact that it ”seldom raises Islamic-related
claims, whether on political or merely ethical grounds, focusing much more
on constitutional matters” (Ibid). In fact the movement has gone out of
its way to allay any fears of its revolutionary aspirations, cultivating
a closer Islamic-Christian dialogue as recently displayed by its open letter
to Pope John Paul II (Zisser, 1996:103). As explained by Sheikh Muhammad
Fannish, ”to consider the Islamic republic a political system currently
being proposed by the Islamic movement in Lebanon would be contrary to
the truth and an ideological misconception that has no basis in the position,
platform, and statements of that movement” (al-Hayah, 18 April 1992). In
a similar fashion, the Hizballah strongly emphasize that the movement is
entirely Lebanese in character rather than a foreign entity directed by
Iran in order to reinforce its internal legitimacy within Lebanon. As reinforced
by a member of the movement´s Politbureau, ”Hezbollah is a Lebanese
party, with a Lebanese leadership and Lebanese decisions. When it makes
a decision, it takes the interests of Lebanon, not Iran into consideration”
(FBIS, 22 April 1996). Yet, for the Hizballah, this amounts to a de facto
recognition of Lebanon´s sovereignty and a commitment to its territorial
integrity rather than a manifestation of a wider pan-Islamic goal (Gunning,
1995). The recognition of Lebanon´s territorial integrity has been
underscored by Sheikh Fadlallah, who elaborated that ”I want my country
to be free and independent and to deal with Iran and other countries on
the basis of protecting Lebanon´s interests” (al-Safir, 7 June 1996).
As such, the Hizballah declares its commitment towards the unity of its
people and the preservation of domestic peace rather than conflict urging
vigilance against internal (the Lebanese government) and external (American
and Israeli) plots against Lebanon and its people as well as against Lebanon´s
alliance with Syria, as exemplified by the movement´s restraint from
retaliating for the killing of 9 members in September 1993 (al-Ahd, 17
December 1993) and its handover of the Sheikh Abdallah barracks in the
Biq´a to the Lebanese army (Kayhan International, 22 December 1990).
Secondly, Hizballah
could also more effectively campaign for increased redistribution of resources
for the poor Shiite community, increasing its popularity and taking some
strain off its resources from Iran (AP, 9 January 1997). ”Our presence
in parliament”, explained Sheikh Nasserallah, ”is for the sake of the oppressed.”
As such, the Hizballah campaigns against Hariri´s ambitious reconstruction
policies, arguing it will accumulate vast foreign debt and ”be forced to
approach the World Bank and international organizations and become beholden
to those governments and organizations that have given it loans” (FBIS,
1 March 1993). Opposing Hariri´s economic policies on the grounds
of priority as it continues to ignore development problems, Hizballah urges
that the state´s economical role must achieve harmony between activating
the public sector, on the one hand, and ”the necessity of not deserting
the state´s responsibilities towards the citizens and public utilities,
especially what concerns supporting the steadfastness of the areas confronting
the Zionist occupation” (Hizballah 1996 Electoral Programme). The movement´s
deputies charge both the Hariri government as well as Amal with neglecting
the welfare of the Shi´a community, often bypassing assistance provided
by the Council of the South and distributing aid across different class
as well as sectarian lines (Palmer, 1996:55). As such, Hizballah´s
provision of humanitarian aid ”without discrimination between one citizen
and another, or one sect and another” (al-Manar, 20 June 1997) reinforces
the movement´s message and commitment to abolish sectarianism in
reality. Yet, at the same token, Hizballah welfare services assists indirectly
with the economic rehabilitation of Lebanon. ”We have been encouraged”,
said Dr Muhammad Baqr Fadlallah, ”to take the burden off the government´s
shoulders” (The Times, 12 May 1990). The adoption of a policy of restraint
and, at times, cooperation, has enabled the Hizballah to rapidly become
a major powerbroker on the Lebanese scene, which has served to undermine
the position of the Amal. As such, the movement has spearheaded and called
for an effective plan of opposition to the present government in expectation
of a suitable opportunity for change by urging discussion and common action
among oppositional parties (Monday Morning, 3 March 1997). This was evident
by Hizballah´s 1996 initial electoral alignment with oppositional
forces against the government of Rafiq Hariri, such as with communists
and other leftist forces, in the Biq´a and in the South which threatened
the defeat of Nabih Berri´s Syrian-supported Amal movement (Issues,
December 1996). After Syrian intervention on the eve of the last two-rounds
of the elections, Hizballah was forced into a tactical alliance with Amal
in the campaign in southern Lebanon after Hizballah-Amal war of words threatened
to translate into real confrontation on the ground, especially as Hizballah
had surprisingly lost its two seats in Mount Lebanon and Beirut districts
to Amal and was determined to increase its representation in southern Lebanon
from two to four seats (Trendle, 1996). After gaining these four seats
in the South, Hizballah´s joint list with Amal in the Biq´a
returned three further candidates, bringing the movement´s total
parliamentary representation to 7 MPs and three non-Shi´i supporters.
Despite Hizballah´s reduced electoral strength, the fact that the
movement´s rhetorical confrontations with the Hariri government have
not led to violence is a firm demonstration of the movement´s political
maturity, realizing that it cannot afford to jeopardize its hardwon political
and social gains nor its resistance role in southern Lebanon. It is also
a demonstration of the limits of Hizballah´s maneuvering within the
framework of the wider Iranian-Syrian relationship and the limits to the
movement´s ability to extend as well as present itself as an alternative
oppositional force amidst sectarian politics and Syrian hegemony (Usher,
1996; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997:155).
Veiling itself
as the champion of the poor and dispossessed, the Hizballah has gained
notable respect from all quarters from Shi´a and non-Shi´a
alike for the professionalism in its political conduct, amplified by its
conduct on the ground and its role as an impeccable and incorruptible moral
force (Christian Science Monitor, 5 December 1996). In fact, Hizballah
leaders have reiterated that the movement ”do not oppose in a blind way
or for the sake of opposition only; if the (Hariri) government offers a
project useful to the people, we support it.” Hizballah´s deputies
have been careful in coordinating their positions with its command leadership
as a unified front to avoid weakening its position and rumours of division
within the party (al-Diyar, 19 December 1993).
Hizballah´s
integration into mainstream Lebanese politics accords it with a legitimate
means and a platform to confront areas of Lebanon´s external relations,
especially working against the government´s negotiations with the
Israeli regime. ”Israel want to impose a peace accord in return for its
withdrawal from our territory”, declared Sheikh Nasserallah, ”an accord
that resembles the 17 May accord signed with Amin Jumayyil. We reject this
accord and demand that Israel withdraw unconditionally from Lebanese territory”
(FBIS, 1 March 1993). Rather than becoming subservient to foreign interests,
the Hizballah advocates further political and economic integration of Lebanon
with its Arab and Islamic environment in an effort to resist American hegemony
and penetration of the region and to continue its support for the resistance
to the Israeli occupation of Palestine. As such Hizballah has pledged to
continue ”not to recognize Israel even if the entire world does”, (Radio
Lebanon, 2 October 1993) and that ”compromises with Israel do not bind
other nations and they do not have to recognize such a surrender” (FBIS,
1 March 1993). The movement views suspiciously Hariri´s reconstruction
policies as gearing itself towards an eventual peace settlement with Israel.
However, in return for the Lebanese government´s pledge to make no
political or territorial concessions to Israel until it withdraws from
Lebanon, the Hizballah has stated indirectly that it would focus on party
politics and accept disarmament once Israel withdrew from the entire zone
(The Independent, 10 November 1993; AP, 28 December 1995). As explained
by Sheikh Nasserallah, ”we are not a political, security or military alternative
to the state” (MENA, 3 May 1996). In other areas, Hizballah´s political
platform endorses aspects of the Hariri government´s foreign policy,
especially in safeguarding Syria´s military role in preserving internal
stability and in confronting the newly-established strategic alliance between
Turkey and Israel (Kayhan International, 22 December 1990).
While Hizballah´s
political participation represent a new chapter in successfully reinventing
itself from extremism to moderation and as a means to safeguard its hardwon
achievements over the last fifteen years, it has also revealed a series
of limitations for the movement in extending its position in the future
as merely a political party. While Hizballah´s electoral success
in the 1992 elections could be attributed to a combination of factors,
ranging from a highly sophisticated electoral machine supported by Iran,
the boycott of the elections by oppositional candidates and parties in
certain district to the highly popular social services provided by the
movement (Hamzeh, 1993), the outcome of the 1996 elections underscored
the fact that Hizballah cannot expect to make any further significant political
inroads. This setback does not meant that the movement will abdicate its
political role as a major oppositional force to the Hariri government,
rather it will continue to hammer away at perceived weaknesses, to work
towards eroding Amal´s popularity and influence, and forge tactical
alliances with other confessional parties towards these ends while working
to safeguard the role of the resistance in southern Lebanon. For the Hizballah,
the 1996 electoral experience safeguarded the movement´s role as
a potent political force and social provider but was a demonstration that
the Lebanese political game is strictly determined and controlled by Syria.
As such, Hizballah´s political fortunes are inextricably tied to
its ”resistance project” in southern Lebanon as a guarantor to maintain
its position, role and momentum as a movement within Syrian-controlled
Lebanon.
It is likely
the Islamic Resistance will continue to improve its operational techniques
and manage to inflict further IDF and SLA casualties, especially as the
1996 ”understandings” is advantageous for this type of low-intensity warfare
against a conventionally more powerful enemy and as it will continue to
serve as a useful bargaining tool for Syria in its negotiations with Israel.
For the Hizballah, its resistance activity represent a vital ingredient
in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Shi´ite community.
While Hizballah´s popularity would be boosted by forcing the Israelis
out of southern Lebanon, it simultaneously represent a wider problem for
the movement as it would lose, to an extent, its confrontational character
and revolutionary past. Yet, Hizballah leaders repeatedly makes it clear
that it will accept disarmament once its enemy withdraws from occupied
areas and that it would accept the extension of Lebanese authorities in
charge of security. As encapsulated by Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah, ”when
the Zionist enemy withdraws from the occupied areas, we will not be the
authority in charge of security. We have a (Lebanese) state, and it will
exert its security authority there. As for what will happen after a withdrawal,
let the Israelis withdraw and then we will see” (Mideast Mirror, 14 February
1997).
Conclusion
The Hizballah
is a remarkably changed organisation in the 1990s compared to the previous
decade and has managed to reinvent itself from a militant revolutionary
organisation into a formidable political, cultural, social and military
force in the post-civil war environment. This so-called ”Lebanonization”
process of the Hizballah, which Sheikh Fadlallah defines as ”examine the
prevailing circumstances in Lebanon and formulate its strategy within that
framework, making allowances for Lebanon´s particular circumstances,
its confessional sensitivities, its perception of its environment”, (Fadlallah,
1995:67) is a trademark of the movement and visible in the close interrelationship
between its political, social, and military activity, capitalizing on opportunities
to position itself and extent as a movement while exercising pragmatic
judgement of the prevailing conditions and limitations imposed on the movement
by Syria´s agenda and the confessional nature of Lebanon´s
political make-up. Hizballah´s reinvention as a movement with an
entry into mainstream Lebanese politics cannot be considered an abandonment
of its earlier ideological and revolutionary principles. And while one
can argue that the movement operate simultaneously towards an external
as well as internal audience in the rhetorical sphere, it is clear that
the Hizballah operate to safeguard its existing and future political and
social achievements. It is important to recognize that the movement has
always worked according to an incremental strategy over a long time-frame
and is patient. As recognized by Sheikh Nasserallah, ”Israel must disappear
and will disappear (because) it is an entity based on oppression and aggression.
It must disappear in the name of justice; it represents evil, and evil
will be conquered one day. I don´t know when that will happen, in
five years, 10 years or 50 years” (APS Diplomat Recorder, 15 February 1997)
In the meantime, the Hizballah is continuing to fulfill a legitimate role
as a major political, social and military movement, especially as the provider
and protector of the lowest segments of Lebanese society neglected by the
Hariri government´s reconstruction efforts.
Despite Hizballah
pledges to be ”the vanguards of the confrontation against normalization”,
(FBIS, 14 October 1993) especially following the event of an Israeli withdrawal
from southern Lebanon, recent internal Lebanese developments indicate that
the completion of Hizballah´s Lebanonization process is far from
over, especially given its political status quo following the 1996 parliamentary
elections when it lost the seats of 2 MPs, ”clipping the movement´s
wings” (Usher,1996) and given visible internal dissension within the movement
over its direction between al-Tufayli and Nasserllah, the former charging
Hizballah deputies with ”complicity” with the Hariri government and
neglect of the Shi´a community in the Biq´a area (Monday Morning,
30 June 1997). In a move resembling the independent resistance attacks
against Israel in the autumn of 1992 by the al-Tufayli faction in response
to Hizballah´s decision to participate in the Lebanese political
system, al-Tufayli has challenged not only Sheikh Nasserallah and Hizballah´s
command leadership but also the Hariri government by announcing the establishment
of a rival movement called ”Revolution of the Hungry” on 4 July 1997 in
the Baalbek-Hermil area. In an effort to reassert himself politically as
well as socially due to his marginalization within the Hizballah for his
radical and uncompromising line, Sheikh al-Tufayli declared that the aim
of his wide-scale movement was to revolt and force the Lebanese authorities
to ”act to save the badly deteriorating economic conditions in the country”
(SWB, 7 June 1997) as it was responsible for ”hunger, widen poverty and
ignorance, waste public funds; steal; apply the law of the jungle, branish
the weapon of repression in the faces of the disinherited” (Monday Morning,
30 June 1997). Adopting civil disobedience as a course of action through
non-payment of taxes and peaceful demonstrations, al-Tufayli´s campaign
of the ”Revolution of the Hungry” presents not only a problem for the Lebanese
authorities, as evident by the infusion of 97 million US dollars for rural
development in destitute regions of the Biq´a as well as in Akkar
in northern Lebanon, (Futures TV, 4 July 1997) but has served to marginally
threaten the cohesiveness of the Hizballah´s as a movement, as evident
not only by friction between Sheikhs Nasserallah and al-Tufayli but also
the initial intercession by Sheikh Fadlallah between Nasserallah´s
command leadership and al-Tufayli on equal terms (SWB, 2 July 1997) While
al-Tufayli´s movement with 3-5,000 supporters cannot be considered
a serious power-struggle within the Hizballah leadership, especially as
Sheikh Nasserallah has recently molded the movement´s portfolio positions
with individuals more loyal to him and the fact that al-Tufayli´s
followers are composed of mainly Brital-villagers, radical militants as
well as some criminal elements wanted by the Lebanese authorities, it nevertheless
demonstrates that the movement is still grappling with internal problems
over the direction of the movement (L´Orient-Le Jour, 4-7 July 1997).
At a minimum, the rift between al-Tufayli and the Hizballah movement at
large is illustrative of the fact that the ”resistance” project occupy
the most central position for the movement, for some at the expense of
dealing with the accelerated poverty of the Biq´a area especially
following the forcibly curbing of drug cultivation. This can be further
gauged by the fact that the highest echelons of Hizballah´s leadership
all come from the South rather than from Beirut and the Biq´a, the
latter being the origin of where the movement was founded in 1982 (The
Lebanon Report, No.3, Fall 1997). Another likely explanation for al-Tufayli´s
move may represent a Syrian attempt to balance the various forces within
Lebanese politics or as a way to signal to Iran, Hizballah and the Hariri
government that it firmly controls Lebanese affairs, especially likely
when considering that al-Tufayli could never have been allowed to launch
his movement without Syrian knowledge and consent. Equally, one cannot
discount that the public rift between Nasserallah and al-Tufayli may represent
an orchestrated move by the Hizballah itself to further its political and
social gains at the expense of the Lebanese state as the movement cannot
expect to make any further political inroads under the current Lebanese
political, social and military status quo. What is clear in the almost
Byzantine nature of Lebanese politics is that Hizballah has reached its
peak in political, social and military terms. A major dilemma for the future
of the movement is that the achievement of its military objectives (in
the event of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal) will fundamentally shake
the movement to its very foundation, possibly producing gradual fissures
in the cohesiveness of the movement. While it is clear that the Hizballah
is here to stay as a legitimate force on the political and social scene,
the movement´s future (and its ability to grow) is inextricably linked
to the dynamics of Syria´s confrontation with Israel, the movement´s
ability to retain armed struggle, and the long-term success of Lebanon´s
rehabilitation process. It is therefore not surprising that the Hizballah
will closely conceal its cards whether to continue armed struggle even
after the land in the South is liberated in order to avoid facilitating
an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon and to seperate the Lebanese from
the Golan tracks in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. In some ways, Hizballah
is hostage to its own fortunes.
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