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Term Paper Assignment Andrew Smith(K957039@Kingston.AC.UK) Geog 305 Fall 1997 ALGERIA:CAUSES OF CRISIS INTRODUCTION The problem that exists in Algeria today is the civil war which rages across the nation. The civil war in Algeria is a result of a French invasion, inevitable Islamic fundamentalism and a breakdown in democracy. The war is being fought out between the Algerian government security forces and the military wing of the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front(FIS), the Islamic Salvation Army (FIA) which is said to have 25 000 members (Malley 1996). The conflict also involves several breakaway factions, the biggest and most violent being the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) who is estimated to have 12 500 members (Malley 1996). The GIA is suspected to be behind the massacres of civilians where death squads converge on an area and indiscriminately kill men, women and children with ax blows to the body or slit their throats with knives, sometimes even burn their victims to death(Lancaster 1997). The problem exists in Algeria which is in North Africa.(ALGERIA MAP LINK) At the moment the conflict is solely a civil one and Algeria's neighbors Morocco, Tunisia or Libya have not be drawn into the problem and have not been affected. Even though it is essentially a civil war, there is concern in Europe and American of an exodus of refugees trying to escape the bloodshed which could cause a international crisis like that seem in Rwanda. The situation in Algeria is being watched closely by Egypt and Turkey, which are both secular states who could easily become Islamic states The methods employed in the war include suicide bombers, secular death squads, assassinations, snipers, murdering of foreigners, more than 100 since 1992 (Los Angeles Times 1997), hijacking planes and bombing overseas targets to bring attention to their plight. To date, it is estimated that 67 journalists have been killed (Los Angeles Times 1997) and, because of this, the Algerian government is reluctant to issue visas to foreign journalists which means that the news received from Algeria is not always totally reliable. The sources showing that the problem exists are numerous. Newspapers and other media sources like television, radio, books, and Rand reports commissioned by the US Army, widely report the war and its implications. Other evidence that shows the problems exist comes in the form of the great white book on terrorism in Algeria, a detailed government dossier of photographs and reports of the massacres. The civil war is a problem for many reasons, the first reason is because thousands of men, women and children are being killed in the name of war, civilians and military personal alike. The second reason that makes the conflict a problem is a fear that Algeria might be "transformed under the iron fist of fundamentalism into a new Iran"(Zecchini 1997) and obviously, this would have implications on the west, who admit they have little influence over Algeria(Fuller 1995). The third and last reason that makes this civil war a problem is the fact that the instability war causes does not help Algeria to grow into a strong industrial nation. The death tolls in the Algerian crisis reflect the seriousness of the problem. In the last six years of war, it is reported by the that at least 60 000 lives (Washington Post 25/9 1997)have been lost due to the civil war. The news agency The Associated Press and Reuters give similar figures (Washington Post 1/9 1997). In a country with a population calculated at 25 million in 1994 (Malley 1994), 60 000 deaths is a sizable proportion of the people, and for all of these reasons the civil war in Algeria is a serious and real problem. Looking into Algeria's problems firstly at its historical roots, and then the more recent political happenings, it is evident that there are many different identifiable causes of war. [A FRENCH INVASION: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW] A brief history of the French occupation is needed to understand their part in the creating of civil war in modern Algeria. The French invasion took place in the year 1830 when Charles X sent 37 000 troops, under the guise of driving out Turkish tyrants. The French claimed that there were no such things as real Algerians before they conquered the region as there had never been a nation of people on the African coast between Tunisia and Morocco. (Metz 1994) On the first day of the invasion, the French stole 100 million francs from the Casaba, and historians argue that this showed their real intentions, to loot Algeria rather than free it. There was very little resistance from the Turks against the mobilized and well armed Christians. Initially the French only wanted a limited amount of land, the area around the capital, Algiers, however the powers successively encouraged settlement. The reasons were that even though French policy, behavior and organization in Algeria were failures, the occupation had to carry on for the sake of national prestige. By 1841, 37 000 colons shared 50 000 acres of land. In 1914 there were three quarters of a million colons who owned much of the Algerian land.(Metz 1994) Laws passed in 1881, the Code D'Indigenat, listed 41 laws specifically designed to limit the powers and rights of Muslims. At the same time Islamic institutions were outlawed or dismantled and Muslim education was limited to a small amount of schools. (Ciement 1997) Throughout the French colonial years rebels were treated harshly. Between 1871-1914 the people of Algeria were had punitive reparations of 36.5 million francs imposed on them and 1.4 million acres of land was seized. This quelled the rebels for a long time. Measures were taken against the tribal people of Algeria to limit the damage they could do in terms of rebellion, tribes who were known to co-operate were treated favorably.(Metz 1994) There were limited rebellions from 1914 onwards but the real success only came post 1954 when armed organized resistance came about. War was declared on the 1st of November 1954 the challenger to the French rule came from the Islamic National Liberation Front (FLN). The FLN assaulted French properties in Algeria, using hit and run guerrilla style tactics similar to those the FIA and GIA use against the FLN today. The Rebel army consisted of 40,000 men. As the war got worse and it looked unlikely that they French would win without sustaining heavy losses and public opinion in France was turning against the government as the death tolls rose. De' Gaulle organized a national referendum, in which 6 million out of the 6.5 million voters demanded independence and Algeria was granted independent on July 3 1962.(Reudy 1992) The cost in terms of lives was huge. In eight years of warfare it is estimated that 1.5 million Algerians died, compared to 18 000 French military personal. (Metz 1994) The result of the French invasion and colonization of Algeria was huge. The country was transformed in terms of political and economic structure and religion. Before the invasion Islam was the first religion and had been since the Arabic invasion of the 7th century. The French brought Christianity which very quickly took over as the main religion, creating a divide between the people of Algeria who were either Christians or Muslim. The colonization created a duel personality in Algeria. The 132 year French reign left an imprint on Algeria and its people who are the most westernized people in the Arab world. They imposed a western system of society and Government on a relatively uncivilized populous who had little or no control in their country's affairs. The problem the French colonization has given the people of Algeria is now that Algeria has reverted to Islam the voters have shown they want a western style democratic society with Islamic values. There is a question to whether the relative democracy the French tried to set up can work hand in hand with Islam. As Ben Hadj, a top FIS official, puts it "Democracy is Pagan"(Peterson 1994), perhaps implying that if Algeria embraces Islam as fully as the FIS would have them do it would lose democracy [INEVITABLE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM] The governments following the war of independence had the goal of giving Algeria a national identity and they choose to do this through Islam. Successive governments committed themselves to reviving indigenous Arabic and Islamic cultural values as establishing Arabic and the national language.(Metz 1994) Islam was a way of uniting the people of Algeria and giving them an identity, or even to restore the one they had before the French came. The FLN governments were Islamic but were rather Liberal in their approach. The FLN wanted an Islamic Arab socialist state to increase Islamic awareness and reduce western influence(Mezt 1994). The FIS accused the FLN of an anti-Islamic drift and this is why fundamentalism came to being in Algeria. The fundamentalists first significant step came about when the FIS, the self proclaimed "party of god", was founded in 1989 even though religious parties are banned by the constitution and "In less than a year and a half the Islamic front had essentially conquered Algeria before its former masters eyes," referring to the first democratic elections before the cancellations. (Malley 1996) The problem this causes is that although the FLN are an Islamic party they are desperate to keep a form of democracy which would not be possible if the fundamentalists were in control, even if they have to be un-democratic about it, and they are concerned that if the FIS comes to power then democracy would be lost forever. The argument that Islamic fundamentalism is inevitable in Algeria comes from Graham Fuller, author of the Rand report titled "Algeria-The next Islamic state?"(Fuller 1995) The report was commissioned by the US Army who wanted to know what the consequences would be for America and Europe should the fundamentalist FIS come to power. According to Fuller the question is not to know when the FIS will get power in Algeria but how and in what circumstances will it achieve it, that is with which other political groups, and the reason for this are many. One of the major reasons is because the ruling 5 man council lacks legitimacy as they were not democratically elected. Fuller also goes on to conclude that the existing regime, basically a military junta, is intellectually and politically bankrupt(Fuller 1995) This is backed up by the fact that even pre-war the Algerian government was considered corrupt and incompetent as the country struggled with unemployment, food shortages and a rising national debt which was as of 1994 25 million. (Ciement 1997) The fact that RAND considers Islamic fundamentalism unavoidable in Algeria is a problem because it offers no immediate solution to the problem facing Algerians as the FLN are as determined as the FIS to win, and neither are willing to back down. [A BREAKDOWN IN DEMOCRACY] One of the most important reasons for the civil war is the breakdown in democracy, as it was the spark which ignited the conflict. It could be argued that civil war was waiting to happen in Algeria as Fuller did when he said "change is simply long overdue in states like Algeria"(Fuller 1995). After the Algerian war of independence, the FLN ran a one party state and therefore all political, economic and social organizations had to conform to the parties ideas and ideologies. The regimen before the civil war was a military backed organization known by the people in French as "Le pouvoir" or in English "the power". There was a turning tide towards fair democratic elections in Algeria and, sure enough, in June of 1990 the first pluralistic elections were held. These were only local and municipal elections, but they were be a good indication of the peoples voting persuasions and a rehearsal for future national elections. (Metz 1994) The FIS's popularity was shown as they won 54% of the total popular vote compared to the FLN's 28%. That means in real terms that 4 million Algerians had voted for the FIS whereas only 2 million had voted for the government. The FIS did especially well in the bigger cities and the capital city. In Algiers they won 64% of the vote, in Oran 7o% of the vote and a huge 72% in Constatine. It seemed that the FIS had captured the protest votes of the discontented Algerians. (Ciement 1997) In the next round of voting the FIS did remarkably well again. Although their total vote slipped from 4 million people to 3 million they were left the overall winner with 47% of the popular vote, which meant it had captured 188 of the available 231 seats. This compared to the FLN's 23%, 15 seats, made the FIS a clear winner. When all the polls were closed and the ballots counted, the FIS needed just 27 of the remaining 199 seats to control the new national assembly in the next round of voting. (Metz 1994) The FLN was in trouble and before they could find a legitimate solution to their problem, the Army stepped in. President Chadli appeared on national television January 11 1991 to announce his resignation and was placed under house arrest. A presidential advisory body-the Haut coseil de securite (HCS)took charge and canceled the final round of elections and assumed all presidential powers creating a 5 member haut conseil d'etat (HCE). The cancellation of the elections was a clear and direct measure to stop total Islamicizing Algeria. (Metz 1994) Having overthrown the government, the first thing the HCE did was to outlaw the FIS party and 10,000 members were taken to jail without trial, thus forcing the radical FIS members underground and launch a guerrilla war against the ruling junta. The HCE consisted of some civilian members but this was just a thin veil to hide the fact that this was a military coup. Mohammed Boudiaf was appointed president almost immediately, having been one of the leaders in the war against the French. This appointment was probably to establish popularity for the regime by having a historical hero in charge rather than solid political reasons. In his time, president Boudiaf tried to negotiate a settlement with the Islamic fundamentalists but was assassinated in the process. Who he was killed by is not known but one plausible theory is that it was by hard liners in his party who did not want a negotiated settlement with the fundamentalists. In 1994 Liamie Zeronal former defense minister and hard-liner, took charge and set up a 60 seat advisory council to take the place of the APN. He was elected in 1995 but still not democratically as the FIS was illegal and could not put forward any candidates. Zeronal is still in power today. (Ciement 1997) [Conclusion] Clearly in Algeria there has been a breakdown in democracy and this is one of the major reasons for the civil war, as the FIS will not accept the Governments authority, and are fighting to get the place in power which they should have won had the elections not been stopped. The lack of democracy and banning of their respective parties has forced the FIA and FIS and GIA underground to take power by force as it was stolen from them at the ballot box, and this is another cause of the civil war. It is for all of these reasons I conclude that the problems facing Algeria today are results of a French invasion, inevitable Islamic fundamentalism and a breakdown in democracy. The problem has not been resolved is because of the overwhelming hatred between the groups involved. They have demonised each other to an extent that it seems there is not peaceful solution to the problem. The main problem is that the FIS refuses to recognize the authority of the ruling Junta, and the Junta refuse to let the FIS take power democratically as they fear the FIS would never relinquish it. At the present time it seems that a solution to the problem is not going to be forthcoming in the near future. Taking into account the findings of the Rand report and the other available evidence, it appears that for peace to be found in Algeria the Algerians need to find a way to embrace Islam fully whilst still preserving democracy. It is difficult to predict a likely outcome for the events in Algeria as the events in the history of the problem are remarkably unpredictable. The Rand organization outlined some possible outcomes in his report by way of three scenarios. The first possible outcome is that there will be a government collapse, causing violence and chaos and this will bring about a social revolution. The second scenario involves a deal in which the generals of the Junta will agree to share power. This scenario seems increasingly unlikely as this was the path President Boudiaf was pursuing when he was assassinated and the FLN are more unwilling than ever to speak with the FIS because of the massacres widely blamed on the Islamics. The problem with this outcome is that it is only delaying the political decision which is necessary. The last scenario Fuller sees, is a democratic alternative in which new elections would be called and the FIS would more than likely win and take control of the government. Looking at the past form of the ruling Junta this seems very unlikely. (Fuller 1995) There is one other possibility that looks increasingly likely as time passes, and that is that foreign forces will intervene firstly politically and then possibly forcefully even though initially they would mediate for peace it could be possible for them to depose the FLN. Evidence that this might happen comes from several recent quotes by leaders who are becoming increasingly aware and looking for solutions. The U.N Secretary General, Kofi Annan said in Sept. 1997 "Words are no longer enough...It is extremely difficult for us to pretend that nothing is happening, that we know nothing, and that we should abandon the Algerian people to their fate (Trueheart 1997). Since then General Annan has offered to mediate between the FLN and the FIS. Other world leaders who have spoken out about Algeria recently include Pope John Paul II who said "My thoughts turn to the Martyred in Algeria...News of unheard-of violence, which unceasingly hits so many innocent people continues to reach us."(Trueheart 1997) Another indication that the world is now noticing the problem in Algeria comes from the Clinton Administration which issued a statement saying"(we hope) the political system can begin to generate peaceful channels for dissent and to allow the Algerian people to overcome this nightmare."(Trueheart 1997) [Bibliography] Ciment, C. 1997. Algeria:The Fundamentalist challenge. New York. Facts on file Fuller, G. "Algeria:the next fundamentalist state?" Jan 1995. Http://WWW.RAND.ORG. (10/09/97) Kinzer, S. 1997. New York Times. New York June 22 1997 Los Angeles times, 1997. Los Angles, June 30 1997 Malley, R.1996. The call from Algeria:Third worldism revolution and the turn to Islam. California. University of California Metz, H.C. 1994. Algeria:A Country study. Washington. Library of Congress. Peterson, S. 1997 Christian Science monitor. Washington. July 3 1997. Peterson,S. 1997. Christian science monitor. Washington June 9 1997. Reudy, J. Modern Algeria:The origins and development of a nation. Indiania. Library of Congress. Trueheart,R. 1997. Washington Post Washington, Sept 9 1997. Washington Post. 1997. Washington, Sept 1 1997. Washington Post. 1997 Washington, Sept 30 1997. Zecchini, L. 1997. Le Monde (The World) Paris, Jan 15 1997.