Now about Col. Minor's 700 militia from Falls Church; they made it to DC! They arrived in Washington around sunset to find it appearing deserted. Many citizens HAD left, but some had stayed. The Virginia Militia remained at the grounds of the US Capitol while their leader went in search of someone to host them. They were in need of some supplies before they could go into action.
Col. Minor contacted a prominent local physician, Dr. James Ewell, who lived very close to the Capitol building. Col. Minor invited his group physician, Dr. Peake when Dr. Ewell said he would take them directly to a meeting with the President of the United States. Madison had many things going on that evening and referred the Colonel and his tactical need to Secretary of War Armstrong who could likely be found at his home nearby in the building group called "Seven Buildings". They went and found him.
In typical Armstrongian footdragging and dismissal, the Secretary of War told Col. Minor that the Quartermaster, a Col. Henry Carberry, would take care of all his supply needs in the morning. Members of today's armed forces will recognize the classic "hurry up and wait" situation the VA Militia faced of running eight miles to Washington and then being put off. You will see that this deserves at least two "US failures" marks. You can also see how the mere attitude of one person in authority can null the heroic efforts of many. But you will also see how this childish, momentary attitude will cascade into other effects. Col. Minor did not know what greater effects this would have and it is just as well, for he was outraged enough for the moment. He returned to his troops at the Capitol. This author questions whether Winder was aware of the presence of these soldiers. No such mention is made in any historical source. Yet it might be assumed he did from his actions later that night.
Also that night, at the British camp at Melwood;
Cockburn's aide, Lt. Scott, was sent in place of the Admiral to report to Admiral Cochrane, who was aboard one of the larger ships left back at Benedict. Cochrane was no doubt amazed by the lack of resistance from the Americans, but concerned that they may be concentrating further inland for a colossal strike.
Admiral Cochrane considered the directive he had been given by his superior; to not risk if little could be attained. He likely considered what his reputation would become in history if his force was "bushwacked" and destroyed for the poor excuse of trying to sack the puny town of Washington. He may have felt they had put on a "grand parade" and showed dominance, had occupied three towns and taken lots of supplies, so why risk more? He issued an order for Cockburn and Ross to bring all their forces back toward the ships for departure. Lt. Scott took the message and left the Admiral's ship into the dark and strange American countryside.
General Winder, instead of finding rest, found himself horribly busy this night. Everything rested on his shoulders and there was little cooperation or competency. Information continued to be unreliable, supplies short, and everyone seemed to need double-checking. Few had slept long and well last night, and this night appeared it would be worse.
Royal Navy Lt. Scott rode back toward the Melwood estate. Unfortunately, about midnight, he realized he was lost; in a foreign country and in pitch blackness. For the next two hours he sought the right roads and turns, and finally came upon Melwood. He found the officers in a shed and gave them the return order. Cockburn was distressed. He likely felt Cochrane was being an "old granny", and there was all the MORE reason to proceed with the planned attack with the discovered lack of resistance. He and Ross discussed the matter. It was within Cockburn's authority to ignore the order on his own estimation of the situation. Ross could follow either commander, and chose to continue the march. In fact, they decided they would begin the march within a couple of hours. Soon, the men were wakened in the dark, and by 5 that morning, the thousands of British soldiers, in their three groups Ross had organized them in since Benedict marched forth into the unfamiliar, dark, American countryside.
Winder had ridden his third horse down. Horses were the "cars" of those days. As a car runs out of gas, a horse eventually gets exhausted and no amount of spurring or beating will make it "go". He rode it to McKeowins, popular DC hotel/tavern from where he had borrowed it, and found there were no other "fresh" horses available. He became a pedestrian - and with so much left to do!
Gen. Winder walked toward the makeshift camp near the Navy Yard. At this point, some authors say he went past the Capitol. Had he done so, he might have noticed somehow that Col. Minor's men were there and he billeting across the street in Dr. Ewell's house. But no connection between Winder and this important force of men is ever mentioned.
It should be mentioned that the US Capitol Building in 1814 did not look quite like it does now. Today, there are five parts visible; the center with dome, the end buildings that house the House and Senate chambers, and the two little connecting buildings between the center and the ends. In 1814 there was no center, no dome and no end buildings. Just the two, now-inconspicuous connecting buildings were there. It was in these that the House and Senate met, where the Supreme Court met, and where the Library of Congress was. Space was limited, but there were far fewer legislators back then when we only had 15 states.
The VA militia soldiers had the honor of sleeping in the chamber used by the House of Representatives. The reader should also note that there was no separate Supreme Court building as today; the Justices used a room under the Senate Chamber. There was no special building for the Library of Congress as there is today. The Library really WAS for Congress use, so it was right there in the Capitol in its own special room.
Perhaps at the time of night it was when (if) Winder passed the Captiol, the VA militia had declared "lights out" and thus the general saw it dark as usual, not knowing there were 700 infantry and 100 cavalry in and around it. Anyway, Winder reached his campgrounds south of the Capitol near the Navy Yard.
Winder found all well at the US camp and left to check on the status of the two bridges that the British could use to enter DC. The Lower Bridge (most often used) was guarded against the British thousands by 30 men with axes. There were none of the combustibles there that Winder had ordered from Commodore Tingey at the Navy Yard. He'd station some men there when he got back to camp. For now, he had to check the upper bridge (called Stoddert's Bridge). There he found nobody at all! A British scout may have found this out an hour ago and for all anyone knew the British may be marching for it at that moment.
Winder headed for the camp and reached it about midnight. He gave orders for Stoddert's Bridge to be burned. He could only hope the orders would be carried out; who knows? Perhaps the US soldiers going there would find British swarming across it. As for the lower bridge, he had Capt. Burch take some men and cannon to the near side to guard it, and he arranged for infantry to guard the far side. If they got there soon that would be ok, but he still needed the combustibles from the Tingey at the Navy Yard, not far away from camp. He headed there with his aide, Major Briscoe.
Midnight in Bladensburg. Some of the inexperienced guards thought they heard enemy soldiers and fired shots, causing everyone to jump out of sleep to action. Soldiers were formed up for defence. It seemed like nothing but could be something. The issue is investigated for two hours in the night until finally it is found there is no danger. But it makes US Militia Gen. Stansbury think of how vulnerable he is there. The men are dismissed at 2am.
General Winder and Major Briscoe were walking toward the Navy Yard. In the dark, with no paved roads, the tired general stumbled and fell. This injured his right arm and ankle, but he went on. Tingey answered the knock at his door. Commodore Barney, enjoying the comfort of Tingey's quarters, was there too. Winder asked about the explosives for the bridge. Tingey assured him they'd be there when needed. Now, this author is certain that Winder was heroic if only to keep his temper at this point. Exhausted and injured as he was, concerned when others were not, busy while others slept, he simply told Tingey he needed the explosives "now". Tingey complied; he sent some sailors and the boat of powder kegs out in the water and to the bridge. Winder went there also, to make sure all was as he intended. One can wonder if Winder got off his ankle and saved some strength by going with the sailors in the boat.
A glow in the night sky between 2 and 3 in the morning informed Winder that at least one order he gave was executed; Stoddert's Bridge was finally taken care of.
In Bladensburg, the soldiers are roused again at 3 am. Stansbury wants to march them into Washington and safety. A messenger is sent to Gen. Winder telling him of this decision. The men are assembled and move out in darkness.
Finding all in order at the lower bridge, Winder was probably met by a messenger from Stansbury about his moving toward Washington. Winder sent off a note that Stansbury is needed in Bladensburg, not Washington. Winder then went back to camp to find rest. It was then about three in the morning.
Stansbury's soldiers were marching away from Bladensburg, but didn't get far when a message is brought back from Winder telling Stansbury to stay put. Stansbury talks things over with Col. Sterett and other officers and they decide Winder doesn't understand and they shall proceed to Washington. A message of this decision is sent to Winder.
At camp, Winder layed down on a cot in Major Peter's tent, waking him and complaining about the evening's events. But Peter fell back to sleep. It is likely that a messenger soon located the general with news from Gen. Stansbury; that he had again decided against Winder's "suggestion" that they remain in Bladensburg and was moving to join Winder's force in Washington. Winder wrote a more insistant version of his order that Stansbury was to be in Bladensburg and NOT come to Washington. Winder went to Gen. Smith's tent. Perhaps there he'd find rest.
There was even less rest for Gen. Stansbury and his men. It was clear that he was to return to Bladensburg. But he'd "be damned" if he was going to be caught in town with the river at his back. The troops were mortified to be turned around and marched back. Stansbury was mortified to give the order and loose their trust in him. But the order was clear.
Now, one may ask "where was the mistake here; in Stansbury moving his men around in the dead of night, or on Winder's part for not allowing his force to be consolidated (although again retreated from the enemy)? It is easy to say now knowing the British did NOT attack at all that night - neither at a bridge nor in Bladensburg. But not knowing this, should Stansbury have just stayed put and not worn out his men? Another "US failure" mark for the scoreboard. Yet, if the British HAD poured into Bladensburg that night, Stansbury would have been a hero. But that is what scouts are for.