This proved merely the overture. At 1142 a group of nine torpedo-bombers in close formation came in high from the port bow, used a patch of cloud on the port beam as cover in which to execute a series of turns together; and then gradually descended towards their target, stringing out into 'a loose, staggered line ahead', before launching their attack in waves of two or three in line abreast. It was, the victims quickly learned, the standard tactical pattern for Japanese torpedo-bomber pilots. They executed the attack as if they simply had not noticed the fire being blasted up at them by 66 anti-aircraft guns of 4-inch calibre and upwards (including Prince of Wales sixteen 5.25-inch) and 74 2-pounder pom-poms. Captain Bell, the Captain of the Fleet, later remarked that the attack was 'very well executed and the enemy in no way pertubed by our gunfire'.
As the Japanese aircraft made their final run-in, Repulse, swinging to starboard, escaped damage, but Prince of Wales, swinging to port, was hit aft at 1144 on the port side abreast of 'P3' and 'P4' turrets and probably by another torpedo simultaneously abaft 'Y' (main armament) turret. These were 24-inch torpedoes with warheads of 1,210-pounds, as against the 18-inch torpedoes with 300-pound warheads used by the Fleet Air Arm in their strikes against Bismarck and Italian battleships [at Taranto and the Battle of Matapan]. The results of the first two hits on Prince of Wales, and particularly the one aft, proved devastating, as was finally confirmed by a Royal Navy diving team which examined the wreckage of the ship in 1966.
This torpedo blew a hole twelve feet in circumference in the hull, smashed the 'A' bracket holding the outer port propeller shaft, and bent the shaft itself. The distorted shaft revolving at full power caused thunderous vibration throughout the ship. Worse, it thrashed open watertight bulkheads and shattered fuel and oil pipes along its length. The way was clear for water pouring in through the hole blown by the torpedo in the after end of the shaft passage to reach the vitals of the ship, rendering nought all her carefully designed anti-torpedo protection. 'B' engine room, 'Y' boiler room, the port diesel generator room and the 'Y' turret action machinery room all swiftly filled with sea water.
With some 2,400 tons of water aboard, Prince of Wales listed 13 degrees to port and settled by the stern until, by 1220, the port side of the quarterdeck was awash despite counter-flooding. With both port propeller shafts out of action and her steering gear crippled - very similar to the damage inflicted by the Fleet Air Arm on Bismarck and Vittorio Veneto - the Prince of Wales now helplessly turned in a circle at 15 knots.
This was not all. The shock of the explosion and the swift inrush of water knocked out her electric power supply. Five out of eight dynamos quickly succumbed, four of them those supplying the after part of the ship. The damage-control parties then failed to switch power from the remaining three dynamos to the after part by means of the ring-main breakers; a failure never explained. Instead Prince of Wales' damage control parties repeated the error of the Ark Royal's by devoting their energies to running emergency lines to individual points - in this case, to the forward 5.25-inch turrets. The after 5.25-inch twin turrets, having lost power, could only be slowly operated by hand. Fan-ventilation and telephone communications in the after part of the ship were similarly dead. In the dim light of emergency lamps men sweated to the point of collapse in the remaining engine and boiler rooms as temperatures climbed to 150 degrees fahrenheit. But, far more serious still, nine out of the ship's eighteen pumps had died with loss of electric power, all of them in the stricken after part of the ship. The mass of water continuing to flood through the hole made by the torpedo could not be pumped out.
At 1210, with the ship's steering motors dead, Captain Leach had hoisted 'not under control' black balls. The pride of modern British warship design and construction had been reduced by one attack by enemy aircraft to a cripple. It was the later opinion of at least one distinguished sailor that weaknesses in her design rendered her 'not as good structurally as some people thought'. Certainly a later enquiry under Lord Justice Bucknill into the ship's loss found weaknesses in the layout of her electoral system, which failed to comply with principles laid down by the Controller of the Navy in 1938; and as a consequence other King George Vs were to undergo major improvements in this regard. The routing of ventilation ducts and cable shafts was also criticised (shades of Ark Royal). The enquiry recommended that the vulnerable stern part of the ship should be isolated by an extra, and strengthened, bulkhead. So far as her damage-control parties were concerned, there can be little doubt that they, like the rest of the ship's company, were not at the peak of efficiency simply because there had never been time to work up properly since she was commissioned.
Meanwhile Captain Tennant of the Repulse had sent an emergency signal to Singapore at 1105 that Force Z was being attacked, the only signal ever received on shore to indicate that air support was urgently needed. Six minutes after this Tennant succeeded in combing the tracks of all nine torpedoes launched by a further group of Mitsubishis, and two minutes later again Repulse was missed by high-level bombers while under helm at speed. Tennant now brought the Repulse closer to the flagship to ask if he could assist her; there was no reply. Soon it was Repulse's turn again. A group of nine torpedo-bombers was spotted low on the horizon on the starboard bow. When three miles distant they split up into two sub-flights for the final run-in. The right-hand flight approached from starboard and dropped their torpedoes at a range of 2,500 yards just as the old battlecruiser began to swing to comb them. The other flight made a dummy run at the Prince of Wales, lying abaft the Repulse's port beam, but then backed in a tight turn back to attack the Repulse from the port side. One torpedo struck home amidships 'with a great jarring shudder, as though a giant hand had shaken the ship', recalled one officer. Yet Repulse still steamed at 25 knots; still her 4-inch guns and eight-barrelled pom-poms strove to put a cage of high explosive round the wounded ship.
At the same time Prince of Wales, incapable of manoeuvre, was attacked from starboard and hit twice forward of the breakwater and just before the bridge. Two minutes later, at 1226, she took two more torpedoes, this time aft near 'Y' turret and abreast of 'B' turret. The consequent flooding had the effect of reducing her list to port to 3 degrees, but the starboard outer propeller shaft was stopped, and the flagship's speed fell away to only 8 knots.
The attackers now concentrated their efforts on the Repulse, attacking from all directions so that it was impossible for Captain Tennant to comb every track. One of the ship's officers has described what followed:
'Again the sky was blackened with shell-bursts from our fire, but the aircraft came on relentlessly to drop their torpedoes, the tracks of which could be seen heading straight for us. With the ship already committed to a swing to starboard to meet the attack from that side, the torpedoes were unavoidable and we were hit three times with only seconds separating the explosions. The first exploded near the Gunroom, the second abreast the mainmast, which shook and swayed, the heavy steel wire shrouds whipping violently. The ship seemed to stagger in her stride, and I knew instinctively that this was the end, that Repulse was doomed.'
In fact she had been hit by four torpedoes, not three. Listing heavily to port Repulse turned 90 degrees to starboard, which brought her fine on the Prince of Wales' quarter and on a parallel course. Over the tannoy (which was fortunately still working) the Captain now ordered everyone on deck:
The decision for a commanding officer to make [he wrote later], to cease all work in the ship below, is an exceedingly difficult one, but knowing the ship's construction I felt sure that she would not survive four torpedoes, and this was borne out, for she only remained afloat six or seven minutes after I gave the order for everyone to come on deck . . .
Inexorably Repulse rolled to port as men scrambled up her ever more sloping decks and tilting ladders to reach the ship's side beyond the starboard rails. One survivor was to remember:
'The strange sensation of walking down the ship's side just abreast of the bridge. As I reached the bilge keel the ship was moving through the water, the ship's side was horizontal and I was standing upright . . . hundreds of men were now standing bands holdjon the ship's side and bilge keel; some already sliding down the round bottom before making a last jump . . . I took my cap and shoes off and looked at the numerous heads of those who, forward of me, had already jumped, and were floating past as the ship ws still moving ahead at about five knots, even though on her beam ends. It was now or never and I took a deep breath and jumped . . .'
Captain Tennant himself was to recollect looking over the starboard wing of the bridge when the Repulse had reached a 30- degree list and seeing the Commander and two or three hundred men collecting on the starboard side of ths ship:
'I never saw the slightest sign of panic or ill-discipline. I told them from the bridge how well they had fought the ship, and wished them good luck. The ship hung for at least a minute and a half to two minutes with a list of about 60 to 70 degrees to port, and then rolled over at 1233.'
The C-in-C ordered the destroyers Electra and Vampire to pick up the survivors, who numbered 42 out of 66 officers (including Tennant himself) and 754 out of 1,240 ratings. The task was accomplished without interference from Japanese aircraft, which had more important prey to kill.
The Prince of Wales was now steaming north at 8 knots. Soon after Repulse went down nine high-level bombers flew over the flagship from port to starboard, turned, and ten minutes later attacked from ahead and down the centre line as usual. From the compass platform the ship's torpedo officer watched the attack come in: 'some guns in the forward group still going. Again steady formation of nine -waited for bombs to arrive - Captain said to Admiral "now", and we all laid flat - pattern hit ship aft.' Luckily only one bomb struck home and that caused only superficial damage.
This was the last attack. But in any case Prince of Wales was dying minute by minute. At 1250 she signalled Singapore naval base 'EMERGENCY. Send all available tugs . . . ' Eleven minutes later she repeated it. But she was beyond the succour of far-off tugs. The destroyer Express came alongside her starboard quarter and began to take off the wounded; the Carley floats (rafts) were launched and the gripes (bands holding the boats in place) were cast off the boom boats. By 1310 she was settling fast and listing heavily to port, a fact which impressed itself on one survivor when he 'suddenly saw that the sea was lapping at the support of the lowest pom-pom mounting. The sea near the base of the funnel! It struck me in a flash that not only was the ship heeled over but also very low in the water and the end probably a matter of minutes . . ' Captain Leach now gave the order to don lifejackets and abandon ship. At 1320 Prince of Wales began to heel steeply, watched by appalled survivors aboard the Express:
'The great battleship continued to roll slowly away. As her upperworks dwindled and then vanished, the grey paint on her hull changed to brown as the dividing black line of her boot-topping rose out of the water and the men at the guard rails began to climb over and slide down the treacherous slope.'
. . . At 1320 HMS Prince of Wales, flagship of Force Z and the Eastern Fleet, capsized and sank . . . taking Admiral Sir Tom Phillips and Captain Leach with her. Ninety out of 110 officers and 1195 out of 1502 ratings were rescued.
To destroy Force Z had cost the Japanese only eight aircraft - another cruel demonstration of the ineffectiveness of the capital ships' anti-aircraft fire and in particular of the technical shortcomings of the fire-control system adopted by the Admiralty before the war . . .
As Prince of Wales went down, eleven Royal Air Force Brewster Buffalo fighters arrived on the scene, prompting a distant group of Japanese bombers to jettison their bombs and make for home. The Buffaloes had been kept on standby at Sembawang airfield on Singapore Island to give air protection to Force Z. Tennant's emergency signal had reached the Air Operations Room at 1219, and the Buffaloes were in the air only seven minutes later . . . Now the Buffaloes patrolled overhead while the survivors of both ships were being picked out of the water or from Carley floats and boats.
Other Accounts of the Battle
Samuel Eliot Morison - from 'History of United States Naval Operations in World War Two'
Captain S.W. Roskill - from 'The Navy at War 1939-45'
