By AVRAHAM SELA

                (December 4) - The vociferous public debate over Lebanon of
                the last two weeks has revealed two main developments. The
                first is the continuously descending threshold of Israeli society's
                willingness to further tolerate the toll of continued military
                presence in south Lebanon. The second is the unmistakable
                awareness of the government that the growing public unrest can
                no longer be ignored.

                Indeed, the days when the IDF's presence raised no questions,
                reflecting "consensus," are over. The deepening involvement of
                grass-roots groups in the debate and the ever-strengthening
                voices in support of a unilateral withdrawal represent a
                widening consciousness of the undeniable failure of the
                security zone concept in terms of cost-benefit calculations.

                The public awakening came after years of denial and
                hibernation. It was the disaster of last year's helicopter tragedy,
                which claimed the lives of 73 soldiers, that gave birth to the
                "Four Mothers" organization. Similarly, the fall of 12 more in the
                abortive naval commando raid that September triggered the
                establishment of The Movement for Leaving Lebanon
                Peacefully, headed by MK Yossi Beilin. Yet for a society
                overwhelmed by issues of national security, peacemaking with
                the Palestinians, and economic depression, the attempts to
                pressure the decision makers "from below" remained
                ineffective.

                The recent toll of seven soldiers within two weeks brought the
                issue back to center stage, showing that despite long intervals
                between disasters, we have grown ever more impatient with the
                high military and political echelons. We are less and less
                tolerant of the explanations, apologies, and promises for
                reassessment and more creative tactics, all of which proved to
                be empty words.

                To put it bluntly, Israeli decision-makers in this government, like
                their predecessors, prefer to preserve the security zone concept
                regardless of its undeniable failure rather than taking the risk of
                post-withdrawal attacks on Israel from south Lebanon for which
                they may be held responsible.

                No doubt, the preferable policy is to reach agreement with
                Lebanon that would ensure Israel's security interests before
                returning to the international border. In the absence of such a
                possibility, however, what is the calculated risk of a unilateral
                withdrawal?

                The question is no longer whether the IDF should pull out of
                Lebanon, but how to minimize the risks of the proposed
                alternatives. In other words, should Israel withdraw without full
                proof guarantees, and in their absence, how would Syria and
                Hizbullah, the main actors on the other side, respond.

                The opponents of a unilateral withdrawal argue that Syria would
                continue to encourage guerrilla attacks on Israel, because it
                would be the only way to bring its government to resume the
                negotiations over the Golan Heights. In this effort, they claim,
                Hizbullah would play a leading role because of its own interest
                in eliminating Israel and liberating Jerusalem.

                These arguments ignore Syria's interest in maintaining
                Lebanon's stability, continued economic prosperity, and
                rehabilitation following 15 years of civil war. That these
                developments have been in force since the early 1990s was
                due to Syria's efforts since the mid-1970s, during which it has
                paid dearly in material and human losses. Syria would have to
                consider carefully the damage that Israel could cause to
                Lebanon as a Syrian asset, should there be repeated attacks on
                Israel's northern territory from Lebanon.

                Israel's presence on Lebanese soil makes it easy, even
                legitimate for Syria to encourage guerrilla attacks on the IDF
                and the South Lebanese Army. But given Syria's interest in
                advancing a settlement on the Golan, it would have to consider
                the impact of such attacks on the US administration, whose
                involvement would be necessary for Syria in any case. And
                finally, Syrian President Hafez Assad has shown impressive
                prudence regarding violation of Israel's sovereign territory, even
                when proxies are involved.

                As to Hizbullah, the picture of a mercenary group presented by
                the opponents of a unilateral withdrawal is far from accurate.
                Hizbullah is deeply rooted in the social and political reality of
                Lebanon, competing for power and access to resources like any
                other political movement. That Iran has been its patron and
                financier, and Syria is allegedly supporting it militarily or
                approving its activities, does not mean that these two countries
                own it.

                Unlike the Palestinian guerrilla organizations that dominated
                south Lebanon and were expelled by Israel in the war of 1982,
                Hizbullah's intentions have never been to liberate Palestine, but
                to advance domestic social and political goals, in which the
                armed struggle against Israel has played a major role. Despite
                occasional announcements that it intends to fight Israel until
                Jerusalem is liberated, Hizbullah leaders have also said the
                opposite - that their war is not with Israel as such and that they
                would cease fighting once it fully withdraws from Lebanon.

                Another striking piece of evidence is that in over 15 years of
                fighting, Hizbullah's guerrillas have never attempted to cross the
                border into Israel, even though they have repeatedly
                demonstrated the permeability of the security zone by physically
                reaching it.

                The Lebanese political system is extremely anxious to see
                Israel withdraw to the international border, but cannot
                acknowledge this officially, and certainly not support it by giving
                security undertakings. Yet most of the political parties and
                centers of power in Lebanon would like to see Hizbullah
                disarmed, which may become legitimate only when Israel
                withdraws from south Lebanon.

                Finally, unilateral withdrawal is not meant to create a rosy
                situation in which peace prevails in the North. Given that the
                security zone is unable to prevent Katyusha rockets from hitting
                Israel, our northern border can be defended from inside Israeli
                territory. Our continued presence in Lebanon is a liability more
                than an asset, and it is about time to bring to an end the
                anomaly of protecting one's own territory by occupying a
                neighbor's.

                The writer is a senior lecturer in the Department of International
                Relations at the Hebrew University and a former member of the
                Israeli delegation to the Nakoura talks.