Part 3



to the point of giving 5-10 logical reasons why, e.g. a peasant should give

him a piece of cloth, or a needle and thread to mend his clothes. When

behaves in this manner, no type of propaganda of the enemy will be able to

make a "terrorist" of him in the eyes of the people.



In addition, hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity in the existence of

the guerrilla acquire meaning in the cause of the struggle due to the

constant psychological orientation.



4. Camp Procedures



Encamping the guerrilla units gives greater motivation, in addition to

reducing distractions, and increases the spirit of cooperation of small

units, relating the physical environment to the psychological one. The

squad chief shall establish the regular camping procedure. Once they have

divested themselves of their packs, the chief will choose the appropriate

ground for camping. He should select land that predominates over the zone

with two or three escape routes. He will choose among his men and give them

responsibilities such as:



~ Clean the camp area.



~ Provide adequate drainage in case of rain. Also build some

trenches or holes for marksmen in case of emergency. In addition,

he will build a stove, which will be done by making some small

trenches and placing three rocks in place; in case the stove is

built on a pedestal, it will be filled with clay and rocks.



~ Build a wind breaking wall, which will be covered on the sides and

on the top with branches and leaves of the same vegetation of the

zones. This will serve for camouflaging and protecting it from

aerial visibility or from enemy patrols around.



~ Construct a latrine and a hole where waste and garbage will be

buried, which should be covered over at the time of abandoning

the camp.



~ Once the camp has been set up, it is recommended that a watchman

be positioned in the places of access at a prudent distance,

where the shout of alarm can be heard. In the same moment the

password will be established, which should be changed every 24

hours. The commander should establish ahead of time an alternate

meeting point, in case of having to abandon the camp in a hurried

manner, and they will be able to meet in the other already

established point, and they should warn the patrol that if at a

particular time they cannot meet at the established point, the

should have a third meeting point.



These procedures contribute to the motivation of the guerrilla and

improve the spirit of cooperation in the unit. The danger, sense of

insecurity, anxiety and daily concern in the life of a guerrilla require

tangible evidence of belonging in an order for him to keep up his spirit

and morale.



In addition to the good physical conditions in which the guerrilla

should find himself, good psychological conditions are necessary, for which

group discussions and becoming a self critic are recommended, which will

greatly benefit the spirit and morale of the same.



Having broken camp with the effort and cooperation of everyone

strengthens the spirit of the group. The guerrilla will be inclined then

towards the unity of thought in democratic objectives.



5. Interaction with the People



In order to ensure popular support, essential for the good development

of guerrilla warfare, the leaders should induce a positive interaction

between the civilians and the guerrillas, through the principle of "live,

eat , and work with the people," and maintain control of their activities.

In group discussions, the leaders and political cadres should give emphasis

to positively identifying themselves with the people.



It is not recommendable to speak of military tactical plans in

discussions with civilians. The Communist foe should be pointed out as the

number one enemy of the people, and as a secondary threat against our

guerrilla forces.



Whenever there is a chance, groups of members should be chosen who

have a high political awareness and high disciplinary conduct in the work

to be carried out, in order to be sent to the populous areas in order to

direct the armed propaganda, where they should persuade the people through

dialogue in face-to-face confrontations, where these principles should be

followed:



~ Respect for human rights and others' property.



~ Helping the people in community work.



~ Protecting the people from Communist aggressions.



~ Teaching the people environmental hygiene, to read, etc., in

order to win their trust, which will lead to a better democratic

ideological preparation.



This attitude will foster the sympathy of the peasants for our

movement, and they will immediately become one of us, through logistical

support, coverage and intelligence information on the enemy or

participation in combat. The guerrillas should be persuasive through the

word and not dictatorial with weapons. If they behave in this way, the

people will feel respected, will be more inclined to accept our message and

will consolidate into popular support.



In any place in which tactical guerrilla operations are carried out in

populous areas, the squad should undertake psychological actions parallel

to these, and should proceed, accompany and consolidate the common

objective and explain to all the people about our struggle, explaining that

our presence is to give peace, liberty and democracy to all Nicaraguans

without exception, and explaining that out struggle is not against the

nationals but rather against Russian imperialism. This will serve to ensure

greater Psychological achievements which will increase the operations of

the future.



6. Conclusions



The nature of the environment in guerrilla warfare does not permit

sophisticated facilities for psychological operations, and the face-to-face

persuasion of the guerrilla combatant-propagandists with the people is an

effective and available tool which we should use as much as possible during

the process of the struggle.



ARMED PROPAGANDA



1. Generalities



Frequently a misunderstanding exists on "armed propaganda," that this

tactic is a compulsion of the people with arms. In reality, it does not

include compulsion, but the guerrilla should know well the principles and

methods of this tactic. The objective of this section is to give the

guerrilla student an understanding of the armed propaganda that should be

used, and that will be able to be applied in guerrilla warfare.



2. Close Identification with the People



Armed propaganda includes all acts carried out by an armed force,

whose results improve the attitude of the people toward this force, and it

does not include forced indoctrination. This is carried out by a close

identification with the people on any occasion. For example:



~ Putting aside weapons and working side by side with the peasants

in the countryside: building, fishing, repairing roofs,

transporting water, etc.



~ When working with the people, the guerrillas can use slogans such

as "many hands doing small things, but doing them together."



~ Participating in the tasks of the people, they can establish a

strong tie between them and the guerrillas and at the same time a

popular support for our movement is generated.



During the patrols and other operations around or in the midst of

villages, each guerrilla should be respectful and courteous with the

people. In addition he should move with care and always be well prepared to

fight, if necessary. But he should not always see all the people as

enemies, with suspicions or hostility. Even in war, it is possible to

smile, laugh or greet people. Truly, the cause of our revolutionary base,

the reason why we are struggling, is our people. We must be respectful to

them on all occasions that present themselves.



In places and situations wherever possible, e.g. when they are resting

during the march, the guerrillas can explain the operation of weapons to

the youths and young men. They can show them an unloaded rifle so that they

will learn to load it and unload it; their use, and aiming at imaginary

targets they are potential recruits for our forces.



The guerrillas should always be prepared with simple slogans in order

to explain to the people, whether in an intentional form or by chance, the

reason for the weapons.



"The weapons will be for winning freedom; the are for you."



"With weapons we can impose demands such as hospitals, schools, better

roads, and social services for the people, for you."



"Our weapons are, in truth, the weapons of the people, yours."



"With weapons we can change the Sandino-Communist regime and return to

the people a true democracy so that we will all have economic

opportunities."



All of this should be designed to create an identification of the

people with the weapons and the guerrillas who carry them. Finally, we

should make the people feel that we are thinking of them and that the

weapons are the people's, in order to help them and protect them from a

Communist, totalitarian, imperialist regime, indifferent to the needs of

the population.



3. Implicit and Explicit Terror



A guerrilla armed force always involves implicit terror because the

population, without saying it aloud, feels terror that the weapons may be

used against them. However, if the terror does not become explicit,

positive results can be expected.



In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant threat of

physical damage. If the government police cannot put an end to the

guerrilla activities, the population will lose confidence in the

government, which has the inherent mission of guaranteeing the safety of

citizens. However, the guerrillas should be careful not to become an

explicit terror, because this would result in a loss of popular support.



In the words of a leader of the Huk guerrilla movement of the

Philippine Islands: "The population is always impressed by weapons, not by

the terror that they cause, but rather by a sensation of strength/force. We

must appear before the people, giving them the message of the struggle."

This is, then, in a few words, the essence of armed propaganda.



An armed guerrilla force can occupy an entire town or small city that

is neutral or relatively passive in the conflict. In order to conduct the

armed propaganda in an effective manner, the following should be carried

out simultaneously:



~ Destroy the military or police installations and remove the survivors to

a "public place."



~ Cut all the outside lines of communications: cables, radio, messengers.



~ Set up ambushes in order to delay the reinforcements in all the possible

entry routes.



~ Kidnap all officials or agents of the Sandinista government and replace

them in "public Places" with military or civilian persons of trust to our

movement; in addition, carry out the following:



~ Establish a public tribunal that depends on the guerrillas, and cover the

town or city in order to gather the population for this event.



~ Shame, ridicule and humiliate the "personal symbols" of the government of

repression in the presence of the people and foster popular participation

through guerrillas within the multitude, shouting slogans and jeers.



~ Reduce the influence of individuals in tune with the regime, pointing out

their weaknesses and taking them out of the town, without damaging them

publicly.



~ Mix the guerrillas within the population and show very good conduct by

all members of the column, practicing the following:



Any article taken will be paid for with cash.



The hospitality offered by the people will be accepted and this

opportunity will be exploited in order to carry out face-to-face

persuasion about the struggle.



Courtesy visits should be made to the prominent persons and those with

prestige in the place, such as doctors, priests, teachers, etc.



The guerrillas should instruct the population that with the end of the

operative, and when the Sandinista repressive forces interrogate them,

they may reveal EVERYTHING about the military operation carried out.

For example, the type of weapons they use, ho many men arrived, from

what direction they came and in what direction they left, in short,

EVERYTHING.



In addition, indicate to the population that at meetings or in private

discussion they can give the names of the Sandinista informants, who

will be removed together with the other officials of the government of

repression.



When a meeting is held, conclude it with a speech by one of the

leaders of guerrilla political cadres (the most dynamic), which includes

explicit references to:



The fact that the "enemies of the people" -- the officials or

Sandinista agents -- must not be mistreated in spite of their criminal

acts, although the guerrilla force may have suffered casualties, and that

this is done due to the generosity of the Christian guerrillas.



Give a declaration of gratitude for the "hospitality" of the

population, as well as let them know that the risks that they will run when

the Sandinistas return are greatly appreciated.



The fact that the Sandinista regime, although it exploits the people

with taxes, control of money, grains and all aspects of public life through

associations, which they are forced to become part of, will not be able to

resist the attacks of our guerrilla forces.



Make the promise to the people that you will return to ensure that the

"leeches" of the Sandinista regime of repression will not be able to hinder

our guerrillas from integrating with the population.



A statement repeated to the population to the effect that they can

reveal everything about this visit of our commandos, because we are not

afraid of anything or anyone, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans. Emphasize

that we are Nicaraguans, that we are fighting for the freedom of Nicaragua

and to establish a very Nicaraguan government.



4. Guerrilla Weapons Are The Strength of the People over an Illegal

Government



The armed propaganda in populated areas does not give the impression

that weapons are the power of the guerrillas over the people, but rather

that the weapons are the strength of the people against a regime of

repression. Whenever it is necessary to use armed force in an occupation or

visit to a town or village, guerrillas should emphasize making sure that

they:



~ Explain to the population that in the first place this is being done to

protect them, the people, and not themselves.



~ Admit frankly and publicly that this is an "act of the democratic

guerrilla movement," with appropriate explanations.



~ That this action, although it is not desirable, is necessary because the

final objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society, where

acts of force are not necessary.



~ The force of weapons is a necessity caused by the oppressive system, and

will cease to exist when the "forces of justice" of our movement assume

control.



If, for example, it should be necessary for one of the advanced posts

to have to fire on a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in

which the guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political

proselytism, the following is recommended:



~ Explain that if that citizen had managed to escape, he would have alerted

the enemy that is near the town or city, and they could carry out acts of

reprisal such as rapes, pillage, destruction, captures, etc., it this way

terrorizing the inhabitants of the place for having given attention and

hospitalities to the guerrillas of the town.



~ If a guerrilla fires at an individual, make the town see that he was an

enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the guerrilla

recognized as their first duty the protection of citizens.



~ The command tried to detain the informant without firing because he, like

all Christian guerrillas, espouses nonviolence. Firing at the Sandinista

informant, although it is against his own will, was necessary to prevent

the repression of the Sandinista government against innocent people.



~ Make the population see that it was the repressive system of the regime

that was the cause of this situation, what really killed the informer, and

that the weapon fired was one recovered in combat against the Sandinista

regime.



~ Make the population see that if the Sandinista regime had ended the

repression, the corruption backed by foreign powers, etc., the freedom

commandos would not have had to brandish arms against brother Nicaraguans,

which goes against our Christian sentiments. If the informant hadn't tried

to escape he would be enjoying life together with the rest of the

population, because not have tried to inform the enemy. This death would

have been avoided if justice and freedom existed in Nicaragua, which is

exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla.



5. Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects



It is possible to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets,

such as court judges, mesta judges, police and State Security officials,

CDS chiefs, etc. For psychological purposes it is necessary to gather

together the population affected, so that they will be present, take part

in the act, and formulate accusations against the oppressor.



The target or person should be chosen on the basis of:



~ The spontaneous hostility that the majority of the population feels

toward the target.



~ Use rejection or potential hatred by the majority of the population

affected toward the target, stirring up the population and making them see

all the negative and hostile actions of the individual against the people.





The hostility of one or two men can be overcome by eliminating the

enemy in a rapid and effective manner. This is the most common danger.



When the enemy is equal in the number of its forces, there should be

an immediate retreat, and then the enemy should be ambushed or eliminated

by means of sharpshooters.



In any of the cases, the Armed Propaganda Team cadres should not turn

the town into a battleground. Generally, our guerrilla will be better

armed, so that they will obtain greater respect from the population if they

carry out appropriate maneuvers instead of endangering their lives, or even

destroying their houses in an encounter with the enemy within the town.



5. A Comprehensive Team Program - Mobile Infrastructure



The psychological operations through the Armed Propaganda Teams

include the infiltration of key guerrilla communicators (i.e., Armed

Propaganda Team cadres) into the population of the country, instead of

sending messages to them through outside sources, thus creating our "mobile

infrastructure."



A "mobile infrastructure" is a cadre of our Armed Propaganda Team

moving about, i.e., keeping in touch with six or more populations, from

which his source of information will come; and at the same time it will

serve so that at the appropriate time they will become integrated in the

complete guerrilla movement.



In this way, an Armed Propaganda Team program in the operational area

builds for our comandantes in the countryside constant source of data

gathering (infrastructure) in all the area. It is also a means for

developing or increasing popular support, for recruiting new members and

for obtaining provisions.



In addition, an Armed Propaganda Team program allows the expansion of

the guerrilla movement, since they can penetrate areas that are not under

the control of the combat units. In this way, through an exact evaluation

of the combat units they will be able to plan their operations more

precisely, since they will have certain knowledge of the existing

conditions.



The comandantes will remember that this type of operation is similar

to the Fifth Column, which was used in the first part of the Second World

War, and which through infiltration and subversion tactics allowed the



                                   Part 4

                                   Militia

                                    Home

      Copyright © 1999 Excel Studios Corporation, All rights reserved.
                         Revised: December 16, 1999.