Whether the Enlightened person is subject to Karma is an important philosophical question. If so, what's the use of Enlightenment? If not, then the law of causation is not universal. (source)

Everytime it is brought up that the Enlightened person is free from Karma the roof falls in. From the Samsara side of things it just doesn't compute and most are willing to argue and argue on and on over it because it is so contradictory to everyday experience. Actually it's so simple it isn't worth the time for the most part...however, the following "explanation" from the works of Nagarjuna leads up to and through a potential resolving of the issue...presented here in TEN pages. Ten pages, 190K, for something simple.

MMK: Nagarjuna's Mula Madhyamaka Karika

Structure of the Karika

FOOTNOTE: Kenneth Inada, quoted in Kalupahana 1986, 3 One result of this is that often it cannot be determined precisely which works attributed to him are authentically his. Of the more than one hundred texts bearing Nagarjuna's name, only thirteen are almost certainly his.

FOOTNOTE: Lindtner, 9-11 There are two reasons that it is difficult to determine which of these many works are his: One, his influence was extensive and his name venerated. It was not uncommon in Indian tradition for an adherent of a school to attribute a work to the school's original founder, as a means of paying respect. This certainly happened within Madhyamika. Two, there was likely more than one author actually named Nagarjuna, and there may have even been many.

FOOTNOTE: A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), 375 Of these thirteen works that were authentically written by the Nagarjuna in question, one stands out as being his chief work: the Mulamadhyamakakarika, "Verses on the Fundamentals of the Middle [Way]."

FOOTNOTE: Nagao writes that the name of this work was likely given to it by the Sino-Japanese tradition. This tradition found one verse of the treatise, XXIV.18, to be paramount; this verse concluded with the term madhyama pratipat, "Middle Path," and the treatise was named after it. (Nagao 1991, 190) This work stands supreme primarily because of its inherent merit, both in terms of philosophical acuity and innovativeness. It is also one of the few works that are indubitably his. The treatise also deserves to be regarded as unique because it was historically pivotal; it inspired a number of subsequent commentaries by other acclaimed thinkers and galvanized Buddhism into developing a wholly new school of thought based on this work, the Madhyamika, the "Middle Way" school. Finally, the Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan traditions are all unanimous in considering the karika as Nagarjuna's magnum opus.

FOOTNOTE: Lindtner, 10 The karika consists of 450 sententious verses.

FOOTNOTE: (448 verses plus 2 in the dedication) These verses have been preserved in the form of twenty- seven short chapters, each dealing with one topic. (For sake of clarity, it was necessary to differentiate between Nagarjuna's chapters and the chapters of this thesis. To solve this, Nagarjuna's chapters will henceforth be referred to as "sections," and the word "chapter" shall be taken to refer to chapters of this thesis.) The entire karika, minus commentary, would only run to thirty or forty pages. The chapter (section) structure in which the text is preserved is possibly a later formalization, most likely by Candrakirti. This is evidenced by the fact that the section titles provided by Candrakirti are often misleading as to the actual contents of the section, and also because copies of the karika preserved in Chinese and Tibetan occasionally contain very different section headings.

FOOTNOTE: Sprung, xv The verses are written in a precise metered form which was the staple of classical Sanskrit composition.

FOOTNOTE: Coulson, 250 Each verse consists of two lines of exactly sixteen syllables each which, while not rhyming, are very poetic and rhythmic when read aloud or chanted. Part of the reason for this writing style was to facilitate memorization. Books were often preserved in writing by this period in time, but the chief means of transmission was still oral. However, this is not the only import of the karika's poetic structure. Nagarjuna was not merely a reflective philosopher. He was a monk, and the purpose of monasticism was to facilitate meditation and traveling the path to enlightenment. This work, like his hymns, was surely intended to be an aid in meditation. One could memorize the karika and meditate on it by contemplating one verse at a time. The verses were not intended to be prosaic explanations of a philosophical position, but rather were meant to illuminate, in a terse and often aphoristic manner, certain precise aspects of the Buddha's teachings about the nature of reality and the proper path. Although the meaning of the verses is usually clear, there are many that defy interpretation. Like the famous Zen koans, some verses seemingly make no attempt to explain a philosophical theory but instead aim to provoke an immediate transcendence of conceptual limitations.

Methodology of this Examination of the Karika

FOOTNOTE: cf. Kalupahana 1986, 27-31 This approach, too, can be misleading and has no definitive validity; ultimately it may reveal little more than the interpretive bias of the interpreter. The most fruitful approach in the present context will be first to present in summary form the scope and thought of the karika itself and only afterwards to discuss its broader philosophical meaning and possible intent.

There are two admitted drawbacks of this approach, i.e. examining the karika and the karika alone. One, it will not be possible to present "the thought of Nagarjuna" as a whole. Other of his works show different sides to his thought and character and provide fruit for differing interpretations of his place in the broad spectrum of Buddhist thought. For example, the karika makes almost no mention of any of the themes which came to be emblematic of the "Greater School" of Mahayana,

FOOTNOTE: The only exception is one mention of the Bodhisattva-career in XXIV.32. However, even this mention does not demonstrate Nagarjuna to be an advocate of Mahayana, so it could be objected that an examination of the karika only would attribute too much "Older School"-ness to him. A second drawback is that presentations of his concepts could often be made clearer by recourse to other of his or his follower's works. It will be responded that these two drawbacks are not debilitating, and may not even be handicaps. An exposition of solely the karika can be defended because this work is truly the cornerstone of the entire subsequent Madhyamika school in all of its variety. The karika is the vitalizing influence of Madhyamika and all the main themes of the school are to be found in it. As mentioned above, the Buddhist tradition is unanimous in considering it to be the keystone of Madhyamika and perhaps even the single most influential work in all of Buddhism after the original sutras.

What would perhaps be most desirable would be to skip a section-by-section analysis of the karika and jump straight to a discussion of its broader themes and significances. An attempt to do this was the initial intent of this thesis. What quickly became apparent, though, was how great the amount of background knowledge necessary to make sense of this work and how little of this knowledge could be presupposed on the part of the reader. Take, for example, this wonderfully cryptic verse: "The arising of arising is exclusively the arising of primary arising. Again, the primary arising produces the arising of arising."

FOOTNOTE: karika VII.4. (All quotations from the karika, unless otherwise noted, are from the translation of David J. Kalupahana in Kalupahana, 1986.) Lest the reader be kept in suspense, this verse is explained in context below, page 57. The obscurity of such a statement is not the fault of the translation; the above is perhaps the clearest translation of this verse available. It is not to be assumed that the meaning of a verse like this automatically becomes pellucid if one has a background in Buddhist philosophy, but it does illustrate the difficulties one faces in attempting to comprehend and communicate Nagarjuna's thought. It was thus deemed necessary to summarize the basic themes of each of the twenty-seven sections, one by one, and briefly introduce the reader to the concepts contained therein. Only after this has been done can broader observations be made and the philosophical significances extracted. Certain translations of Madhyamika thought have presented only selections from the original works, sometimes calling them the essential selections.

FOOTNOTE: e.g. Sprung 1979 The implication of this pointed out by David Kalupahana, translator of and commentator on the Mulamadhyamakakarika, is that the remaining sections are inessential.

FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1986, 27 This thesis will not adopt that approach. While the following exposition of the karika may appear lengthy, the reader must be assured that prolixity has been scrupulously avoided and only the few most essential themes of each section have been mentioned.

Nagarjuna was both a Buddhist monk and an apologist for Buddhism. It is the Buddha's philosophy, and this philosophy only, that engaged his thought and veneration, as evidenced by frequent references to "the Buddha(s)" and "the fully enlightened one."

One thought informs the whole karika: the Buddha taught that there is no substantial essence underlying and supporting the manifest world.

FOOTNOTE: The reader's attention is called to the etymology of the word "substantial:" the Latin roots are sub = "under" + stare = "to stand." A "substance" is that which stands under something and provides the ground of being for it. The abiding soul and/or an absolute God posited by some schools of thought is, by definition, not dependent upon any element of the world for its existence, and the Buddha's philosophy holds that anything that is not dependent cannot be real. It would either transcend or precede existence, and thus could not exist. Notwithstanding, the mass of humanity perceives and believes in the real existence of the world, all the elements contained therein, and the characteristics of and relations between these elements. Nagarjuna devotes the majority of his sections to an analysis of these aspects of the putative world, such as cause-and-effect, the senses, action, and time. Following this, he examines the Buddha's teachings themselves, focusing on the nature of the enlightened being, the Noble Path, enlightenment itself, and dependent arising.

A Presentation of the Treatise

SECTION ONE

Causation, and some Initial Problems

Nagarjuna devotes his first section, "Examination of Conditions (pratyayas)," to the subject of causation. A discussion of causation had to precede his examination of the elements of reality (dharmas), for it is a thing's origin that determines its ontological status. Discussion of causal theories held a paramount place in Indian philosophy, because it was felt that a system's theory of causality reveals the method of the entire system.

FOOTNOTE: Murti 1960, 166 The Buddha's explanation of the causal process is dependent arising: "if this arises, that arises. If this ceases, that ceases."
It is unlike any of the non-Buddhist theories of causation which fall in one of four categories:

• self- causation,
• other-causation,
• a combination of the two,
• or no causation.

• The first, self- causation, is exemplified by the Vedic tradition of asserting the reality of the immutable Universal Soul, atman. Briefly, this declares all effects to be inherent in their cause, which cause is in every case some form of the eternal atman.

FOOTNOTE: cf. David J. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1975), 6-15 A problem with self- causation is that the effect must be inherent in the cause. If so, then nothing new has occurred or come to be.

• Other- or external- causation declares all change to be produced by some form of a deus ex machina, such as God, fate, or a deterministic self- nature.

FOOTNOTE: ibid., 5 A problem with other-causation is that if cause and effect are different then the relation is lost, and, for example, fire could be produced from water.

• A third type of causal theory advocated by some schools is basically a combination of the self- and other-causation. The problem with this is that both of the above two problems are compounded.

• The final option is that neither self- nor other-causation operates, which position is in effect an indeterminism that denies all causation. If anything were to emerge ever, anywhere, then everything could emerge at all times, everywhere.

FOOTNOTE: discussed below, pages 115-118 he opens the karika with, in the first verse, what would appear to be an unqualified rejection of all the possible theories of causation.

"No existents whatsoever are evident anywhere that are arisen from themselves, from another, from both, or from a non-cause," he declares.

"There are only four conditions (pratyayas), namely,

• primary condition, (i.e. hetu - root-cause in the abhidhamma, motive, wholesome, unwholesome or neutral)
• objectively supporting condition, (i.e. objects from the perceptions)
• immediately contiguous condition, (i.e. immediate context)
• and dominant condition." (i.e. )

FOOTNOTE: karika, I.2 The word he uses here for "condition," pratyaya, was often found in the early Buddhist texts as a synonym of "cause."

FOOTNOTE: Kalupahana 1975, 54 A condition, in this context, is a foundation on the basis of which a thing can come to be: "[There] are conditions (pratyayas), because, depending on them, [things] arise," defines Nagarjuna.

FOOTNOTE: karika I.7 A condition (pratyaya) seems to be a cause which is necessary but not sufficient. It is that which cooperates in causing a thing to arise, but is not the sole cause of its arising. The difficulty of interpreting Nagarjuna's statements lies in the fact that, even if a condition is only a part of the cause, it is still a cause. He has thus, in the first two verses, denied the tenability of the four non-Buddhist theories of causation, only to follow it with an assertion that conditioned causal relations do exist.

FOOTNOTE: A comprehensive discussion of the four conditions (pratyayas) Nagarjuna mentions in verse two is beyond the scope of this examination.

Of the hundreds of commentaries on and studies of Nagarjuna's philosophy since his death, the main hermeneutical approaches boil down to only a very few, and these few come into play even at this early point in the karika. A brief summary of the various hermeneutical approaches is necessary here, at the outset, partly because they offer differing ways to reconcile verse one (denial of causality) and verse two (affirmation of causality), but also because they will be seen to surface again and again in various guises throughout this presentation of the karika.

• 1) One way to interpret the disparity between the two verses is that Nagarjuna is being selective about what type of causation he admits. A "cause" in the sense of an active and determinate force that effects change is rejected. What is admitted is only that, if certain conditions (pratyayas) are present, a thing can arise dependent on them.
• 2) A second possible interpretation is that Nagarjuna in verse one is only denying that a causally-arisen existent is evident; the causal process could perhaps be claimed to be either hidden or transcendent, and thus not accessible to human perception.
• 3) A third interpretation also rests on the word "evident:" Nagarjuna could be claiming that, while causal relations are perceived by an unenlightened person, they are seen as illusory and unreal by the one who has realized nirvana.
• 4) Fourth, the crux of the argument could be the concept of real existence. Verse one declares that no existents are evident that have come to be through the workings of causation. Perhaps things do arise from causes, but these things do not really exist. Whereas the previous interpretation holds that the causal processes are illusory, this position would state that it is the ontic status of the elements themselves that is under attack.
• 5) A final exegesis is that mentioned earlier: Nagarjuna can perhaps be seen as rejecting causation in all its forms and manifestations.

FOOTNOTE:

• Kalupahana solves this apparent contradiction between the first two verses simply by stating that Nagarjuna was denying causation but was neither denying nor confirming conditionality. This interpretation is questionable and, even if it is valid, the problem is not wholly resolved.

It may seem hasty to present so many interpretations so soon. However, as mentioned, an immediate discussion of them is warranted, for, while here the various positions relate only to Nagarjuna's treatment of causation, they can and have been applied to almost all of the topics he examines. The five interpretations as they relate to this context and their broader implications can be summarized as follows:

• 1) Nagarjuna accepts causation, but selectively. He isolates exactly which theory of causation he supports, clarifies this theory, and rejects the rest.
• 2) Nagarjuna rejects the human ability to understand the process, in this case the workings of cause-and-effect. The mysterious mechanics of the universe are either too transcendent or too esoteric for human investigation to access.
• 3) The whole process as well as its products are illusory. The individual mired in the sphere of relativities may believe that the world has certain qualities, but these specious beliefs evaporate when one attains enlightenment and sees the true nature of things.
• 4) The issue arises due to a mistaken understanding of existence. There are conditions (pratyayas) dependent upon which things come to be, and one can speak of cause and effect relative to these things, but they do not enjoy the status of having substantial existence. Having no measure of independence, they cannot be said to be real.
• 5) Nagarjuna is rejecting everything for the sake of nonsense. He denies causation only to follow it with an assertion of causation. The point of this is to force his readers to abandon concepts altogether and achieve an unmediated awareness of the absolute, and nonconceptual, nature of the world.

These five opinions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It will be seen that most or all are accurate in certain situations and that there may not be any one single exegesis that will be accurate in all situations.

• (Eternalist) The self-nature of the effect is not evident in the conditions (pratyayas), he says in verse three, so the relation between cause and effect is not one of identity. The effect is not inherent and preexisting in the cause. If it were, then the self-nature of the effect would have to exist before the effect itself came into manifestation. Yet this implies eternalism and leads to a philosophical impasse like that the atman school faced when forced to explain how change could occur if self- nature is eternal and immutable.
• (Anarchy) Neither, however, is the effect a new creation that is wholly different from the cause. If the effect were not preexistent in the condition, then effects would not depend on causes. This would allow for utter randomness---anything could arise at any time.

FOOTNOTE: karika I.12

• It is thus not appropriate to see the effect as arising either from conditions (pratyayas), which implies eternalism,
• or from non-conditions (pratyayas), which implies anarchy.

The two options are that an effect either existed or did not exist at the time it was brought into being, but neither position withstands scrutiny. The reason is that neither of the two elements of the equation, the "effect" and its "cause," can exist independently. They come into being only in dialectical relation to each other, and neither can be isolated and examined separate from its dialectical component.
• If the effect is said already to exist at the time of its rising, then what is the use of saying it had a cause? If it already existed, then the concept of a cause becomes superfluous.
• However, neither can one say that the effect did not yet exist at the time of its arising. If so, then what would be the function of a cause? "Of what use is a [cause] of the existing [effect]?" asks Nagarjuna. FOOTNOTE: karika I.6. (pratyaya translated by me as "cause." cf. Monier-Williams 673)
• Neither can one attempt to resolve the dilemma by positing some agency that is either a combination of existence and nonexistence or is a rejection of both.
• There is thus no way to attribute any form of existence to an effect and still speak of its cause. "Since a thing that is existent or non-existent or both existent and non-existent is not produced, how pertinent in that context would a producing cause be?" Nagarjuna summarizes.

FOOTNOTE: It may seem that an inherent contradiction in Nagarjuna's philosophy is exposed by his language: in the very act of denying the reality of either existence or non-existence the verb "to be" is used. For example, verse XXV.10 reads "nirvana is neither existence nor non- existence" (italics mine). This problem stems from translation only. Unlike English, Sanskrit does not rely on the verb "to be" to express relations. In this example, the original is "na bhavo nabhavo nirvanam," which literally reads "Neither existence nor non- existence nirvana." (Curiously, though Sprung pointed out this problem, he neglected to answer it. Cf. Sprung 12)

(1)NOTE: This series of pages has been modified and edited by the Wanderling to facilitate a smoother, easier reading for a somewhat complicated subject matter. The original unmodified 190K format can be reached by clicking HERE

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