Less than half a mile to the east, Colonel Louis Hebert's Louisianians had become entangled in a thick brushwood and were taking a severe shelling from Davis' batteries. Davis' 59th Illinois was on the edge of this same thicket. "The underbrush was so heavy," Lieutenant Colonel George Currie recorded, "we could not see twenty feet from us." Hebert's men finally surged out, fighting hand-to-hand with the Illinois infantrymen. A few minutes later the 18th Indiana, moving to the front in double-quick time, found the 59th Illinois retiring in disorder. Sure of victory, Hebert led his men out into the open, only to be flanked and then surrounded by fresh Illinois and Indiana troops. At 2:30 p.m., Colonel Hebert's brigade fell apart and he was captured.

    With their leaders gone, the units of Van Dorn's right wing collapsed. Demoralized soldiers retreated in confusion--divisions, regiments, and companies becoming intermixed. Batterymen and cavalrymen along the Bentonville road--most of whom had seen no action--waiting impatiently for orders, but none came.

    About 3 o'clock General Pike learned of the loss of the army's leaders. He tried to rally the troops near Leetown, but it was too late. He began riding about the rear areas--an odd-looking figure in frontier buckskins--ordering his Indians and other scattered units to move toward the high ground of Pea Ridge and try to make their way to Van Dorn's position near Elkhorn Tavern. When Sigel reached Leetown about 4 o'clock to bring the full power of his artillery to bear on the Confederates, he found no one there to fight.

    Around Elkhorn Tavern that day, however, it was a different story.

    At about the same time that McCulloch's cavalry began their early morning skirmishing with the Federals near Leetown, Price's army of 6,200 men reached the Telegraph Road junction two miles north of Elkhorn Tavern. Very few Union soldiers were in that deep rear area, and the Confederates moved rapidly southward along Telegraph Road, meeting scattered resistance from the 24th Missouri Union Infantry. This regiment had been placed on light guard duty in the rear because its term of service had ended an the men were awaiting orders to be sent home. Two companies of Missouri and Illinois cavalry came to their aid.

    In an enveloping movement, Price sent his first and second brigades down the west side of the road, while he led a third brigade down the east side. A mile north of the tavern, Colonel Elijah Gates led his Missouri Confederate cavalry in a sweeping charge across the fields, fell back before heavy fire, dismounted his men, attacked, and was again driven back.

    To meet this thrust at his rear supply area, Curtis chose Colonel Eugene Carr, a born horse soldier with piercing eyes and a jutting black beard. Carr rode hurriedly up to Elkhorn Tavern, ordered his staff to establish division headquarters there, and immediately began forming a battle line. To the east of the road went Colonel Grenville Dodge's brigade; to the west Colonel William Vendever's brigade.

    When Carr first saw the advancing masses of Confederates he was amazed at the size of the force that had got in the Union army's rear. He sent an urgent call for reinforcements back to Curtis, and ordered Dodge and Vandever to take defensive positions and hold fast. Union artillery was already emplaced along both sides of the road facing southward; the pieces had scarcely been turned about when the Confederates opened a bombardment.

    For thirty minutes the big guns dueled, with Elkhorn Tavern in the midst of the exchange. A new York Herald correspondent, who had counted on the relative safety o Carr's division headquarters, reported a shell bursting upon a company of infantry beside the tavern; another fell among horse teams in the rear yard; a solid shot struck the building and passed completely through. Polly Cox, her son, and his wife were not injured; at the first shriek of an overhead shell they had taken refuge in the cellar.

    As dense clouds of smoke began covering Pea Ridge, a few reserve companies of infantry and cavalry and a battery of mountain howitzers reached Carr's headquarters. At that stage of the fighting, Curtis dared send no more troops to his right because of McCulloch's fierce assault against his left. "Colonel Carr," Curtis later wrote, "sent me word that he could not hold his position much longer. I could then only reply by sending him the order to 'persevere'."

    With almost uncanny accuracy, Price's gunners now began blasting the 3d Iowa Battery from the ridge. A cavalry charge followed up the shelling, but was forced back by Vandever's 9th Iowa Infantry. In a succession of attacks and repulses that continued through the morning, both sides suffered heavy casualties, among them Price's most trusted brigadier, William Slack, mortally wounded. Both Carr and Price also were painfully wounded but refused to leave the field.

    About 2 o'clock, as though by mutual agreement, the exhausted troops of both armies drew apart for the first lull of the day. During this period Carr, still awaiting reinforcements, consolidated his defense positions, while Van Dorn prepared to mount a massive attack, hoping for a coordinated action from McCulloch's army to the west.

    By 3 o'clock the battle was raging furiously again, Price attacking Dodge's 4th Iowa and 35th Illinois with such force that Dodge's left collapsed. When Vandever saw what was happening, he ordered his brigade to shift rightward and close the gap. As Vandever was executing this change of front, Colonel Henry Little's Confederates swarmed out of the brush with wild yells, breaking through Vendever's 9th Iowa, capturing men and guns. "With a shout of triumph," Colonel Little reported, "Rives's and Oates's regiments dashed onward past the Elkhorn Tavern, and we stood on the ground where the enemy had formed in the morning."

    Bringing batteries forward, the Confederates quickly enfiladed Dodge's regiments, forcing them back to a rail fence opposite Vandever's hastily re-formed line. "At this time the ammunition of the 4th Iowa was almost entirely given out," Dodge reported, "and I ordered them to fall back, which they did in splendid order in line of battle, the enemy running forward with their batteries and whole force."

    As an early dusk fell over the smoky battlefield, Captain Henry Guibor unlimbered a Confederate battery directly in front of the tavern and began dueling with Carr's harried gunners, who had fallen back almost to Curtis' headquarters. About 5 o'clock Curtis himself came up with Asboth's division and found Carr still persevering, doggedly holding his line across Telegraph Road almost a mile below the tavern.

    Weariness from eleven hours of continuous fighting and loss of blood from three wounds had brought Carr near to collapse. Curtis immediately relieved him, ordered the troops to bivouac in position, and then asked for a report of casualties. The 4th and 9th Iowa regiments had paid heavily for their stubborn resistance. The men of the 24th Missouri, whose terms of service had ended, but who had to bear the first shock of Price's attack, had taken 25 percent casualties.

    Elkhorn Tavern, which had served as a Union headquarters in the morning, now became a Confederate headquarters. "My troops," said Sterling Price, "bivouacked upon the ground which they had so nobly won almost exhausted and without food, but fearlessly and anxiously awaiting the renewal of the battle in the morning." The tavern cellar served as a hospital, one of the first patients being Price himself. By the light of a candle, Mrs. Cox cleaned his wounded arm and bandaged it with one of her aprons.

    Van Dorn was pleased to learn that Price's troops had captured seven cannon and 200 prisoners, but as the night wore on and the full story of the route of McCulloch's troops began to come in, he realized that victory o the left had been nullified by defeat on the right. General Pike arrived to report the loss of McCulloch, McIntosh, and Hebert; he had placed Stand Watie's mounted Cherokees on Pea Ridge and was hopeful the Indians would fight better on the morrow. Hours later Van Dorn heard from Colonel Elkanah Greer; the Texas cavalryman had collected remnants of McCulloch's scattered regiments and was awaiting orders. Van Dorn ordered Greer to march his force up to Telegraph Road and prepare for another day of fighting.

    Outside the tavern, troops built fires against the night chill. Although orders were issued to extinguish these blazes, many continued to burn long after midnight. From the darkened Federal lines only a short distance away, sounds came clearly on the frosty air. "Their artillery and baggage wagons," noted Colonel Henry Little, "seemed to be continually moving."

General Curtis' artillery and wagons were indeed moving that night--into positions selected by Franz Sigel, who had been given the responsibility for preparing a massive artillery attack at dawn. Sigel studied campfires along the ridge, estimating the location of Confederate troops, and disposed his guns accordingly. He also ordered his own troops to keep silent and build no fires.

    At midnight, Union division commanders and staff officers met in Curtis' tent. Carr, Dodge, and Asboth were wounded and depressed. Only Curtis and Sigel were optimistic. Curtis pointed out that for the first time in the fighting the Union army had four infantry divisions massed for attack; Sigel was confident that his artillery would stop Van Dorn's drive.

    In their lines facing Elkhorn Tavern, the Union troops shivered and tried to catch a few winks of sleep. Some angrily discussed the Indians' way of fighting, their barbarous use of scalping knives. They also could hear the sounds of their enemy, "the tread of their sentinels and the low hum of conversation but a few yards away."

    Dawn came early o March 8, with a reddish sun in a pale blue sky. Because there had been no wind to drive away the previous day's battle smoke, it still hung in folds over woods and fields. On both sides of the battlefield artillerymen were making last-minute changes in positions. They unlimbered their guns, led horses fifty paces to the rear, and awaited orders.

    Most of the Confederate batteries were in open woods along the base of the ridge, the Federals facing them from a crest of high ground below Elkhorn Tavern. About 7 o'clock a cannon blast from the Confederates opened the second day of fighting. Sigel, who was commanding Curtis' left wing, accepted the challenge with alacrity, and soon had forty guns in action. "A brisk cannonade was kept up for upward of two hours," reported the New York Herald correspondent. "The sharp booming of the six-, twelve- and eighteen-pounders followed each other in rapid succession." This was probably the most concentrated artillery duel ever fought west of the Mississippi River; the muffled roar of guns was heard for forty miles across the Ozark hill country.

    Sigel's well-placed guns scored hits on the Confederate batteries, and quickly scattered Stand Watie's Cherokees along Pea Ridge. When he was confident that he had his enemy off balance, Sigel ordered the 12th Missouri and the 25th and 44th Illinois to throw forward a strong force of skirmishers. With drums beating and flags waving, the Federal infantry regiments moved out in perfect alignment. "The rattling of musketry," Sigel later wrote, "the volleys, the hurrahs, did prove very soon that our troops were well at work in the woods, and that they were gaining ground rapidly."

    Meanwhile Curtis' right wing had fallen back before the Confederate artillery fire, but as soon as Sigel's regiments began advancing, Curtis ordered Carr and Davis to attack with extended lines, maneuvering so as to get on Van Dorn's left flank. At the same time additional regiments from Osterhaus' and Asboth's divisions joined in the general attack upon the ridge. "The upward movement of the gallant 36th Illinois," Curtis noted, "with its dark-blue line of men and its gleaming bayonets, steadily rose from base to summit, when it dashed forward into the forest, driving and scattering the rebels from these commanding heights. The 12th Missouri, far in advance of the others, rushed into the enemy's lines, bearing off a flag and two pieces of artillery." It was a classical pincers movement, and in a matter of minutes the Confederates were caught in a concentrated crossfire.

    By 10 o'clock Van Dorn knew that he was beaten. All morning he had been waiting for ammunition wagons from his temporary base camp near Sugar Creek; they had been delayed because of a mix-up in orders and were still a mile from the battle ground when the Federals opened their flanking attacks. Confederate gunners used stones in their cannons when their shot gave out; infantrymen threw away their useless rifles and fired short-range shotguns at advancing Yankees.

    Van Dorn started his ambulances moving eastward from Elkhorn Tavern down a side road that led to Huntsville, and for the next half hour the Confederates were fighting to cover a general withdrawal. "The enemy advanced," said Colonel Henry Little who was in the midst of this engagement. "On, on they came, in overwhelming numbers, line after line, but they were met with the same determined courage which this protracted contest had taught them to appreciate. ... Their intention of turning our flanks...being now clearly evident, we slowly fell back from our advanced position, disputing every inch of ground which we relinquished."

    In this last fighting Confederate losses mounted sharply, and included many of the South's most promising young officers. Among them was 19-year-old Churchill Clark, a battery commander, grandson of William Clark the famous Western explorer. While covering the withdrawal, young Clark was decapitated by a round shot.

    A soldier of the 36th Illinois who was among the first to reach the top of the ridge described the scene: "The mangled trunks of men lay thickly scattered around, and so close as to require the utmost care to avoid stepping on their cold remains. From each tree or sheltering nook the groans of the wounded arose, while muskets, saddles, horses, blankets, hats and clothes hung in shreds from every bush or in gory masses cumbered the ground...Federal soldiers shared the contents of their canteens with thirsty wounded Confederates. The fierce passions which animated them an hour before, while panting for each other's blood, had subsided, and pity for the maimed supplanted the feelings of hate and fury."

    By noon all artillery fire had ceased. In the mistaken belief that they were close on the heels of Van Dorn's army, Sigel's infantrymen poured northward up Telegraph Road in pursuit of fleeing Confederates. The main army, however, had slipped away southeastward on the road to Huntsville, with Shelby's cavalry covering the rear.

    After the fighting ended, and Colonel Carr was moving his division out to find forage for his horses, he stopped briefly at Elkhorn Tavern. Polly Cox, her son, and daughter-in-law had already departed; twenty-one hours under fire had been enough of war for them. Carr glanced at the ridgepole of the abandoned, shell-torn tavern, then ordered the huge elk horns brought down as a souvenir of the battle. (Years later the horns were returned and are now in a museum at Garfield, Arkansas.)

    Carr's division had suffered more casualties than the other three Federal divisions combined. Total for the Union forces was 1,384. The Confederates lost about the same number, but they lost three good generals and too many line officers who could never be replaced, and they had lost the crucial battle for control of the Missouri border. Missouri was now secure for the Union, and Arkansas was open for eventual Federal occupation.

    For some reason the fortunes of the Civil War did not favor the leaders who fought at Pea Ridge. Both Curtis and Sigel became major generals, but Curtis fell into disfavor in Missouri and was shunted off to Kansas; Sigel went to Virginia and was twice relieved from command for poor generalship. Carr and Dodge had to wait until after the war to establish their reputations on the Western frontier--Carr as an Indian fighter, Dodge as a railroad builder. Van Dorn returned to Mississippi, was defeated at Corinth and charged with dereliction of duty; although exonerated he was soon afterward shot to death off the battlefield by a jealous husband. Price also lost his Mississippi battles, invaded Missouri in 1864, was defeated at Westport, and would have been brought before a Confederate court of inquiry had the war not ended.     As for the two private soldiers who achieved the fame of being mentioned in dispatches--Thomas Welch who brought the warning of a Confederate attack in the rear, and Peter Pelican who killed General McCulloch--a few months after the battle both men took leave without permission and never returned to their companies.

    On the other hand, there was Curtis' chief quartermaster, a 30-year-old captain who had gone north the day before the battle to collect grain and rations for the Federal troops. His name was Philip H. Sheridan.