Syria's ability to prevent the guerrillas from attacking Israeli forces is unclear.
 

Scott Peterson

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor DAMASCUS, SYRIA 

Among the most effective "cards" that Syria has ever played is one
that it doesn't fully control: Islamic Hizbullah guerrillas in southern
Lebanon, who with Syria's help and Iran's backing are winning their
fight against Israel's occupation there.

Syria and Israel are toying with a resumption of peace talks, and any
agreement is likely to return the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights to
Syria for peace. Linked to that would be an Israeli withdrawal from
Lebanon - where Syria keeps its own controlling force of 35,000
troops.

The steady stream of Israeli casualties in southern Lebanon prompted
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak during his election campaign last
spring to vow an Israeli withdrawal from there, a commitment that was
widely applauded in the Jewish state. But Syria's ability to prevent
Hizbullah from continuing attacks remains unclear, especially from
"rogue" militants.

"Syria has strategic influence over Hizbullah, but not tactical control,"
says a senior Western diplomat in Damascus. "That tactical control
can be taken by those who want to kibosh a peace agreement."

With Syrian acquiescence, Hizbullah has raised the stakes with
regular, deeper strikes against Israeli forces and their local,
Israeli-trained and supplied South Lebanon Army militia allies. The
message to Israel: This front line is still open, and Damascus is the key
to solving it.

"The Syrian interest is to keep the Israeli fingers in the mangle, but not
to squeeze too hard," says the diplomat.

Israel has occupied parts of Lebanon since 1978, initially to prevent
cross-border attacks from Palestinian guerrillas. In 1985 it created a
nine-mile strip in the south it calls its "security zone" to thwart
Hizbullah, which had taken up the resistance fight.

Despite denials from Tehran, it is widely believed that Hizbullah for
years has received Iranian military equipment via Damascus or the
Syria-controlled Beirut airport. Ibrahim Hamidi, of the London-based
Al-Hayat newspaper in Damascus, likens the relationship to an
underwater diver's setup: Iran is Hizbullah's oxygen tank, and Syria its
air hose.

"If Syria cuts the tube, there is no more oxygen," says Mr. Hamidi.
"How can Iran support Hizbullah without Syria?" Yet analysts here
agree that Hizbullah, by and large, has its own reasons for respecting
any peace. They note that since the early 1990s Hizbullah has played
a role in mainstream politics and holds seats in the Lebanese
parliament.

Iran, too, is widely believed to be ready to follow Syria's lead, to
maintain its own close ties to Damascus. Lebanon's Army, which has
received official US military support such as used equipment from US
drawdown stocks in Europe, has said that it can maintain security in
the south if Israel pulls out.

Still, recent rhetoric has sent shivers down the backs of Israeli
strategists - as it was most likely intended to do. During a visit to
Tehran by Hizbullah Secretary-General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah,
Iranian officials announced that it would convene an anti-Zionist
conference next February.

"The liberation of Jerusalem is our common goal, and we must not
allow foreign plots and pressure to divide us," Iran's reformist
President Mohamad Khatami was quoted as telling Mr. Nasrallah.
Hizbullah was praised for "fighting for ... Arab and Islamic dignity."

Hizbullah, in fact, is arguably the most effective paramilitary outfit in
the world, and has been the first Arab force of any type to deliver a
sustained, though unconventional, drubbing of the once-revered Israeli
Defense Force.

Though observers note that Syria may not able to fine-tune its wishes
regarding Hizbullah, and that the guerrillas have enough weaponry on
hand to fight for a long period without resupply, Syria's will in
Lebanon has been delivered forcefully in the past.

"If Syria gets the deal that gets the Golan, it will be quiet in southern
Lebanon," says another Western diplomat.

Difficulties could arise if Israel decided to pull its troops out
unilaterally, without a settlement that returned the Golan to Syria.
Noting that Hizbullah's actions are Syria's only concrete leverage
against Israel, some suggest that Damascus would risk attacks on
Syria proper to "drag Israel back" to southern Lebanon.

"There is a discussion within Hizbullah," notes a Western envoy.
"Should they claim Israeli defeat and a Hizbullah victory - and
concentrate on Hizbullah welfare [programs] and politics? Or should
they follow those on the militant wing who may want to continue until
they reach Jerusalem?"

Like all its operations, Hizbullah shrouds its intentions in mystery. If
Syria does make peace with Israel at some point, however, and
Syria's use of Hizbullah as a "card" disappears, then some predict a
big change.

"Syria is a secular state with an inborn dislike of Islamic
fundamentalism," says the senior diplomat. "In the future there could
be a parting of ways."