mar2000

Monday, March 20, 2000

Only complete withdrawal

There is no clear indication that Syria plans to sign a comprehensive agreement in the near future, so Israel must stick with the assumption that its withdrawal from Lebanon will be unilateral. That assumption apparently has caused a rift between the IDF and the government, including the prime minister, over how complete the withdrawal should be. The IDF wants to leave some outposts in Lebanon, near the border, to give it a tactical advantage because of the topography in the area. The military say a total withdrawal to the international border will endanger some of the border settlements. The prime minister believes that leaving a few outposts inside Lebanese territory will be interpreted as continued occupation and an invitation for Hezbollah to continue attacking the IDF and the settlements.

Both arguments are based on the ambiguity of Hezbollah's intentions and those of its patrons. However, based on statements from the organization's leaders and from Lebanon's political leadership, a withdrawal which doesn't free Lebanon completely from Israeli occupation could be regarded as redeployment, not withdrawal. This would leave intact the rationale of "national resistance" - meaning Hezbollah activity against Israel. A total withdrawal may not guarantee the end of Hezbollah's ambition to eliminate the state of Israel, but it could undermine the legitimacy given to it by the Lebanese and Arab world by virtue of Hezbollah's resistance to Israeli occupation. More significantly, it would move the dispute directly into the hands of Lebanon, Syria and Israel, and out of the Hezbollah's.

From the military perspective, a complete withdrawal would free Israel from the restraints of the "Grapes of Wrath" understandings, which attempted to spell out the rules of engagement in the security zone. Israel could reassert its natural deterrent power based on a proven ability to hit strategic targets without considering tactical limits imposed by agreements. There might be no guarantee that Israeli deterrence will be enough to prevent attacks on IDF outposts or Israeli settlements. But if the IDF remains in Lebanon, even a couple of hundred meters inside the border, it could generate enough friction to ignite a daily grind of conflict no different than the one experienced up to now - and at the same cost.

Tactical positions and topographic advantages are essential when conducting conventional combat. But combat in Lebanon has proved that these advantages are meaningless against Katyusha rocket attacks, and they have no significance when the IDF uses the Air Force to strike targets inside Lebanon. Beyond these factors, the most important interest of all should be the goal of the withdrawal - moving the conflict from the battlefield to diplomatic channels. South Lebanon has long been a card the Syrians have played. Only a total withdrawal can shift negotiations with Damascus to the basis on which they should be conducted - the Golan Heights in return for a full peace, and not merely for quiet in Lebanon.