In the fall
of 68 the 192nd was given 2 Korean pilots so that they could fly with us
and observe our techniques. Each of the slick platoons got one and
ours was named Cpt. Kim. After bouncing around for
a few flights with other pilots it became my job to fly with Cpt. Kim.
I found Cpt. Kim to be a very intelligent
person but there were 2 problems that I had to deal with. The first
was his English. He could speak English but I had to listen really
close and anticipate what he was trying to say in order to understand him.
As our time together wore on his English improved quite a bit. I learned
quite a bit about Korea and his life there as well as the Korean outlook
on the war.
The second problem was a big one;
he could not fly worth beans. The ability was there as well as an intense
desire but it seemed as though he was self-taught. I don't know
where he got his flight training but it was extremely poor and as a result
most of our training was simple helicopter basics. Because he
could not handle the ship very well it would jeopardize both the crew and
ship to use him in combat so almost all our flights were Ash & Trash
types. Fortunate for me Cpt. Kim had a sense of humor and understood
the situation.
On one particular flight we had
to pick up some U.S. types at the end of the runway at the HQ pad and Cpt.
Kim was having a little trouble hovering. We finally got there and
he got it down but we had to wait a short while for our passengers.
Because of the sun we had our dark visors down. Our passengers finally
got on board and I let Cpt. Kim have the ship for takeoff while I talked to
the tower. Because we were on the short end of the runway Cpt. Kim
would need to pull in a little more power than usual in order to clear the
small hooch's there. He did that just after passing through translational
lift but forgot to kick in left pedal, to compensate for the additional power,
which would keep us pointed in the right direction. Because no pedal
was added the chopper torqued around and started flying sideways. This
upset the CE a little because he was not used to being in front of everything,
which was the pilot's job. The passengers as well were aware that this was
not your normal takeoff. I was still on the controls and gave Cpt.
Kim a few seconds to think about it then gave the left pedal a push, which
straightened us out. I then looked over at Cpt. Kim and even with the
visor down he knew what kind of look I had on my face, he said "Sorry".
I knew what was happening but had to let him embarrass himself a little so
it would sink in and he would learn by it. Though we were in no actual
danger Cpt. Kim didn't know that but knew he had just screwed up. It
did sink in and with the ship now pointed in the right direction we began
the mission.
The guy in charge of the mission
picked Cpt. Kim to talk to about the mission. Normally we just yell or extend
the helmet mike and hit the floor mike button for passenger conversation but
Cpt. Kim promptly took off his helmet and gave it to the officer. When
that officer saw Cpt. Kim's smiling face he about died. His lower jaw
had dropped well below his Adam's apple and I knew he had figured he had
gotten on the wrong ship and was probably going to die in a crash as a result.
I think the takeoff had a
little something to do with it. We were still flying into the sun and
with my visor down he could not tell if I was Korean as well. When
I finally spoke he told me he was sure happy to hear an American's voice
coming from that seat. We both had a good laugh over that one.
In the fall of 68 the rules of war
changed, some think due to a trader high up in command. All the pilots
were gathered together and informed that as of now we could not shoot back
if shot at because the stray bullets might hit friendly troops in the area.
If we were shot at we were supposed to call the local commander who then
would call the district commander for that area who then would call the Vietnamese
commander for that area and if there were no troops in the area we would
be given the OK to return fire. Going through all that would probably
take a day or two. They also told us our call sign was now changed
from our respectable "Pole Cat" to "Filmore Signet", what a sorry call sign.
That lasted a couple of weeks because it really screwed things up with all
the outpost and pickups. We went back to "Pole Cat" on our own and
nothing was ever said again about it.
Cpt. Kim and I were given the mission
to relocate a Vietnamese outpost on High Way 1 to a new location just 10
miles south also on High Way 1. We were somewhat north of Phan Thiet
but out of radio range because of a poor radio. The flights lasted
only about 8 minutes or so and Cpt. Kim was having a ball doing all the flying.
We had done about 10 or so flights when the outpost we were working for gave
us a call. We were told that someone on a motorcycle had just stopped
by and told them that a U.S. jeep had just been ambushed down the road and
that 2 Americans and a Vietnamese lady had just been shot. They
asked us to check it out. It just so happened
that we were on the empty return trip when we got the call and only about
3 minutes away from the ambush. We spotted the jeep but didn't see
any bodies because they had been picked up by someone just behind the jeep
when they saw the VC hightail it into the large expanse of swail grass to
the west of the highway. We found out later that the 2 Americans were
AWOL GIs from
Saigon that had stolen the jeep and were headed north with
one of their girlfriends.
We circled the jeep from about 500 ft
and notified the outpost what we had found. Then low and behold I noticed
lines in the swail grass. It seems that when one goes through the grass
it results in the blades tilting slightly. You can't see it from the
ground but from the air it looked as if someone had drawn a line to each
of the 4 VC that were now trying to hide in the grass.
We had them dead to rights but couldn't shoot. I got some altitude and
tried to call back to base but couldn't get anyone. Just then 2 of
the guys started to run for it. They had about 3/4 mile of swail grass
to go through before hitting a train track that separated the grass area
from the tree line. The lead guy had a white hat and all 4 had rifles.
I ordered the CE to open fire with the fire directed just in front of the
guy with the hat. I was hoping he would think we were just bad
shots and lay down a while so we could gain some time and make some more
calls. He figured it out and just kept running. We used up our
machine gun ammo just as he made it to the tree line. Because we were
getting low on fuel we had to return to Phan Thiet. About 15 minutes
out of Phan Thiet I got a hold of someone else's gun ships and put them on
to the location and outpost frequency.
As we landed at the fuel pit, I had my
3rd tail rotor failure and had to set her down right there. Unbeknownst
to me an oil can had bounced through one of the circular relief holes in the
tailboom bulkhead area. It wedged vertically directly under the left
pedal hydraulic servo, which resulted in a frozen pedal. I ordered
everyone to get what they could and follow me. We then went to the
closest ship on the line, found that it was flyable and promptly stole it.
By the time we got back to the ambush the gun ships from the other company
were already there and they were granted permission to fire from who knows
where. I directed them to a "U" shaped patch of trees where the VC
with the white hat had gone in and they blew it up. I doubt he was
still there. We did follow out the other lines in the grass and found
one of the VC hiding under a little trestle where the train tracks when over
a small gully. Troops from the compound came out and picked him up.
Cpt. Kim was cool during the entire thing.
He later told me he would have shot them all when we first spotted them.
I often wondered about how I would have felt if the old rules had still been
in effect and I was able to order those 4 VC killed. I wondered also
about the VC in the white hat and what he must have been thinking about,
us catching him red handed and not finishing the job.
We finished our resupply of the outpost
and returned to base. Cpt. Kim had a little trouble figuring out why
we were so limited by rules that were so obviously planted by the enemy.
The OPS officer told me about the oil can and then told me not to steal any
more of his ships.
Except for getting in and out of the rather
tight chopper revetments I let Cpt. Kim do virtually all the flying and his
flying did improve quite a bit. I reported such to OPS and they let
us pull out one of the ranger teams that were in the nearby jungle.
I let Cpt. Kim spot the team then told him how to set up for the extraction
and he took us in. On short final I took over with him also on the controls
and we were in and out in about 2 seconds. It was about as perfect an
extraction as one could hope for. We didn't even have time to put a
skid down before all of them were in and the CE gave us the "Go" command.
Cpt. Kim got the ship back after we cleared the trees. As we were climbing
out he commented on how professional we Americans were.
I sometimes wonder how he made out flying
wise when he returned to his own unit. Less than a year later I asked
for and received a tour of duty in S. Korea. That is a story for another
time.
The End
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