

# RECAP OF MY THOUGHTS SO FAR

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## MYMANIFESTO

### INTRODUCTION

O.k..

Unfortunately, most of this is going to be mostly copy-pastas from stuff I've previously written. To reiterate, this was NOT all written in this e-mail. A lot of this are taken from forum posts in the past (like my entire defense of my political philosophy), and it may be very jumpy since I'm basically copying and pasting everything I've previously written into one manifesto. However, I think it covers my stance well.

You might personally want to look at the contents of Book 2 rather than Book 1.

Book 1: Political Philosophy

Politically I am what I believe is referred to as an "Anarcho-Capitalist".

With that said, here's the quick introduction: I will be defending a system known as Anarcho-Capitalism, sometimes known as Market Anarchism, or sometimes even known as Voluntarism. There is supposedly a slight semantic difference between these terms, but I admit that I do not understand these differences.

So, to get to the main topic, this will hopefully be a somewhat well-written manifesto to the topic of AnCaps, the ethical defense, and explicit defenses and mechanisms.

Section 1: The Ethical Defense

Subsection a: An introduction to Ethical Theories

There is first the ethical defense. For this there are many ways one can go:

- 1) Natural Rights
- 2) Utilitarianism
- 3) Aristotelianism
- 4) Religion
- 5) Ugh, objectivism
- 6) Else

For 1, Rothbard's Ethics of Liberty is probably the magnum opus, and will be what I argue under for reasons I give after introducing the cases.

For 2, there are two approaches. A form of subjective utility, in which case Mises's Human Action covers your bases, or the typical notion of value, in which case David Friedman's The Machinery of Freedom I believe covers the AnCap case.

For 3, I do not know of a piece of literature off the top of my head; but I do know some people that give Aristotelian justification to AnCaps, and I can get in touch with them.

For 4, the case is similar to 3. Yes, albeit it is rare and fairly weird-sounding, there are fundamentalist Christian Anarcho-Capitalists out there.

For 5, it is something I wish to not even go into.

For 6, I leave open that perhaps there is some other rational theory that you have created or picked up on. Unfortunately, the most common one I come across of this type is a form of ethical cultural relativism, of which I cast serious doubt. However, I do believe Stefan Molyneux cooked up an ethical theory of his own justifying anarcho-capitalism. And he does have some (compared to the rest of the AnCap you-tubers) very well-polished videos giving his justification and some colorful stories (this is a favorite of

mine, denouncing war is a fun thing to do: <http://www.lewrockwell.com/molyneux/molyneux20.html>).  
;http://www.lewrockwell.com/molyneux/molyneux20.html

Here is my rationale for why I don't argue in favor of 2 through 6.

2)

I have written about why I don't accept utilitarianism before, so this is a copy-pasta from me:

\*I'm not sure if I have given these before, but these are my reasons for objecting to Utilitarian positions:

The following, is, more or less my take on it when I object to it, as unlike mathematics I know no formally adhered to standard definition of Utilitarianism:

\*It is Deterministic. To maximize 'happiness', we must necessarily have a 'happiness function' for all human beings. This is the prime motivator, at least for me, for moving Socialism -¿ Keynesianism -¿ Neoclassicalism (which I might as well call Milton Friedmanism :p) -¿ libertarianism. However, from what I know of Physics now, at least (ironically to a certain extent) empirically things tend to agree with the Copenhagen Interpretation, which agrees with a non-deterministic-verse. An objection to this might be to maximize the probability happiness function, however, my objection to this is that 1) I believe we can accept that for a moral theory to be a moral theory it must tell us what actions are moral and immoral 2) With maximizing a probability happiness function we can only know what actions are moral or immoral until after they take place, so 3) I posit that this inherently breaks premise 1), one might argue that 1) with-holds no notion of when an action is deemed immoral; but if not before the action takes place, then implicitly 1) can not hold. \*The "Unusual Circumstances" Objection. I believe it is fair to assume a moral rule like, "Somebody killing everyone in the world in pure rage" to be bad; racism is bad; killing for no reason, in general, is bad. However, say we have an enraged killer and that he would gain and infinitude of happiness from killing off every other person in the world, so much so, that this would outweigh the disbenefit in all the future of the rest of the current world population, by Utilitarianism, the action becomes justified. A common objection to this, is two-fold: 1) It is rare. 2) We can solve it with Rule Utilitarianism. My response to the first is also two-fold. First is that there are more common occurrences where "Unusual Circumstances" may appear. Imagine a police force that is investigating a brutal homicide of two black men, and the investigation is not going well, there are no leads, and it eventually gets to the point where the city is going to riot is the murder is not resolved somehow. So, the police take an innocent homeless guy, frame him, and jail him for the homicide. An injustice has occurred, framing innocent people is not a good thing, and yet Utilitarianism justifies it. Or, take the Utilitarianistic justification for racism I posited last time: if it were not for the White Americans, the American Indians would still be living in dirt tipis; therefore, we are justified to lording over them (which I hope we can agree to as being bad).

My next response to the first objection is that it shouldn't matter that it's rare. The fact that a moral theory can give us contradictory results should alone be enough to discredit it.

My response to the second objection is that Rule Utilitarianism appears to be normal Utilitarianism only on a grander scale, and thus appears to me to have the objections of normal Utilitarianism times a fold. That is I don't see how this really escapes the "Unusual Circumstances" objection. Furthermore, it is also faced with the problem of generalization. Also, [http://www.mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae6\\_1\\_7.pdf](http://www.mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae6_1_7.pdf)

Finally, It is an 'end justifies the means' ethic. And thus Utilitarianism is apt to the criticisms of that ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The\\_ends\\_justify\\_the\\_means#Criticisms\\_of\\_consequentialism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_ends_justify_the_means#Criticisms_of_consequentialism)). is supposedly another critic of it; but I haven't really read all of that yet.

\*I have posed some of these criticisms to a graduate student in philosophy. \* \*

\*Regarding your first objection, I'd point out that you're trying to make a purely consequentialistic theory prescriptive, which can only be done by changing the theory.....In other words, utilitarianism makes a claim about "the good," and then ostensibly claims that individuals ought to act in a way that would tend to promote the good. They can't claim that individuals ought to act in the way that actually brings about the best outcome, because as you point out, that doesn't inform moral decisions. But they don't actually claim that, and so avoid your objection.\*

\*As for the "unusual circumstances" objection (the first example is more commonly termed the "utility monster" objection, from Nozick's thought experiment; the second one doesn't have a name I'm familiar with, but it's usually phrased as a sheriff executing an innocent man to prevent a riot), I agree that this kind of objection is important, and that the first response cannot acceptably accommodate it.\*

\*The rule utilitarian response is to some degree based on Nozick's observation that certain social conventions generate an atmosphere of fear which makes it impossible to think about classes of actions as simply the sum of their parts....The central insight.....is that sometimes we live together better when we don't actively try to promote happiness.\*

\*The problem with rule utilitarianism, I think, is that it gives the wrong account of why we ought to do the things that we ought to do...The reason that we ought to treat people with respect and sensitivity, for example, is not simply that we tend to live better lives when we do so; respect and sensitivity are what people are /due/, and it would be shitty of us to treat them any other way. \*

Of which I mostly agree with him on these points, but this doesn't change my opinion of Utilitarianism either.

3)

The argument against this is much smaller and compact, and embarrassingly, I don't have it with me. In case you do know what I'm talking about, it's an argument against some circular logic that takes place in Aristotle's Ethics. If you are really interested in convincing me down this lane of argumentation, then I'll pull out my notes and do a decent search for th'bastard.

4)

Simply put, I'm not very religious. However, I believe the typical line of reasoning is the same as what I believe is called 'Divine Command Theory. In which case, the criticisms I hold to that are similar (with a replace of the necessary names (i.e. isomorphic)) to the objections against ethical relativism.

6)

Perhaps this is the road to go. Then construct an ethic, reason for it, and debunk mine.

I did look at FDR's ethic, and his series of podcasts building up his ethic, and I can't get past the part where he pretty much arbitrarily denounces a definition for what 'good' is.

Subsection b: The Political Ethics

Finally, I should say now that even though if I should, hypothetically, take 1 and you 2, you still taking the aspect that 2 are correct despite my objections. I'll probably take a pick and choose stance. If I find what I see as a flaw in an argument that assumes 2, then I'll mention them, otherwise I'll stay clear, since this wouldn't hurt an argument that uses 1 as its premise.

With that done, let me try to build things up from 1.

We start as so. Taking the argument from Descartes of 'I think therefore I am' I say that this implies, in a sense empirically, but formally a priori, that we have free will, and I thus own myself (in the common sense, we will see that this would be a justification against aggression of our life). In taking the stance of homesteading, and in a Crusoe like way, when I mix my labor with something else I have established property (and here we will build up a justification against aggression of our property). We justify this type of property along with the property of ourselves as so:

\*(one) owns his self and the extension of his self into the material world\*

What, then, occurs in Capitalism is nothing more than an exchange of property rights.

There is a notion of 'voluntary slavery' that sometimes crops up in libertarian circles which I wish to address at the moment. By our earlier argument we based self-ownership on the concept of free will. The acceptance of 'voluntary slavery', therefore, necessitates us to say that free will can be given away, which we a priori deny. And thus we have constructed the theoretical system of voluntary exchange (And here we build a defense against aggression against our liberties. All together now: life, liberty, and property (or as the more utilitarian bent would give it: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness)).

And here I take the juncture to say what I mean by 'aggression', and to clear up some possible semantic bickering:

\*We have seen the absurdity of saying that man does not have free will because he has not the /power/ to violate the laws of his nature because he cannot leap oceans at a single bound. It is similarly absurd to say that a man is not 'truly' free in the free society because, in that society, no man is 'free' to coerce against another man or to invade his property. Here, again, the critic is not really dealing with freedom but with power; in a free society, no man would be permitted (or none would permit himself) to invade the property of another. This would mean that his /power/ of actions would be limited; as man's power is always limited by his nature; it would /not/ mean any curtailment of his freedom. For is we define freedom, again, as the /absence of invasion/ by another man of any man's person or property, the fatal confusion of freedom and power is at last laid to rest. \*

There comes one final issue, about the recourse of justice in such an ethic, or how we exactly compose that coercion is immoral. And from here I've seen two ways. One is to apply aggression to the first categorical imperative, and say that if aggression were a universal ethic, we would clearly have some troubles. The second is to take it to the second categorical imperative, and say that we, by acting in the way that normal human beings do, in principle accept that aggression is bad (personally, I find the first justification stronger, as the arguments against the second justification may come from the same tree that the arguments against Hobbes' 'social contract' come from).

Thus, we come across that: that murder (taking one's life), theft (taking one's property), and slavery (taking one's liberty) is wrong (no duh, huh?). Furthermore, I will for now only note that I'm fairly confident that this ethic holds to the tests of Kant's first and second categorical imperatives. It is also thus from here we can come to (really ground-breaking work here guys) stuff like, 'If you steal stuff, it ought to be returned' and stuff like this.

However, the major part of the ethic has been laid down, and I should note that from here and here alone I should be able to give full course to say the main tenets of the justification of an AnCap, and say stuff like, 'taxation is theft' and pretty much call the entirety of the State an immoral institution. More quotes:

\*Or, as the great German sociologist Franz Oppenheimer perceptively put it, there are only two means to the acquisition of wealth. One is the method of production, generally followed by voluntary exchange of such products: this is what Oppenheimer called /the economic means/. The other method is the unilateral seizure of the products of another: the expropriation of another man's property by violence. This predatory method of getting wealth Oppenheimer aptly termed /the political means /\*

Finally, I end this by noting I am giving a much shortened picture of the story. Most of this is from Locke's Two Treatises of Government, and Rothbard's The Ethics of Liberty (if you want a crash course, <http://www.mises.org/rothbard/ethics.pdf> , chapters 6-9).

#### Subsection c: Addendum

I feel I only made a notion in passing here. But, to summarize, the basic ethical premise so far is that because the State is coercive, I can't justify it. Thus, on a rights and ethical basis I can't accept the notion of the State. I deal with issues of practicality next, but there are still some things I should clear up.

In this theory, I have not discussed such things as generosity. Technically, the theory leaves charity to be rather neutral, in fact it leaves most things as neutral. murder is bad, but 'not murder' isn't necessarily good, it simply has no connotation. The main point is that we are not 'bad' if we don't give to charity. Perhaps there is a way to develop some extra bar of virtue into here, I don't know. The general principle is this, "If you didn't consent to making sacrifices, there are limits to how much you are morally obligated to sacrifice for another." And Thompson puts in a good argument of it here: <http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/Phil160,Fall02/thomson.htm> ;<http://spot.colorado.edu/>

### Section 2: Practical Concerns

#### Subsection a: Introduction

So, even agreeing with the above, there is still the issue of how this would all work in practice. We are in a sense under the control of the government by an incredible amount. Even taking pains to justify such things as having no SS or /public/ welfare seems troublesome, let alone roads or even courts for that matter.

At this point I am very much encouraged to bring it up on a point-by-point basis. However, I feel I should bring up the typical cases of: welfare, consumer protection, roads, and courts.

And it is here that I find the fine-line between utilitarianism and the 'practicality' for which I am arguing tends to blend. For essentially, my arguments are not, 'This is grand, this is the best'; but rather, 'It will be better than the government would have it'. And so, to lay down this general spirit, I'll start off by laying some of the general reasons of AnCap v. government, of which one I have been doling out for quite some time now.

\*A very classic argument is one that I call the Hayekian one ( The Road to Serfdom is another good book btw, and was given a positive review by Winston Churchill himself! It's on a lot of top 100 most

influential book lists).

The premise is the coupling between economic and political goods, and the necessary link that any succession of economic freedoms leads to a necessary succession of political freedoms; and this is what the book sets down.

Here's a picture summary: <http://www.mises.org/books/TRTS/>\*

Or as Milton Friedman used to say, 'They start with the best of intentions.' As a hypothetical example, say we are 'given' the U.K.'s NHS, from here it is not too inconceivable to further restrict medical practices not in the public market. Nor is it too inconceivable, in an effort to bring down health costs, start having nationally enforced waistlines (<http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/06/04/japan-cracks-down-on-waistlines.html>), <http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/06/04/japan-cracks-down-on-waistlines.html>

The other thing is what should be known as 'Friedman's Law' (Or, in a nutshell, government inefficiency). Or to quote him directly on bureaucrats, 'Where are these angels you speak of?' My general stance towards government, and this may be due to the stories I've heard about the Argentine Dirty War, is that I don't trust them.

Subsection b: Welfare

Here's the biggest argument I've heard:

"To say the Capitalism does not care for the poor is completely true, in that Capitalism makes them richer and thus eliminates them almost entirely."

And that's the gist. The other arguments I make is an appeal to the generalized arguments I played earlier, and the 'crowding out' effect of the public sector.

Subsection c: Consumer Protection/regulation

A lot of this I take from <http://www.ideachannel.tv/>. <http://www.ideachannel.tv/> The general idea is that a good that defrauds its customers, is not only liable to some possible legal proceedings; but after which their product will most likely run into the ground. Furthermore, regulations (again, despite best intentions) give rise to that which is crony capitalism (as far as I know, this is the sole purpose of regulations in country's like Argentina (yay for acceptable bribing)), and it is via the legal and coercive state prescriptions of such regulations that allow collusion to not even occur, but to get away with the things that they do.

As a subset of this, I would like to talk about the FED, and the rationale behind 'stabilization' policies, but as I write this I am nearing my bed-time :p. Thus, expect the rest of this to hold a further account of brevity.

Furthermore, in the case of the protection of the consumer, another quote that I think puts it better than I could have (talking about campground amenities for consumers):

\*Division of the Consumer Sure, we give labor its due, but what about the consumer? While traveling and camping, we end up at a different campground every night. Since we were in areas new to us, we had no real action-knowledge of possible campgrounds, their cost, or condition. (1)Sure, there is the occasional KOA, but for the most part, campgrounds are independently debaced and locally operated. All that we had to guide us was our Garmin and campground guide. Yet, every campground we stayed at was just what we desired: clean and cheap. Even though each owner can be almost certain that we are never going to return to their campground, they were pleasant and helpful. So, why are these campgrounds such joys? Simple: the division of the consumer. You see, it is the locals and the regulars who demand quality at a reasonable price. In addition, it is these very same folks ? and their preferences ? that drive the market for local campgrounds. Through this process, my family benefits. Of course, the same is true for most hotels, stores, restaurants, etc., across the United States; the locals and regulars guide the entrepreneur and his investments. When these folks visit my slice of Ohio, I will repay them. They will benefit from my buying and abstaining from buying. Each day, my neighbors and I direct local entrepreneurs to produce desired products and services. In the end, everyone benefits from individuals acting in their own best interests, acting without outside ? or centralized ? influence.\* (<http://mises.org/story/2986>)  
;http://mises.org/story/2986

#### Subsection d: Roads/Externality regulation

If I were to accept utilitarian standards, I would bring up the typical standard of Coase. However, seeing as this is not the case, I bring up something else.

As for externalities, I remember a discussion I had a long while back, complaining about the pollution of gone-by river (<http://www.austrianforum.com/index.php?showtopic=1896&hl=polluted+river>), and one of the first posts back was noting, 'Who owns the river?' (again, despite best intentions). And so, how would the market go about solving this or roads for this matter. The generalized notion is that of internalizing costs.

If I have a plot of river that I see you polluted, this is aggression against my property, and thus action can be taken.

As far as transportation goes, I'll give the classic lighthouse example. Who paid for the lighthouse? The answer become somewhat self-motivated: businesses had an incentive to seeing boats get to their docks.

Or, in another case of internalization, let us take the case of roads. Maybe, like railroads, the costs for short travels are large; however, a very significant amount of costs are taken by those that travel a long way. Just like the campsite parable, let us use consumer division once again, we have freight-line companies and bussing companies that determine long-term routes, such that if major roadways become too costly, they suffer the expense of losing a large amount of this business.

This may not be the only way this will work either. To my knowledge, both in ancient times and even in certain areas now (<http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog/lewrw/archives/021678.html>), <http://www.lewrockwell.com/blog>

(another book notice: there is one written by the name of Francois Tremblay, although he is more prone to ad hominem-esque writing, the book is called *But Who Will Build The Roads?*)

#### Subsection e: Law and Order

Search around, many links on this ([http://mises.org/journals/jls/9\\_2/9\\_2\\_2.pdf](http://mises.org/journals/jls/9_2/9_2_2.pdf)), this is the one I'm most familiar with: <http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Iceland/Iceland.html>, Hoppe wrote a book called *The Myth of National Defense* that might be interesting in this area as well)

AnCaps even go so far as to suggest placing laws on the market. As another historical example (besides the Medieval Iceland), we can take a look at the Law Merchant, settling as unit for private arbitration; and as far as the Law Merchant is concerned, is able to enforce its decisions by essentially black-listing merchants that don't obey the laws.

You might think of what is termed as PDAs to be similar (also other schemes of insurance/etc.). I enter into a contract with a PDA in a similar fashion as to ADT. And, as I've heard hashed and rehashed in the forums across the interwebs. It is in the PDA's best interest to avoid bloodshed. To quote the Godfather, "I don't like violence, Tom. I'm a businessman. Blood is expensive." The PDA or PDA's would choose an intermediary arbitrator and go from there.

O.k., two more things I feel I should have, but these are mainly going to be rushed copy-pasta'ed responses from e-mails I've sent. I want to deal with the issue of exploitation I brought way early in the posting, and with monopolies. O.K. GO.

#### Subsection f: Exploitation

I argue that the base of this argument is whether or not capitalist perform a useful function. For if the worker agrees to the labor, and in return the capitalist, I can't see how this results in exploitation.

And the idea behind this is one argued through the Bastiat-Proudhon debates (here: <http://praxeology.net/FB-PJP-DOI.htm>), <http://praxeology.net/FB-PJP-DOI.htm>

However, even so, the main issue as per my generalist advance, is how an individual is protected from it more in a capitalistic society than a socialistic one.

(in the case of slavery of the OP, it is a crime, and thus punishable under law)

Monopolies, Collusion, Warlords:

Of all the subjects, this is the one I am still shaky on. For if I take that collusion is not a natural process, then so must I naturally accept that this must occur with PDA's as well. And if this is the case, why has not the governments around us broken into PDA's by now? Although I am not completely sure, I am currently of the opinion that throughout the course of history there has been this sloooooooooooooow progression of ever-gradual increases in political freedom. To quote Ron Paul, 'You know what's an old idea? (squeaky pubescent voice) */\*tyranny\** (/squeaky pubescent voice)!'

The point of monopolization is still a different one, but still goes to the typical arguments. As far as I know, humongous anti-trust didn't bring down Neenah's massive market share, but they just slowly collapsed from competition. But then what about the predator pricing and other schemes that a monopoly could do that would seemingly be enhanced by the fact that the business is now a roadway? The same predator pricing schemes, in fact, that similarly occurred with Standard Oil? Getting discounts from railroads due to their volume and fuel-practice-cooperation with those railroad companies (analogous to 'isolation of businesses from roadways'-cooperation with the roadside businesses). Just use common sense here, say a bunch of homeowners own a lake which they all border, and I own that lake. I could throw a bunch of shit in the lake, and charge people to use it; but, 1) people will be willing to drive far away from an overpriced lake full of shit, and 2) Not only have I willingly lowered my own property values, I've hurt the property values of those around me. Say the situation was more complex and there was a contract, well, then, contract-theory takes over.

Taking the argument that this falls prey to the generalization of anti-anti-trust ideas, I defer to this: <http://www.mises.org/story/2694#4a>. Or take the Friedmanite argument that private monopoly is better than a public one should a monopoly disobey the flowing laws of history and not die.

Actually, let me throw in another parable here that I very much love:

Three men were sitting in jail, and decided to tell each other what they were in for.

'I charged prices too higher than everyone else, and was charged with price gouging.'

'I charged prices lower than everyone else, and was charged with predatory pricing.'

'I charged prices the same as everyone else, and was charged with price fixing.'

## Book 2: Personal Philosophy

(Obviously not as well-developed. Since this is essentially 'personal philosophy' I feel as if I'm reinventing the wheel, so to speak. I don't have an access to a history of thought as I did with Political Philosophy. That being said, the rest of this e-mail will be comparatively short.)

### Section 1: Personal (work?) Ethic

I first must admit that this section has for me personally been COMPLETELY return and redone philosophically in my life. This is the latest incarnation.

I sum it up with the following core ideas, "The Romance of the Programmer" (RotP), "The Dichotomy of the Mind" (DotM), and "The Attainability of Desires" (AoD).

RotP is something I have discussed frequently before. The idea of a programmer programming until he collapses from exhaustion is something that I personally find admirable. But there are two things that I wish to clarify on this.

The first is that I should not become quick to judge that is a universal ideal. That is to say, I have only personal evidence, and thus this ideal should at most only apply to me. I believe in the past I came upon confusion whilst trying to satisfy this desire for RotP amongst the entirety of humanity in an effort to search for a common effort to ease my search at attaining RotP once more.

The second is that I believe RotP fills in the mold of what I would refer to as a higher desire. That of the lower desire being egotistical, emotional, or physiological.

By DotM, I mean the dichotomy that occurs between the higher desires. Even though I feel there is a large desire to try to accomplish some intellectual pursuit, I find myself doing what I usually do, wasting time on the /foru/ et. al.. Even while I am seemingly satisfying the lower desires, I am filled with a sense of guilt that I am not satisfying what I feel to be higher desires that I know from experience would fill me with a great sense of pride.

In order to try to correct the imbalance perpetuated by DotM, I bring up the idea of AoD. This is the idea I've had before, that through simple practice of imagination or whatever, it is possible at any moment to satisfy our desires without the need of a tangible product or interface. This is the main thing

of importance that I feel as if I discussed. That, it seems unlikely that the capacities for desires would either remain infinite or at the very least continue to grow at an exponential rate with their being satisfied.

So, I want to posit my theory for how to distinctly classify where desires lie as far as the DotM goes, and how to use this to achieve RotP (which I feel I've gotten the closest I've ever had to achieving). As a small recap of my philosophy which I've expounded on before, DotM is basically the current procrastination state, AoD is the means, and RotP is the ends.

So, here's the constructive process to classify desires as they lie in DotM:

Lower desires are not on an intellectual basis, whereas higher desires are. Thus, use your intellect to place a disincentive on all desires in order to see which desires are still fulfilled.

If I had a real problem with drinking, I'd place a disincentive on it, like not buying drinks to put in my refrigerator at home; this forces me to have to leave the house to go get a beer. Since intellectual and higher desires are those things that I should need minimal resources to attain anyways, these desires are readily attainable and thus more likely to be pursued in absence of other material things. Thus, in this way I'm able to classify those desires that fit in DotM.

However, in the same way, these scheme of classification also gives me a way to AoD.

It's a long stupid-theoretical way to say that I should place physical disincentives (since I'm not good at mental in/disin-centives) to stop what is essentially procrastination.

I mean, I found myself reading a fucking book on LISP to ease my stress. The fact that I'm now procrastinating by reading a LISP book is, I believe, a good problem to have.

The problem I see in this though, is being able to continue this. I explained this in the possible exponential discretion and fundamental problem possible with AoD. But, it makes sense that there should be an inherent mental limit to such things, so I believe that's possible to overcome.

## Section 2: Relationships

Honestly, this is something that I have never really put serious thought into until this e-mail. All of my relationships have been platonic, and I don't see anything wrong with that? I don't know, I guess you'll have something to say here.

## Section 3: Goals

As expressed in Section 1, I think it's more fulfilling to have some intellectual instead of more physical goals. And seeing how a goal in life is what I would characterize as the ultimate ends, I feel it's the kind of thing that keeps oneself from feeling their life has been wasted.

In this respect this is way, as I've probably stated before to you, I wish to write at least /one/ paper and get it published in a journal or something like this. If I do that then I feel as if my life will not have been for naught, and I won't feel as depressed about myself later in life.

Other than that, it'd be whatever hopefully somewhat intellectual goals I wish to accomplish. Go live on the Moon?