

A REFUTATION OF ROBERT D. KAPLAN’S THESIS, AS PROPOSED IN THE
1994 ARTICLE “THE COMING ANARCHY,” USING THE ARGUMENT THAT
HIS EXTRAPOLATIONS OF THE EVENTS IN WEST AFRICA BEING AN
INDICATOR OF THE FUTURE STATE OF THE WORLD ARE ERRONEOUS

A Thesis

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ABSTRACT

In 1994, Robert D. Kaplan published an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* entitled “The Coming Anarchy.” Using exemplar nations from West Africa to support his prophecy, Kaplan’s thesis in this article is, in part, that by 2050 environmental changes, such as global warming induced flooding, salinization, desertification, erosion and topsoil loss, as well as man-made deforestation and pollution will cause scarcities of natural resources such as arable land and potable water. This resource scarcity, coupled with destabilizing urban poverty and overpopulation, will exacerbate ethnic conflicts and cause mass migration of individuals, which in turn will further increase conflict, crime, and the proliferation of disease. All of these reactions to overpopulation and environmentally induced conflict, crime, and migration will, according to Kaplan, ultimately lead to weakened central governments, the empowerment of private armies and security firms, the obsolescence of current political borders, and the creation of a global anarchy where crime and war are virtually indistinguishable.

However, because Kaplan does not provide adequate sources for the information communicated in his article, nor adequately defends his conclusions, many readers of “The Coming Anarchy” may be misled into a reaction by the article because it may contain factual errors. The research that is presented here is intended to discredit the thesis of “The Coming Anarchy” by refuting Kaplan’s global apocalyptic message and, so not to dismiss the real hardships in West Africa, to simultaneously use Kaplan’s work as a vehicle to examine the very real anarchy that does indeed threaten the region of West Africa.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I.A) Statement of the Problem

In 1994, Robert D. Kaplan published an article in the *Atlantic Monthly* entitled “The Coming Anarchy.” Because of the popularity of its resource-scarcity subject matter, as well as Kaplan’s own reputation as a credible journalist, whose work has also been published in such respected publications as *National Interest* and the *Wall Street Journal*, this article became both popular and influential among interest groups and academic institutions. Using exemplar nations from West Africa to support his prophecy, Kaplan’s message, in part, is that by 2050 environmental changes, such as global warming induced flooding, salinization, desertification, erosion and topsoil loss, as well as man-made deforestation and pollution will cause scarcities of natural resources such as arable land and potable water. This resource scarcity, coupled with destabilizing urban poverty and overpopulation, will exacerbate ethnic conflicts and cause mass migration of individuals, which in turn will further increase conflict, crime, and the proliferation of disease. All of these reactions to overpopulation and environmentally induced conflict, crime, and migration will, according to Kaplan, ultimately lead to weakened central governments, the empowerment of private armies and security firms, the obsolescence of current political borders, and the creation of a global anarchy where crime and war are virtually indistinguishable.

The thesis of “The Coming Anarchy” has received, and continues to receive,¹ much exposure. Kaplan’s article is presented in numerous academic institutions for deliberation, including the University of California Berkeley, Brown University, Tufts University, Johns Hopkins University, Columbia University, Georgetown University, American University, Princeton University, George Mason University, as well as Harvard University, the American Graduate School of International Relations and Diplomacy, and others.² As stated, it was originally published in a reputable magazine, *The Atlantic Monthly*, has been debated in numerous other publications, such as *The Wilson Quarterly*³ and *Foreign Policy*,⁴ and others, and was eventually republished, almost completely unchanged, as the headline of a successful book of the same title in 2001.

“The Coming Anarchy” or the “anarchy thesis” also had an impact on influential political figures including Vice President and 2000 Presidential candidate Al Gore⁵ who has openly and repeatedly shared his concern’s over population growth and climate change⁶ and is said to have “asked the Central Intelligence Agency to oversee a systematic investigation of the causes of ‘state failure’ it [“The Coming Anarchy”] described,”⁷ and former deputy national security adviser Samuel R. Berger, who was said to have “scheduled a hurried meeting to address the issues Kaplan had raised.”⁸ Similarly, Kaplan’s impact in the form of the subjects within “The Coming Anarchy” can also be found, almost verbatim, within the speeches of many other high-level US government officials such as:

Secretary of State Madeline Albright who, in her 1998 speech at the Earth Day summit stated:

...the security of our nation will be affected by whether we are able to prevent conflicts arising over scarce resources...A major contributor to the stress we place on global environment is the growth in the world's population...Unless we act, sea levels will continue to rise throughout the next century...[there will also be] significant and possibly sudden changes in agricultural production...larger migrations of people...more widespread malaria, cholera and other infectious diseases.⁹

Director for Central Intelligence, John M. Deutch who, in his 1996 speech to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, stated:

Environmental degradation, encroaching deserts, erosion, and over farming, destroy vast tracks of land. This forces people from their homes and creates tension between ethnic and political groups as competition for scarce resources increases...As the world population expands and resources such as clean water and arable land become more scarce, it will become increasingly likely that activities of one country will have an environmental impact that goes beyond its borders. US policymakers will need warning on issues that are likely to affect US interests and regional stability.¹⁰

Even within a February 1995 document issued by the White House entitled “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” there is a section on “The Environment and Sustainable Development” which reads:

Increasing competition for the dwindling reserves of uncontaminated air, arable land, fisheries and other food sources, and water, once considered ‘free’ goods, is already a very real risk to regional stability around the world. The range of environmental risks serious enough to jeopardize international stability extends to massive population flight from man-made or natural catastrophes...to large-scale ecosystem damage caused by industrial pollution, deforestation loss of biodiversity, ozone depletion, desertification, ocean pollution and ultimately climate change...one cannot help but conclude that population growth and environmental pressures will feed into social unrest and make the world substantially more vulnerable to serious international frictions.¹¹

Lastly, even Kaplan himself, as former consultant to the U.S. Army's Special Forces Regiment,¹² has had the opportunity to directly address audiences of influential military officials and it was said that, echoing Kaplan's view, “Timothy Wirth, undersecretary of state for global affairs, gave a speech...in which he cited

environmental degradation, poverty, disease and conflict-driven migration as ‘the primary threats to human security.’ Similarly...Brian Atwood, administrator for the Agency for International Development, argued that ‘disintegrating societies and failed states . . . have emerged as the greatest menace to global stability’ and should be seen as a ‘strategic threat.’”¹³

This mass exposure of Kaplan’s anarchy thesis has created two threats: The first is the possible fear that “The Coming Anarchy” could instill in educators, students, voters, and policy makers creating unjustified intervention or isolation reactions or to, as director of the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Project Geoffrey D. Dabelko put it, “seal off the borders, and if that doesn’t work send in the troops.”¹⁴ The second threat, which is a substantially higher one to human lives, is that Kaplan’s exaggerated thesis is read as absolute fiction, thus lessening the realities of the plight of individuals living in West Africa and creating unconscious apathy in those same educators, students, voters and policy makers.

Although Kaplan does not overtly state that intervention into West Africa and other areas used as “evidence” in “The Coming Anarchy” is necessary to prevent such an anarchic “falling dominos” effect, his work could be used to support arguments for a country’s intervention, possibly driven by ulterior motives, into the countries of West Africa and elsewhere. For example, much the same way that human rights or weapons of mass destruction has been accused of being used as a front for recent interventions, with a environmentalist platform governments could use arguments like Kaplan’s to gain control of oil deposits in the Gulf of Guinea or in other sub-Saharan areas; areas where the United States is forecast to be importing about 25 percent of its oil by 2015,¹⁵ where “overall oil production is expected to rise from 3.8 million

barrels a day in 2001 to 6.8 million by the year 2008” and where, “about \$52 billion is going to be invested in African deepwater drilling by the year 2010.”¹⁶

Conversely, although Kaplan does not overtly state that isolation of the region of West Africa, or of the United States *from* the region, is necessary, his work could also be used to support arguments for developed countries to “wash their hands” of this region’s countries like, for example, as happened between the United States and Liberia during Liberia’s second civil war.¹⁷ This isolation effect is identified well in a review of “The Coming Anarchy” by Philip Bennett of the Boston Globe: “Although Kaplan did not intend his thesis to cause Americans to turn away from Africa -- ‘we ignore this dying region at our own risk,’ he wrote -- that is what happened. The reaction of many to his doomsday scenario was to shrink from the source of the plague.”¹⁸ Ultimately, the concern is that based on erroneous information, Kaplan’s thesis in “The Coming Anarchy” could create a “fight or flight” reaction among its readers and could therefore influence them towards a misinformed opinion of intervention or isolation.

As previously stated, an even worse reaction to “The Coming Anarchy” than the two spectrum extremes of intervention or isolation, could be if the reader finds Kaplan’s dramatic journalistic description of the region too unbelievable, prompting them to not take the article seriously and to disregard the topic completely. As evidence of this, in review of “The Coming Anarchy” many of Kaplan’s critics argued that his extrapolation of the events in West Africa onto a global scale is simply too broad and therefore should be dismissed as fictitious; even then President “Bill Clinton found Kaplan’s article ‘stunning;’ remarking that it ‘makes you really imagine a future that’s like one of those Mel Gibson ‘Road Warrior’ movies.’”¹⁹ The problem with this quick dismissal of Kaplan’s article is that it sends the message that

as long as anarchy does not threaten developed countries, then those residing in the developed West should pay no mind to such preposterous threats to their way of life. This is a problem because it ignores the fact that beneath Kaplan's "story" of global anarchy there is a very real anarchy threatening, if not already occurring in, those areas which Kaplan used as the starting point for global chaos, namely, West Africa.

Despite that many have presented casual objections to "The Coming Anarchy" and despite that even Kaplan himself, in his preface to his book *The Coming Anarchy*, devoted a short two paragraph disclaimer, which included an admission that "Africa is not a bellwether for politics for the rest of the world,"²⁰ the fact remains that casual refutations and a two paragraph disclaimer did not dissuade Kaplan from reprinting the unchanged anarchy thesis in 2001, has done nothing to dissuade academic institutions from presenting the work to their students, nor have they done anything to limit the risk of the abovementioned threats spawned by the article.

Apart from the violations of sovereignty which could arise from interventions, and the humanitarian obligations ignored from isolation or disregarding the issue, the main threat of this article is that because Kaplan does not provide adequate sources for the information, nor adequately defend his conclusions, many may be misled into a reaction by "The Coming Anarchy" because it may contain factual errors. The research that will be presented here is intended to discredit the thesis of "The Coming Anarchy" by refuting Kaplan's global apocalyptic message, but so not to commit the same "dismissal" error of some of Kaplan's previous critics, to simultaneously use Kaplan's work as a vehicle to examine the very real anarchy that does indeed threaten the region of West Africa.

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²⁰ Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*. New York: Random House, 2000. p xiii

I.B) Explanation of Methodology

There are multiple flaws in Kaplan's global anarchy thesis, the three most salient are: 1) It is erroneous to extrapolate the events in West Africa onto the entire world; 2) quantitative support for his conclusions is inadequate and therefore his projections may be incorrect; and 3) he omits contextual and causal aspects regarding his "evidence" and thesis.

To address each of these flaws I will utilize a three-pronged methodological approach to refute Kaplan's thesis.

- Historical Comparison: Global Status of Non-Nation State Conflicts
- Quantitative Corrections: Test the Quantifiable Validity of Kaplan's Thesis
- Point-by-Point Methodological Approach to Accuracy and Omissions

1) Historical Comparisons: Non-Nation State Conflicts

Regardless of their causes, in "The Coming Anarchy" Kaplan is ultimately referring to anarchy resulting from conflicts between groups, not nations, spreading globally. Therefore, adopting a historical-descriptive approach, this section examines the history and current status of non-nation state¹ conflict in order to present evidence contrary to Kaplan's prediction of increasing global conflict.

Historically intrastate conflicts can have four possible outcomes, of which anarchy is not one, they are:

- Quelled domestically before spilling over
- Spilled over then quelled
- Quelled by the pooled cooperation of international coalitions
- Ongoing

2) Quantitative Corrections: Data:

Kaplan makes numerous claims about the state of West Africa and the world by 2050 but neglects to cite sources or defend the projected figures he provides in his article. For this reason, I will introduce data from reputable sources, such as the United Nations Population Division Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and elsewhere, and compare it with the data proposed in Kaplan's work. The data, which will be presented in this thesis, are for West Africa in the following countries and categories: Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria; for environmental conditions, population figures, and disease statistics.

3) Point-by-Point Approach to Accuracy and Omissions

Kaplan's work has been broken down into sentences (affixed to document) where specific claims are being presented as evidence to support his anarchy thesis. Some of these claims are with regard to conditions within countries or categories that would not be explored through the above listed methods; those that are relevant would be discussed here. For example, Kaplan's statement, "...given that in 2025 India's population could be close to 1.5 billion..." would not be addressed either through the historical comparison nor the West African data. Therefore, this section would address this point.

Additionally, this section will also address possible contextual and causal omissions made by Kaplan with regard to certain specific categories that he presents as evidence in "The Coming Anarchy." For example, Kaplan states that, among other things, overpopulation in Freetown, Sierra Leone, is going to result in an increase in conflict. A contextual omission would be if the rate of urban population growth for Sierra Leone is decreasing, and a causal omission would be that other cities in the

world are overpopulated (New York, Paris, Hong Kong, etc) but do not have the conflict Kaplan is envisaging, therefore population growth and overpopulation cannot be implied to be a cause of conflict as Kaplan does. This point-by-point omission section would also address other issues like disease and environmental issues; for example, when Kaplan cites soil erosion as an environmental factor related to scarcity, he omits the contextual and causal questions of whether it is the environment which is causing soil erosion or corruption which is allowing illegal logging in the region to continue.

I.B.i) I.B. Footnotes

¹ Although in addition to intrastate conflicts, international terrorism is also an example of non-nation state groups being party to a conflict it is not covered in this refutation because Kaplan pays only minimal attention to it; in fact he only devotes one sentence to the issue: “Loose and shadowy organisms such as Islamic terrorist organizations suggest why borders will mean increasingly little and sedimentary layers of tribalistic identity and control will mean more.” As he does not present international terrorism as substantial evidence to support his thesis, it is not necessary to discuss it in this refutation.

I.C) Expected Findings

The findings of each of the components of the three-pronged methodological approach used here, historical, quantifiable, and point-by-point accuracy/omission, are expected to aid this refutation by identifying the weaknesses in the evidence of Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" thesis.

The purpose of conducting the historical approach method, and the expected findings to come of it, is to draw upon the fact that past armed and non-nation state conflicts have not led to "anarchy," as Kaplan describes it, therefore the armed and non-nation state conflicts that Kaplan draws upon as evidence in his thesis will not either. If proven, this proposition will contribute to the refutation of Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" because it will directly counter his thesis that the conflicts in West Africa will lead to global "anarchy."

The expected findings of the quantifiable methodological approach are that the quantifiable data Kaplan presents as evidence for the coming anarchy is exaggerated or incorrect. If his data is proven as such, this proposition will contribute to the refutation of Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" because it will weaken the trajectory evidence of Kaplan's thesis.

The expected findings of the point-by-point omission research proposed in this refutation are twofold. First, the findings of the point-by-point segment would test the validity of statements Kaplan made in his thesis about areas and issues not covered elsewhere in the thesis, and second, the omission segment would identify contextual and causal phenomena omitted in Kaplan's thesis which could alter the "anarchy" conclusions he arrived at. For example, Kaplan emphasizes a link between overpopulation and conflict but omits the fact that other regions of the world are also over populated but do not experience such conflict as Kaplan describes. Therefore,

figures demonstrating population growth are not evidence to a future increase in conflict as he implies. If proven, this proposition could demonstrate weakness between the evidence Kaplan provides and the conclusions he draws.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

II.A) Similar Prophetic Writings

Prophets like Kaplan are nothing new. In the immediate post Cold War era, there was a flood of scholars, diplomats, and journalists alike, all quick to put forth their versions, some optimistic, others less so, of the next decade and beyond. Similarly, well before the end of the Cold War, in some cases even well before the Cold War itself, there have been academics and others who, whether citing the environment, overpopulation, disease, or resources conflicts as the cause, have been putting forth their prophecies of the doom to befall humanity.

II.A.i) Prophecies of the Immediate Post Cold War Era

In the same year as the fall of the Berlin Wall, Francis Fukuyama, with his *National Interest* article “The End of History,”¹ was one of the first to gain popularity based on his prediction of what the world would be like after the fall of the Soviet Union. In Fukuyama’s optimistic article, (optimistic for liberal-economic-based Western governments), he put forth his idea that with the last viable opponent to the free market system of the West gone, democratic and economic liberalist principles would lead humanity in the final stage of its ideological and governmental experimentation and of the global economy’s evolutionary growth:

What we are witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or a passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.²

Aside from the starkly contrasting global trajectories between Fukuyama's and Kaplan's prophecies, another area where Fukuyama's prophecy breaks from Kaplan's is that Kaplan prophesizes about tangible changes on the global scene (increased intrastate conflict, dramatic environment changes, overpopulation, proliferation of disease etc.) Fukuyama believed that "the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world."³ Meaning that, the optimistic/peaceful side of the "End of History" prophecy is not yet upon us, with no guarantee to ever be.

Referencing the same free markets hailed by Fukuyama, another prophet of the early 1990's, Benjamin Barber, had a more pessimistic view of things to come. In Barber's 1992 attempt at prophecy, the *Atlantic Monthly* article "Jihad vs. McWorld,"⁴ Barber envisioned that the West's "commercially homogenous global network" would play a more aggressive role on the international scene, the force of which would be matched only by the retribalization of sectarian isolationists refusing to be part of it. In Barber's bifurcated future not only is "the planet...falling precipitately apart *AND* coming reluctantly together at the very same moment," but also, "the old interwar national state based on territory and political sovereignty looks to be a mere transitional development." This last attribute of Barber's prophecy is much more characteristic of Kaplan's own predictions of ineffectual national borders and a world crime and war are indistinguishable.

Like Barber's sovereignty prediction, another characteristic of Kaplan's future, that of ethnic strife, can be found in yet another post-Cold War prophet's work:

Samuel Huntington's 1993 article, "The Clash of Civilizations."⁵ Within "The Clash of Civilizations" doomsday prophecy, Huntington's hypothesis not only conflicts with Kaplan's prediction of a future based on conflict over scarce resources, but also with Fukuyama's economic, and Barber's ideological prophecies.

...the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will be the battle lines of the future...⁶

In addition to Huntington's thesis diverging from Kaplan's regarding the cause of conflict, in the "The Clash of Civilizations" Huntington also differs from Kaplan in another way. By stating "[t]his article does not argue that civilization identities will replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear..." Huntington presents a much different view than Kaplan regarding the future.

With the exception of Fukuyama's 1989 "yet incomplete in the real or material world" economic/democratic prophesy, the characteristics of the other prophets of the post Cold War predictions, Barber's 1992 sectarian semi-autonomous communities, and Huntington's 1993 cultural/ethnic strife, can be found in Kaplan's, seemingly tardy, 1994 "The Coming Anarchy." Where Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" prophecy makes itself unique from its diachronic compatriots though, is that Kaplan has included other factors into his prediction that Barber and Huntington left out, such as the environment, overpopulation, disease, and scarce resources.

But by including these "other factors" is Kaplan's perspective truly unique? Or is he simply merging multiple doomsday predictions into a single prophecy? To explore this query, here will be presented the works which existed prior to Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" that have previously addressed these "other factors."

II.A.ii) Environmental Doomsday Prophecies

Although the thought of the environment being a means of global catastrophe has existed as far back as Genesis,⁷ and concerns over the urbanization and industrialization of the planet is a familiar topic in such classic American literature as *Walden*,⁸ here, the environmental doomsday works that will serve as the scream of the locomotive which broke Thoreau's reverie begin in 1864's with George Perkins Marsh's works, *Man and Nature*,⁹ and its 1874 republished version, *The Earth as Modified by Human Action: Man and Nature*.¹⁰ When reading Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" Marsh's works ring familiar with his citation of the negative effects of deforestation, canal building, water pollution, and, especially, desertification in Africa, but where Kaplan's work was published in 1994, Marsh's writing was first published 130 years earlier and has since been labeled as the "first modern discussion of our ecological problems"¹¹ or as the "first comprehensive study of human impacts on the environment."¹²

Having been inspired to produce *Man and Nature* by his observations of the environmental damage Vermont farmers caused by the clearing of their lands, Marsh's work is similar to another work that may have influenced Kaplan's perspective on resource scarcity and an environmental doomsday at our own hand: Garret Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons."¹³ Where Hardin presented commons as a micro-sample intended to be extrapolated onto the planet as a whole, Kaplan presents the region of West Africa as his "Tragedy of the Commons" to also be extrapolated onto the entire planet. Hardin's example of self-interested herders who place their personal benefit over that of the immediate community is similar to

Kaplan's migrating West Africans who threaten the integrity of political borders, also in pursuit of their personal benefit – survival.

Like the Kaplan-Hardin connection, a similar link can also be drawn from “The Coming Anarchy” to another premier environmental doomsday work, Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*.¹⁴ In the first chapter of *Silent Spring*, entitled “A Fable for Tomorrow,” Carson describes the characteristics of a once beautiful small town that has met its end at the hand of, what Carson says the townsfolk had done to themselves, the overuse of harsh pesticides. Similarly, in “The Coming Anarchy” Kaplan describes the characteristics of a once beautiful region - “Flame trees, coconut palms, and a ball-point-blue Atlantic composed the background. None of it seemed beautiful, though.”¹⁵ - that has also met its end. Instead of pesticides though, what Kaplan loosely labels as “anarchy” is the cause of West Africa's end. Each author had selected extreme examples of their selected destructive causes, Carson's pesticides and Kaplan's “anarchy,” and condensed them into their own fabled locals, Carson's small town and Kaplan's morose interpretation and description of West Africa. The difference between these two is that where Carson ends her description with a paragraph stating that the following chapters will attempt to explain and identify the single cause for the fictitious small town's demise, Kaplan abandons the issue after describing the “urban sprawl” of his “small town” into the rest of the World, leaving the reader with no solution, policy recommendation, nor further examination of, the problems which Kaplan says are at hand.

On the opposite side of the spectrum to Kaplan's abandonment of the issue within *The Coming Anarchy* lies another interpreted prediction of environmental doomsday that not only followed through with its predications within the work itself, but also published subsequent editions based on the initial prophecy; this series¹⁶ of works

began in 1972 with *The Limits to Growth; A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*.¹⁷ The authors of *Limits to Growth*, Donella and Dennis Meadows and their team, state that they never intended the work to be a prediction of doom but rather an example of choice or a warning,¹⁸ a warning that Kaplan would agree with:

If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next 100 years.¹⁹

Meadows et al. refute the notion of their being classified as doomsayers and call their work an example of choice because they continue the *Limits to Growth* stating that doom is not inevitable:

It is possible to alter these growth trends and to establish a condition of ecological and economic stability that is sustainable far into the future. The state of global equilibrium could be designed so that the basic material needs of each person on earth are satisfied and each person has an equal opportunity to realize his or her individual human potential.²⁰

Not only is this silver lining optimism a marked difference in between *The Limits to Growth* thesis and that presented in “The Coming Anarchy,” but also, where Kaplan would state that the repercussion of destructive human habits will result in ultimate anarchical upheaval, Meadows et al. conclude that if growth trends do continue uninterrupted then “the most probable result will be a sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity”²¹; also an undesirable end, but not absolute anarchy.

II.A.iii) Overpopulation Doomsday Prophecies

Where the roots of Kaplan’s environmental doomsday vision could be seen in academic texts as far back as 1864, the roots of Kaplan’s overpopulation doomsday prophecy can be traced back over half a century further with the publication of the

Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus' 1798 work "An Essay on the Principle of Population."²² In attempting to answer some general questions regarding "the future improvement of society,"²³ Malthus based his overpopulation doomsday prophecy on the theory that unchecked natural rates of human reproduction would result in geometric increases in population growth while food supplies would only progress arithmetically. Malthus, like Kaplan, presented his concerns about overpopulation focusing specifically within poverty-stricken communities,²⁴ but unlike Kaplan what Malthus believed to be an *aid to* population control - his "positive checks" of famine, plague, and war - Kaplan believes to not only be a *result of* overpopulation, but also, a direct cause of the anarchy he prophesizes.

Focusing on future population growth and overpopulation, Malthus' 1798 work is supported by another influential author who stated that overpopulation was already at hand in 1948. Within *Our Plundered Planet*,²⁵ Fairfield Osborn states that even at two billion the world's population carrying capacity had already been met²⁶ and, like Kaplan, viewed the nation's forests and water resources as under threat from human activity. In addition to setting forth a bleak view of the future due to overpopulation, Osborn did include a solution to the overpopulation problem:

Man must recognize the necessity of cooperating with nature. He must temper his demands and use and conserve the natural living resources of this earth in a manner that alone can provide for the continuation of his civilization.²⁷

The presentation of a solution to the population problem not only sets Osborn apart from Kaplan but also another overpopulation doomsayer (and 1948 contemporary) as well, William Vogt.

In his work *Road to Survival*²⁸ William Vogt also explored the problems of overpopulation, but with a much dire message than Osborn's. More in line with Kaplan's own inevitable anarchy, Vogt's message was that the "the Day of Judgment

is at hand,” that the United States, and indeed humanity as a whole, was at imminent risk of compromising the relationship between food supplies and world population.

By excessive breeding, and abuse of the land, mankind has backed itself into an ecological trap. By a lopsided use of applied science, it has been living on promissory notes. Now, all over the world, the notes are falling due.²⁹

With the relatively unpopular population doomsayers Osborn and Vogt aside, the contemporary author that is possibly most referred to as the modern Malthus, is Paul Ehrlich with his 1968 work *The Population Bomb*.³⁰ Sourcing overpopulation-caused economic and famine catastrophes as the bearers of doom, Ehrlich also prophesied the end of humanity if immediate population control initiatives were not implemented.

We must have population control at home, hopefully through a system of incentives and penalties, but by compulsion if voluntary methods fail. We must use our political power to push other countries into programs which combine agricultural development and population control. And while this is being done, we must take action to reverse the deterioration of our environment before population pressure permanently ruins our planet. The birth rate must be brought into balance with the death rate or mankind will breed itself into oblivion. We can no longer afford merely to treat the symptoms of the cancer of population growth; the cancer itself must be cut out. Population control is the only answer.³¹

Unfortunately for Ehrlich the dates of his predicted doom have past and many aspects of his thesis have been demonstrated incorrect – the most frequently referenced of which was his loss in a wager with econometrician Julian Simon over the future prices of metals – but this didn’t prevent Ehrlich from continuing to broadcast his predictions, although modified, and to produce his 1990 work *The Population Explosion*.³² With Ehrlich’s writings on the environment earning him the MacArthur Foundation “genius” award for having encouraged “greater public understanding of environmental problems”³³ it is not surprising that he, or Kaplan himself, would not be deterred by unfulfilled prophecies or making erroneous predictions weak in scientific evidence.

II.A.iv) Disease Proliferation Doomsday Prophecies

Similar to Ehrlich's awards not being a deterrent to the production of erroneous doomsday predictions, awards, in the form of book sales, certainly wouldn't have been a deterrent for the creation of one of the most popular³⁴ contemporary writings on a disease-caused doomsday: Richard Preston's novel, *The Hot Zone*.³⁵ A fictional work about an outbreak of the Ebola virus in the United States, Preston does not prophesize global doomsday epidemic but rather takes fact (the lethality and communicability of the Ebola Zaire virus) and invents a story to illustrate the potential danger of any lethal virus. This doomsday approach contrasts with Kaplan's because, as a novelist, Preston is clear that the work is fiction while Kaplan presents his conclusions as a journalist writing with its authenticity rooted in his "own realizations in traveling by foot, bus, and bush taxi in more than sixty countries"³⁶ which, Kaplan assures the reader in the preface of the book, "track well with the analyses of the military and intelligence communities."³⁷

II.A.v) II.A. Footnotes

- ¹ Fukuyama, Francis "The End of History," *National Interest* (Summer 1989): pp. 3-28.
- ² As sourced in Kimball, Roger. "Francis Fukuyama & The End of History" *The New Criterion* Vol. 10, No. 6, February 1992. (www.newcriterion.com)
- ³ As sourced in Kimball, Roger. "Francis Fukuyama & The End of History" *The New Criterion* Vol. 10, No. 6, February 1992. (www.newcriterion.com)
- ⁴ Barber, Benjamin. "Jihad vs. McWorld," *The Atlantic Monthly*; 1992
- ⁵ Huntington, Samuel. "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.
- ⁶ Huntington, Samuel. "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), p. 1.
- ⁷ "And, behold, I, even I, do bring a flood of waters upon the earth, to destroy all flesh, wherein is the breath of life, from under heaven; and every thing that is in the earth shall die." Genesis 6-17, King James Version
- ⁸ Thoreau, Henry David. *Walden*; or, *Life in the Maine Woods*. Boston: Ticknor & Fields, 1854. Dover Thrift Editions, 1994.
- ⁹ Marsh, G.P., *Man and Nature*. Cambridge: The Harvard University Press, 1965. (Annotated reprint of 1864 edition.)
- ¹⁰ Marsh, G.P., *The Earth as Modified by Human Action: Man and Nature*. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co., 1976. (Straight reprinting of the 1874 edition.)
- ¹¹ Lienhard, John H. Engines of Our Ingenuity. Radio Program Episode No. 595. Produced by KUHF-FM Houston. (<http://www.uh.edu/engines/epi595.htm>)
- ¹² Irvine, Sandy. *The Real World Resources Guide*. Campaign for Political Ecology, 1995. HTML version by Richard Kimber. (<http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/docs/rwca.htm>)
- ¹³ Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science*, p 162 (1968).
- ¹⁴ Carson, Rachel. *Silent Spring*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962.
- ¹⁵ Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*. New York: Random House, 2000. p 3
- ¹⁶ "Series"- Meadows et al. Limits to growth; a report for the Club of Rome's project on the predicament of mankind. New York, Universe Books 1972.
Meadows et al. Limits to growth: a report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind. 2d ed. New York: Universe Books, 1974.
Meadows et al. Beyond the limits: confronting global collapse, envisioning a sustainable future. Post Mills, Vt.: Chelsea Green Pub. Co., c1992.
Meadows et al. Limits to growth: the 30-year update. White River Junction, Vt: Chelsea Green Publishing Company, c2004.
- ¹⁷ Donella H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth; A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*. New York: Universe Books, 1972.
- ¹⁸ "It was not about a preordained future. It was about a choice. It contained a warning, to be sure, but also a message of promise." Donnella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, and Jørgen Randers. "Beyond the Limits to Growth" as sourced in *In Context*, Issue No. 32, Summer 1992, Page 10 (<http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC32/Meadows.htm>)
- ¹⁹ Donnella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, and Jørgen Randers. "Beyond the Limits to Growth" as sourced in *In Context*, Issue No. 32, Summer 1992, Page 10 (<http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC32/Meadows.htm>)
- ²⁰ Donnella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, and Jørgen Randers. "Beyond the Limits to Growth" as sourced in *In Context*, Issue No. 32, Summer 1992, Page 10 (<http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC32/Meadows.htm>)
- ²¹ Donnella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, and Jørgen Randers. "Beyond the Limits to Growth" as sourced in *In Context*, Issue No. 32, Summer 1992, Page 10 (<http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC32/Meadows.htm>)
- ²² Malthus, Thomas Robert. "An Essay on the Principle of Population." London, J. Johnson, 1798.
- ²³ Malthus' work "An Essay on the Principle of Population" was subtitled "As it affects the future improvement of society with remarks on the speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other writers"
- ²⁴ Evidence of Kaplan's focus on overpopulation within poverty-stricken areas within "The Coming Anarchy" can be seen within the following excerpts, "...95% of the population increase will be in the poorest regions of the world..." (*The Coming Anarchy* p. 22) "Perhaps 15% of Abdijan's population...live in shantytowns..." (*The Coming Anarchy* p. 10) "...the Ivory Coast's 13.5 million people will become 39 million by 2025, when much of the population will consist of urbanized peasants..." (*The Coming Anarchy* p. 11).

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- ²⁵ Osborn, Fairfield. *Our Plundered Planet*. Boston, Little, Brown, 1948.
- ²⁶ Osborn, Fairfield. *Our Plundered Planet*. Boston, Little, Brown, 1948. p. 37
- ²⁷ *Texas Parks and Wildlife*; October 1969 Issue
- ²⁸ Vogt, William. *Road to Survival*. New York, W. Sloane Associates, 1948.
- ²⁹ Vogt, William. *Road to Survival*. New York, W. Sloane Associates, 1948. as sourced in “The World's Food” RBC Letter; The Royal Bank of Canada. November 1948; Vol. 29, No. 11. (<https://service.royalbank.com/rbcpdf/rbletter/november1948.pdf>)
- ³⁰ Ehrlich, Paul R. *The Population Bomb*. New York : Ballantine Books, 1968.
- ³¹ Ehrlich, Paul R. *The Population Bomb*. New York : Ballantine Books, 1968; as sourced in brothersjudd.com book review (http://www.brothersjudd.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/reviews.detail/book_id/91)
- ³² Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, *The Population Explosion* - (1990))
- ³³ Kellard, Joseph. "Reason vs. Faith: Julian Simon vs. Paul Ehrlich" *Capitalism Magazine*. April 26, 1998. (<http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=44>)
- ³⁴ Not only did *The Hot Zone* enjoy 42 weeks on the New York Times' Best Sellers List, but it also “caused a frenzy of media coverage and inspired several fictional adaptations (including the hit film *Outbreak*).” - Sourced from the May 5th 2005 “Life Sciences Industries Summit” biography of Richard Preston. (<http://www.biotech.sunysb.edu/educWork/summit2005/program/speakers.html>)
- ³⁵ Preston, Richard *The Hot Zone* First Anchor books Edition, New York 1995
- ³⁶ Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*. New York: Random House, 2000.
- ³⁷ Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*. New York: Random House, 2000. p xv

II.B) Direct Support for, or Criticisms Against, Kaplan's Anarchy Thesis

Within this section will be presented Kaplan's critics' opinions of his anarchy thesis as well as the favorable, or unfavorable, mention "The Coming Anarchy" has received in the works of other authors. As "The Coming Anarchy" was a popular article and the thesis conveyed within quite broad, not only transcending the boundaries of many disciplines but countries and continents as well, the reviews of Kaplan's work are numerous and equally broad. Because of this, the following limitations have been placed upon this section's review to include works which *directly* refer to Kaplan's anarchy thesis or to the "The Coming Anarchy," and are produced by critics from within Kaplan's own profession: journalists. Journalists' critiques of Kaplan's work were specifically selected as the focus of this section's review for two reasons: Firstly, through interviews, quotes, and references, journalistic reviews published by respected news companies include the opinions of professionals from the fields in which the article is discussing; in this case, those fields and regions of the world upon which Kaplan's anarchy thesis trespasses. Secondly, within the "Statement of the Problem" section of this thesis it was identified that not only policy makers but also average readers (read 'voters' and those that comprise 'public opinion') may be misled by "The Coming Anarchy." This misleading is either encouraged or discouraged by the reviews and opinions of other journalists, as they are presented in their articles, and professional book reviews. Meaning, the average reader would not delve into the academic or governmental publications regarding each of the subjects within Kaplan's work to verify its accuracy, rather, it is within the journalistic critiques, book reviews, and opinion pieces that the public receives verification, or contradiction, of such published information. It is for this reason, to further examine the misleading or corrective

impact of Kaplan's thesis upon the public through the support, or the criticisms, of journalists, book reviews, and op-ed pieces, that this section's focus is almost exclusively upon journalistic critiques of Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy," and upon the favorable or unfavorable way the work is referenced within articles.

II.B.i) Direct Support

Since its February 1994 publication, both "The Coming Anarchy" and Kaplan's anarchy thesis within have received much support. This support comes from numerous directions, and regards many different aspects of Kaplan's work. Here, the areas in which "The Coming Anarchy" has received support have been classified and will be presented in the following categories: political and public support; acclaim for the accurate depiction of current events conveyed within "The Coming Anarchy"; support for the overall conclusion and specific conclusions made within "The Coming Anarchy"; support for the thought provoking aspect of the work; and lastly, this support section closes with a brief review of the quotes of what *appear* to be support presented within the "acclaims" list of *The Coming Anarchy* but could be, when placed back into their original contexts, interpreted as out-of-context portions of larger criticisms of Kaplan's work.

It is within the political and public support that one portion of the concerns stated within this thesis's "Statement of the Problem" section, specifically that "The Coming Anarchy" could influence educators, students, voters, and policy makers despite its factual errors, become validated. The political support discovered in review of the critiques of "The Coming Anarchy" includes accounts that "the piece ["The Coming Anarchy"] reportedly has been studied and mentioned by Vice President Gore and Clinton himself," and that after being "riveted" by Kaplan's article former President

Clinton “joined the neo-Malthusian bandwagon.”¹ But despite further allegations that many in Clinton’s “administration seem intrigued by the chaos doctrine” the exposure of Kaplan’s anarchy thesis goes beyond those officials because, “[a]ccording to press reports, Kaplan’s article also circulated throughout the senior staff of the White House’s National Security Council and National Economic Council.”² The implication of political support for Kaplan’s work is further emphasized by comments made by journalists that Kaplan’s opinions are held in high regard within political and intellectual spheres; such as that within the *Baltimore Sun*, “Dr. Huntington and Mr. Kaplan are taken seriously by serious people,”³ or within *The New Republic*, “His book is praised by the leading intellectuals of our time.”⁴

The presentation of political support, or the appearance thereof, within media publications provides support for Kaplan’s anarchy thesis and can influence the public or the average reader (again, those that comprise “public opinion”) to believing its validity; An example of such a reader can be found in a letter that was submitted to *Canadian Business* in which the author stated:

ON A RECENT FLIGHT FROM Edmonton, I read Robert Kaplan’s moving and frightening essay, *The coming anarchy*...Then I turned to Canadian Business and Gina Mallet’s whining feature article on taxes. Kaplan’s article certainly told me more about the issues that should concern me as a businessperson than did Mallet’s. Canada is not threatened by over taxation or by most of the other goblins so beloved by the business community. We are threatened by our own self-pity and by our growing lack of perspective on the world’s largest problems.⁵

Already believing Kaplan’s work to identify “the world’s largest problems” this average reader would only become more convinced of the validity of the anarchy thesis by reading that political officials and intellectuals were also considering “The Coming Anarchy.”

Support for “The Coming Anarchy” has also been presented throughout journalistic reviews as being an accurate depiction of then, and now, current international affairs. Journalists supported Kaplan’s work by likening it to then-current, and today’s international affairs, referring to newspaper headlines, “For an early look at what writer Robert Kaplan has described as ‘The Coming Anarchy,’ you need only read the daily news reports out of Africa,”⁶ and television reports, “Kaplan’s books were vividly written, and, unpleasant though it was, the news they brought resonated with what Americans could observe on their television screens,”⁷ which reported, and report on, specific international events such as those within Rwanda, “What, then, do these grisly and sorrowful events in Rwanda say? They say that, as Kaplan so direly predicted, in areas of the world we are beginning to reach the point where murderous gangs are taking over, where the forces of order and security are simply being overtaken by new forces of anarchy and chaos,”⁸ and more recently in Kenya, “THE MAYHEM that visited the residents of Mathare North, a low-income settlement bordering one of the poorest slums in Nairobi, last week is perhaps a sign of things to come. It was the kind of urban warfare predicted by Robert D. Kaplan nearly a decade ago in a much-quoted article published in the Atlantic Monthly, entitled ‘The Coming Anarchy.’”⁹ Support for Kaplan’s depiction of current events were also generalized into broad terms of the then-current state of the world, “Recent international events...seem to be ushering in the disorder Kaplan predicts”¹⁰ and that Kaplan correctly describes “the issues and the crises that humankind will face -- or, I would say, we are facing!”¹¹ Support of “The Coming Anarchy” in its accurate portrayal of current events can even be found in more recent reviews of the state of West Africa, “Reading ‘The Coming Anarchy’ today, one is struck by the prophetic accuracy of Kaplan’s description of the beggars’ world, or at least his description of

West Africa,”¹² of the state of the African continent on the whole “Kaplan’s prophecy...seems a fair description of much of African reality in 2000,”¹³ and even recent history in general, “what Kaplan describes as his ‘realist’ analysis...fits recent history uncomfortably well.”¹⁴

Like the support for Kaplan’s description of the state of then and now international affairs, critiques that provide support for the overall anarchy thesis, as well as specific conclusions within “The Coming Anarchy,” also abound in both the reviews of, and articles that source, the work. Support for the overall anarchy thesis can be described as falling into four categories: Those that *unquestionably accept* – authors of those articles that unquestionably accept Kaplan’s anarchy thesis as true make their support evident by focusing their own articles not on the content of the anarchy thesis itself, but rather, on periphery issues such as those that depend on (“So what’s America to do?”¹⁵) or caused (“How did it all come to this point?”¹⁶) the unquestionable anarchy; Those that *strongly agree* – authors of those articles that strongly agree can either identify the anarchy thesis as correct outright, “Kaplan’s theme was ‘the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.’ He was right,”¹⁷ or similarly label the anarchy thesis in metaphor, “the clarity of his [Kaplan’s] vision serves as a wake-up call”¹⁸; Those that *moderately agree* – authors of articles that moderately agree present their agreement with Kaplan’s anarchy thesis more cautiously in their reviews or articles, such as “Robert Kaplan’s view of a savage and chaotic future is stark and sobering and quite believable”¹⁹ or “when Kaplan interrupts our pleasant reverie with the admonition that ‘The clock ticks toward something unpleasant ...,’ it is hard not to wake and start paying close attention”²⁰; Those that *agree and attempt to convince* – those authors that attempt to

convince the reader are not as common as the forms of other support, but they do surpass all the other support categories in their potential impact on readers; for example, in review of “The Coming Anarchy” one journalist wrote:

I urge readers to locate this issue of The Atlantic Monthly. It’s the most disturbing viewpoint that I’ve encountered in years. But it provides a good means by which to interpret and better comprehend the many disparate, horrible, and confusing events that we encounter on our nightly news.²¹

By encouraging the reader to use “The Coming Anarchy” as a tool to “interpret” and “comprehend” current events, this critique is attempting to influence the reader to adopt the anarchy thesis; going well beyond a simple supportive review or reference.

Support for the “The Coming Anarchy” can also take a more specific form by agreeing with certain aspects or conclusions within the work or the anarchy thesis. These conclusions can regard specific *topical areas*, such as the future standard of living within the First and Third worlds, it’s “...easy to imagine a future in which life inside the limo got better and better while life among the beggars got worse and worse,”²² or national security, “He [Kaplan] recognizes that many Americans yawn at the word environment...But he argues, I think persuasively, that it is ‘the national-security issue of the early 21st century,’”²³ *regional areas*, such as the Balkans “...there is weight behind his words when Kaplan argues in the Atlantic essay that the Balkans conflict could lead to a wider cultural war between Orthodox Christianity and Islam,”²⁴ or even conclusions about *specific countries*, such as Nigeria, India, Brazil, “Perhaps, as Kaplan suggests, Nigeria, India and Brazil will become ungovernable. India’s growing population and shrinking resource base certainly pose enormous challenges for any government,”²⁵ Canada, “He [Kaplan] makes a persuasive case that Canada will not hold together,”²⁶ and even the United States, citing immigration “...U.S. immigration policy quickly needs a radical overhaul. If not, the racial polarity

and social fragmentation that Robert Kaplan catalogued over a year ago will accelerate,”²⁷ and also citing urban violence, “Anyone can test Kaplan’s thesis in the slums of any large U.S. city, any time after dark; anarchy has already arrived. We call it Queens, and Watts.”²⁸

Even in articles and reviews where the author may not entirely agree with Kaplan’s conclusions, some still express support for his work, citing different reasons like the benefit of Kaplan’s opinions, “These are trenchant, provocative opinions, whether or not one accepts the more apocalyptic tinge of his essays,”²⁹ or the accuracy of the threats facing the states of West Africa and other similar less developed countries, “To challenge some of his conclusions is not to dispute the threats that Kaplan vividly describes.”³⁰ Similarly, non-specific support for “The Coming Anarchy” within articles and reviews has been expressed using a plethora of varied praise, describing the work as “provocative,”³¹ “rewarding,”³² “thoughtful,”³³ “important,”³⁴ “compelling,”³⁵ “gripping, sobering, alarming,”³⁶ “persuasive,”³⁷ “interestingly scary,”³⁸ and a “worthy study”³⁹ because, among other reasons, the opinions contained within “concentrate the mind,”⁴⁰ and are a “challenge to conventional thinking.”⁴¹

Obviously, one would think, support for Kaplan and “The Coming Anarchy” should be presented within the “acclaims” section of the book *The Coming Anarchy*, and there is. Listed on the first three unnumbered pages of the book, are blurbs from *The Boston Globe*, *Rocky Mountain News*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post Book World*, *The Baltimore Sun*, *The New York Times Book Review*, *The National Post*, *Parameters*, *Booklist*, as well as from R. James Woolsey (former director of the CIA), Samuel Huntington, Douglas Brinkley (director of the Eisenhower Center), and Michael Lind (author of *Vietnam: The Necessary War*). But, while most of these

reviews do genuinely convey support for Kaplan and “The Coming Anarchy” there are four that, when the blurb is placed back into its original context, could very easily be interpreted, not as acclaim for *The Coming Anarchy* but rather, as criticisms of Kaplan’s work. Each of these will be briefly discussed here.

The blurb that was taken from Norman Provizer’s review in the Rocky Mountain News, reads:

Highly engaging...[Kaplan] comfortably blends academic references with the observations of a journalist reporting on travel....Never less than provocative....[H]e makes the reader think hard thoughts when we would all rather dream.⁴²

But in the same review, Norman Provizer continues that Kaplan’s anarchy thesis is “certainly not beyond rebuttal,” that Kaplan is neither “necessarily right or strikingly original” and Provizer makes the accusation that Kaplan “tosses out a number of...provocative ideas in an unsatisfying and offhand fashion...”⁴³

Similarly, in the same review that the blurb from the *Baltimore Sun* was taken, which reads, “[Kaplan] has read widely and writes superbly. Even if you shake your head at his extreme prognostications, you may catch yourself fearing that he is right,”⁴⁴ the author, Scott Shane, likens Kaplan to “your grumbling uncle who can find a new cloud inside every silver lining,” says that Kaplan makes “outlandish statements [which] may lead a reader to dismiss Kaplan as merely perverse,” accuses Kaplan of having “an outsized ego and a tendency to follow his theories beyond the bounds of common sense.” Going further still, Shane continues to criticize “The Coming Anarchy” by pointing out that Kaplan may “...underestimate the ways in which information technology and global trade have made historical precedents less relevant,” and that the sample countries Kaplan uses to support his thesis are selective and misleading: “His world view was shaped in the caldrons of the Balkans and Africa; it might be different if he had spent more time in, say, Southeast Asia.”⁴⁵

Regarding the review in *The New York Times Book Review* by Adam Garfinkle, from which the blurb cited in the “acclaims” section reads:

[Kaplan] has found himself a large and sometimes powerful audience, and he is determined to convey some practical, big-picture warnings to the more efficacious members of that audience before they get us all into terrible trouble. We should pay close attention.⁴⁶

Garfinkle is particularly harsh on both Kaplan’s anarchy thesis as well as Kaplan’s other works, the popularity of which Garfinkle attributes to Kaplan being “accident-prone” as an author; “accident prone” because Garfinkle states that Kaplan’s “‘Balkan Ghosts,’ [had] fallen into the hands of a certain novice denizen of the Oval Office...” and that the popularity of Kaplan’s *The Arabists* was because the book:

...tripped off a darkly comic accident, which is that a certain segment of the American Jewish community took just one look at the title and the author’s last name and presumed that the book was a slam against those eternal State Department anti-Semites.⁴⁷

With regard to the book *The Coming Anarchy*, Garfinkle continues his assault saying that the essays within it are “dissimilar in length, topic, and even tone” and that Kaplan “over interpreted the calamities of West Africa, and exaggerated their general relevance for world politics.” As for Kaplan’s anarchy thesis of inevitable doom, Garfinkle states that Kaplan “...should have paid more attention to the enormous power of bad government, about which there is, in the end, nothing inevitable, not even in Sierra Leone.” Lastly, in this review from which a quote was taken to provide acclaim for Kaplan, the Garfinkle casually points out that Kaplan is unscholarly in his approach to writing “The Coming Anarchy”:

Kaplan merges literature and analysis, storytelling and philosophy, observation and history in a way that few writers even dare nowadays. Such an ambitiously eclectic approach is bound to cut a few scholarly corners.⁴⁸

Garfinkle further underscores his accusation that Kaplan is unscholarly by stating that “Serious scholars do not always appreciate Kaplan’s take on their pet subjects, and sometimes they have a point.” This comment implies both that Kaplan is not a serious scholar and, by saying that serious scholars would have point to disagree with Kaplan, implies that Kaplan’s work is not only unscholarly, but is incorrect as well.

The last examination of the blurbs cited in the “acclaims” section of *The Coming Anarchy* to be presented here is the most revealing in its decidedly unsupportive view of Kaplan’s work. The blurb, written by Michael Mandelbaum, from the *Washington Post Book Review* is presented in the section as follows:

The glaring global reality, as the new millennium begins, is not that we are becoming like the Third World but rather that they have so little chance of becoming like us...This is a tragic and perhaps dangerous circumstance, and, as it happens, over the last 10 years nothing has done more to bring it to the attention of those lucky enough to live in North America than the reporting of Robert Kaplan.⁴⁹

What this blurb neglects to convey is that in the same review Michael Mandelbaum presents a definitively negative critique of the book *The Coming Anarchy*, the anarchy thesis, and even of Kaplan himself. Mandelbaum states that not only do the essays within *The Coming Anarchy* have “no unifying theme” but also they “...do not have a single coherent argument...[they] rely heavily on historical references. [which]...should be used, if not sparingly, then at least carefully, and Kaplan’s use of history is not careful” and, Mandelbaum continues, “Kaplan’s grasp of 20th-century history is similarly shaky.” In response to Kaplan’s assertion that West Africa offers “an eerie taste of what American cities might be like in the future,” and that politically “the future of the Third World may finally be our own,” Mandelbaum continues his scathing critique:

Now, the United States certainly has problems. It always has had them and it always will. But they are surely of a different, and lower, level of seriousness than those that afflict the Third World. To be bored, distracted, and uncultured, as some Americans are, is unfortunate; to be hungry, disease-ridden, and living in an unending state of mortal terror is far worse.⁵⁰

In fact, when placed back into context, Mandelbaum's quote in *The Coming Anarchy* could be interpreted not as acclaim to Kaplan's work but rather a commentary at the inaction of North Americans to the plight of those in the Third World; in other words, Mandelbaum could have meant that it is tragic that so little has been done in the last ten years to bring the plight of those in the Third World to the attention of North Americans then the reporting of an incoherent, egotistical, exaggerating, journalist who incorrectly references historical facts.

This examination of the "acclaim" section of *The Coming Anarchy* was necessary for two reasons. First, in reviewing support for Kaplan, it would be neglectful not to note those supportive reviews that are cited by the book in which "The Coming Anarchy" is presented. And second, the examination of these "acclaims" draws attention to the fault of contradiction, presented in these blurbs in the form of context, one of the many criticisms which Kaplan himself is accused of in his writing. This criticism, and others, will be discussed in more detail in the following subsection.

II.B.ii) Direct Criticism

The criticisms against "The Coming Anarchy" and Kaplan's anarchy thesis are numerous and their focus varied. These wide-ranging direct criticisms, found in journalistic critiques, reviews, and other articles, are categorized and discussed in the paragraphs below. The categories include criticisms against the overall anarchy thesis; its lack of policy suggestions; criticism that "The Coming Anarchy" article is a threat; criticisms against the article's unprofessional and unscholarly presentation; criticisms

against apparent prejudices conveyed within the work; criticisms regarding Kaplan's methodology and the interpretations of findings; criticisms regarding argumentative flaws and contradictions within the work; criticisms disagreeing with specific conclusions presented within the article; and lastly, the criticism that the anarchy thesis did not take into account certain issues.

Those criticisms that attack the overall anarchy thesis do so on the basis of Kaplan's assumption that anarchy is "inevitable"⁵¹ while others disregard the anarchy thesis as "not altogether persuasive,"⁵² "lacking,"⁵³ as "a cliché about horror"⁵⁴, or "too pessimistic, and...just plain wrong."⁵⁵ Other critiques have attacked the work calling it a "perverse form of travel journalism with intellectual window-dressing"⁵⁶ and that, as a prophetic piece, it "certainly was no guide to the world's future."⁵⁷ Some even simply state that Kaplan's anarchy thesis is "dead wrong,"⁵⁸ or, as this thesis implies, that the extrapolation of the events of West Africa onto the world is "absurd."⁵⁹

Ironically, another group of critics attacked "The Coming Anarchy" for a very different reason, one that implies wholehearted acceptance of the anarchy thesis. They complain, not that the thesis is unbelievable but rather that Kaplan, and others who support his work, didn't give advice or offer any "specific policy recommendations"⁶⁰ to prevent the coming anarchy; that, despite Kaplan's citation of "crass materialism, hypocrisy, ignorance, arrogance, hubris about mankind's mastery over the natural world...he did not exhort the sinners to go and sin no more."⁶¹ The fact that he offered no advice, message, or policy solutions, an allegation that Kaplan "freely admits,"⁶² could be because his motivation for writing the piece was not to recommend solutions to prevent the coming anarchy but rather just to shock readers,

or as a *Boston Globe* author wrote about Kaplan, “[h]e did not...recommend much of anything. He seemed mainly interested in scaring the hell out of his readers.”⁶³

Some critics, though, were not scared in the way that Kaplan may have intended them to be. “The Coming Anarchy” frightened these critics because they viewed, not the anarchy thesis, but the *piece itself* as a threat, and criticized it for its potential consequences. For example, some saw “The Coming Anarchy” as a threat because of Kaplan’s assertion that the national security issue of the 21st century should be the environment. This aspect of Kaplan’s piece was considered a threat for many reasons including: the concerns that the potential impact of the piece could take “money and attention from the Pentagon’s core war fighting mission,”⁶⁴ that the approach of blurring the environment with national security to raise public awareness to environmental and humanitarian issues is “likely to backfire”⁶⁵ because it “is more likely to endanger support for needed humanitarian and environmental programs abroad, as the public begins to question the priorities of those making the case.” Similarly, another concern is that “The Coming Anarchy’s” message to redefine the environment as *the* national security issue “ignores bigger threats.”⁶⁶ Converse to these concerns, another criticism of the piece derived from its being perceived as a threat was that it caused a need to downplay the environmental security issue - as Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Director of the Environmental Change and Security Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center stated in his *Wilson Quarterly* critique of the “The Coming Anarchy”:

Yes, there are meaningful connections between environmental problems and organized violence, many concluded, but in the backlash after Kaplan’s article, few were prepared to say that the environment plays a more significant role than the traditionally understood political, economic, and social causes of conflict.⁶⁷

Despite these very heavy-issue criticisms of “The Coming Anarchy,” criticisms regarding Kaplan’s unprofessional and unscholarly approach to formulating and presenting his anarchy thesis are much more abundant in the work’s critiques. In addition to the unscholarly characteristics of Kaplan’s work identified above by the critiques of Mandlebaum, and Provizer, Kaplan has also been criticized for his lack of footnotes, habit to “slip annoyingly into [unverifiable] me-journalism: ‘I was there,’ he broods metaphorically (and sometimes literally), ‘so I know,’”⁶⁸ or for being blinded by a “I see it, therefore it matters”⁶⁹ form of assessing issue importance. According to some of his critics, another unprofessional habit exhibited by Kaplan within “The Coming Anarchy” is that of making generalizations, “...Kaplan’s penchant for sweeping generalizations...too often undermines his other essays,”⁷⁰ this criticism is further emphasized, rather comically, through an article which appeared in *The New Statesman* which read, “some political scientists have attacked his [Kaplan’s] historical generalisations with a hostility usually reserved for Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis.”⁷¹

Other more personal criticisms regarding the unprofessional or unscholarly presentation of “The Coming Anarchy” accuse Kaplan of presenting an article and thesis draped in prejudice. Within “The Coming Anarchy” critics have cited evidence of prejudice regarding many of the areas the work discusses, including: cultural prejudices, “Kaplan’s article...contained so many gross historical inaccuracies and cultural prejudices that I hardly know where to begin.”⁷²; prejudice regarding the civilization of West Africa, “Contrary to the impression that Mr. Kaplan’s article conveys, civilization in West Africa did not begin and end with colonial rule.”⁷³; and, by “...resurrecting old cultural prejudices of Africa as a place of savagery,”⁷⁴ this same critic also accused “The Coming Anarchy” of spreading prejudice by

influencing public opinion to take a step back with regard to their perceptions of Africa as a whole.

Two other areas where a large body of criticism against “The Coming Anarchy” exists, regard Kaplan’s methodology and the interpretations of his findings. The methodological criticisms of “The Coming Anarchy” have attacked the article on many fronts. Critics have addressed faults in the article’s method for asking the wrong question in its quest to present the environmental security issue. Dubbed the “third wave” of the environmental security debate, these critics argue that “The Coming Anarchy” “asked only how the environment might contribute to conflict, not why it might do so in some cases and not others,”⁷⁵ and that Kaplan’s thesis should have focused “more on why people facing scarcity and resource disputes often turn away from violent conflict,”⁷⁶ or, in other words, that the approach Kaplan used only presented one side of the story. The fact that Kaplan is only presenting “one side” of the situation is eloquently conveyed in an article written by one of Kaplan’s much-quoted “The Coming Anarchy” sources, Thomas Frasier Homer-Dixon:

On one side, we have the neo-Malthusians...who claim that finite natural resources place strict limits on the growth of human population and consumption; if these limits are exceeded, poverty and social breakdown result. On the other side, we have optimists...Each of these perspectives grasp a portion of the truth, but neither tells the whole story.⁷⁷

Another criticism of the methodology of “The Coming Anarchy” is its use of examining and presenting only selective example to support its thesis. For example, “One reviewer of Kaplan’s book suggested that, if he had taken a different route across Africa (visiting, for example, Senegal and Botswana), he would have come to different conclusions,”⁷⁸ or, as was previously noted above by Scott Shane, Kaplan’s “world view was shaped in the caldrons of the Balkans and Africa; it might be different if he had spent more time in, say, Southeast Asia.”⁷⁹ Put metaphorically, one

critic commented on Kaplan's use and presentation of selective examples stating, "when you're writing about a whole planet, there is something to be said for studying forest management rather than scrutinizing (however skillfully) a series of trees."⁸⁰

Not only are the examples Kaplan used within "The Coming Anarchy" criticized, but also his interpretation of his findings are also disparaged by many who reviewed his work. Those who have issue with Kaplan's interpretations cite his interpretations of the countries that he visited, "It remains entirely possible...to walk Mr. Kaplan's ground, interview the same officials and till the same scholarly earth and yet reach very different conclusions,"⁸¹ or simply that Kaplan has exaggerated the relevance of his findings, "Kaplan has over interpreted the calamities of West Africa, and exaggerated their general relevance for world politics,"⁸² or that "many of the crises that make up 'The Coming Anarchy' have been exaggerated, and even the genuine ones exist within a broader pattern of progress."⁸³ In some critic's opinions, Kaplan's exaggeration is to the point of fiction, stating that "Bill Clinton was right to see Mad Max in 'The Coming Anarchy': Kaplan's speculations are generally the kind of dystopian fantasies that one finds in Hollywood's futuristic extravaganzas."⁸⁴ Other ways that Kaplan's critics express their opinions that his findings presented in "The Coming Anarchy" are exaggerated are by calling his conclusions "extreme prognostications,"⁸⁵ "too gloomy,"⁸⁶ "overly gloomy,"⁸⁷ "extremely pessimistic,"⁸⁸ and even Kaplan himself "acknowledges that time has proved some of his books overly pessimistic in places."⁸⁹

In addition to criticizing Kaplan's interpretations of his findings, critics of the "The Coming Anarchy" also find fault with, as this thesis does, the extrapolations he makes with those findings. Examples of such criticism include one within *The New Republic* that states, "In general, Kaplan's style of analysis is the reverse of historical

scholarship. It consists of leaping from a limited number of observations to wild speculations of the broadest conceivable nature,”⁹⁰ or from the *World Press Review* which states that, “it is absurd to argue, as Kaplan does, that Africa – and especially troubled West Africa – is a reflection of what the whole world will be like in a few decades”⁹¹ and continues, “The problems he [Kaplan] writes about...are real. But are they serious enough to halt or even reverse human progress...The evidence is slim”⁹²

There are also many criticisms against the logic in the argument put forth within “The Coming Anarchy” as well as allegations of contradiction both within the work and in Kaplan’s stated reason for writing the article. Regarding the logic of the argument presented within “The Coming Anarchy” some critics simply state that Kaplan’s assertions “are so sweepingly speculative that they are both irrefutable and unprovable,”⁹³ while others believe that Kaplan began writing “The Coming Anarchy” before having thought of the argument or even the questions he was trying to answer by writing it, “the essay itself was written in a rather anarchic style, and in part, one suspects, because Kaplan had only just begun to wrestle with the big questions that he was trying to address.”⁹⁴ In addition to these argument flaws – that there is no possible way to argue his assertions because they are “unprovable” or that his argument is “anarchic” because he started writing before he conceived the questions he was attempting to answer – Geoffrey D. Dabelko points out what may be one of the most concrete flaws in Kaplan’s argument: “Most important, Kaplan’s ‘anarchy’ thesis suffered an obvious logical flaw. While poverty and environmental destruction were grievous problems in the less developed countries, most of them remained far from the complete collapse suffered in Haiti and West Africa.”⁹⁵

Kaplan also faced the allegation of being contradictory not only in the argument of his anarchy thesis, but also in his stated reason for writing “The Coming Anarchy.”

In his, previously quoted here, critique of “The Coming Anarchy” entitled “Inside the Limo,” Robert Kagan accuses Kaplan and the anarchy thesis as being contradictory regarding where the anarchy threat was coming from, “Most of the time, he seemed to be suggesting that the threat to the West came from without... At other times, however, it was clear that Kaplan believed that the limo world was itself plagued with inherent, self-destructive tendencies.”⁹⁶ More interestingly though, Kagan also accuses Kaplan of, through the production of “The Coming Anarchy,” being contradictory to the “realist” stance that Kaplan broadcasts, quite loudly, in the article and elsewhere. Kagan explains this allegation, in addition to criticizing the argument of the anarchy thesis as impossible and implausible, by stating:

He [Kaplan] is prepared to follow the logic of realist amorality wherever it leads him...[but] THE FINAL IRONY is that Kaplan himself is probably not amoral. To spend one's adult life chronicling so much human misery is unusual behavior for a realist. Beneath the cold facade of hardheaded realism one can imagine in Kaplan a heart that aches for the poor souls about whom he writes...Kaplan's writings, especially 'The Coming Anarchy,' can also be read as a cry for help on behalf of the beggar world. This would at least explain why Kaplan attempts the impossible, why he tries so hard to show that the fate of the liberal West is directly and intimately tied to the plight of West Africans. He knows that many in the West may be unperturbed at the prospect of a truly 'bifurcated' world...Why, exactly, should they care if the rest of the world, in West Africa, Central Asia, and even parts of Latin America, sinks back into barbarism? Kaplan tries to force them to care by insisting, implausibly, that the horrors that he witnesses in West Africa will soon be visited on the liberal West.⁹⁷

In addition to these allegations against Kaplan's intentions, or critiques citing the flaws in the logic of the anarchy thesis argument, there are numerous criticisms against specific conclusions that Kaplan presents in “The Coming Anarchy” as well. Some critics take on the larger conclusions of “The Coming Anarchy” such as believing that the risk of the resource scarcity threat, upon which the anarchy thesis partially depends, is entirely unfounded, “Recent scientific studies confirm that the Earth's basic resources are vastly greater than what are needed to feed even the 10

billion people who are almost certain to inhabit the planet by the middle of the next century,”⁹⁸ or that the world on the whole is not becoming more miserable, as Kaplan would have us believe, but rather “By every measure life on Earth is getting better.”⁹⁹ Others though, addressed their criticism towards smaller conclusions made within “The Coming Anarchy” like conclusions regarding specific countries, regions, or issues.

Criticisms against some of the country conclusions that Kaplan presents within “The Coming Anarchy” regard specific nations, such as Sierra Leone, about which one of Kaplan’s critics writes, “the dynamics of the country’s collapse are far less mysterious and more pedestrian than the spurious environmental and cultural essentialism which Kaplan ascribes to it,”¹⁰⁰ India, where in a letter from the *New York Times* editor’s desk the author writes that Kaplan’s fear “of India’s becoming a failed state is...groundless,”¹⁰¹ Israel, where the author of an article from the *Star Tribune* states his optimism of deepening “Islamic-Jewish cooperation,”¹⁰² and America, about which Kagan states:

The security policies of restaurants in the Ivory Coast do not reveal much about the level of crime in America’s future. And as for Africa acting as a catalyst for American racial polarization: the truth is that every government in Africa could collapse and it would not have a sliver of the impact of the slaying of a single African immigrant by New York City policemen.¹⁰³

Some, even more expanded criticisms against Kaplan’s country conclusions place their focus on entire regions like North America, “North America is not, of course, headed for anarchy,”¹⁰⁴ and Europe, “West African states may indeed face ‘an anarchic implosion of criminal violence,’ but it does not necessarily follow that...[their] collapse would profoundly shake the foundations of European and American democracy.”¹⁰⁵ While others refute his conclusions on a global scale, “The

biggest flaw in Kaplan's thesis is that he assumes the chaos in West Africa and the Balkans will spread to the rest of the world."¹⁰⁶

Many critics who also presented criticism for Kaplan's conclusion within "The Coming Anarchy" did so focusing their criticisms upon specific issues rather than on geographic areas. Such issue-based refutations are quite varied, disagreeing with Kaplan's conclusions regarding both the large and small issues he discusses. An example of a criticism regarding one of Kaplan's smaller-issue conclusions regards Kaplan's "absurd claim that many people in the developing countries 'find war and barracks existence a step up rather than a step down'" commenting that for Kaplan "To imply that Africans see this [war] as a 'step up' is insulting."¹⁰⁷ Other critics focused on Kaplan's larger conclusions, such as Kaplan's conclusion about the erosion of the nation state, "it is nation states, with their armies, governments, laws and legitimacy that are - and will remain - the dominant force in world affairs,"¹⁰⁸ or even opposing Kaplan's overpopulation-anarchy link, "Anarchy is not caused by increasing population, but largely has to do with a country's willingness to give its people opportunities to make their lives better."¹⁰⁹

The last segment of this presentation of criticisms of "The Coming Anarchy" is similar to the specific issue criticisms discussed above but, instead of criticizing Kaplan's *conclusions*, this section focuses on criticisms which reflect specific issues Kaplan *neglected* in formulating his anarchy thesis and in writing "The Coming Anarchy." These neglected points include such varied topics as: individual responsibility and morality; the successes of human nature; progressive trends; other contributing factors to the anarchy thesis; anarchy-avoiding solutions, the importance of interdependence; and lastly, potential opportunities or benefits within the issues discussed in "The Coming Anarchy."

Having been written by a numerously self-proclaimed, realist and containing Hobbesian over and undertones, it is not surprising that “The Coming Anarchy” is criticized for neglecting, or at least undervaluing, the roles that individual responsibility and morality play in the formation of the anarchy thesis. An example of this criticism can be found in a *Foreign Policy* article in which, when discussing Kaplan’s work, the author states, “environmental determinism devalues individual choice” and that within the anarchy thesis “The question of individual responsibility never arises...Human agency is absent.”¹¹⁰ Another similar criticism of “The Coming Anarchy” accuses Kaplan of focusing only on the negative examples of human nature and neglecting the positives, commenting that for Kaplan, “human nature may explain our increasing environmental messes, but not, say, the tide of democratic reform that has swept through the former Soviet Union, Latin America and elsewhere.”¹¹¹

In focusing upon humanity’s decline back to barbarism, Kaplan, according to his critics, neglects many of the progressive trends that directly counter some aspects of his anarchy thesis. The author of a review of Kaplan’s work in *The Gazette* (of Montreal) cites a progressive trend in an area where Kaplan only focuses in the negative: the decline of the nation state. The author accuses Kaplan of neglecting progress in a trend regarding nation state by presenting some of the benefits of having less ridged borders, “Kaplan’s analysis fails to appreciate the changing nature of state sovereignty and international norms, highlighted by former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet’s recent confinement in Britain, humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and the growing influence of non- state actors.”¹¹² Similarly this same author cites other areas where Kaplan neglects progressive trends, stating that Kaplan’s anarchy thesis does not “permit any room for mitigating circumstances - such as technological innovation, nascent democratic roots in Latin America or a leveling of world

population growth.”¹¹³ Some of Kaplan critics have delved further into the many areas covered by “The Coming Anarchy” accusing Kaplan of ignoring “key trends such as declining global rates of child mortality and rising Third World rates of...literacy and life expectancy.”¹¹⁴ Others continue, opening their criticism even further suggesting that Kaplan is “blind to real progress being made in food production, disease control, [and] the promotion of democracy and human rights.”¹¹⁵ Not only does Kaplan’s neglect in all of these areas prompt some critics to dismiss “The Coming Anarchy” and the anarchy thesis, believing that ““In almost any way you care to measure, life is getting better for people in developing nations,””¹¹⁶ but also his neglect of specific progressive trends makes some critics believe that even the historical and philosophical ‘evidence’ he presents throughout “The Coming Anarchy” to support the anarchy thesis is not relevant, “Steeped in history and literature, Kaplan may underestimate the ways in which information technology and global trade have made historical precedents less relevant.”¹¹⁷

Interestingly, “The Coming Anarchy” received additional criticism from some camped on the same side of the anarchy thesis fence as Kaplan. These critics chastised Kaplan for neglecting additional points (besides those regarding the environment, diseases, etc.) that would contribute to anarchy coming to fruition. Specifically, Kaplan is criticized for neglecting what one author calls the “proximate external determinants of political anarchy in the developing world” the critics argument is that because of “World Bank and International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs, unstinting Western support for military institutions and restrictive and discriminatory global trade practices...the coming anarchy has a great deal to do with the deliberate policies and actions of Western governments and peoples themselves.”¹¹⁸ An additional subject in which Kaplan was criticized for

neglecting in “The Coming Anarchy” was the role that multinational corporations play in the erosion of the nation state, “Kaplan doesn’t even mention, much less deal with...the corporate state,” which, the critic continues, “are larger, more aggressive, and patently more lawless than many of our nations.”¹¹⁹

Converse to criticisms regarding issues that facilitate anarchy, many critics viewed Kaplan’s anarchy thesis as neglecting the power of factors which would contribute to the prevention of, or solutions to, “anarchy” such as interdependence and politics. A staunch critic of the anarchy thesis, Robert Write, criticizes Kaplan for neglecting the notion of interdependence and the “growing logic behind cooperation” the process of which, he believes, “is now moving so fast that the world is going to reach a system of institutionalized cooperation among nations that is so thorough it qualifies as world governance.”¹²⁰ Other critics present a less utopian neglect criticism focusing on the power of politics claiming that “Politics often seems useless to Kaplan; he is seeking the key to the future at some molecular level of culture,”¹²¹ and that the anarchy thesis is “anti-political,” discounting “the capacity of individuals to work cooperatively in the face of calamity or to negotiate fair shares in the face of scarcity.”¹²²

It is regarding this notion, of working cooperatively “in the face of calamity,” that other critics have accused Kaplan of neglect. They say that within “The Coming Anarchy” Kaplan has neglected the potential opportunities that could arise from a situation of mutual threat, like that which could arise from resource scarcity.

Opportunities like, as the author of an article from *The Ottawa Citizen*, stated:

Kaplan may be right, but surely we cannot live as if that were the case...The task is no different now than it was in other times of megacrisis: it is to look beyond the dangers and to seek out the opportunities...Looking across the horizon, I see three clusters of opportunity: the rise of interdependence in the face of environmental and economic globalization; the rise of local initiatives around the

world as people demand more control over their own lives; and the growing realization that knowledge and innovation (technological and social) are essential keys to prosperity.¹²³

The criticism is that Kaplan does not address, or rather, he neglects, the possibility of agreements or joint problem solving efforts between groups facing resource scarcity. Instead he focuses exclusively on conflict scenarios where all parties believe themselves entitled to the scarce resources, this exclusive view is neglectful, according to critics, because quite possibly, as was put well in an opinion piece from the *San Francisco Chronicle*, “when the scarcity of uncontaminated resources precipitates global conflict, the need to cooperate with the demands of natural systems will overcome arrogance.”¹²⁴

II.B.iii) II.B. Footnotes

¹ “Even President Clinton has joined the neo-Malthusian bandwagon; he was riveted by an apocalyptic jeremiad that appeared earlier this year in the Atlantic Monthly. The piece, written by foreign correspondent Robert Kaplan, envisions a world of growing chaos, anarchy, disease, and corruption as hungry refugees surge across borders in search of food and nations fight over scarce resources.” - Budiansky, Stephen. “10 billion for dinner, please” U.S. News & World Report; September 12, 1994; World Report, Vol. 117, No. 10; Pg. 57. Copyright 1994 U.S. News & World Report.

² “...many in the [Clinton] administration seem intrigued by the chaos doctrine, and it goes beyond those officials, such as Wirth and Atwood, whose budgetary interests coincide with the argument. According to press reports, Kaplan's article also circulated throughout the senior staff of the White House's National Security Council and National Economic Council. Most important, the piece reportedly has been studied and mentioned by Vice President Gore and Clinton himself.” Rosner, Jeremy D. “Is Chaos America's Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton's Team” The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Aug 14, 1994. pg. c.01

³ O'Mara, Richard. “Feel Lousy About the Future? Dr. Doomsayer Says It Can Only Get Worse” The Sun. Baltimore, Md.: Nov 13, 1994. pg. 4.E

⁴ Kagan, Robert. “Inside the limo” The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

⁵ Butcher, John. “Taxing cash flow” Canadian Business, May, 1994. Section: Letters, Pg. 6. Copyright 1994 CB Media Limited.

⁶ Ignatius, David. “A plan for Africa taxpayers can support”; Ottawa Citizen, June 11, 2003. p. A15. Washington Post Writers Group. Copyright 2003 CanWest Interactive.

⁷ Mandelbaum, Michael. “Falling Apart” The Washington Post, March 5, 2000. p. X06. Also see, Sanger, Clyde. “Glimmers in Africa's Darkness” The Toronto Star, May 21, 2000. Copyright 2000 Toronto Star Newspapers, Ltd. - “Of Course there's truth, only too visible on television screens, in what these two knowledgeable journalists [Kaplan and Dowden, author of the Economist's ‘The Hopeless Continent’] (and others) are saying.”

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¹⁰ Serwer, Andrew E. “The end of the world is nigh - Or is it?” Fortune. New York: May 2, 1994. Vol. 129, Iss. 9; pg. 123, 2 pgs

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¹⁵ Gold, Philip. “TAKING CHARGE of our violent world; Political lessons from the classics” The Washington Times, December 30, 2001. Section: Part B; Books; Pg. B8. Copyright 2001 News World Communications, Inc.

¹⁶ Geyer, Georgie Anne. “Forces of Anarchy Seen In Rwanda's Grisly Events” Times-Picayune April 19, 1994. p. B07. Copyright 1994 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co.

¹⁷ Kagan, Robert. “Inside the limo” The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

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- ²⁴ White, Robert J. "When the threat is 'criminal anarchy,' diplomacy is not much help" Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN) February 13, 1994. p. 23A. Copyright 1994 Star Tribune.
- ²⁵ White, Robert J. "When the threat is 'criminal anarchy,' diplomacy is not much help" Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN) February 13, 1994. p. 23A. Copyright 1994 Star Tribune.
- ²⁶ Scialabba, George. "Dark journey: a journalist's tour of our coming apart" September 27, 1998 The Boston Globe. p. F2 Copyright 1998 Globe Newspaper Company. Also See: Stewart, Walter. "He's Afraid of a Big Bad World" The Toronto Sun, February 21, 1994. p. 11. Copyright 1994 Toronto Sun Publishing Corporation. - "He [Kaplan] adds, 'Quebec, based on the bedrock of Roman Catholicism and francophone ethnicity, could yet turn out to be North America's most cohesive and crime-free state.' Hmmm. I wouldn't bet the farm on Quebec's 'Roman Catholicism' as a continuing crutch, but the rest of the "argument holds."
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- ²⁸ Stewart, Walter. "He's Afraid of a Big Bad World" The Toronto Sun, February 21, 1994. p. 11. Copyright 1994 Toronto Sun Publishing Corporation.
- ²⁹ Oliver, Dean. "Yankee Come Home: Can the U.S. afford its empire?" The Ottawa Citizen, August 6, 2000. p. C14. Copyright 2000 CanWest Interactive. CanWest Global Communications Corp.
- ³⁰ White, Robert J. "When the threat is 'criminal anarchy,' diplomacy is not much help" Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN) February 13, 1994. p. 23A. Copyright 1994 Star Tribune.
- ³¹ "Kaplan is never less than provocative...his theme is too important to dismiss." - Provizer, Norman. "End of the Cold War Offers Harsh Lessons" March 5, 2000 p. 3E. Denver Rocky Mountain News (Colorado). Copyright 2000 Denver Publishing Company.
- ³² "His article makes for rewarding, provocative, but not altogether persuasive reading." - Feeney, Mark. "21st-century headaches, wonk wit, the Bang game; LITERARY LIFE" The Boston Globe. February 9, 1994. p. 67. Copyright 1994. Globe Newspaper Company.
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- ³⁶ "...Robert Kaplan writes a gripping, sobering, alarming essay..." - Simula, Vern. The Finnish American Reporter. Hancock: Jun 1994. Vol. 7, Iss. 6; pg. 9
- ³⁷ "It was probably Kaplan's portrait of a 'bifurcated' world that most readers found interesting, persuasive, and even predictive." - Kagan, Robert. "Inside the limo" The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs
- ³⁸ "...provocative and interestingly scary." - The Economist. "Tea leaves" February 23, 2002 U.S. Edition. Copyright 2002 The Economist Newspaper Ltd.
- ³⁹ "As with all of Kaplan's work, solid journalism combines with a gloomy sense of history to produce a worthy study." - Kirkus Reviews, August 15, 2000. Copyright 2000 Kirkus Service, Inc.
- ⁴⁰ "...Mr. Kaplan's bold assertions do concentrate the mind." - Bernstein, Richard. "Books of the Times; Dashing Shortlived Hopes of Global Harmony" The New York Times, February 23, 2000. Section E; Page 9; Column 1; The Arts/Cultural Desk Copyright 2000. The New York Times Company
- ⁴¹ "...Kaplan offers a profound challenge to conventional thinking about the direction of the world." - Shane, Scott. "'Coming Anarchy': A very grim world" The Sun. Baltimore, Md.: Feb 13, 2000. pg. 11.F
- ⁴² As quoted in, Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.
- ⁴³ "...Kaplan's pessimism...is certainly not beyond rebuttal.... Kaplan is never less than provocative. True, he tosses out a number of those provocative ideas in an unsatisfying and offhand fashion....'Journalistic careers,' Kaplan writes, 'are rarely built on embracing realism.' He is a clear exception to that rule and that is to the benefit of us all - not because he is necessarily right or strikingly original, but, rather, because he makes the reader think hard thoughts when we would all rather dream." - Provizer, Norman. "End of the Cold War Offers Harsh Lessons" March 5, 2000 p. 3E. Denver Rocky Mountain News (Colorado). Copyright 2000 Denver Publishing Company.

⁴⁴ As quoted in, Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.

⁴⁵ "In these big-thinking essays about the future of the world, Robert D. Kaplan sometimes comes across as your grumbling uncle who can find a new cloud inside every silver lining...outlandish statements [which] may lead a reader to dismiss Kaplan as merely perverse. But despite an outsized ego and a tendency to follow his theories beyond the bounds of common sense, Kaplan offers a profound challenge to conventional thinking about the direction of the world....Even if you shake your head at his extreme prognostications, you may catch yourself fearing that he is right. That's because what Kaplan describes as his "realist" analysis -- he rejects the pessimist label -- fits recent history uncomfortably well....Steeped in history and literature, Kaplan may underestimate the ways in which information technology and global trade have made historical precedents less relevant. He ignores the Internet. His world view was shaped in the caldrons of the Balkans and Africa; it might be different if he had spent more time in, say, Southeast Asia." - Shane, Scott. "'Coming Anarchy': A very grim world" *The Sun*. Baltimore, Md.: Feb 13, 2000. pg. 11.F

⁴⁶ As quoted in, Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.

⁴⁷ Garfinkle, Adam. "The Sky Is Always Falling" *The New York Times*, March 19, 2000. Section 7; Page 27; Column 2; Book Review Desk. Copyright 2000 The New York Times Company.

⁴⁸ Garfinkle, Adam. "The Sky Is Always Falling" *The New York Times*, March 19, 2000. Section 7; Page 27; Column 2; Book Review Desk. Copyright 2000 The New York Times Company.

⁴⁹ Excerpt from Mandelbaum, Michael. "Falling Apart" *The Washington Post*, March 5, 2000. p. X06. As quoted in, Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.

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⁵² Feeney, Mark. "21st-century headaches, wonk wit, the Bang game; LITERARY LIFE" *The Boston Globe* February 9, 1994. p. 67 Copyright 1994. Globe Newspaper Company.

⁵³ Klare, Michael. *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict*. Metropolitan Books. As sourced in Lowrie, Arthur L. "U.S. Foreign Policy Revolves Around New Dynamics" *Tampa Tribune*, August 12, 2001. p. 4. Copyright 2001 The Tribune Co.

⁵⁴ Bennett, Philip. "Viewing the world through a dark crystal ball" May 20, 1996, *The Boston Globe*. p. 31. Copyright 1996 Globe Newspaper Company.

⁵⁵ "...Barton Biggs, the globetrotting chairman of Morgan Stanley Asset Management...says Kaplan's views have a familiar ring. 'I think he's one of these guys, like from the Club of Rome 20 years ago, who love to trot out a doom-and-gloom scenario. It's too pessimistic, and it's just plain wrong.'" - Serwer, Andrew E. "The end of the world is nigh - Or is it?" *Fortune*. New York: May 2, 1994. Vol. 129, Iss. 9; pg. 123, 2 pgs

⁵⁶ "'The Coming Anarchy' looked to many critics like little more than a perverse form of travel journalism with intellectual window-dressing. It certainly was no guide to the world's future." - Dabelko, Geoffrey D. "The Environmental Factor." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Autumn 1999): p 16.

⁵⁷ "'The Coming Anarchy' looked to many critics like little more than a perverse form of travel journalism with intellectual window-dressing. It certainly was no guide to the world's future." - Dabelko, Geoffrey D. "The Environmental Factor." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Autumn 1999): p 16.

⁵⁸ "The Kaplan piece draws all of these anxieties together into a coherent thesis: Environmental and demographic pressures, combined with the collapse of traditional nation-states, are bringing a period of profound instability and chaos. It is absorbing, fascinating, frightening stuff. It is also dead wrong." - Gee, Marcus. "Surprise! The world gets better" *World Press Review* v. 41 (July 1994) p. 18-20

⁵⁹ "As miserable as much of Africa may be, it is absurd to argue, as Kaplan does, that Africa -- and especially troubled West Africa -- is a reflection of what the whole world will be like in a few decades. Africa is an exception to the rule, a dark chapter in a much larger story. By and large, that story is one of remarkable, sustained, and dramatic progress. Despite all the looming troubles, so eloquently recounted by Kaplan, life for the majority of the world's citizens is getting steadily better in almost every category." - Gee, Marcus. "Surprise! The world gets better" *World Press Review* v. 41 (July 1994) p. 18-20

⁶⁰ "policy makers complain that Homer-Dixon and others [like Kaplan] fail to offer specific policy recommendations." - Dabelko, Geoffrey D. "The Environmental Factor." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Autumn 1999): p 19 .

⁶¹ "KAPLAN'S CHAOTIC ESSAY was a jeremiad aimed at the West, and, as with all jeremiads, it counted among the greatest of the sinners' sins their willful ignorance of the imminence of God's wrath and, perhaps even more damning, their refusal to heed the prophet's warning. What distinguished this from the traditional jeremiad, however, was that it was unclear what the sinners needed to do to reform

their ways. The traditional jeremiad offered a solution, a way of appeasing God and avoiding his just punishment. It aimed to convince men to reform their souls, to live more pious lives, to seek humility, to renounce worldly goods and worldly ambitions, to do God's bidding. Although in his sketchy indictment of the West, Kaplan cited the usual list of sins-crass materialism, hypocrisy, ignorance, arrogance, hubris about mankind's mastery over the natural world and God's universe-he did not exhort the sinners to go and sin no more." - Kagan, Robert. "Inside the limo" *The New Republic*. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

⁶² "...[Kaplan] is a dark visionary who freely admits he has no policy solutions to offer." - Barthos, Gordon "The Future; The next century seen through a glass darkly" *The Toronto Star*. March 4, 1995. Insight; Pg. B8. Copyright 1995 Toronto Star Newspapers, Ltd.

⁶³ Scialabba, George. "Dark journey: a journalist's tour of our coming apart" September 27, 1998 *The Boston Globe*. p. F2 Copyright 1998 Globe Newspaper Company.

⁶⁴ "Kaplan's thesis was beset by critics on all sides - by defense planners and intellectuals concerned about diverting money and attention from the Pentagon's core war fighting mission...as well as by environmentalists who objected to the idea of defining the Environmental Security issue." - Dabelko, Geoffrey D. "The Environmental Factor." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Autumn 1999): p 16.

⁶⁵ "It will always be difficult to sustain public support for long-term efforts to alleviate suffering abroad. But elevating these efforts to national security doctrine and overstating the security consequences of inaction is not only inaccurate - it is also likely to backfire. The public would not long endorse a foreign policy that glossed over great power relations, ignored the morality of foreign regimes, undervalued democracy, and assumed American decline. Those who are flirting with the chaos doctrine are flirting with disaster." - Rosner, Jeremy D. "Is Chaos America's Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton's Team" *The Washington Post*. Washington, D.C.: Aug 14, 1994. pg. c.01

⁶⁶ "...environmentally-driven anarchy is more than a Third World problem. Kaplan suggests it is 'the national security issue of the early 21st century' and should replace George Kennan's strategy of containment as the driving concern of American foreign policy. This is a bold claim that deserves critical analysis and debate...Resource constraints clearly play a role in its conflicts, and the United States can and should devote more attention to humanitarian concerns abroad. But that is not the same as calling such concerns America's most important national security challenge. That approach is more likely to endanger support for needed humanitarian and environmental programs abroad, as the public begins to question the priorities of those making the case...Indeed, there are clear flaws in elevating a concern over the developing world's chaos to the level of national security doctrine. It ignores bigger threats. It assumes great powers and nation states (including the United States) are of declining importance. It undervalues moral accountability. And it tends to lack the emphasis...on the promotion of democracy abroad." - Rosner, Jeremy D. "Is Chaos America's Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton's Team" *The Washington Post*. Washington, D.C.: Aug 14, 1994. pg. c.01

⁶⁷ Dabelko, Geoffrey D. "The Environmental Factor." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Autumn 1999): p 16.

⁶⁸ "Mr. Kaplan's thin, unfootnoted book of essays...[whose] breezy chapters slip annoyingly into me-journalism: 'I was there,' he broods metaphorically (and sometimes literally), 'so I know.'" - Oliver, Dean. "Yankee Come Home: Can the U.S. afford its empire?" *The Ottawa Citizen*, August 6, 2000. p. C14. Copyright 2000 CanWest Interactive. CanWest Global Communications Corp.

⁶⁹ "Reporters like to think that their operative principle is 'Because it matters, I see it'; too often, a more accurate statement would be 'I see it, therefore it matters.' At one point, Kaplan writes of the massive new Ataturk Dam in Turkey, "The emerging power of the Turks was palpable." As he describes the dam, one does not doubt that palpability - for someone there. To someone looking at a statistical abstract of Istanbul, that emerging power might not - nor should it? - seem so palpable. This may be the foremost limitation of on-the-ground knowledge." - Feeney, Mark. "21st-century headaches, wonk wit, the Bang game; LITERARY LIFE" *The Boston Globe* February 9, 1994. p. 67 Copyright 1994. Globe Newspaper Company.

⁷⁰ Kirkus Reviews December 15, 1999. Copyright 1999 Kirkus Service, Inc.

⁷¹ Khanna, Parag. "Tragic realism; Robert D Kaplan's books may be out of print in Britain, but he is emerging as one of the most influential commentators on the new world order" *New Statesman* February 25, 2002. Copyright 2002 New Statesman Ltd.

⁷² Walker, Peter. "Letters; This World" *The San Francisco Chronicle*. April 17, 1994. This World. p. 2/Z1. Copyright 1994 The Chronicle Publishing Co.

⁷³ Walker, Peter. "Letters; This World" *The San Francisco Chronicle*. APRIL 17, 1994. This World. P. 2/Z1. Copyright 1994 The Chronicle Publishing Co.

⁷⁴ Walker, Peter. "Letters; This World" The San Francisco Chronicle. APRIL 17, 1994. This World. P. 2/Z1. Copyright 1994 The Chronicle Publishing Co.

⁷⁵ "Mathews and others who argued for a broad redefinition of security sought to place the physical health of the individual or the society, rather than just the territory of the state, at the center of what was to be secured. Beginning in the early 1990s, Homer-Dixon and other 'second wave' scholars and practitioners [like Kaplan]...narrowed the scope to focus on environmental stress that causes or triggers violence...During the second wave, researchers asked only how the environment might contribute to conflict, not why it might do so in some cases and not others." - Dabelko, Geoffrey D. "The Environmental Factor." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Autumn 1999): p 18.

⁷⁶ "...should focus more on why people facing scarcity and resource disputes often turn away from violent conflict - for example, how a democratic movement could have been born out of Soweto's poverty, or why Mexico does not engage in state-sponsored terrorism against the United States." - Rosner, Jeremy D. "Is Chaos America's Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton's Team" The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Aug 14, 1994. pg. c.01

⁷⁷ Homer-Dixon, Thomas. "Is Anarchy Coming? A Response to the Optimists" Toronto Globe and Mail. May 10, 1994.

⁷⁸ Sanger, Clyde. "Glimmers in Africa's Darkness" The Toronto Star, May 21, 2000. Copyright 2000 Toronto Star Newspapers, Ltd.

⁷⁹ Shane, Scott. "'Coming Anarchy': A very grim world" The Sun. Baltimore, Md.: Feb 13, 2000. pg. 11.F

⁸⁰ Feeney, Mark. "21st-century headaches, wonk wit, the Bang game; LITERARY LIFE" The Boston Globe February 9, 1994. p. 67 Copyright 1994. Globe Newspaper Company.

⁸¹ Oliver, Dean. "Yankee Come Home: Can the U.S. afford its empire?" The Ottawa Citizen, August 6, 2000. p. C14. Copyright 2000 CanWest Interactive. CanWest Global Communications Corp.

⁸² Garfinkle, Adam. "The Sky Is Always Falling" The New York Times, March 19, 2000. Section 7; Page 27; Column 2; Book Review Desk. Copyright 2000 The New York Times Company.

⁸³ Gee, Marcus. "Surprise! The world gets better" World Press Review v. 41 (July 1994) p. 18-20

⁸⁴ Kagan, Robert. "Inside the limo" The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs Also see: Dabelko, Geoffrey D. "The Environmental Factor." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Autumn 1999): p 14. - "President Bill Clinton suggested that 'the coming anarchy' might be the successor vision to Mel Gibson's...*The Road Warrior*."

⁸⁵ "Even if you shake your head at his extreme prognostications, you may catch yourself fearing that he is right." - Shane, Scott. "'Coming Anarchy': A very grim world" The Sun. Baltimore, Md.: Feb 13, 2000. pg. 11.F

⁸⁶ "Is Mr. Kaplan too gloomy? Probably he is." - Lewis, Anthony. "Abroad at Home; A Bleak Vision" The New York Times, March 7, 1994. Section A; Page 17; Column 1; Editorial Desk. Copyright 1994 The New York Times Company.

⁸⁷ "National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and other key officials have dismissed Kaplan's impressions of Africa as overly gloomy - as, reportedly, did Clinton." - Rosner, Jeremy D. "Is Chaos America's Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton's Team" The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Aug 14, 1994. pg. c.01

⁸⁸ "The journalist Robert Kaplan portrayed an extremely pessimistic view of Africa in his 1994 article, 'The Coming Anarchy.'" - Challenor, Herschelle S. "The African Renaissance: Illusion or Reality." *Black Renaissance* Spring 2002. Vol.4, Iss. 1; pg. 130. Johns Hopkins SFX.

⁸⁹ "Kaplan acknowledges that time has proved some of his books overly pessimistic in places, but says their continuing sales suggest the questions they raise 'continue to be relevant.'" - Ringle, Ken. "Oracle of a New World Disorder; Robert Kaplan's Global Journeys Took Him Into the Culture of War" The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Feb 21, 2002. pg. C.01.

⁹⁰ Kagan, Robert. "Inside the limo" The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

⁹¹ "As miserable as much of Africa may be, it is absurd to argue, as Kaplan does, that Africa - and especially troubled West Africa - is a reflection of what the whole world will be like in a few decades. Africa is an exception to the rule, a dark chapter in a much larger story. By and large, that story is one of remarkable, sustained, and dramatic progress. Despite all the looming troubles, so eloquently recounted by Kaplan, life for the majority of the world's citizens is getting steadily better in almost every category." - Gee, Marcus. "Surprise! The world gets better" World Press Review v. 41 (July 1994) p. 18-20

⁹² "The problems he [Kaplan] writes about - soil erosion, air pollution, deforestation, the contamination of water supplies - are real. But are they serious enough to halt or even reverse human progress,

creating 'a run-down, crowded planet of skinhead Cossacks and juju warriors...battling over scraps of overused earth'? The evidence is slim" - Gee, Marcus. "Surprise! The world gets better" *World Press Review* v. 41 (July 1994) p. 18-20

⁹³ "Assertions like that are so sweepingly speculative that they are both irrefutable and unprovable. The dire conclusion about coming anarchy seems overdrawn. West African states may indeed face 'an anarchic implosion of criminal violence,' but it does not necessarily follow that West Africa will prove a paradigm for 'most of the rest of the world' or that its collapse would profoundly shake the foundations of European and American democracy." - Bernstein, Richard. "Books of the Times; Dashing Shortlived Hopes of Global Harmony" *The New York Times*, February 23, 2000. Section E; Page 9; Column 1; The Arts/Cultural Desk Copyright 2000. The New York Times Company.

⁹⁴ Kagan, Robert. "Inside the limo" *The New Republic*. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

⁹⁵ Dabelko, Geoffrey D. "The Environmental Factor." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Autumn 1999): p 16.

⁹⁶ Kagan, Robert. "Inside the limo" *The New Republic*. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

⁹⁷ Kagan, Robert. "Inside the limo" *The New Republic*. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

⁹⁸ "Recent scientific studies confirm that the Earth's basic resources are vastly greater than what are needed to feed even the 10 billion people who are almost certain to inhabit the planet by the middle of the next century. The real threat is not that the Earth will run out of land, topsoil, or water but that nations will fail to pursue the economic, trade and research policies that can increase the production of food, limit environmental damage, and ensure that resources reach the people who need them. Indeed, embracing the myth of environmental scarcity could ironically prompt the United States and other countries to adopt policies that virtually guarantee that the apocalyptic future that environmentalists foretell really does come true." - Budiansky, Stephen. "10 billion for dinner, please" *U.S. News & World Report*; September 12, 1994; *World Report*, Vol. 117, No. 10; Pg. 57. Copyright 1994 U.S. News & World Report.

⁹⁹ "By every measure life on Earth is getting better...consider, one by one, the robust state of the Earth's vital signs...children born [Infant mortality rate decreasing]...life expectancy in the Third World has grown...if education is a key to development - and everyone agrees that it is - prospects for growth have never been better...the world economy had grown...more than enough to outstrip the population increase...expansion of world trade [where]...developing countries will get freer access to rich-world markets for some of their main exports...world fertility rate has fallen dramatically...[and] could drop still further...[regardless of declines in fertility] the Earth has the capacity to sustain far more people than it does today...increase in food production...food prices...have been dropping for decades...many conflicts have drawn to a close in recent years..." - Gee, Marcus. "Surprise! The world gets better" *World Press Review* v. 41 (July 1994) p. 18-20

¹⁰⁰ "...the crises of war and state collapse in the West African state of Sierra Leone, which has been devastated by a civil rebellion which began ostensibly as armed incursions from neighbouring war-torn Liberia in 1991. It critically examines current literature on the crises, including Robert Kaplan's use of the country as a case study for his views on the "coming anarchy," and concludes that the dynamics of the country's collapse are far less mysterious and more pedestrian than the spurious environmental and cultural essentialism which Kaplan ascribes to it." - Gberie, Lansana, M.A., MA Thesis: "War and state collapse: The case of Sierra Leone" Wilfrid Laurier University (Canada), 1998, 164 pages; AAT MQ24378

¹⁰¹ "The British prophesied the breakup of India 50 years ago and were proved wrong; Robert D. Kaplan's fear...of India's becoming a failed state is equally groundless." - Gumaste, Vivek. "India, the Mosaic" *The New York Times*, March 26, 2000. Section 4; Page 16; Column 5; Editorial Desk. Copyright 2000 The New York Times Company

¹⁰² "...one need not be a dreamy optimist to challenge the implication of his [Kaplan's] assertion that 'Israel is destined to be a Jewish ethnic fortress amid a vast and volatile realm of Islam.' The implication of continued isolation is contradicted by the current enlargement of Arab-Israeli cooperation, which in turn will deepen Islamic-Jewish cooperation." - White, Robert J. "When the threat is 'criminal anarchy,' diplomacy is not much help" *Star Tribune* (Minneapolis, MN) February 13, 1994. p. 23A. Copyright 1994 Star Tribune.

¹⁰³ Kagan, Robert. "Inside the limo" *The New Republic*. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

¹⁰⁴ Scialabba, George. "Dark journey: a journalist's tour of our coming apart" September 27, 1998 *The Boston Globe*. p. F2 Copyright 1998 Globe Newspaper Company.

¹⁰⁵ "KAPLAN'S ATTEMPT TO turn West Africa into a window on the entire world's future was, of course, labored. West African states may indeed face 'an anarchic implosion of criminal violence,' but it does not necessarily follow that West Africa will prove a paradigm for 'most of the rest of the world' or that its collapse would profoundly shake the foundations of European and American democracy." - Bernstein, Richard. "Books of the Times; Dashing Shortlived Hopes of Global Harmony" The New York Times, February 23, 2000. Section E; Page 9; Column 1; The Arts/Cultural Desk Copyright 2000. The New York Times Company

¹⁰⁶ "The biggest flaw in Kaplan's thesis is that he assumes the chaos in West Africa and the Balkans will spread to the rest of the world. For over 1,000 years, Balkan peoples have battled each other, pausing only during the regimes of strong-arm rulers like Tito. In West Africa, tribalism has been the rule, not the exception, throughout history. Despite long-festering regional conflicts, the world has managed to wipe out dozens of diseases and reduce infant mortality rates. In country after country, free markets are making people's lives better." - Serwer, Andrew E. "The end of the world is nigh - Or is it?" Fortune. New York: May 2, 1994. Vol. 129, Iss. 9; pg. 123, 2 pgs

¹⁰⁷ "Let me start with his 'absurd claim that many people in the developing countries 'find war and barracks existence a step up rather than a step down.'" I spent two years working in a small village in Sierra Leone as a Peace Corps volunteer, and I have worked and lived elsewhere in Africa and Asia. I can assure Mr. Kaplan that the vast majority of people in these countries who live on the edge of subsistence view war with profound dread. War displaces poor people from their meager sources of livelihood. Where there is little hope of assistance from governments, the result is invariably the kind of misery and humiliation that we have seen recently in Somalia. To imply that Africans see this as a 'step up' is insulting." - Walker, Peter. "Letters; This World" The San Francisco Chronicle. APRIL 17, 1994. This World. P. 2/Z1. Copyright 1994 The Chronicle Publishing Co.

¹⁰⁸ "In fact, while many ethnic, environmental, and other humanitarian problems do cross borders, it is nation states, with their armies, governments, laws and legitimacy that are - and will remain - the dominant force in world affairs. And from the Balkans to the Mideast to Asia, the greatest threat to peace remains the ambitions of nation states and leaders who are hostile to democracy and norms of international behavior." - Rosner, Jeremy D. "Is Chaos America's Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton's Team" The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Aug 14, 1994. pg. c.01

¹⁰⁹ Varshney, Ashutosh. "Population and Anarchy" October 21, 1999. Section A; Page 24; Column 6; Editorial Desk. The New York Times. Copyright 1999 The New York Times Company.

¹¹⁰ "The question of individual responsibility never arises... The threats cited by mainstream foreign policy theorists - aggression, terrorism - imply intent. Chaos and anarchy imply randomness. Wars are launched. But the threats of chaos... 'metastasize.' Human agency is absent. This environmental determinism devalues individual choice. It shares overtones with those who suggest that violent urban criminals are simply victims of their surroundings. (Any who think this a false criticism might ask why the photos scattered through Kaplan's article include one of rioters in Los Angeles following the Rodney King verdict; there is no explanation for its inclusion, but the implication is that these too are environmental victims.)" - Rosner, Jeremy D. "Is Chaos America's Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton's Team" The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Aug 14, 1994. pg. c.01

¹¹¹ "...democracy and markets are not at the top of the chaos agenda. Kaplan, for example, argues: 'Democracy is problematic; scarcity is more certain.' In other words, human nature may explain our increasing environmental messes, but not, say, the tide of democratic reform that has swept through the former Soviet Union, Latin America, and elsewhere." - Rosner, Jeremy D. "Is Chaos America's Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton's Team" The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Aug 14, 1994. pg. c.01

¹¹² "On a critical note, Kaplan's analysis fails to appreciate the changing nature of state sovereignty and international norms, highlighted by former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet's recent confinement in Britain, humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and the growing influence of non- state actors. In addition, his gloomy view of the world (which he would argue is only prudent) does not permit any room for mitigating circumstances - such as technological innovation, nascent democratic roots in Latin America or a leveling of world population growth." - McKenna, Peter. "Author takes measure of 'new world disorder'" The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec) April 8, 2000. p. J3. Copyright 2000 CanWest Interactive. CanWest Global Communications Corp.

¹¹³ "On a critical note, Kaplan's analysis fails to appreciate the changing nature of state sovereignty and international norms, highlighted by former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet's recent confinement in Britain, humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and the growing influence of non- state actors. In addition, his gloomy view of the world (which he would argue is only prudent) does not permit any room for mitigating circumstances - such as technological innovation, nascent democratic roots in Latin

America or a leveling of world population growth.” - McKenna, Peter. “Author takes measure of ‘new world disorder’” *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec) April 8, 2000. p. J3. Copyright 2000 CanWest Interactive. CanWest Global Communications Corp.

¹¹⁴ “...Kaplan ignores key trends such as declining global rates of child mortality and rising Third World rates of food production, literacy, and life expectancy.” - Rosner, Jeremy D. “Is Chaos America’s Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton’s Team” *The Washington Post*. Washington, D.C.: Aug 14, 1994. pg. c.01

¹¹⁵ “Students in Kaplan’s audience suggested he was blind to real progress being made in food production, disease control, the promotion of democracy and human rights.” - Barthos, Gordon “The Future; The next century seen through a glass darkly” *The Toronto Star*. March 4, 1995. Insight; Pg. B8. Copyright 1995 Toronto Star Newspapers, Ltd.

¹¹⁶ “‘In almost any way you care to measure, life is getting better for people in developing nations,’ says Biggs. ‘In China, Thailand, India, Pakistan, and Mexico, living standards are rising and life expectancy is up. Per capita income is increasing rapidly.’” - Serwer, Andrew E. “The end of the world is nigh - Or is it?” *Fortune*. New York: May 2, 1994. Vol. 129, Iss. 9; pg. 123, 2 pgs

¹¹⁷ “Steeped in history and literature, Kaplan may underestimate the ways in which information technology and global trade have made historical precedents less relevant. He ignores the Internet. His world view was shaped in the caldrons of the Balkans and Africa; it might be different if he had spent more time in, say, Southeast Asia.” - Shane, Scott. “‘Coming Anarchy’: A very grim world” *The Sun*. Baltimore, Md.: Feb 13, 2000. pg. 11.F

¹¹⁸ “Nor is there [within ‘The Coming Anarchy’] any mention of some of the proximate external determinants of political anarchy in the developing world - namely, World Bank and International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs, unstinting Western support for military institutions and restrictive and discriminatory global trade practices... The fact of the matter is that Kaplan’s book is uncomfortable not because of what it says but rather what it omits. Significantly, his obsession with the fallout of the new world “disorder” for the citizens of the West precludes him from recognizing that the coming anarchy has a great deal to do with the deliberate policies and actions of Western governments and peoples themselves.” - McKenna, Peter. “Author takes measure of ‘new world disorder’” *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec) April 8, 2000. p. J3. Copyright 2000 CanWest Interactive. CanWest Global Communications Corp.

¹¹⁹ “There is, however, one element missing in this thesis. In discussing the erosion of the nation-state, Kaplan doesn’t even mention, much less deal with, one of its successors, the corporate state. Amazingly, in discussing the degradation of the planet, he blips over the role of the global conglomerates whose striving for growth and profits at any cost to the ecosystem, much less the people of the planet, accounts for so much of the damage. Some of our corporations are larger, more aggressive, and patently more lawless than many of our nations.”¹¹⁹ - Stewart, Walter. “He’s Afraid of a Big Bad World” *The Toronto Sun*, February 21, 1994. p. 11. Copyright 1994 Toronto Sun Publishing Corporation.

¹²⁰ “[Robert] Wright believes that the process of interdependence and the growing logic behind cooperation is now moving so fast that the world is going to reach a system of institutionalized cooperation among nations that is so thorough it qualifies as world governance. Kaplan believes that the world is moving very slowly and inexorably out of the nation-state phase. That may ultimately lead to something better, but the process of leading to something better is very chaotic.” - Robert Wright, Robert Kaplan. “Mr. Order meets Mr. Chaos” *Foreign Policy*. Washington: May/Jun 2001. Iss. 124; pg. 50, 11 pgs.

¹²¹ Bennett, Philip. “Viewing the world through a dark crystal ball” May 20, 1996, *The Boston Globe*. p. 31. Copyright 1996 Globe Newspaper Company.

¹²² “It is anti-political. It discounts the capacity of individuals to work cooperatively in the face of calamity or to negotiate fair shares in the face of scarcity. It ignores how vast an influence culture, religion, and political institutions play - in the Third World as elsewhere - in mediating responses to hardship.” - Rosner, Jeremy D. “Is Chaos America’s Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton’s Team” *The Washington Post*. Washington, D.C.: Aug 14, 1994. pg. c.01

¹²³ “Kaplan may be right, but surely we cannot live as if that were the case. As Jean Paul Sartre said, we may not be able to bequeath a better world to our children, but we must always live as if we could. The task is no different now than it was in other times of megacrisis: it is to look beyond the dangers and to seek out the opportunities... Looking across the horizon, I see three clusters of opportunity: the rise of interdependence in the face of environmental and economic globalization; the rise of local initiatives around the world as people demand more control over their own lives; and the growing realization that knowledge and innovation (technological and social) are essential keys to prosperity.” -

Bezanson, Keith. "The global crisis machine; Canadians must help find new ways to stop it and shift it into reverse" The Ottawa Citizen, March 24, 1994. p. A9. Copyright 1994. CanWest Interactive. CanWest Global Communications Corp.

¹²⁴ Klasky, Philip M. "Letters; This World" The San Francisco Chronicle. April 17, 1994. This World. P. 2/Z1. Copyright 1994 The Chronicle Publishing Co.

II.C) Works Regarding Select Components of the Anarchy Thesis:

Environmental Security, Resources, and Conflict; and Intrastate Conflict

It is the interpretation of this refutation that the core prophecy of the anarchy thesis is that, due to environmental and demographic stresses, non-nation state actors will engage in conflicts over scarce resources that, if not prevented in some way, will weaken their own countries' governments and spill over international borders creating an anarchy-like future. Due to this interpretation, that among other things, anarchy is a function of conflict, the scholarly work and literature regarding two groups of conflict-related matter need to be addressed. First, because conflict is a function of the environment and resource scarcity it is necessary for this refutation to discuss the concepts of environmental security, and the relationship between resources and conflict. Second, to ensure that an unbiased understanding of non-nation state conflict is presented, and because conflict is a function of things other than the environment or resource scarcity, causes of intrastate conflict, other than resources or the environment, must also be discussed. It is within this section that works regarding these core components of the anarchy thesis will be introduced and discussed.

II.C.i) Environmental Security, Resources, and Conflict

As the topic of resource-scarcity-caused conflict is commonly linked with environmental degradation, population growth, and security (so-called environmental security or EcoViolence arguments), works that relate to these subjects, which have not been previously presented, and are relevant to this refutation, will be discussed here.

Although the topic of environmental security will be the forefront of this section, this refutation is not so much interested in all of the components of the complex environmental security debate as it is with a few specific components as the subject relates to the core of Kaplan's anarchy thesis. The works representing these relevant subjects will be presented as either supporting Kaplan's anarchy thesis (sharing the opinion that the environment should be considered a security threat and resource scarcity may lead to conflict), or challenging the anarchy thesis (believing instead that the environment should not be considered a security threat, that resource scarcity may not lead to conflict, or otherwise contradict the anarchy thesis). Lastly, because one of the concerns of this refutation, as was stated in the "Statement of the Problem" section, is the possibility of "The Coming Anarchy" instilling fear in educators, students, voters, and policy-makers, which could possibly lead to unjustified interventions, literature that supports the idea that the environmental security argument could be, or is being, manipulated to achieve ulterior motives will also be presented here.

Before outlining the different camps within the resources-conflict subject, it is first necessary to briefly introduce the changing character of security as it is related to the environment so to give the resources-conflict subject policy relevance and historical context. The idea to expand national security to include environmental threats has been advocated by many individuals and international organizations with varying arguments. While some individuals reflected the belief that it was necessary to expand the notion of security based on the simple argument that to focus on military threats exclusively is inadequate and omits a large portion of other threats, including the environment (Ullman, 1983), some international reports even went so far as to state that "the whole notion of security as traditionally understood - in terms

of political and national threats to sovereignty - must be expanded to include the growing impacts of environmental stress-locally, nationally, regionally, and globally.”¹ Other individuals wanted to broaden the concept of security not only to include environmental threats but also natural resources and demographic components, with specific concerns that factors surrounding population growth, environmental degradation, and renewable resources, could create so-called “environmental refugees” and civil unrest (Matthews, 1989). Stimulated by the notion of the environment, and related issues, being labeled as security threats, some scholars expressed that “environmental problems cannot be isolated from underlying social, economic, and political causes” and that further studies needed to be conducted to better understand the link between security and the resources (Gleick, 1991).

Concerns over the environment as a security threat went as far up the political ladder as to include President Clinton (Clinton, 1995), and suggestions on how to best address these threats included an increased role of the U.S. Department of Defense (Butts, 1994), and even preemptive military action to be used to stop or diminish such threats internationally (Butts, 1999). Conversely, others who, although agreed that the environment was a security threat, were critical of the use of the military as the most appropriate tool to combat environmental issues fearing that a military approach would bar more internationally cooperative solutions (Barnett, 2001). Regardless of the method of handling environmental threats, others believed that environmental security was a fundamental shift in international relations where the nation-state was the only vantage point for security concerns (Dyer, 2001), while others simply believed that wars or conflicts remedying intrastate or interstate “maladaptions,” including those over natural resource distributions or scarcities, were simply the continuation of the traditional use of war as an adaptive mechanism (McNeely, 2000).

Lastly, other scholars disagreed entirely with the notion of the environment being labeled as a security issue for many reasons, including arguments similar to Barnett's (Barnett, 2001), that the notion of "security" implicitly removes nonviolent responses to environmental concerns (Conca, 1994), or that militarizing the environmental issue and the notion of "Environmental Security" not only questions the foundations of sovereignty and security, but also undermines the environmental cause by potentially becoming a self fulfilling prophecy (Deudney, 1991).

Although the environmental security argument is directly related to the anarchy thesis in many ways, Kaplan himself has been mentioned as a proponent of an environmental-pressure-related neo-Malthusianism viewpoint in literature on the issue (Soysa, 2002), the major link between the anarchy thesis and the environmental security argument revolves around one specific issue: the relationship between resources and conflict. The causal relationship between resources and conflict expressed within the anarchy thesis is an obvious projection of a core component of the environmental security argument. That there is a causal relationship between resources, the environment, and conflict is a view shared by many scholars both within and out of the environmental security camp. While some cite an impending environmental crisis as being, short of nuclear war, the greatest threat to the security of all nations (Myers, 1993), others specifically believe that scarce resources and increased demands on resources from population growth simply amplify the potential for international conflict (Soroos, 1992; Myers, Simon, 1994).

Works presented by an individual who is cited specifically by Kaplan in "The Coming Anarchy" and who is the leader of what has become known as the "Toronto Group," Thomas Homer-Dixon, have strongly contributed to the resource scarcity-

conflict argument (Homer-Dixon 1991; 1994; 1999). In his 1999 work, Homer-Dixon puts forth the argument that,

...many developing countries face increasingly complex, fast-moving, and interacting environmental scarcities. These scarcities can overwhelm efforts to produce constructive change and can actually reduce a country's ability to deliver reform. Consequently, environmental scarcity sometimes helps to drive societies into a self-reinforcing spiral of violence, institutional dysfunction, and social fragmentation.²

Also in his 1999 work, Homer-Dixon presents his argument that scarcities can result in two forms of conflict, the first being, "ethnic clashes arising from population migration and deepened social cleavages due to environmental scarcity" and the second being, "civil strife...caused by environmental scarcity that affects economic productivity and, in turn, people's livelihoods, the behavior of elite groups, and the ability of states to meet these changing demands."³

Others refer to these scarcities simply as "trigger mechanisms" that can result in violent conflicts (Baechler, 1999), which can, in-turn, reinforce scarcities and thusly encourage more conflict (Martin, Szuter 1999). Some scholars have stated that the type of resources, such as oil, is a determinant to whether or not conflict occurs (Ross, 2004); similarly, others have attempted to create systems to determine which scarcities and environmental conditions cause conflict (Allenby, 2000). Others still, have emphasized situational aspects revolving around resource scarcities and the prospect of violent conflict, such as whether or not the nation is dependent on the sale of primary natural resources (Collier, Bannon, 2003), or that the regime type or other factors are detrimental to the result of scarcity-caused violence (Barnett, 2001; Gleditsch, 1997).

Many scholars are in disagreement with the theory of a causal relationship between scarcity and conflict for numerous reasons. Some directly confront the science and method of the resource-conflict argument put forth by Homer-Dixon and others (Hartmann, 2001; Peluso, Watts, 2001). Other critics, while acknowledging examples of resource wars in history, believe that resource scarcity-conflicts, especially between states, are unlikely to occur now or in the future (Deudney, 1991; 1999). Some scholars believe that there is no relationship between certain resources, such as those that are “lootable,” like narcotics or precious stones, or even agricultural resources, and the likelihood of civil war (Ross, 2003). Others believe that while there may be a relationship between scarcity and conflict other factors mitigate the occurrence of violence, such as the emergence of democratic governments (Gleditsch, 1997), the role of markets and policy in influencing distribution, or in replenishing scarce resources (Haas, 2002; Lipschutz, 2003).

Some disagree with a scarcity-conflict argument because they have an entirely different view regarding the relationship between resources and conflict. For example, while some believe that resources may be a cause of conflict, others believe that the stronger relationship between resources and conflict is that resources serve as a source for funding of conflict rather than a cause of conflict (Le Billon, 2001), or that the scarcity of resources encourages innovation (Boserup, 1965; Tiffen, Mortimore, Gichuki 1994), or that resource abundance, not scarcity, is the cause of conflict (Collier, 2000; Collier, Hoeffler, 1998; 2000; Peluso, Watts, 2001). Others believe that the focus of the causal relationship between resources and conflict is wrong, citing the need to “denaturalize” the scarcity issue place additional consideration on social factors which lead to conflict (Lipschutz, 1997), the need to pay greater attention to role of anthropological issues and local political economies in areas of

conflict (Timura, 2001), or some even simply disagree with the scarcity-conflict argument addressing that the outbreak of conflict and the decision to avoid such conflict cannot be so easily simplified: “The implications of scarcity for conflict depend on a host of factors, some quantifiable, many not, which will impinge on decisions of how to cope with scarcity,” (Richards, 2002). Other scholars believe that the entire resource-conflict argument is irrelevant because, regardless of whether or not there is a causal relationship between scarcity and conflict, the world and human life in general is improving (Myers, Simon 1994), or that the world and the condition of the environment is not as bad environmental security advocates put forth (Lomborg, 2002).

Now, having stated a brief overview of the environmental security argument, having partially addressed some environmental security proponents view of the role of the military in countering environmental threats, as well as discussed the debates regarding the relationship between resources and violent conflict, here can be discussed some of the arguments from scholars who share a similar concern with this refutation: that the environmental security argument and the argument for a causal-link between resources and violent conflict could be, or is being, manipulated in an attempt to achieve ulterior motives.

Whether focusing on biodiversity loss and the threat of “eco-fascism” (Byers, 1994), posing the question of “security for whom?” and the threat of “eco-imperialism” (Dalby, 2002), or citing the incompatibility of traditional security methods with environmental problems and the threat of “eco-totalitarianism” (Deudney, 1999), the ulterior motive arguments present a similar concern: will environmental security become a tool of a hegemonic power to manipulate a “global

environmental imperative” argument so to, among other things, “limit southern development, or to control its political arrangements[?]”⁴ (Dalby 1999; Dyer 2001).

Three, of the many, issues regarding the misuse of the environmental security argument have been identified by scholars as follows: some state that interventions based on environmental security threats *could* be used as a provocation to fight to serve preexisting agendas (Haas, 2002; Timura, 2001); others criticize that the environmental security argument has *already created* situations where resource management has lead to “militaristic proportions” (Peluso, 1993); and others still, criticize that even *past* cases of violent conflict are being manipulated by environmental security proponents, such as Homer-Dixon, by being used as evidence of the link between scarce resources and violent conflict, while ignoring the more direct political roots of those conflicts (Timura, 2001).

Other misuses of, or ulterior motives for, those who put forth environmental security arguments, range from those who take advantage of the vagueness of the concept to manipulate funding or justify the continued existence of arguably obsolete institutions (Timura, 2001); ulterior motives that benefit developed countries by diverting attention away from the environmental problems related to their own internal consumption habits (Dalby, 1999); or even ulterior motives of the Pentagon to procure funding to repair environmental damages caused by their own military bases (Haas, 2002).

In conclusion of this subsection, the anarchy thesis has its roots in the environmental security camp, and “The Coming Anarchy” has even, as was mentioned above, been directly cited as an attempt to indirectly advance the environmental security argument via environmental-pressure-related neo-Malthusianism (Soysa, 2002). A major component of both the anarchy thesis and the

environmental security argument is the relationship between scarce resources and violent conflict. The literature on both the environmental security arguments and on the relationship between resources and violent conflict demonstrates not only that a causal link between scarce resources and violent conflict is questionable, and not only that military or interventionist remedies to environmental problems may be an inappropriate, but also, that those who advocate such responses may be motivated by varying ulterior motives. As such, this section contributes to the refutation of “The Coming Anarchy” by presenting counter opinions to Kaplan’s assumed link between resources and violent conflict, by presenting opinions against Kaplan’s implied interventionist remedy to environmental problems, and by presenting opinions that share the concern of this refutation, that the anarchy thesis could be used for ulterior motives other than environmental protection or humanitarian concerns.

II.C.ii) Causes of Intrastate Conflict

As was stated in the introduction to this section, it is the interpretation of this refutation that the core prophecy of the anarchy thesis is that, due to environmental and demographic stresses, non-nation state actors will engage in conflicts over scarce resources that, if not prevented in some way, will weaken their own countries’ governments and spill over international borders creating an anarchy-like future. Where the preceding subsection addressed a portion of this interpretation of the anarchy thesis by introducing perspectives regarding the environmental security argument and the relationship between resources and violent conflict, this subsection will address another portion of the core of the anarchy thesis, namely, non-nation state actors conflicting within a country, or intrastate conflict.

A discussion of intrastate conflict in general, and its causes, is essential to this refutation because although the main argument of the anarchy thesis regards the impact of the environment and scarcities on conflict and security, a refutation of “The Coming Anarchy” which only reviewed environmental security and resource scarcity literature would be lacking. It would be lacking because the environment and scarcities are not, according to Kaplan, the only causes of intrastate conflict and the anarchy that he foresees. This is evident in the following quote from “The Coming Anarchy”:

Future wars will be those of communal survival, aggravated or, in many cases, caused by environmental scarcity. These wars will be sub national, meaning that it will be hard for states and local governments to protect their own citizens physically. This is how many states will ultimately die.

This quote underscores two key points of Kaplan’s anarchy thesis. First, for Kaplan to state that war will be “in many cases caused by environmental scarcity” implies that his anarchic future, and the ultimate demise of the nation state, will be caused by situations of conflict brought about by things other than the environment or resource scarcity. Second, Kaplan directly cites these wars as being “sub national,” or rather, intrastate. Because Kaplan has introduced the existence of causes other than the environment and resource scarcity as facilitators of conflict at a “sub national” level, it is necessary for this refutation to identify what exactly, according to Kaplan, these other causes are, and to present the opinions of scholars regarding such causes from intrastate conflict literature. Before introducing the intrastate conflict literature, how this refutation interpreted Kaplan’s presentation of specific causes of intrastate conflict must be briefly discussed.

Although much of “The Coming Anarchy” is riddled with ambiguous implications and statements prophesizing the demise of specific nations, or nation states in general, such as: “But will the nation-state of Turkey, as presently constituted, be the inheritor of this wealth? I very much doubt it.” And, “The coming upheaval, in which foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts, will loom large in the century we are entering.” The article does, on rare occasion, make statements about specific causes for collapse, destabilization, or the break-up of specific countries. Examples of this include economics, water, communal violence, and urbanization in India,

Given that in 2025 India’s population could be close to 1.5 billion, that much of its economy rests on a shrinking natural-resource base, including dramatically declining water levels, and that communal violence and urbanization are spiraling upward, it is difficult to imagine that the Indian state will survive the next century.

Africa’s “distress” in the United States,

Africa may be marginal in terms of conventional late-twentieth-century conceptions of strategy, but in an age of cultural and racial clash, when national defense is increasingly local, Africa’s distress will exert a destabilizing influence on the United States.

Or religion, culture, and language in Canada,

Quebec, based on the bedrock of Roman Catholicism and Francophone ethnicity, could yet turn out to be North America’s most cohesive and crime-free nation-state.

Despite the ambiguous statements and these select specific causes, the majority of the “evidence” posited by Kaplan in support of the anarchy thesis is presented in a manner where information is put forth without explanation of that information’s relation to conflict or to state collapse, for example:

The yearly net population growth is 3.6 percent. This means that the Ivory Coast’s 13.5 million people will become 39 million by 2025, when much of the population will consist of urbanized peasants like

those of Chicago. But don't count on the Ivory Coast's still existing then. Chicago, which is more indicative of Africa's and the Third World's demographic present--and even more of the future--than any idyllic junglescape of women balancing earthen jugs on their heads, illustrates why the Ivory Coast, once a model of Third World success, is becoming a case study in Third World catastrophe.

It is because Kaplan presents his argument in this way, that this refutation must make certain assumptions regarding Kaplan's causal logic. Specifically, this refutation must assume that Kaplan is presenting this information as playing a causal role in the creation of conflict, state collapse, and eventual anarchy. In other words, because the final result of the anarchy thesis is, in part, violent, criminal, stateless, anarchy, this refutation assumes that every statement Kaplan makes within "The Coming Anarchy" is being presented as a contributing factor to that end. For example, although Kaplan does not specifically state, "population growth causes intrastate conflict," when Kaplan makes a statement within "The Coming Anarchy" such as "Over the next fifty years the earth's population will soar from 5.5 billion to more than nine billion," the statement is interpreted here as Kaplan citing population growth as, either directly or indirectly, having a causal relationship to conflict, state collapse, and eventual anarchy.

Based on this interpretation of Kaplan's statements, there are many places within "The Coming Anarchy" where Kaplan either directly or indirectly cites phenomena that he implies to have a role in "sub national" conflict and the eventual demise of the nation state. It is from these assertions that a list of Kaplan's causes for intrastate conflict has been developed.

Due to the fact that this list of intrastate conflict catalysts is both broad and numerous, the best approach to discuss each issue clearly, is to classify these causal factors as belonging to one of four groups: 1) structural factors, 2) political factors, 3) economic/social factors, and 4) cultural/perceptual factors.⁵ Additionally, each cause

listed within these respective categories is accompanied with a footnote providing quotations from “The Coming Anarchy” justifying its being classified as one of Kaplan’s causes of intrastate conflict.

Structural Factors:

Kaplan cites many causes that can be classified as structural factors (structural factors are factors relating to weak states, intrastate security concerns, and ethnic geography) that contribute to intrastate conflict. These include issues regarding Kaplan’s concerns pertaining to *state weaknesses*, such as failing states, government type, education, crime, and disease, concerns regarding the *military*, such as rogue military groups, shrinking state militaries, mercenaries, private security firms, drug cartels and urban mafias, and lastly, what Kaplan refers to as “*geographic destiny*,”⁶ which includes demographic issues, such as population growth, age structure, mass migration, and urbanization, as well as population concentration and colonial influence on ethnic groupings.

Structural Factor: state weaknesses

Kaplan directly and indirectly cites *state weaknesses* as being either a cause of, or a contributor to, conflict and the anarchy that he foresees. He does this by identifying weakness in states’ ability to protect its citizens,⁷ to protect its borders,⁸ to control its territory,⁹ to control its military,¹⁰ to control commerce and trade,¹¹ to provide social services,¹² to provide infrastructure¹³ or to improve current infrastructure.¹⁴ He even accuses some states as having artificial borders,¹⁵ as being incapable of adapting to a state system,¹⁶ of having weak political parties,¹⁷ weak financial institutions,¹⁸ and finally, Kaplan asserts, without the former support from Cold War allies¹⁹ all these

state weaknesses will lead to a withering away of central governments²⁰ in places that already had a “weak tradition of central government” to begin with.²¹

Although they may not agree with his overall thesis, it would be difficult to find intrastate conflict scholars to challenge Kaplan’s implication that a weak state, especially one containing all of the characteristics described above, contributes to a situation of intrastate conflict. Indeed some scholars specifically identify weak states as a starting point for analyses of internal conflict (Brown, 2003; Helman, 1992; Zartman, 1995), and even support many of Kaplan’s assertions, positing that when state structures weaken, violent conflict frequently follows due to intrastate power struggles, ethnic conflicts, and organized crime, with such conflict getting to a point where “the state in question might ultimately fragment or simply cease to exist as a political entity”(Brown, 2003). Similarly, others assert that a weak state may not only be a cause of intrastate conflict but that they may potentially contribute to violent conflict by inadvertently providing rebel forces with weapons via their inability to protect state armories or other government equipment (Collier et al., 2003). Aside from the obvious reasons why a weak state may be a *cause* of violent conflict, scholars assert that a weak state may also not be able to *prevent* the outbreak of intrastate conflict because of citizens’ lack of faith in the ability of their government to protect them; for example, “Deterring rebellion in its early stages requires an effective local presence of government and a willingness to share information on the part of the population....Local populations may neither appreciate nor trust weak states, which therefore lack the information to contain rebellion” (Collier et al., 2003). On the other hand, some scholars do not directly believe that state failure inevitably leads to intrastate conflict, but rather, assert that the relationship between state failure and internal conflict is “circular,” meaning that, weak states provide room for

rebellious groups and factions to gain strength, these non-state actors then diminish the states' ability to protect its citizens, which in-turn motivates the citizens to seek protection and to join groups other than state forces (Ayoob, 2003).

Aside from these opinions from the literature, that weak states play a causal role in intrastate conflict, inadvertently contribute to it, are unable to prevent it, or play a circular "feeding" role in intrastate conflict, there is an important factor from the intrastate conflict literature regarding weak states which not only needs mention, but also is a fact which Kaplan omits in his anarchy thesis. This is the assertion that state failure is a process, not a single event, and that the process is not, as Kaplan implies in "The Coming Anarchy," irreversible (Ayoob, 2003; Zartman, 1995).

Continuing with the relationship between state weaknesses and intrastate conflict, throughout "The Coming Anarchy" Kaplan makes numerous implications that the type of government has a role in either bringing about, or containing, intrastate conflict. He does this by negatively portraying regimes in West Africa as tyrannical²² or repressive,²³ implying that these types of governments will only contribute to violent intrastate tactics - a situation that he perceives as only continuing in light of inevitable scarcities²⁴ and "environmentally driven wars."²⁵ In an attack of government type from the other end of the spectrum, responding to the global challenges ahead, Kaplan labels democracy as "problematic"²⁶ or in some cases irrelevant,²⁷ he also states that for some states federalism "is not the answer,"²⁸ and implies that only through strict religious rule will other states potentially be governable.²⁹ These opinions lead Kaplan to present what are, in his opinion, the resulting government types that a citizen of a developing country will be able to choose from in the future, each of which directly implying some form of intrastate violent conflict:

In the developing world environmental stress will present people with a choice that is increasingly among totalitarianism (as in Iraq), fascist-tending mini-states (as in Serb-held Bosnia), and road-warrior cultures (as in Somalia).

With regard to what role the type of government has in bringing about, or suppressing, conflict, the intrastate conflict literature is mixed. While some state that closed authoritarian regimes are likely to lead to an explosive boiling-point situation (Brown, 2003), other believe that a “lack of democratic rights appears to have no significant effect” in the outbreak of intrastate conflict (Collier, 2003). On the other hand regarding democracies, some scholars state that other variables, such as income level of the state citizens, are important to take into account when assessing a type of government’s ability to prevent intrastate conflict, positing that in low-income countries, democracy is not the cure-all government type to prevent intrastate conflict (Collier et al., 2003). Others even go so far as to state that not only can intrastate conflict causing resentment build in democratic settings “where some groups are inadequately represented in...state and political institutions” (Brown, 2003) but also that “Given the right environmental conditions, insurgencies can thrive...even in democracies” (Collier et al., 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Other scholars posit that neither full autocracies nor full democracies have tendency for intrastate conflict greater than the other, but rather it is partial democracies which have higher risk than both (Esty et al., 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre et al., 2001). Some scholars present the argument that the government type is only secondary to nationalistic ideology which can either counter ethnic divisions (Collier et al., 2003; Hechter, 2001), or alternatively, can result in intrastate conflict when based in ethnic conceptions (Brown, 2003; Snyder, 1993; Pfaff, 1993) or can be manipulated by individuals to create internal division (Collier et al., 2003).

What this literature demonstrates is that despite there being support for Kaplan's skepticism towards the success of democracies in preventing intrastate conflict, the literature is so conflicted regarding the role of government type and the likelihood of intrastate conflict that no real conclusion can be made regarding what type of government is best at averting intrastate conflict. But, it is precisely because of this that a conclusion can be made regarding Kaplan's opinion regarding government type in the "The Coming Anarchy." In the above quote from the article, Kaplan asserts that in the future a totalitarian regime will be one of the three government types available to a citizen in the developing world (the other two being "fascist-tending" or "road warrior"). But, specifically because the literature does not support any evidence that an authoritarian regime is more apt at preventing intrastate conflict than, say, a democratic one, Kaplan's claim that a totalitarian regime will be an option for an individual to "choose" from in his anarchic future, is just as correct, or incorrect, as stating that democratic one would also be an available option.

Last within this group of state weaknesses, Kaplan presents other structural factors concerning intrastate security such as education, crime, and disease. He implies that education is a contributing factor to intrastate conflict by making references to the low education levels of potential power holders³⁰ as well as the general population.³¹ He also implies a causal relationship between crime and intrastate conflict by referring to petty crime,³² smuggling,³³ urban crime³⁴ and violence,³⁵ corruption,³⁶ international drug cartels³⁷ and mafias,³⁸ resulting in increasing lawlessness,³⁹ crime surges,⁴⁰ and unprovoked crime⁴¹ which will lead to an "anarchic implosion of criminal violence"⁴² where distinctions between war (read intrastate conflict) and crime will be indistinguishable.⁴³ Similarly, Kaplan also makes implications regarding a relationship between disease and intrastate conflict by

making reference to the “unchecked spread”⁴⁴ of specific diseases such as HIV/AIDS,⁴⁵ tuberculosis,⁴⁶ and malaria,⁴⁷ contributing to “chaos”⁴⁸ and having a role in inciting group conflicts.⁴⁹

The literature regarding these issues seems to support some of Kaplan’s implications, especially in the relationship between intrastate conflict and education, citing that intrastate conflict is concentrated in countries with little education (Collier, 2003) and that those who join rebel groups are “overwhelmingly young, uneducated males” (Collier, et al. 2003). Similarly, some scholars support a connection between crime and intrastate conflict even going so far as to state that, from an economic analysis perspective, rebellion and protest movements are nothing more than manifestations of organized crime where insurrections and insurgents are “indistinguishable from bandits or pirates” (Grossman, 1999). Also, according to intrastate conflict scholars, the relationship between those groups participating in intrastate conflict, and crime, is a two way street where groups, which were originally politically motivated gradually, shift from violent political groups into criminal organizations. Specifically, some state that this can result from the simple fact that they have a comparative advantage in organized violence and are able to dominate in criminal realms (Collier et al., 2003), or that because of the need for finances to support their objectives, politically motivated intrastate conflict groups undertake criminal activities which in turn, because the organization may start to attract more criminal types and fewer politically motivated members, may change the character of the group to adopt an essentially criminal ‘roving bandit’ nature (Collier et al., 2003; Olson, 1993). Lastly, regarding criminal activity and intrastate conflict, some of these same scholars specifically state that rebel groups have combined with urban criminal organizations referencing, for example, cases where politically motivated intrastate

conflict groups will, again motivated by the need to obtain finances to advance their cause, purchase kidnap victims from criminal organizations and then make the final ransom demands (Collier et al., 2003). Last within the discussion of these three topics, education, crime, and disease, scholars also support Kaplan's implications that there is a relationship between conflict and disease, stating that meeting the needs to respond to disease like HIV/AIDS, and the debilitating effect of HIV/AIDS on state militaries, puts such a strain on government that they are unable to exert complete control over domestic armed forces (Daly, Price-Smith, 2004; Elbe, 2002; Ostergard, 2002).

In summary of Kaplan's views regarding, education, crime, and disease, Kaplan's implications do have ample support within the intrastate conflict literature. Additionally, though, just because some of the scholarly literature does support these implications, does not mean that the obvious points regarding these issues can be ignored, these points being: not all uneducated people engage in intrastate conflict, not all crime leads to chaos, and disease does not inevitably result in the destabilization of nation states.

Structural Factor: military

Kaplan directly and indirectly cites issues related to the *military* as being a cause of, or a contributor to, intrastate conflict and the anarchy that he prophesizes. He does this by positing that a transformation of war is occurring⁵⁰ in which traditional military machines are doomed to break down,⁵¹ where states will no longer have a monopoly of military force⁵² and private armies will become empowered.⁵³ These private armies, according to Kaplan, are not only linked to drug cartels,⁵⁴ urban mafias,⁵⁵ mercenaries and other military entrepreneurs,⁵⁶ but will also consist of rogue military groups which, as they are no longer controllable by their governments,⁵⁷ are

now either independent or allied with local leaders.⁵⁸ It is within these military-related conditions that Kaplan asserts there will be a “growing pervasiveness of war,”⁵⁹ in which armed groups and ordinary citizens will become indistinguishable.⁶⁰

Although Kaplan does present vague reasons for why this transformation of war and splintering of armies is occurring, such as resource scarcities, ethnic conflict, and religious divisions, many scholars describe this approach as ignoring the actions and decisions of individuals, creating a “no-fault” history which leads to a “shoulder-shrugging” approach where officials believe that “little can be done to control these inanimate forces” (Brown, 2003). Similarly, some scholars believe that understanding the formation of private military organizations will uncover the origins of intrastate conflicts (Collier et al., 2003) and have delved more deeply than Kaplan into the subject of the creation of intrastate-armed factions. It is within this literature that a hole in Kaplan’s prophecy regarding military issues and intrastate conflict within the anarchy thesis is revealed.

Before addressing this though, it is important to mention that, as with the discussion of state weaknesses, it would be difficult to find scholars that challenge the notion that a situation of such widely dispersed and affiliated “military” groups as Kaplan describes does not add to intrastate conflict. Indeed many scholars believe that a government’s inability to control “the behavior of its soldiers on the ground” and to supply adequate defense to their citizens directly results in increased intrastate conflict (Collier, 2003). Some intrastate conflict analysts believe that the fundamental cause of a government’s inability to control its forces stems from economic incentives such as the inability to adequately compensate their armies who turn to looting, taxing, and involvement in commerce and diverting humanitarian aid (De Waal, 1996), while others believe that no amount of military spending will provide defense

against large-scale intrastate violence if a government has failed to successfully implement economic development initiatives (Collier et al., 2003).

It is within a portion of these economic aspects of intrastate conflict (economic issues will be discussed in more detail within the Economic/Social factors portion of this subsection) that the area where Kaplan's "explanation" of the formation of multiple military groups is lacking, is introduced. As stated, Kaplan posits that these groups will form because of various causes like ethnic and religious grievances and in the pursuit of criminal activity. The problem with this explanation is that some scholars state that when religious and ethnic divisions are measured objectively, they offer no explanatory power in predicting the likelihood of intrastate conflict and they go on to argue that the motivation for the formation of such groups is in fact irrelevant, stating that only the financial viability and sustainability of the group is what is important to intrastate conflict (Collier, 2003) – this financial viability and sustainability of multiple intrastate factions is an issue which Kaplan omits completely.

Although Kaplan does cite financially viable organizations like drug cartels and urban mafias as participants within this transformation of war, in the anarchy thesis he was not introducing the illicit drug trade and urban mafia activity as economic engines for ethnic and religious movements. In fact, Kaplan fails to mention anything regarding the origins of the financial viability of these warring intrastate factions, such viability as supportive external governments hostile to the governments in which intrastate conflict is occurring, sympathetic financially supportive diasporas, or profitable criminal activity such as those related to guerrilla groups, like kidnappings or holding hostage the infrastructures of multinational corporations (Collier et al., 2003). In short, within Kaplan's anarchy thesis, in which he presents a future of

multiple intrastate rogue military forces, violent ethnic and religious factions, private armies, and mercenaries, he fails to explain the economic engines to support such organized conflict.

In summation of the structural factors related to the military, it is obvious how multiple armed groups based on ethnic, religious, and criminal ideologies operating in a state which does not have control over its own military would be prone to intrastate conflict. But, despite the fact that Kaplan identifies some independent armed forces with viable, sustainable economic engines, namely drug cartels and mafia groups, Kaplan does not present evidence for the economic sustainability of other armed intrastate groups, an aspect that economic theorists of intrastate conflict (Collier, 2003; Collier et al., 2003) deem a requisite to organized violent conflict like the private armies, and military splinter groups which Kaplan describes.

Structural Factor: “geographic destiny”

Last within this presentation of the structural factors within “The Coming Anarchy” regarding intrastate conflict, Kaplan directly and indirectly cites issues related to what he calls “*geographic destiny*”⁶¹ as being either a cause of, or a contributor to, intrastate conflict and the anarchy that he prophesizes. He does this by identifying demographic issues, such as country-specific population growth⁶² and doubling rates,⁶³ region-specific birth rates like in sub-Saharan Africa⁶⁴ and the Middle East,⁶⁵ as well as global population growth rates⁶⁶ and population growth in general⁶⁷ that will result in “overpopulation”⁶⁸ and “planetary overcrowding”⁶⁹ which will in turn “incite group conflicts.”⁷⁰ Kaplan also implies a relationship between intrastate conflict and age structure, such as in West Africa⁷¹ and the Gaza Strip.⁷² Other demographic issues, which Kaplan either directly, or indirectly, implies as

having a causal relationship with intrastate conflict, are population shifts such as refugee migrations,⁷³ non-specific migrations,⁷⁴ and large-scale population movements,⁷⁵ which will “sharpen ethnic divisions,”⁷⁶ and also “incite group conflicts.”⁷⁷ Similarly, Kaplan implies a relationship between intrastate conflict and the demographic issue of urbanization in such places as Africa,⁷⁸ the Middle East,⁷⁹ Asia,⁸⁰ the Asian Sub-Continent,⁸¹ but also mentions, the “unregulated urbanization”⁸² of cities in general.⁸³ Included within his notion of “geographic destiny” Kaplan implies a relationship between intrastate conflict and the concentration of populations, asserting that some countries’ populations concentrations and physical geography makes them unable to govern their territories,⁸⁴ simply do not make “geographic or demographic sense,”⁸⁵ or that populations’ ethnic groups have settled in ways that “obliterate borders,”⁸⁶ transform cities into “sprawling villages,”⁸⁷ or have otherwise migrated in ways which disable borders from being cartographically valid.⁸⁸ Much of the population concentration issues that Kaplan implies to have a causal relationship with interstates conflict are, according to him, due to the influence of colonial powers creation of borders and the resulting assemblage of ethnic populations, such as in West Africa⁸⁹ and the Middle East,⁹⁰ or otherwise implying that countries and boarders established through means other then colonial powers have more cohesive ethnic geographies, and hence are more internally stable, then those that were established by colonial powers.⁹¹

Kaplan receives a substantial amount of support regarding many of his assertions contained here within the notion of “geographic destiny.” Some scholars do posit that countries with rapid population growth are more susceptible to intrastate conflict (Collier, 2003) others also assert that countries with youthful populations have historically had more occurrences of intrastate conflict (Anastasion, Cincotta,

Engelman 2003). Similarly, there is support from the literature that population movements can contribute to intrastate conflict (Krebs, Levy, 2001; Levy, 2003; Weiner, 1992) especially when caused as a result of ethnic conflict or environmental disaster (Levy, 2003). Interestingly though, there is material within the intrastate conflict literature that challenges, at least in part, some of Kaplan's concerns over urbanization, specifically, they state that groups which are least likely to rebel are those concentrated within urban environments (Gurr, 2003; Fearon, 1999; Melander, 1999) but, expanding the discussion of urban concentration, other scholars posit that in countries where the population is concentrated in urban areas, but that also have large rural areas with low population density are more at risk of intrastate conflict (Collier et al., 2003).

Similarly, regarding geographic and population concentration relating to intrastate conflict, some scholars state that "Geography matters because if the population is highly geographically dispersed, the country is harder for the government to control than if everyone lives in the same small area" (Collier, 2003), but, regarding population concentrations, Kaplan's implication that that cross-boarder homogeneous ethnic group strength outweighing national borders, is contested by scholars who state that ethno political action is dependent on more than just shared ethnicity and requires the transcendence of local connections such as clans, classes, and communities (Gurr, 2003). As for the relationship between colonial influence and intrastate conflict, although some scholars state that colonial institutions have long-lasting effects that can be either good or bad (Collier et al., 2003; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2001), again Kaplan receives support from some scholars who assert that ethnic geography, arranged via countries' former colonial powers or otherwise, does play an important role in intrastate stability (Brown, 2003), and posit that countries

with different types of ethnic geography are likely to experience different kinds of internal problems (Brown, 2003; Levine, 1996).

In summary of Kaplan's implications regarding those structural factors contained here within "geographic destiny" as they relate to the intrastate conflict literature, it appears that, at least concerning population growth rates, age structure, the impact of mass migrations, and ethnic geography, Kaplan has many supporters. Alternatively, though, there are arguments against Kaplan's implications regarding urbanization and intrastate conflict, as well as his implication that cross-border ethnic homogeneity inherently trumps national borders.

In conclusion of the review of the intrastate conflict literature and Kaplan's views that are categorized here as structural factors, those issues pertaining to *state weaknesses*, the *military*, and "*geographic destiny*," Kaplan meets a mix of support and challenges. Although scholars agree that state weakness can contribute to intrastate conflict, the examination of the literature regarding the subject reveals that Kaplan omitted the fact that becoming a weak state is a process which is not irreversible, that his assertion that the future will bring more totalitarian states is no more correct than an assertion that the future will bring more democratic ones, and that other factors regarding state weakness, such as education, crime and disease do not inevitably lead to intrastate conflict as Kaplan implies. Similarly, regarding military issues, although scholars agree that a situation of multiple competing military or military-like groups does contribute to intrastate conflict, the review of the intrastate conflict literature demonstrates that Kaplan's 'no-fault' approach to the causes of the development of such groups ignores political and individual contributions to their formation as well as overlooks the economic viability and sustainability of the types of warring factions Kaplan describes. In review of the

intrastate conflict literature and the last issue within the structural factors presented here, “geographic destiny,” Kaplan views received both support and challenges. Support, concerning population growth rates, age structure, the impact of mass migrations, and ethnic geography, and challenges, regarding urbanization and intrastate conflict, cross-border ethnic homogeneity.

Political Factors:

Within “The Coming Anarchy” Kaplan also makes some causal implications regarding issues that can be classified as political factors (political factors are view here as factors relating to discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, intergroup politics, and elite politics) as contributing to intrastate conflict. These include issues that relate to Kaplan’s concerns over the *role and character of politics*, as well as issues regarding *country elites and government leadership*.

Political Factor: role and character of politics

Regarding the *role and character of politics*, Kaplan implies that the entanglement of political grievances with social, economic, racial, religious, and criminal motives⁹² creates a situation of “less and less ‘politics’” in specific countries and “other places”⁹³ which results in a situation where politics and political values are trumped by concerns over personal security⁹⁴ (read intrastate conflict).

Many scholars from the intrastate conflict literature contribute input to the relationship between these “entangled” issues and political institutions, such as social issues like the relationship between poverty and the stability of political institutions in democracies (Collier et al., 2003), economic issues such as development and modernization exacerbating strains on political systems (Brown, 2003), racial or

religious issues like the notion that states and political processes ease or inflate intergroup tensions (Bowen, 1996) or that political systems which are open and responsive to ethno political claims usually work towards nonviolent solutions to ethnic grievances (Gurr, 2003). Despite these contributions though, the presentation of opinions from the intrastate conflict literature on Kaplan's implications here may not be as important to this portion of this refutation as is identifying the fact that while Kaplan placed so much emphasis on those issues covered in the preceding structural factors he paid comparatively little attention to the role of politics in his anarchy thesis and "The Coming Anarchy." This could possibly be due to his stylistic appeal to more frightening and non-specific issues like crime, disease, rogue military groups, mercenaries, and massive refugee movements; more frightening when compared to the less exciting topic of the implications of individuals' political values in "other places."

Political Factor: country elites and government leadership

Kaplan alludes to *country elites and government leadership* as playing a role in intrastate conflict by indirectly implying the incompetence of government leaders due to youth,⁹⁵ by directly asserting that the lack of education and sophistication⁹⁶ of future elites and government leaders will force them to relinquish power,⁹⁷ or by directly asserting that the repressive tactics of future leaders will incite civil unrest.⁹⁸

Obviously intrastate conflict scholars agree that the actions and impacts of elites and government leaders can directly contribute to bringing about intrastate conflict. Some scholars do this by citing that "fear and hate generated from the top" is what pushes citizens to exercise violence (Bowen, 1996), or that the tactics of elites and politicians vulnerable to domestic challengers in times of political and economic

troubles can directly contribute to the occurrence of intrastate conflict (Brown, 2003; HRW, 1995) by elites manipulating ethnic groups into committing organized violence (Brass, 1997; Collier et al., 2003; Gurr, 2000; Hardin, 1995). Similarly, some scholars cite government leaders' promotion of ethnic or cultural subordination and assimilation strategies as a possible source of citizens' grievance that could result in intrastate conflict (Gurr, 2003). Other scholars cite the perceptions of citizens to the greed of corrupt elites as creating secessionist reactions, a source of potential conflict, in resource rich nations (Collier et al., 2003). Alternatively, though, some of these same scholars point out that just as elites and government leaders can create factors which can lead to intrastate conflict, such as negative stereotyping, they can work to prevent, or undo, it as well (Bowen, 1996).

Lastly, one of Kaplan's statements in "The Coming Anarchy" concerning country elites and government leadership meets direct challenge from the intrastate conflict literature. While Kaplan extrapolated citizens' values onto future leadership and state action in the following quote:

Because the demographic reality of West Africa is a countryside draining into dense slums by the coast, ultimately the region's rulers will come to reflect the values of these shanty-towns...Their behavior may herald a regime more brutal than Eyadema's repressive one.

Jack S. Levy, Board of Governors Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, in his work "Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War" (Levy, 2003) indirectly identifies Kaplan's extrapolative flaw when explaining:

We have to be careful whenever we use causal variables at one level to explain behavior or outcomes at a 'higher' level. Individual- or domestic-level variables, for example, do not provide a logically complete explanation of aggressive state policies....

Although the presentation of these two conflicting opinions, Kaplan's opinion that governments will reflect the values of shanty-town citizens and Levy's assertion that such extrapolations lack logically complete explanations, does underscore challenges to Kaplan's conclusions concerning country elites and government leadership, however some of the other implications he posited in "The Coming Anarchy," such as government leaders playing a role in intrastate conflict are supported by intrastate conflict scholars.

In conclusion of this discussion of political factors within Kaplan's work, not only does the examination of the intrastate conflict literature demonstrate a lack of attention to the role and character of politics in "The Coming Anarchy" but also that the intrastate conflict literature both indirectly supports and directly challenge some of Kaplan's implications regarding elites and government leaders.

Economic/Social Factors:

Within "The Coming Anarchy" Kaplan also makes some causal implications regarding issues that can be classified as economic/social factors (economic/social factors are here considered to be economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, economic development, and modernization) as contributing to intrastate conflict. These include issues that relate to Kaplan's concerns over *modernization and economic development*, which include issues relating to the stages of a country's economy, and Kaplan's concerns over issues related to the impacts of *poor economic conditions*, which include disparities and poverty.

Economic/Social Factor: modernization and economic development

Kaplan directly and indirectly cites issues revolving around *modernization and economic development* as being either causes of, or contributors to, intrastate conflict and the anarchy that he foresees. He does this by identifying the anger of those that want to raise their children in modern societies but are unable to,⁹⁹ the difficulties of merging traditional life with modernization,¹⁰⁰ the negative repercussions of rapid modernization and development, like in Iran¹⁰¹ and India,¹⁰² and the positive outcomes of gradual development, like in Turkey.¹⁰³ He also implies a relationship between modernization and economic development and intrastate conflict by associating risks to stability with economic decline,¹⁰⁴ such as that brought about by drops in the price of commodities¹⁰⁵ and the shrinking natural-resource bases upon which some economies depend¹⁰⁶ or declining Gross National Products,¹⁰⁷ and the inability to reverse such economic trends because of reasons such as domestic environments which discourage foreign investment,¹⁰⁸ or the withdrawal of the economic support of former colonial powers.¹⁰⁹

The opinions of intrastate conflict scholars on the impact of modernization and economic development on intrastate conflict are varied. Some scholars state that intrastate conflicts, specifically those ethno-political conflicts that gained attention in the early 1990s were not a result of the end of the Cold War as other scholars posited, but rather the indirect consequences of global modernization (Gurr, 2003). Sharing a similar negative view towards modernization and economic development, other scholars emphasize frustrations beget from unmet political and economic expectations as the immediate source of economic development-caused instability and internal conflict (Brown, 2003; Newman, 1991). Correspondingly, other scholars assert that economic development can aggravate intrastate instability if it contributes to

inequities (Brown, 2003). Alternatively, some scholars state that rapid economic growth “will assist peace” (Collier, 2003) and disregard the implication that economic development is a cause of conflict positing rather “the key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development” (Collier et al., 2003).

There is also a large body of opinions attributing intrastate conflict to the various stages of a country’s economy. Some scholars support Kaplan’s implications by stating that slow growth or economic decline significantly increases the risk of intrastate conflict (Collier, 2003; Collier et al., 2003; Collier, Hoeffler 2002), while others posit a number of economic stages which they believe to increase the chances of intrastate conflict, such as economic slowdowns, stagnation, deterioration, and, obviously, collapse (Brown, 2003; Samarasinghe, Coughlan 1991). Also related to the economy, Kaplan’s implication regarding commodities is supported by some scholars who confirm, “countries that have a substantial share of their income (GDP) coming from the export of primary commodities are radically more at risk for conflict” (Collier, 2003).

Economic/Social Factor: poor economic conditions

Also under the category of economic/social factors Kaplan directly and indirectly cites issues related to the impacts of *poor economic conditions*, which include disparities and poverty, as being either causes of, or contributors to, intrastate conflict and the anarchy that he foresees. He does this by mentioning unemployed youths who spend their time drinking alcohol,¹¹⁰ disparities between countries’ rich and poor populations¹¹¹ and regions,¹¹² and by making numerous references to an increasing¹¹³ number of people, or “peasants”¹¹⁴ as he calls them, living conditions of urban poverty,¹¹⁵ which he refers to as “slums”¹¹⁶ and “shantytowns,”¹¹⁷ where even basic

infrastructure¹¹⁸ is unavailable. The reason these poor economic conditions will contribute to intrastate conflict, according to Kaplan, is because “where there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence”¹¹⁹ which is why those in poverty “find war and a barracks existence a step up rather than a step down,”¹²⁰ and contribute to conditions which will result in a socially destabilizing,¹²¹ disparity-driven, “revenge of the poor.”¹²²

Some of Kaplan’s views regarding these poor economic conditions find support in the intrastate conflict literature. Namely, citing inequities resulting from economic development (Brown, 2003) some scholars agree that disparity is a contributor to intrastate tensions. Other scholars, however, assert that neither inequalities in incomes nor assets have a discernable effect on the likelihood of intrastate conflict (Collier et al., 2003; Collier, Hoeffler, 2002).

Kaplan receives further support from the intrastate conflict literature with regard to his implications and assertions concerning the relationship between intrastate conflict and poverty. Some scholars affirm Kaplan’s implication regarding poverty by citing a relationship between a low national income and intrastate conflict (Collier, 2001), while others confirm his opinion that the poverty stricken find sanctuary in participating in conflict either because “organized facilities of a rebel group provide a haven” compared to starvation and despair, or simply because the poor have less to lose and more to benefit from resorting to violence than others (Hirshleifer, 2001). But as for Kaplan’s theory of the “revenge of the poor,” Collier (2003) challenges:

Of course, there may be other reasons why poverty makes it easier for rebels. Poverty can make people desperate or angry. However, if this was an important effect we would expect to find that inequality makes conflict more likely....In fact, inequality does not seem to affect the risk of conflict. Rebellion seems not to be the rage of the poor...

This challenge to one of Kaplan's economic/social factors, although direct, is only one of the *few* opinions that counter Kaplan's implications in this category. Indeed Kaplan does find much support in this area especially with regard to modernization and economic development, economic decline, poverty and war making, and dependence on commodities, and although there were counter opinions to some of Kaplan's implications, like those countering his conclusions regarding rapid economic growth, disparity, and the "revenge of the poor," overall, the literature seems to support much of his presentation of economic/social factors which contribute to intrastate conflict.

The reason for such a wide body of support, though, could be because Kaplan casts a wide net with regard to his economic/social factors of intrastate conflict. For example, by implying that both rapid development *and* poverty lead to conflict he could be accused of covering his bases to ensure that the world appears to be in a state of conflict. This accusation can further be supported when the only non-conflict-producing way to alleviate poverty which Kaplan implies, gradual development as in Turkey, is placed in context of environmental and demographic doom and violent ethnic and religious explosions, the immediacies of which prevent even the possibility of the success of any long-term solutions; in other words, Kaplan is covering his bases by saying that poverty is a cause of conflict which only gradual development *may* alleviate, but gradual or long-term solutions are impractical due to the immediate threats of the environment and overpopulation.

Cultural/Perceptual Factors

Last within this analysis of Kaplan's list of causes of intrastate conflict other than resources and the environment, are those implications that he makes within "The

Coming Anarchy” regarding cultural/perceptual factors (cultural/perceptual factors are here considered to be patterns of cultural discrimination and problematic group histories) of intrastate conflict. These include issues that relate to Kaplan’s implications regarding *race*, *culture*, *religion*, and *ethnicity*, and how they relate to intrastate conflict.¹

Cultural/Perceptual Factor: race, culture, religion, and ethnicity

Kaplan directly and indirectly cites issues revolving around race as being either causes of, or contributors to, intrastate conflict and the anarchy that he foresees. He does this by either specifically stating the imminence of “racial clash,”¹²³ and by associating violent conflict issues to race such as urban crime and low-intensity conflict coalescing along racial lines,¹²⁴ or by suggesting that since the 1960s racial polarity has been transforming the United States,¹²⁵ the domestic peace of which will only be further eroded because events in West Africa will reinforce racial stereotypes.¹²⁶

Kaplan also implies cultural issues as having a factor in intrastate conflict by stating not only that the world is entering into a political era of increased cultural sensitivity,¹²⁷ but also an era where cultures rather than state will war.¹²⁸ He emphasizes his opinion by asserting that as state power fades cultures will have to protect themselves,¹²⁹ and by directly referring to “culture clash,”¹³⁰ “cultural conflict,”¹³¹ and “cultural war,”¹³² which will not only weaken countries, even those in Europe as well as the United States,¹³³ but also have already occurred in Turkey,

¹ Although the separation of these issues here may draw criticism that these subjects are not mutually exclusive, the focus of this refutation is not to present an opinion regarding the definition of any of these terms, indeed their separation is not intended to imply definition or exclusivity, but rather, is necessary to present Kaplan’s opinions regarding these issues, and were separated by *his* use of the specific terms; additionally, the opinions of scholars are presented in ways that transcend the separation of these terms.

Iran,¹³⁴ “intractable-culture zones like Haiti and Somalia,”¹³⁵ and those countries within the potential “powder keg for cultural war,” the Balkans.¹³⁶ Kaplan also implies a relationship between culture and intrastate conflict by indirectly associating Western Enlightenment with stability and all other cultures with violence¹³⁷ even going so far as to accuse other cultures as being “dysfunctional.”¹³⁸

Similarly, Kaplan also directly and indirectly cites issues revolving around religion as being either causes of, or contributors to, intrastate conflict and his prophecy of anarchy. He does this by implying that religious diversity undermines governability,¹³⁹ that religious cleavages threaten the cohesiveness of states,¹⁴⁰ that religious identity will trump nationalism,¹⁴¹ that political and religious beliefs will become entangled,¹⁴² and even implies that some religious beliefs are not suitable for moral society.¹⁴³ He furthers his opinion of a connection between religion and violence by directly stating that climate change will “incite religious upheaval,”¹⁴⁴ that religious fanaticism will play a larger role in the motivation of armed conflict,¹⁴⁵ and that urban crime and low-intensity conflict are also coalescing along religious lines.¹⁴⁶ Additionally, Kaplan emphasizes his view that there is a relationship between religion and intrastate conflict by presenting a large amount of his opinions regarding Islam and violence in “The Coming Anarchy.” He does this by either directly or indirectly implies that religion, via Islam, is related to conflict by describing the religion as “militant,” that it is “the one religion that is prepared to fight,”¹⁴⁷ and by referring specifically to terrorist organizations centered on Islam,¹⁴⁸ and stating that “Israel is destined to be a Jewish ethnic fortress amid a vast and volatile realm of Islam.”¹⁴⁹ He also implies an increase of religious-caused intrastate conflict by referring to the threat of the impending spread,¹⁵⁰ strengthening¹⁵¹ and

intensification¹⁵² of Islam, which will “eat away” at state legitimacy and borders¹⁵³ in the Middle East when the religion, he implies, replaces Arab nationalism.¹⁵⁴

Kaplan also directly and indirectly cites issues revolving around ethnicity² as being either causes of, or contributors to, intrastate conflict and his anarchy prophecy. He does this not only by implying that ethnic diversity within a country undermines governability,¹⁵⁵ but that multi-ethnic societies, or countries with a “patchwork of ethnic groups,”¹⁵⁶ are more fragile than homogeneous societies.¹⁵⁷ He emphasizes this opinion by implying that ethnic homogeneity strengthens the nation state making reference to Israel being an “ethnic fortress,”¹⁵⁸ where the communally shared history and ethnicity of the country makes it a “classic national-ethnic organism,”¹⁵⁹ and by directly referring to ethnically diverse countries as having “ethnic strife,”¹⁶⁰ shifting “ethnic politics,”¹⁶¹ or by implying that their ethnic identities will trump nationality¹⁶² resulting in the creation of group identities that challenge political borders.¹⁶³ Kaplan further implies a relationship between ethnicity and intrastate conflict by referring to deepening ethnic and regional splits in Nigeria,¹⁶⁴ and the sharpening of ethnic divisions,¹⁶⁵ and the inflammation of existing hatreds¹⁶⁶ that will incite group conflicts.¹⁶⁷ Lastly, Kaplan emphasizes his opinion that ethnicity is a source of intrastate conflict via frequently mentioning Kurdish populations in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, the former Soviet Union¹⁶⁸ and in “nearly everybody [country] in the Middle East,”¹⁶⁹ populations that will, according to Kaplan, become the “natural selector,” with regards to the stability of those states.¹⁷⁰

² Although Kaplan also refers to “tribes” in “The Coming Anarchy” a separate section addressing “tribe” is not presented here because Kaplan appears to use the term in connection with ethnicity, therefore a section covering ethnicity is sufficient in addressing his comments regarding “tribes.” An example of Kaplan’s connection between tribe and ethnicity can be found in the following quote from “The Coming Anarchy”: “Everywhere in the developing world at the turn of the twenty-first century these new men and women, rushing into the cities, are remaking civilizations and redefining their identities in terms of religion and tribal ethnicity which do not coincide with the borders of existing states.”

It is obvious that many scholars from the intrastate conflict literature would be of the opinion that the relationship between intrastate conflict and cultural/perceptual factors such as race, culture, religion, and ethnicity is more complex than Kaplan's views presented in "The Coming Anarchy." Some scholars say that a positive or negative relationship between cultural/perceptual factors and intrastate conflict would depend on whether or not state political systems are responsive to such internal factors or attempt to suppress or ignore them (Gurr, 2003). Others assert that the relationship would depend on the ethnic and religious composition of the country; some going so far as to cite specific percentages stating that "if there is one dominant ethnic group that constitutes between 45 percent and 90 percent of the population – enough to give it control, but not enough, to make discrimination against a minority pointless – the risk of conflict doubles" (Collier, 2003), others emphasizing social polarization (Montalvo, Reynal-Querol, 2002), and some citing whether groups are geographically intermingled, or inhabit a separate province or region of the country plays an important role in internal stability. (Brown, 2003; Levine, 1996). Other scholars say that the relationship between cultural/perceptual factors and intrastate conflict depends on the actions of leaders, or "so-called leaders" (Bowen, 1996), and some specifically cite ethnicity as being more easily manipulated by government leaders than any other identity bases (Horowitz, 1998). Other scholars still, cite specific conditions which determine the relationship between intrastate conflict and cultural/perceptual factors; conditions such as the salience of ethno-cultural identity for members of and leaders of the group, the extent to which the group has collective incentives for ethno-political action, the extent of the group's capacities for collective action, and the availability of opportunities in the group's political environment that

increase its chances of attaining group objectives through political action (Gurr, 2003).

Other scholars, while still implying a complex relationship between intrastate conflict and cultural/perceptual factors, directly counter some of Kaplan's claims in "The Coming Anarchy" regarding race, culture, religion, and ethnicity. Some citing the ethnic homogeneity of, and violence which occurred in, Somalia as just one example, directly counter Kaplan by stating that ethnic homogeneity does not guarantee internal harmony (Brown, 2003). Other scholars contribute to this theory by stating that ethnic and religious diversity does not make a society more dangerous, but rather, makes it safer; or that "ethnic and religious divisions, have had no systematic effect on risk [of civil war]" (Collier, 2003); and that diverse societies are more stable by asserting, "where societies are highly fragmented in ethnic and religious terms the risk of rebellion is actually lower than in homogenous societies, and when conflicts do occur they tend to be brief" (Collier et al., 2003). Additionally, with regard to Kaplan's implication that cultural/perceptual factors will "eat away" at states or otherwise compromise the integrity and legitimacy of national borders, the Minorities at Risk project, conducted by the Center of International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, finds that more than half of the politically significant national and minority peoples identified by the study "are minorities who seek recognition and rights within existing societies, not a redrawing of international boundaries" (Gurr, 2000; Gurr, 2003). And with regard to Kaplan's implication that Kurdish populations pose threat to various international borders Gurr (2003) states, "Kurdish leaders have rarely coordinated political actions across state boundaries and most of their rebellions have been crippled by rifts among the rebels themselves."

Other scholars contend that internal conflicts in places like Africa and the Balkans only *appear* to be caused by cultural/perceptual factors stating that, “Far from reflecting ancient ethnic or tribal loyalties, their cohesion and action are products of the modern nation state’s demand that people make themselves heard as powerful groups or else risk suffering severe disadvantages” (Bowen, 1996). Similarly, scholars support the idea that cultural/perceptual factors are being mistaken as a cause of intrastate conflict because of the recruitment practices of rebel organizations and rival forces, who tend to recruit ‘soldiers’ from the same ethnic group, region, or clan to increase cohesion within the organization or faction (Bowen, 1996; Gates, 2002). And, specifically regarding Kaplan’s perception of the ethnic and religious causes behind the conflicts in the Balkans, some scholars contend that the roots of such violence are not founded within ethnic and religious differences but rather are modern attempts to organize individuals around nationalist ideas (Bowen, 1996; Glenny, 2000), and even go so far as to challenge the existence of an ancient ethnic identity at all by attributing the appearance, or creation, of perceived ethnic loyalties to the colonial and postcolonial systems which encouraged individuals to identify themselves with specific colonies (Bowen, 1996).

Some scholars do, however, support Kaplan’s assertions regarding the existence of, and the importance of containing, ethnic conflicts in Africa (Gurr, 2003), and others agree that while most internal conflicts are over power, land, and control over resources there are some intrastate conflicts which involve ethnic or cultural identity (Bowen, 1996). Similarly, there are opinions from the literature that coincide with Kaplan’s views regarding the colonial impact on national borders which create intrastate conflict related to cultural/perceptual factors, such as the creation of “arbitrary” borders carved out of former empires which have either separated ethnic

groups or placed ethnic groups which are “historic enemies” within the same national boundaries (Brown, 2003; Stedman, 1996).

In conclusion of this section regarding Kaplan’s direct or indirect assertions of cultural/perceptual factors such as race, culture, religion, and ethnicity, as being causes of or contributors to intrastate conflict and his anarchy prophecy, it can be said that Kaplan’s views presented in “The Coming Anarchy” not only simplify the relationship between cultural/perceptual factors and intrastate violence but are also directly challenged by the opinions of scholars within the intrastate conflict literature. Specifically, although Kaplan does receive support for his views regarding the borders of nation states created by former colonial powers, the challenges to his opinions include those regarding the comparative safety of national homogeneity to multi-racial/cultural/religious/ethnic societies, the implication that those that do have cultural/perceptual grievances automatically seek international-boarder-redrawing goals as opposed to other goals such as political recognition, the specific threat to various states regarding Kurdish cross-border ties, the existence of actual cultural/perceptual intrastate conflict as opposed to the appearance of them in Africa and the Balkans, the “roots” of the conflicts in the Balkans, and the very existence of ancient ethnicities.

In summation of this presentation of opinions within the intrastate conflict literature regarding Kaplan’s list of causes of intrastate conflict, other than the environment or scarcities, as they were presented either directly or indirectly within “The Coming Anarchy,” the following conclusions can be made. Within each of the categories in which Kaplan’s intrastate conflict causes were classified, Kaplan’s opinions found both support and challenges from the intrastate conflict literature. The major challenges to the causal relationships either directly stated or implied in “The

Coming Anarchy” include the following: Regarding the structural factor of state weaknesses: 1) state failure is a process which is reversible; 2) based on their ability to prevent intrastate conflict, the proliferation of totalitarian states in the future is no more likely than the proliferation of democratic states; and 3) there is no inevitable link between education, crime, or disease, leading to intrastate violence. Regarding the structural factor of military: 1) a ‘no-fault’ approach to the causes of the creation of groups which engage in intrastate conflict omits the political and individual contributions to their formation; 2) regardless of the causes of their formation, warring groups require economic viability and sustainability. Regarding the structural factor of “geographic destiny”: 1) groups that are least likely to rebel are those concentrated within urban environments; 2) it is easier for a government to control a population that is concentrated in a small area; and 3) cross-border ethnic homogeneity does not indicate ethno-political solidarity. Regarding the political factor of the role and character of politics: Kaplan paid comparatively little attention to the role of politics in his anarchy thesis to the other issues. Regarding the political factor of elites and government leaders: 1) just as elites and government leaders can create factors, which can lead to intrastate conflict, they can work to prevent it; and 2) causal variables at one level cannot explain behavior or outcomes at a ‘higher’ level. Regarding the economic/social factor of modernization and development: rapid economic growth is thought by some to be a contributor to peace. Regarding the economic/social factor of poor economic conditions: disparity does not increase likelihood of intrastate conflict. Regarding the cultural/perceptual factors of race, culture, religion, and ethnicity: 1) some scholars believe that diversity increases stability; 2) that not all minorities’ grievances threaten current borders; 3) that some conflicts only *appear* to be caused by cultural/perceptual factors. What this long list

of challenges means with relation to “The Coming Anarchy” and to this refutation is that despite support of some of the anarchy thesis’ conclusions within the intrastate conflict literature (and there is much) there still remains many areas of the thesis against which direct challenges from intrastate conflict scholars exists.

II.C.iii) II.C. Footnotes

¹ World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. *Our Common Future*. New York: Oxford University Press. P. 19

² Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1999. *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. P 5.

³ Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1999. *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. P 5.

⁴ Dalby, Simon. 1999. Threats from the South? Geopolitics, Equity, and Environmental Security in Deudney, Daniel H. and Richard A. Matthew Eds. *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

⁵ These four groupings, or “clusters” as he calls them, are from Brown, Michael E. “Ethnic and Internal Conflicts; Causes and Implications” in Crocker, Chester A. and Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds.) *Turbulent Peace: the challenges of managing international conflict*. Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace. 2003. Chapter 13, P.214. Based on Brown, Michael E. “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” in *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1996. 1-31,571-601.

⁶ “To understand the events of the next fifty years, then, one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war.”

⁷ “Future wars will be those of communal survival, aggravated or, in many cases, caused by environmental scarcity. These wars will be subnational, meaning that it will be hard for states and local governments to protect their own citizens physically.”

“As state power fades--and with it the state’s ability to help weaker groups within society, not to mention other states--peoples and cultures around the world will be thrown back upon their own strengths and weaknesses, with fewer equalizing mechanisms to protect them.”

“In Abidjan, effectively the capital of the Cote d’Ivoire, or Ivory Coast, restaurants have stick- and gun-wielding guards who walk you the fifteen feet or so between your car and the entrance, giving you an eerie taste of what American cities might be like in the future.”

⁸ “Africa suggests what war, borders, and ethnic politics will be like a few decades hence.”

“I would add that as refugee flows increase and as peasants continue migrating to cities around the world--turning them into sprawling villages--national borders will mean less, even as more power will fall into the hands of less educated, less sophisticated groups.”

“Whatever the laws, refugees find a way to crash official borders, bringing their passions with them, meaning that Europe and the United States will be weakened by cultural disputes.”

“Yet the reality was more subtle: as in West Africa, the border was porous and smuggling abounded, but here the people doing the smuggling, on both sides of the border, were Kurds.”

⁹ “The government in Sierra Leone has no writ after dark,” says a foreign resident, shrugging.”

“In truth the Sierra Leonian government, run by a twenty-seven-year-old army captain, Valentine Strasser, controls Freetown by day and by day also controls part of the rural interior.”

¹⁰ “In the government’s territory the national army is an unruly rabble threatening drivers and passengers at most checkpoints.”

¹¹ “The Koranko ethnic group in northeastern Sierra Leone does all its trading in Guinea. Sierra Leonian diamonds are more likely to be sold in Liberia than in Freetown. In the eastern provinces of Sierra Leone you can buy Liberian beer but not the local brand.”

¹² “Even in quiet zones none of the governments except the Ivory Coast’s maintains the schools, bridges, roads, and police forces in a manner necessary for functional sovereignty.”

¹³ “It is located in a gully teeming with coconut palms and oil palms, and is ravaged by flooding. Few residents have easy access to electricity, a sewage system, or a clean water supply.”

¹⁴ “...95 percent of the population increase will be in the poorest regions of the world, where governments now--just look at Africa--show little ability to function, let alone to implement even marginal improvements.”

¹⁵ “Much of the Arab world, however, will undergo alteration, as Islam spreads across artificial frontiers, fueled by mass migrations into the cities and a soaring birth rate of more than 3.2 percent.”

¹⁶ “The state, recall, is a purely Western notion, one that until the twentieth century applied to countries covering only three percent of the earth’s land area. Nor is the evidence compelling that the state, as a governing ideal, can be successfully transported to areas outside the industrialized world.”

¹⁷ “President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who died last December at the age of about ninety, left behind a weak cluster of political parties and a leaden bureaucracy that discourages foreign investment.”

¹⁸ “... laundered drug money... International cartels have discovered the utility of weak, financially strapped West African regimes.”

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- ¹⁹ "In such a moonscape, over which peoples have migrated and settled in patterns that obliterate borders, the end of the Cold War will bring on a cruel process of natural selection among existing states. No longer will these states be so firmly propped up by the West or the Soviet Union."
- ²⁰ "Sierra Leone is a microcosm of what is occurring, albeit in a more tempered and gradual manner, throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war."
- ²¹ "Large-scale population movements are under way, from inland China to coastal China and from villages to cities, leading to a crime surge like the one in Africa and to growing regional disparities and conflicts in a land with a strong tradition of warlordism and a weak tradition of central government--again as in Africa."
- ²² "Tyranny is nothing new in Sierra Leone or in the rest of West Africa."
- ²³ "Their behavior may herald a regime more brutal than Eyadema's repressive one."
- ²⁴ "In addition to engendering tribal strife, scarcer resources will place a great strain on many peoples who never had much of a democratic or institutional tradition to begin with."
- ²⁵ "Just as there will be environmentally driven wars and refugee flows, there will be environmentally induced praetorian regimes--or, as he puts it, 'hard regimes.'"
- ²⁶ "Though each of these nations [Indonesia, Brazil, and, Nigeria] has exhibited democratizing tendencies of late, Homer-Dixon argues that such tendencies are likely to be superficial 'epiphenomena' having nothing to do with long-term processes that include soaring populations and shrinking raw materials. Democracy is problematic; scarcity is more certain."
- ²⁷ "The Indian subcontinent offers examples of what is happening. For different reasons, both India and Pakistan are increasingly dysfunctional. The argument over democracy in these places is less and less relevant to the larger issue of governability. In India's case the question arises, Is one unwieldy bureaucracy in New Delhi the best available mechanism for promoting the lives of 866 million people of diverse languages, religions, and ethnic groups?"
- ²⁸ "The issue in Turkey is not simply a matter of giving autonomy or even independence to Kurds in the southeast. This isn't the Balkans or the Caucasus, where regions are merely subdividing into smaller units, Abkhazia breaking off from Georgia, and so on. Federalism is not the answer."
- ²⁹ "These states, like most African ones, will be ungovernable through conventional secular ideologies."
- ³⁰ "I would add that as refugee flows increase and as peasants continue migrating to cities around the world--turning them into sprawling villages--national borders will mean less, even as more power will fall into the hands of less educated, less sophisticated groups."
- ³¹ "One man I met, Damba Tesele, came to Chicago from Burkina Faso in 1963. A cook by profession, he has four wives and thirty-two children, not one of whom has made it to high school."
- ³² "These are the same youths who rob houses in more prosperous Ivorian neighborhoods at night."
- ³³ "Nevertheless, smuggling across these borders is rampant."
- ³⁴ "This is especially so because Nigeria's population, including that of its largest city, Lagos, whose crime, pollution, and overcrowding make it the cliché par excellence of Third World urban dysfunction, is set to double during the next twenty-five years, while the country continues to deplete its natural resources."
- ³⁵ "The cities of West Africa at night are some of the unsafest places in the world. Streets are unlit; the police often lack gasoline for their vehicles; armed burglars, carjackers, and muggers proliferate."
- ³⁶ "A State Department report cited the airport for 'extortion by law-enforcement and immigration officials.' This is one of the few times that the U.S. government has embargoed a foreign airport for reasons that are linked purely to crime."
- "I had to bribe a Togolese immigration official with the equivalent of eighteen dollars before he would agree to put an exit stamp on my passport."
- ³⁷ "Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism."
- ³⁸ "Imagine cartography in three dimensions, as if in a hologram. In this hologram would be the overlapping sediments of group and other identities atop the merely two-dimensional color markings of city-states and the remaining nations, themselves confused in places by shadowy tentacles, hovering overhead, indicating the power of drug cartels, mafias, and private security agencies."
- ³⁹ "But it is now part and parcel of an increasing lawlessness that is far more significant than any coup, rebel incursion, or episodic experiment in democracy... Crime is what makes West Africa a natural

point of departure for my report on what the political character of our planet is likely to be in the twenty-first century.”

⁴⁰ “Large-scale population movements are under way, from inland China to coastal China and from villages to cities, leading to a crime surge like the one in Africa and to growing regional disparities and conflicts in a land with a strong tradition of warlordism and a weak tradition of central government--again as in Africa.”

⁴¹ “Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.”

⁴² “Though the French are working assiduously to preserve stability, the Ivory Coast faces a possibility worse than a coup: an anarchic implosion of criminal violence--an urbanized version of what has already happened in Somalia.”

⁴³ “Considering, as I’ve explained earlier, that the Strasser regime is not really a government and that Sierra Leone is not really a nation-state, listen closely to Van Creveld: ‘Once the legal monopoly of armed force, long claimed by the state, is wrested out of its hands, existing distinctions between war and crime will break down much as is already the case today in . . . Lebanon, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Peru, or Colombia.’”

“If crime and war become indistinguishable, then ‘national defense’ may in the future be viewed as a local concept. As crime continues to grow in our cities and the ability of state governments and criminal-justice systems to protect their citizens diminishes, urban crime may, according to Van Creveld, ‘develop into low-intensity conflict by coalescing along racial, religious, social, and political lines.’”

⁴⁴ “Sierra Leone is a microcosm of what is occurring, albeit in a more tempered and gradual manner, throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.”

⁴⁵ “As many internal African borders begin to crumble, a more impenetrable boundary is being erected that threatens to isolate the continent as a whole: the wall of disease. . . . As African birth rates soar and slums proliferate, some experts worry that viral mutations and hybridizations might, just conceivably, result in a form of the AIDS virus that is easier to catch than the present strain.”

⁴⁶ “Alan Greenberg, M.D., a representative of the Centers for Disease Control in Abidjan, explains that in Africa the HIV virus and tuberculosis are now ‘fast-forwarding each other.’”

⁴⁷ “It is malaria that is most responsible for the disease wall that threatens to separate Africa and other parts of the Third World from more-developed regions of the planet in the twenty-first century.”

“The deforestation has led to soil erosion, which has led to more flooding and more mosquitoes. Virtually everyone in the West African interior has some form of malaria.”

⁴⁸ “To this protean cartographic hologram one must add other factors, such as migrations of populations, explosions of birth rates, vectors of disease. Henceforward the map of the world will never be static. This future map--in a sense, the ‘Last Map’--will be an ever-mutating representation of chaos.”

⁴⁹ “The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh--developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts--will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War.”

⁵⁰ “To understand the events of the next fifty years, then, one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war.”

“Africa suggests what war, borders, and ethnic politics will be like a few decades hence.”

⁵¹ “Van Creveld warns them that huge state military machines like the Pentagon’s are dinosaurs about to go extinct, and that something far more terrible awaits us.”

⁵² “Considering, as I’ve explained earlier, that the Strasser regime is not really a government and that Sierra Leone is not really a nation-state, listen closely to Van Creveld: ‘Once the legal monopoly of armed force, long claimed by the state, is wrested out of its hands, existing distinctions between war and crime will break down much as is already the case today in . . . Lebanon, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Peru, or Colombia.’”

⁵³ “Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies,

security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.”

⁵⁴ “Imagine cartography in three dimensions, as if in a hologram. In this hologram would be the overlapping sediments of group and other identities atop the merely two-dimensional color markings of city-states and the remaining nations, themselves confused in places by shadowy tentacles, hovering overhead, indicating the power of drug cartels, mafias, and private security agencies.”

⁵⁵ “It is not only African shantytowns that don’t appear on urban maps. Many shantytowns in Turkey and elsewhere are also missing—as are the considerable territories controlled by guerrilla armies and urban mafias... led me to develop a healthy skepticism toward maps, which, I began to realize, create a conceptual barrier that prevents us from comprehending the political crack-up just beginning to occur worldwide.”

⁵⁶ “Van Creveld writes, ‘In all these struggles political, social, economic, and religious motives were hopelessly entangled. Since this was an age when armies consisted of mercenaries, all were also attended by swarms of military entrepreneurs. . . . Many of them paid little but lip service to the organizations for whom they had contracted to fight. Instead, they robbed the countryside on their own behalf. . . .’”

⁵⁷ “Prospects for a transition to civilian rule and democratization are slim. . . . The repressive apparatus of the state security service . . . will be difficult for any future civilian government to control...”

⁵⁸ “In the other part of the country units of two separate armies from the war in Liberia have taken up residence, as has an army of Sierra Leonian rebels. The government force fighting the rebels is full of renegade commanders who have aligned themselves with disaffected village chiefs.”

⁵⁹ “Sierra Leone is a microcosm of what is occurring, albeit in a more tempered and gradual manner, throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.”

⁶⁰ “Given such conditions, any fine distinctions . . . between armies on the one hand and peoples on the other were bound to break down.”

⁶¹ “To understand the events of the next fifty years, then, one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war.”

⁶² “The yearly net population growth is 3.6 percent. This means that the Ivory Coast’s 13.5 million people will become 39 million by 2025...”

“With as much as 65 percent of its land dependent on intensive irrigation, with wide-scale deforestation, and with a yearly population growth of 2.7 percent (which ensures that the amount of cultivated land per rural inhabitant will plummet), Pakistan is becoming a more and more desperate place.”

“...population of 1.54 billion by the year 2025: it is a misconception that China has gotten its population under control.”

⁶³ “This is especially so because Nigeria’s population... is set to double during the next twenty-five years, while the country continues to deplete its natural resources.”

“In twenty-eight years Guinea’s population will double if growth goes on at current rates.”

“Today seventeen out of twenty-two Arab states have a declining gross national product; in the next twenty years, at current growth rates, the population of many Arab countries will double.”

⁶⁴ “...polygamy continues to thrive in sub-Saharan Africa [where]... loose family structures are largely responsible for the world’s highest birth rates”

⁶⁵ “Much of the Arab world, however, will undergo alteration, as Islam spreads across artificial frontiers, fueled by mass migrations into the cities and a soaring birth rate of more than 3.2 percent.”

⁶⁶ “Over the next fifty years the earth’s population will soar from 5.5 billion to more than nine billion.”

⁶⁷ “But nature is coming back with a vengeance, tied to population growth. It will have incredible security implications.”

⁶⁸ “Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.”

⁶⁹ “John Keegan, in his new book *A History of Warfare*, draws a more benign portrait of primitive man, it is important to point out that what Van Creveld really means is re-primitized man: warrior societies operating at a time of unprecedented resource scarcity and planetary overcrowding.”

⁷⁰ “The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh--developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite

group conflicts--will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War."

⁷¹ "In cities in six West African countries I saw similar young men everywhere--hordes of them. They were like loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a fluid that was clearly on the verge of igniting."

⁷² "In that realm, the violent youth culture of the Gaza shantytowns may be indicative of the coming era."

⁷³ "Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism."

"...roughly 400,000 Sierra Leonians are internally displaced, 280,000 more have fled to neighboring Guinea, and another 100,000 have fled to Liberia, even as 400,000 Liberians have fled to Sierra Leone. The third largest city in Sierra Leone, Gondama, is a displaced-persons camp. With an additional 600,000 Liberians in Guinea and 250,000 in the Ivory Coast, the borders dividing these four countries have become largely meaningless."

⁷⁴ "To this protean cartographic hologram one must add other factors, such as migrations of populations, explosions of birth rates, vectors of disease. Henceforward the map of the world will never be static. This future map--in a sense, the 'Last Map'--will be an ever-mutating representation of chaos."

⁷⁵ "Large-scale population movements are under way, from inland China to coastal China and from villages to cities."

⁷⁶ "He will build dikes to save Cape Hatteras and the Chesapeake beaches from rising sea levels, even as the Maldiv Islands, off the coast of India, sink into oblivion, and the shorelines of Egypt, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia recede, driving tens of millions of people inland where there is no room for them, and thus sharpening ethnic divisions."

⁷⁷ "The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh--developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts--will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War."

⁷⁸ "In those cities African culture is being redefined while desertification and deforestation--also tied to overpopulation--drive more and more African peasants out of the countryside."

"Fifty-five percent of the Ivory Coast's population is urban, and the proportion is expected to reach 62 percent by 2000."

"Hardwood logging continues at a madcap speed, and people flee the Guinean countryside for Conakry."

⁷⁹ "In Turkey several things are happening at once. In 1980, 44 percent of Turks lived in cities; in 1990 it was 61 percent. By the year 2000 the figure is expected to be 67 percent."

"Villages are emptying out as concentric rings of Gecekondü developments grow around Turkish cities."

⁸⁰ "Large-scale population movements are under way, from inland China to coastal China and from villages to cities."

⁸¹ "Given that in 2025 India's population could be close to 1.5 billion, that much of its economy rests on a shrinking natural-resource base, including dramatically declining water levels, and that communal violence and urbanization are spiraling upward, it is difficult to imagine that the Indian state will survive the next century."

⁸² "A political era driven by environmental stress, increased cultural sensitivity, unregulated urbanization, and refugee migrations is an era divinely created for the spread and intensification of Islam, already the world's fastest-growing religion."

⁸³ "And the cities keep growing."

⁸⁴ "The fiction that the impoverished city of Algiers, on the Mediterranean, controls Tamanrasset, deep in the Algerian Sahara, cannot obtain forever."

⁸⁵ "Pakistan's problem is more basic still: like much of Africa, the country makes no geographic or demographic sense."

⁸⁶ "In such a moonscape, over which peoples have migrated and settled in patterns that obliterate borders, the end of the Cold War will bring on a cruel process of natural selection among existing states."

⁸⁷ “I would add that as refugee flows increase and as peasants continue migrating to cities around the world--turning them into sprawling villages--national borders will mean less, even as more power will fall into the hands of less educated, less sophisticated groups.”

⁸⁸ “The Kurds suggest a geographic reality that cannot be shown in two-dimensional space.”

⁸⁹ “Part of West Africa’s quandary is that although its population belts are horizontal, with habitation densities increasing as one travels south away from the Sahara and toward the tropical abundance of the Atlantic littoral, the borders erected by European colonialists are vertical, and therefore at cross-purposes with demography and topography.”

⁹⁰ “Like the borders of West Africa, the colonial borders of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Algeria, and other Arab states are often contrary to cultural and political reality.”

⁹¹ “Turkey’s borders were established not by colonial powers but in a war of independence, in the early 1920s.”

⁹² “Van Creveld writes, ‘In all these struggles political, social, economic, and religious motives were hopelessly entangled. Since this was an age when armies consisted of mercenaries, all were also attended by swarms of military entrepreneurs. . . . Many of them paid little but lip service to the organizations for whom they had contracted to fight. Instead, they robbed the countryside on their own behalf. . . .’”

“As crime continues to grow in our cities and the ability of state governments and criminal-justice systems to protect their citizens diminishes, urban crime may, according to Van Creveld, ‘develop into low-intensity conflict by coalescing along racial, religious, social, and political lines.’”

⁹³ “Back then, in other words, there was no ‘politics’ as we have come to understand the term, just as there is less and less ‘politics’ today in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, among other places.”

⁹⁴ “To the average person, political values will mean less, personal security more.”

⁹⁵ “In truth the Sierra Leonian government, run by a twenty-seven-year-old army captain, Valentine Strasser, controls Freetown by day and by day also controls part of the rural interior.”

⁹⁶ “. . . national borders will mean less, even as more power will fall into the hands of less educated, less sophisticated groups.”

⁹⁷ “This is another indication of how political maps are the products of tired conventional wisdom and, in the Ivory Coast’s case, of an elite that will ultimately be forced to relinquish power.”

⁹⁸ “Because the demographic reality of West Africa is a countryside draining into dense slums by the coast, ultimately the region’s rulers will come to reflect the values of these shanty-towns. There are signs of this already in Sierra Leone--and in Togo, where the dictator Etienne Eyadema, in power since 1967, was nearly toppled in 1991, not by democrats but by thousands of youths whom the London-based magazine *West Africa* described as ‘Soweto-like stone-throwing adolescents.’ Their behavior may herald a regime more brutal than Eyadema’s repressive one.”

⁹⁹ “In forty-five years I have never seen things so bad. We did not manage ourselves well after the British departed. But what we have now is something worse--the revenge of the poor, of the social failures, of the people least able to bring up children in a modern society.”

¹⁰⁰ “In Turkey, however, Islam is painfully and awkwardly forging a consensus with modernization, a trend that is less apparent in the Arab and Persian worlds (and virtually invisible in Africa).”

¹⁰¹ “In Iran the oil boom--because it put development and urbanization on a fast track, making the culture shock more intense--fueled the 1978 Islamic Revolution.”

¹⁰² “Economic modernization is not necessarily a panacea, since it fuels individual and group ambitions while weakening traditional loyalties to the state. It is worth noting, for example, that it is precisely the wealthiest and fastest-developing city in India, Bombay that has seen the worst intercommunal violence between Hindus and Muslims.”

¹⁰³ “But Turkey, unlike Iran and the Arab world, has little oil. Therefore, its development and urbanization have been more gradual. Islamists have been integrated into the parliamentary system for decades. The tensions I noticed in Golden Mountain are natural, creative ones: the kind immigrants face the world over.”

¹⁰⁴ “The [Ivorian] economy has been shrinking since the mid-1980s.”

¹⁰⁵ “During the 1980s cocoa prices fell and the French began to leave. The skyscrapers of the Paris of West Africa are a facade. Perhaps 15 percent of Abidjan’s population of three million people live in shantytowns like Chicago and Washington, and the vast majority live in places that are not much better.”

¹⁰⁶ “Given that in 2025 India’s population could be close to 1.5 billion, that much of its economy rests on a shrinking natural-resource base, including dramatically declining water levels, and that communal

violence and urbanization are spiraling upward, it is difficult to imagine that the Indian state will survive the next century.”

¹⁰⁷ “Today seventeen out of twenty-two Arab states have a declining gross national product; in the next twenty years, at current growth rates, the population of many Arab countries will double.”

¹⁰⁸ “President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who died last December at the age of about ninety, left behind a weak cluster of political parties and a leaden bureaucracy that discourages foreign investment.”

¹⁰⁹ “France will withdraw from former colonies like Benin, Togo, Niger, and the Ivory Coast, where it has been propping up local currencies.”

¹¹⁰ “Young unemployed men spend their time drinking beer, palm wine, and gin while gambling on pinball games constructed out of rotting wood and rusty nails.”

¹¹¹ “Another woman complained about the schools. Though her children had educational options unavailable in the village, they had to compete with wealthier, secular Turks. ‘The kids from rich families with connections--they get all the places.’ More opportunities, more tensions, in other words.”

¹¹² “Large-scale population movements are under way, from inland China to coastal China and from villages to cities, leading to a crime surge like the one in Africa and to growing regional disparities and conflicts in a land with a strong tradition of warlordism and a weak tradition of central government--again as in Africa.”

“Its current economic ‘success’ masks deeper problems. China’s fourteen percent growth rate does not mean it’s going to be a world power. It means that coastal China, where the economic growth is taking place, is joining the rest of the Pacific Rim. The disparity with inland China is intensifying.”

¹¹³ “95 percent of the population increase will be in the poorest regions of the world, where governments now--just look at Africa--show little ability to function, let alone to implement even marginal improvements.”

“...an increasingly large number of people will be stuck in history, living in shantytowns where attempts to rise above poverty, cultural dysfunction, and ethnic strife will be doomed by a lack of water to drink, soil to till, and space to survive in.”

¹¹⁴ “I would add that as refugee flows increase and as peasants continue migrating to cities around the world--turning them into sprawling villages--national borders will mean less, even as more power will fall into the hands of less educated, less sophisticated groups.”

¹¹⁵ “This means that the Ivory Coast’s 13.5 million people will become 39 million by 2025, when much of the population will consist of urbanized peasants like those of Chicago.”

¹¹⁶ “Consider ‘Chicago.’ I refer not to Chicago, Illinois, but to a slum district of Abidjan, which the young toughs in the area have named after the American city. (‘Washington’ is another poor section of Abidjan.)”

¹¹⁷ “...never-ending shantytown: a nightmarish Dickensian spectacle to which Dickens himself would never have given credence. The corrugated metal shacks and scabrous walls were coated with black slime. Stores were built out of rusted shipping containers, junked cars, and jumbles of wire mesh. The streets were one long puddle of floating garbage.”

“In that realm, the violent youth culture of the Gaza shantytowns may be indicative of the coming era.”

¹¹⁸ “It is located in a gully teeming with coconut palms and oil palms, and is ravaged by flooding. Few residents have easy access to electricity, a sewage system, or a clean water supply.”

¹¹⁹ “As anybody who has had experience with Chetniks in Serbia, ‘technicals’ in Somalia, Tontons Macoutes in Haiti, or soldiers in Sierra Leone can tell you, in places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence.”

¹²⁰ “It is this: a large number of people on this planet, to whom the comfort and stability of a middle-class life is utterly unknown, find war and a barracks existence a step up rather than a step down.”

¹²¹ “Whereas rural poverty is age-old and almost a “normal” part of the social fabric, urban poverty is socially destabilizing.”

¹²² “In forty-five years I have never seen things so bad. We did not manage ourselves well after the British departed. But what we have now is something worse--the revenge of the poor, of the social failures, of the people least able to bring up children in a modern society.”

¹²³ “To understand the events of the next fifty years, then, one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war.”

¹²⁴ “If crime and war become indistinguishable, then ‘national defense’ may in the future be viewed as a local concept. As crime continues to grow in our cities and the ability of state governments and criminal-justice systems to protect their citizens diminishes, urban crime may, according to Van Creveld, ‘develop into low-intensity conflict by coalescing along racial, religious, social, and political lines.’”

¹²⁵ "During the 1960s, as is now clear, America began a slow but unmistakable process of transformation. The signs hardly need belaboring: racial polarity, educational dysfunction, social fragmentation of many and various kinds."

¹²⁶ "Issues like West Africa could yet emerge as a new kind of foreign-policy issue, further eroding America's domestic peace. The spectacle of several West African nations collapsing at once could reinforce the worst racial stereotypes here at home. That is another reason why Africa matters. We must not kid ourselves: the sensitivity factor is higher than ever."

¹²⁷ "A political era driven by environmental stress, increased cultural sensitivity, unregulated urbanization, and refugee migrations is an era divinely created for the spread and intensification of Islam, already the world's fastest-growing religion."

¹²⁸ "More evidence is provided by the destruction of medieval monuments in the Croatian port of Dubrovnik: when cultures, rather than states, fight, then cultural and religious monuments are weapons of war, making them fair game."

¹²⁹ "As state power fades--and with it the state's ability to help weaker groups within society, not to mention other states--peoples and cultures around the world will be thrown back upon their own strengths and weaknesses, with fewer equalizing mechanisms to protect them."

¹³⁰ "To understand the events of the next fifty years, then, one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war."

¹³¹ "The world, he argues, has been moving during the course of this century from nation-state conflict to ideological conflict to, finally, cultural conflict."

¹³² "...cultural war at the turn of the twenty-first: between Orthodox Christianity (represented by the Serbs and a classic Byzantine configuration of Greeks, Russians, and Romanians) and the House of Islam."

"True, Huntington's hypothesized war between Islam and Orthodox Christianity is not borne out by the alliance network in the Caucasus. But that is only because he has misidentified which cultural war is occurring there."

¹³³ "Whatever the laws, refugees find a way to crash official borders, bringing their passions with them, meaning that Europe and the United States will be weakened by cultural disputes."

¹³⁴ "A recent visit to Azerbaijan made clear to me that Azeri Turks, the world's most secular Shi'ite Muslims, see their cultural identity in terms not of religion but of their Turkic race. The Armenians, likewise, fight the Azeris not because the latter are Muslims but because they are Turks, related to the same Turks who massacred Armenians in 1915. Turkic culture (secular and based on languages employing a Latin script) is battling Iranian culture (religiously militant as defined by Tehran, and wedded to an Arabic script) across the whole swath of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Armenians are, therefore, natural allies of their fellow Indo-Europeans the Iranians."

¹³⁵ "America's sobering comeuppances in intractable-culture zones like Haiti and Somalia"

¹³⁶ "In other words, the Balkans, a powder keg for nation-state war at the beginning of the twentieth century, could be a powder keg for cultural war at the turn of the twenty-first..."

¹³⁷ "As anybody who has had experience with Chetniks in Serbia, 'technicals' in Somalia, Tontons Macoutes in Haiti, or soldiers in Sierra Leone can tell you, in places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in violence."

¹³⁸ "...an increasingly large number of people will be stuck in history, living in shantytowns where attempts to rise above poverty, cultural dysfunction, and ethnic strife will be doomed by a lack of water to drink, soil to till, and space to survive in."

¹³⁹ "The Indian subcontinent offers examples of what is happening. For different reasons, both India and Pakistan are increasingly dysfunctional. The argument over democracy in these places is less and less relevant to the larger issue of governability. In India's case the question arises, Is one unwieldy bureaucracy in New Delhi the best available mechanism for promoting the lives of 866 million people of diverse languages, religions, and ethnic groups?"

¹⁴⁰ "The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research recently made the following points in an analysis of Nigeria: 'Prospects for a transition to civilian rule and democratization are slim. . . . The repressive apparatus of the state security service . . . will be difficult for any future civilian government to control. . . . The country is becoming increasingly ungovernable. . . . Ethnic and regional splits are deepening, a situation made worse by an increase in the number of states from 19 to 30 and a doubling in the number of local governing authorities; religious cleavages are more serious; Muslim fundamentalism and evangelical Christian militancy are on the rise; and northern Muslim anxiety over southern [Christian] control of the economy is intense . . . the will to keep Nigeria together is now very weak.'"

¹⁴¹ "...remaking civilizations and redefining their identities in terms of religion and tribal ethnicity which do not coincide with the borders of existing states."

¹⁴² "Van Creveld writes, 'In all these struggles political, social, economic, and religious motives were hopelessly entangled. Since this was an age when armies consisted of mercenaries, all were also attended by swarms of military entrepreneurs. . . . Many of them paid little but lip service to the organizations for whom they had contracted to fight. Instead, they robbed the countryside on their own behalf. . . .'"

¹⁴³ "Western religion is undermined by animist beliefs not suitable to a moral society, because they are based on irrational spirit power. Here spirits are used to wreak vengeance by one person against another, or one group against another."

¹⁴⁴ "Egypt could be where climatic upheaval--to say nothing of the more immediate threat of increasing population--will incite religious upheaval in truly biblical fashion."

¹⁴⁵ "'From the vantage point of the present, there appears every prospect that religious . . . fanaticisms will play a larger role in the motivation of armed conflict' in the West than at any time 'for the last 300 years,' Van Creveld writes. This is why analysts like Michael Vlahos are closely monitoring religious cults."

¹⁴⁶ "If crime and war become indistinguishable, then 'national defense' may in the future be viewed as a local concept. As crime continues to grow in our cities and the ability of state governments and criminal-justice systems to protect their citizens diminishes, urban crime may, according to Van Creveld, 'develop into low-intensity conflict by coalescing along racial, religious, social, and political lines.'"

¹⁴⁷ "Islam's very militancy makes it attractive to the downtrodden. It is the one religion that is prepared to fight."

¹⁴⁸ "Also, war-making entities will no longer be restricted to a specific territory. Loose and shadowy organisms such as Islamic terrorist organizations suggest why borders will mean increasingly little and sedimentary layers of tribalistic identity and control will mean more."

¹⁴⁹ "Whatever the outcome of the peace process, Israel is destined to be a Jewish ethnic fortress amid a vast and volatile realm of Islam."

¹⁵⁰ "Much of the Arab world, however, will undergo alteration, as Islam spreads across artificial frontiers, fueled by mass migrations into the cities and a soaring birth rate of more than 3.2 percent."

¹⁵¹ "...the government failed to deliver relief aid and slum residents were in many instances helped by their local mosques, can only strengthen the position of Islamic factions."

¹⁵² "A political era driven by environmental stress, increased cultural sensitivity, unregulated urbanization, and refugee migrations is an era divinely created for the spread and intensification of Islam, already the world's fastest-growing religion."

¹⁵³ "That lack will leave many Arab states defenseless against a wave of Islam that will eat away at their legitimacy and frontiers in coming years."

¹⁵⁴ "The Middle East analyst Christine M. Helms explains, 'Declaring Arab nationalism 'bankrupt,' the political 'disinherited' are not rationalizing the failure of Arabism . . . or reformulating it. Alternative solutions are not contemplated. They have simply opted for the political paradigm at the other end of the political spectrum with which they are familiar--Islam.'"

¹⁵⁵ "The Indian subcontinent offers examples of what is happening. For different reasons, both India and Pakistan are increasingly dysfunctional. The argument over democracy in these places is less and less relevant to the larger issue of governability. In India's case the question arises, Is one unwieldy bureaucracy in New Delhi the best available mechanism for promoting the lives of 866 million people of diverse languages, religions, and ethnic groups?"

¹⁵⁶ "Like Yugoslavia, Pakistan is a patchwork of ethnic groups, increasingly in violent conflict with one another."

¹⁵⁷ "Indeed, it is not clear that the United States will survive the next century in exactly its present form. Because America is a multi-ethnic society, the nation-state has always been more fragile here than it is in more homogeneous societies like Germany and Japan."

¹⁵⁸ "Whatever the outcome of the peace process, Israel is destined to be a Jewish ethnic fortress amid a vast and volatile realm of Islam."

¹⁵⁹ "America's fascination with the Israeli-Palestinian issue, coupled with its lack of interest in the Turkish-Kurdish one, is a function of its own domestic and ethnic obsessions, not of the cartographic reality that is about to transform the Middle East. The diplomatic process involving Israelis and Palestinians will, I believe, have little effect on the early- and mid-twenty-first-century map of the region. Israel, with a 6.6 percent economic growth rate based increasingly on high-tech exports, is about to enter Homer-Dixon's stretch limo, fortified by a well-defined political community that is an

organic outgrowth of history and ethnicity. Like prosperous and peaceful Japan on the one hand, and war-torn and poverty-wracked Armenia on the other, Israel is a classic national-ethnic organism.”

¹⁶⁰ “...an increasingly large number of people will be stuck in history, living in shantytowns where attempts to rise above poverty, cultural dysfunction, and ethnic strife will be doomed by a lack of water to drink, soil to till, and space to survive in.”

¹⁶¹ “Africa suggests what war, borders, and ethnic politics will be like a few decades hence.”

¹⁶² “...remaking civilizations and redefining their identities in terms of religion and tribal ethnicity which do not coincide with the borders of existing states.”

¹⁶³ “Imagine cartography in three dimensions, as if in a hologram. In this hologram would be the overlapping sediments of group and other identities atop the merely two-dimensional color markings of city-states and the remaining nations, themselves confused in places by shadowy tentacles, hovering overhead, indicating the power of drug cartels, mafias, and private security agencies.”

¹⁶⁴ “The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research recently made the following points in an analysis of Nigeria: ‘Prospects for a transition to civilian rule and democratization are slim. . . . The repressive apparatus of the state security service . . . will be difficult for any future civilian government to control. . . . The country is becoming increasingly ungovernable. . . . Ethnic and regional splits are deepening, a situation made worse by an increase in the number of states from 19 to 30 and a doubling in the number of local governing authorities; religious cleavages are more serious; Muslim fundamentalism and evangelical Christian militancy are on the rise; and northern Muslim anxiety over southern [Christian] control of the economy is intense . . . the will to keep Nigeria together is now very weak.’”

¹⁶⁵ “He will build dikes to save Cape Hatteras and the Chesapeake beaches from rising sea levels, even as the Maldiv Islands, off the coast of India, sink into oblivion, and the shorelines of Egypt, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia recede, driving tens of millions of people inland where there is no room for them, and thus sharpening ethnic divisions.”

¹⁶⁶ “Environmental scarcity will inflame existing hatreds and affect power relationships, at which we now look.”

¹⁶⁷ “The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh--developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts--will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War.”

¹⁶⁸ “This southeastern region of Turkey is populated almost completely by Kurds. About half of the world’s 20 million Kurds live in ‘Turkey.’ The Kurds are predominant in an ellipse of territory that overlaps not only with Turkey but also with Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the former Soviet Union. The Western-enforced Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq, a consequence of the 1991 Gulf War, has already exposed the fictitious nature of that supposed nation-state.”

¹⁶⁹ “Because the Kurds overlap with nearly everybody in the Middle East, on account of their being cheated out of a state in the post-First World War peace treaties, they are emerging, in effect, as the natural selector--the ultimate reality check.”

¹⁷⁰ “Because the Kurds overlap with nearly everybody in the Middle East, on account of their being cheated out of a state in the post-First World War peace treaties, they are emerging, in effect, as the natural selector--the ultimate reality check. They have destabilized Iraq and may continue to disrupt states that do not offer them adequate breathing space, while strengthening states that do.”

II.D) Kaplan's Writing

It is within this section that Kaplan himself, as well as his published books, will be discussed. This section focus on Kaplan as he is perceived by his peers and those that review his works, how he views himself as journalist and author, and on how his anarchy thesis developed between its original publication in 1994, its republication in 2001, and slightly thereafter.

II.D.i) Kaplan as a Journalist and Author

Similar to the examination of the criticisms against, and the support for, “The Coming Anarchy,” this sub-section has drawn upon the opinions of Kaplan’s journalistic colleagues, and others who have reviewed his work, in the attempt to convey how seriously, or not seriously, Kaplan is considered as a journalist and author. This examination is necessary so to demonstrate two important issues regarding this refutation: Firstly, without an idea of how Kaplan is perceived as a journalist and author on the whole, this thesis would be examining his authorship of “The Coming Anarchy” in a vacuum, so to speak, which could possibly invite criticism that this thesis has taken the author and “The Coming Anarchy” out of context from his other writings. Secondly, “The Coming Anarchy” and Kaplan himself is regarded by many, as will be demonstrated, negatively, almost to the point of being humorously ridiculous in his pessimism and exaggerations, with specific regard to his anarchy thesis. This examination of how Kaplan is viewed by his peers, and others who have reviewed his work, will demonstrate that this negative opinion of Kaplan is *not universal*. It will demonstrate that many view Kaplan as a very serious journalist and author, therefore further underscoring the danger of his anarchy thesis and the need for a refutation thereof.

Criticism of Kaplan as a Journalist and Author

The criticisms against Kaplan as a journalist and author strike on many different levels. They range from, what have been labeled here as, soft criticisms, to criticism that are much more serious attacks against his work and person.

The soft criticisms include calling Kaplan unscholarly and a storyteller, as Garfinkle observed, “Kaplan merges literature and analysis, storytelling and philosophy, observation and history in a way that few writers even dare nowadays. Such an ambitiously eclectic approach is bound to cut a few scholarly corners,”¹ or as Kagan noted, “Kaplan’s style of analysis is the reverse of historical scholarship”²; Kagan even went as far in his critique as to call Kaplan clumsy³ in his explanations. Other soft criticisms attacked Kaplan’s knowledge of history, “Kaplan’s grip on history is weak. Just about every historical event or political philosopher he discusses he gets at least half-wrong,”⁴ his knowledge in general, “There is a limit to lay knowledge and journalistic queries and Kaplan reaches it,”⁵ and one critic even mockingly called Kaplan a “party-pooper”⁶ because of his post-Cold War pessimism. These criticisms of Kaplan as a journalist and author have been labeled as ‘soft’ in comparison to the criticisms presented below.

These harsher criticisms of Kaplan included a barrage of accusations charging Kaplan of extreme egoism. This claim has taken many forms referring to his journalistic coverage of news events, “One may detect a certain egoism in Kaplan’s recurrent claim that ‘the real news’ is being made wherever Kaplan happens to be,”⁷ to his self-perceived prophetic powers, “Kaplan believed that he had been vouchsafed prophetic knowledge about the West,”⁸ and even to the combination of the two, “Kaplan’s excesses...could be chalked up to egoism, albeit of truly impressive proportions. Not only was ‘the real news’ wherever Kaplan happened to be standing; so, too, was the key to discovering all of mankind’s destiny.”⁹ Similarly, Kaplan is

accused of egotism via his self-comparisons to other intellectuals, “He [Kaplan] fancies himself a Gibbon for our time, a fearless exposé of truth in a world dominated by myth...One hesitates, of course, to pursue Kaplan’s self-congratulatory comparison of himself with Gibbon.”¹⁰ He has also been directly criticized as having “an outsized ego”¹¹ and has even been called outright self-serving, “Kaplan appears to believe that realists have a monopoly on the appreciation of tragedy, that believers in progress cannot acknowledge the enduring ‘reality of human evil’ This is a self-serving and inaccurate conceit.”¹²

As a writer Kaplan has also been criticized as being naïve regarding issues surrounding the subjects he frequently discusses, such as poverty and the Third World, “[Kaplan’s work is] ambivalent about development itself and glaringly naïve about basic development issues.”¹³ And regarding his worldview, Kaplan has been criticized as having “distorted vision,” “According to Kaplan, we’re looking at the world through rose-colored glasses: ‘Most people don’t want to see the negative, they only want to see the positive.’...If anyone’s vision is distorted, it’s Kaplan’s.”¹⁴ This accusation of “distorted vision” could be interpreted as belonging to another criticism of Kaplan which has come from many sources, that of bias.

Like his egoism criticisms, those who accuse Kaplan of bias do so in multiple forms. In accusing Kaplan of a biased perception of the world Kaplan is criticized as having “an obsession with order at any cost...[where he] sees dangerous anarchy lurking everywhere”¹⁵ or as being “consumed by a sense of foreboding.”¹⁶ Similarly, Kaplan’s critics have directly accused his bias as effecting the formation of his anarchy thesis – for example, in Kagan’s critique of “The Coming Anarchy” he writes, “One strongly suspects that he [Kaplan] simply found evidence in Africa for what he already believed was the West’s impending -doom.”¹⁷

An interesting point regarding Kaplan's alleged bias and his pessimistic predictions ("impending-doom") is identified through an interview in one of Kaplan's critic's articles, which reads:

One scientist with a definitive point of view about the future is Solomon Snyder, a psychiatrist and neuro-scientist at the Johns Hopkins Medical School...His relevant point is that 'people's view of the future is less related to an intellectual analysis of events and factors than it is to their personality.'¹⁸

This may simply reinforce suspicions regarding a link between Kaplan's alleged bias and pessimistic anarchy thesis, but when Dr. Snyder's assertion is combined with recalling the selective racial, ethnic, specific country examples Kaplan used to convey his anarchy thesis and with the allegation that "Kaplan unwittingly reflects the tensions inherent in the racist and eugenic roots of the modern anti-natal movement,"¹⁹ one gets a more upsetting impression of what may be Kaplan's true personality; An impression that is not challenged by Kaplan's reference to "dysfunctional cultures" in his response to his critic's accusations of personal bias:

Telling the truth about dysfunctional cultures opens you to a charge of bias. But if we refuse to recognize such realities, how can we possibly address the problems they breed?²⁰

All of these criticisms against Kaplan as a journalist and writer paint a rather nasty picture of him: A clumsy, unscholarly, storyteller, with a poor knowledge of history, and poor knowledge in general, who is also an egotistical, self-serving, naïve, "party-pooper," with distorted vision, biased opinions, and possible racist beliefs, who feels it is his duty to identify the realities of "dysfunctional cultures" to address the problems that they breed – this is a stark contrast to the image others have of Kaplan which is presented in the following sub-section.

Support for Kaplan as a Journalist and Author

The criticisms against Kaplan, presented above, and the support for him, presented here, were originally intended to assess the opinions of Kaplan's colleagues, and others who have reviewed his work, and to demonstrate how Kaplan is perceived as a journalist and author, but, as will be seen, the praise of Kaplan and his work go well beyond those two categories.

This praise for Kaplan identifies him with various fields, titles, occupations, and genres. Kaplan is praised for his travel writing, and his supporters even make a point to place him above his travel-writing colleagues by calling him a "master travel writer"²¹ or "scholarly travel journalist."²² His travel writing acclamations have even further emphasized that his work is above the travel writing field claiming that it "occupies a controversial middle ground between historical scholarship and adventure travel."²³ This praise of Kaplan's use of history in his work has even earned him the title of "historian"²⁴ by one of his supporters.

It may be because of these exceptional qualities as a writer that many view him as being above a mere travel writer and considered, as this thesis does, a "respected journalist."²⁵ Even under this title though, his supporters again praise him as being above the norm, stating that he produces "solid journalism,"²⁶ and "ranks easily among the best journalists in the world."²⁷ Regarding his journalistic style, like the acclamation he receives for his historical references, Kaplan has also earned acclaim as an academician: "[Kaplan] comfortably blends academic references with the observations of a journalist reporting on travel."²⁸ In addition to supporting Kaplan's status as an academic, one supporter, writing in the *Baltimore Sun*, counters the labeling of him as a literary storyteller, as was proposed by some of his critics.

In America, unlike in some other countries, artists and writers are not given the same attention in these matters as academics or pundits like Dr. Huntington and Mr. Kaplan, or social critics like Christopher Lasch -- men who offer statistics and eye-witness accounts, rather than literary style and universal metaphors.²⁹

With the a good portion of “The Coming Anarchy” citing Homer-Dixon’s “stretch limo” metaphor, one wonders if this supporter is familiar with Kaplan’s works at all. Similarly, praise for Kaplan’s “eye-witness accounts” may be out of place concerning the prophetic aspects of his work.

Yet, it is regarding Kaplan’s prophecies where another large body of support for Kaplan can be found. Kaplan has received praise in this area because, within his anarchy thesis, he is said to have “plausibly portrayed the future of the Third World...[and the] expanding enclaves within the First World,”³⁰ and, referring to Kaplan’s predictions about the Gulf Region and the Balkans one supporter states that his predictions “have come true before.”³¹ Supporters of Kaplan’s foresight have crowned him a “visionary”³² and attempt to encourage others to join Kaplan’s following with statements like that which appeared in a *Boston Globe* article, “In the confusion ahead, Kaplan’s will be a voice worth listening for.”³³

Because of Kaplan’s focus on U.S. and international affairs and because he is praised for his “visionary” points of view regarding such subjects, Kaplan has also earned a reputation as a “respected journalist who reports on international issues,”³⁴ “a serious geopolitical thinker,”³⁵ and has even been described as “one of America’s most engaging writers on contemporary international affairs.”³⁶ It is Kaplan’s writings on U.S. policy and international affairs that have made some of his supporters disagree entirely with the allegation that Kaplan is a travel writer; one such minded supporter comment on Kaplan’s work: “This is not travel writing, but sharp, often uncomfortable observations about U.S. foreign policy and trends in American life.”³⁷

It is within this role, as a U.S. foreign policy and international affairs specialist, that Kaplan has received indirect praise through his having had audience with political and military officials. Kaplan's supporters cite the fact that, as was stated in the "Statement of the Problem" section of this thesis, Kaplan's work has gained the attention of important political figures and policy makers as a reflection on both Kaplan's work and of Kaplan himself; in other word, their support alludes, if politically and militarily important people listen to Kaplan, then Kaplan himself is politically and militarily important. An excellent example of such support can be seen in the segment of the following *Washington Post* article, in which Kaplan is described as:

...a provocative poet of policy and pessimism...whose 'Eastward to Tartary' won him an invitation to brief President Bush, whose 'Balkan Ghosts' was devoured by Bill Clinton, and whose other books have been blurbed by the likes of Newt Gingrich, Robert McFarlane and Henry Kissinger...

While Washington is filled with journalists seeking information from the military, the military seeks information from Kaplan. He has spoken at Fort Leavenworth, Fort Pendleton, and Fort Bragg. Next month he briefs the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and last week he was in Bulgaria addressing that country's parliament.³⁸

Similar statements that convey this image of Kaplan having a hand in politics include those within articles from the *New Statesman* which states that Kaplan "has been enchanting and distressing armchair policy wonks and foreign policy makers in about equal measure since his long essay 'The Coming Anarchy,'"³⁹ and *The Jerusalem Post*, which states, "President Clinton is said to have been influenced by [Kaplan's work]."⁴⁰

Other peer opinions that present a supportive view of Kaplan include general compliments such as calling him "astute, informed, prescient, wise,"⁴¹ "savvy,"⁴² "analytically daring,"⁴³ "an insightful generalist,"⁴⁴ "an eloquent pessimist,"⁴⁵ a "renaissance scholar,"⁴⁶ a "punctilious teacher,"⁴⁷ with "elegant style,"⁴⁸ "descriptive

powers,”⁴⁹ and that he “writes superbly.”⁵⁰ Trespassing into topics thought to be reserved for Kaplan’s critics, one of Kaplan’s supporters even went as far as to say that Kaplan is “scrupulously sensitive to the needs and sovereignty of native Africans”⁵¹ and that he “works hard never to overgeneralize.”⁵²

Above has been presented a large amount of Kaplan’s peers’ opinions that compliment and support him as an author. This support has come in many different forms, complementing Kaplan on accomplishments in many different fields, and presents a converse perception of Kaplan. But, with such varied support, labeling Kaplan with such wide-ranging titles such as a travel writer, historian, journalist, academic, prophet, U.S. foreign policy and international affairs specialist, and advisor to the military, it becomes difficult to identify Kaplan as fitting into any particular genre. Although this may not appear to pose a problem, or even matter to a refutation of “The Coming Anarchy,” within the next subsection it will become apparent that what genre Kaplan’s work is classified is absolutely essential to the anarchy thesis and, in turn, to the relevance of this manuscript.

II.D.ii) Kaplan on Kaplan and the Anarchy Thesis

The above subsection presented how Kaplan’s readers perceive him as an author. This was necessary to demonstrate that despite a heavy body of criticism against Kaplan, he is perceived by many as a professional journalist and author. How Kaplan is perceived is relevant to this refutation because, if Kaplan had no supporters and was completely disregarded as an author by his peers and others, then his work, including “The Coming Anarchy,” would be similarly disregarded and the creation of this refutation would, essentially, be pointless. For these same reasons, how Kaplan perceives himself, and how he views his own anarchy thesis is equally, if not more,

important to this refutation. To omit how Kaplan views himself as a writer and how his opinion of his own thesis has changed since its original publication would be neglectful in its refutation tantamount to ignoring George Kennan's personal opinions regarding his Long Telegram if one were discussing Containment.

With its relevance being stated, it is within this subsection that, first, Kaplan's opinions regarding his anarchy thesis, and second, Kaplan's opinions regarding himself as an author, are discussed. To present Kaplan's opinions on these issues, seven relevant pieces of literature are examined and the contents within compared and contrasted. These seven pieces of literature are as follows: the original "The Coming Anarchy" as it was presented in February of 1994; three Kaplan interviews dating April 1996, June 1996, and Fall 1999; the preface to the book *The Coming Anarchy* in which "The Coming Anarchy" was republished in its original form in February 2001; and lastly, two post-*The Coming Anarchy* interviews dating April 2001 and February 2002. Through the examination of these pieces of literature, it will be demonstrated that Kaplan is inconsistent in his opinion regarding the anarchy thesis and in his perception of himself as an author. It is within this last inconsistency that the importance of what genre Kaplan is classified as (introduced in the preceding subsection) shows its incredible relevance.

Regarding Kaplan's thesis, this examination has mined each of these pieces of literature to present the inconstancies, contradictions, alterations, and misrepresentations that Kaplan has personally expressed regarding the anarchy thesis from the time of its first publication to one year after its unaltered republication. The following excerpt from the "Statement of the Problem" section of this refutation has been presented below to revisit the essential components of Kaplan's 1994 anarchy thesis; direct "The Coming Anarchy" endnote citations have been added lest the

reader want to verify the interpretations of this condensed version of the anarchy thesis.

Using exemplar nations from West Africa to support his prophecy,⁵³ Kaplan's message, in part, is that by 2050⁵⁴ environmental changes, such as global warming induced flooding,⁵⁵ salinization, desertification, erosion and topsoil loss,⁵⁶ as well as man-made deforestation and pollution will cause scarcities of natural resources such as arable land and potable water.⁵⁷ This resource scarcity, coupled with destabilizing urban poverty⁵⁸ and overpopulation,⁵⁹ will exacerbate ethnic conflicts⁶⁰ and cause mass migration of individuals, which in turn will further increase conflict, crime, and the proliferation of disease.⁶¹ All of these reactions to overpopulation and environmentally induced conflict, crime, and migration will, according to Kaplan, ultimately lead to weakened central governments,⁶² the obsolescence of current political borders,⁶³ and the creation of a global anarchy where crime and war are virtually indistinguishable.⁶⁴

This interpretation of the anarchy thesis is also that that has been presented to the public, exemplified through the following quote from the *Washington Post*:

...Robert Kaplan's article, 'The Coming Anarchy,' in which Kaplan paints a disturbing picture of the destruction wrought on West Africa by poverty, crime, corruption, AIDS and malaria. In the essay, published in February's *Atlantic*, he argues that 'West Africa's future, eventually, will also be that of most of the rest of the world': as pollution, migration, disease, and fighting spill across borders, rich nations will see their security evaporate...⁶⁵

And from the *Wilson Quarterly*:

Kaplan sketched a dark view of the global future in which growing scarcities of water, forests, arable land, and fish, along with rapid population growth and other ills, would breed civil strife and war.⁶⁶

Now that there can be little doubt as to what Kaplan's original anarchy thesis was in 1994, Kaplan's comments from varying interviews will be reviewed here. This review will demonstrate that, although he stood by his thesis for a short time after its publication, he withdrew from it and even presented it differently as time progressed, only to come back to it later on, and then to again change and even misrepresent it after the publication of *The Coming Anarchy*. For each of the examinations of these

interviews the relevant content is summarized and presented, followed by their deconstructions.

In his April 1996 interview,⁶⁷ drawing upon his observations from touring the most troubled regions of the world, which he picked deliberately for their instability,⁶⁸ and, citing such facts as recent high population growth rates (within the “last fifteen or twenty years”) and population doubling periods⁶⁹ within the poorest areas of Africa, India and “our own societies,”⁷⁰ as well as deforestation, migration, AIDS⁷¹ and other diseases,⁷² Kaplan states that “a critical mass of the third world” is “so far behind that they won’t be able to catch up.”⁷³ This will lead to situations where governments will collapse or weak democratic regimes will take over, creating “perfect petri dishes for the rise of organized crime networks.”⁷⁴ In addition, Kaplan continues, developed nations should care about this for their “own naked self-interest.”⁷⁵ Self-interests which, citing concerns of the Third World’s ability to create a consumer middle class,⁷⁶ he emphasizes as being economically based.⁷⁷ Kaplan then concludes the interview stating that, “The long range future may be fine, but the next few decades are going to be [the] most tumultuous in human history...because humanity is economically developing at a faster rate than ever before...” which is dangerous, according to Kaplan, because “development is always uneven, cruel, painful and violent” and “always bring[s] political upheaval in its wake.”⁷⁸ To address these concerns Kaplan suggests that the U.S. should be “engaged in a few select places here and there that also track with our self interest so that we can justify it in terms of Congress and the public, and therefore keep platforms of connections inside these places, between our culture and theirs.”⁷⁹

While some of Kaplan's statements in this interview sound very much like the original anarchy thesis published two years earlier, there are some significant changes in Kaplan's prophetic message. First, in this interview Kaplan states that he deliberately selected "trouble spots" to visit. This differs from the impression he presented in "The Coming Anarchy" that he was merely reporting on his travels and observations of the Third World. Second, Kaplan addresses the *rate* of population growth in recent years, as opposed to his reference to general "overpopulation" and only minimal emphasis on doubling rates within "The Coming Anarchy." Third, he states that developed countries should be concerned with the state of the Third World because, among other reasons, they are the markets of the First World and that "If the third world doesn't make it as a middle class place, or at least a large part of the third world, we are not going to be able to grow at three percent growth rates into the future." This is a significant change because he is no longer threatening that anarchy will result from Third World neglect, but rather, the result will be a slowing in economic growth due to a lacking Third World consumer class. Fourth, not only does Kaplan say that the long range future may be fine, a glimmer of optimism that was not displayed in the inevitable gloom and doom of "The Coming Anarchy," he also says that the short range (the "next few decades") will be tumultuous "because humanity is economically developing at a faster rate than ever before." This obviously differs from the anarchy thesis because Kaplan did not reference development as having a role in proliferating conflict in "The Coming Anarchy."

The last significant difference to the anarchy thesis that Kaplan presented in this interview is his inclusion of a policy suggestion for limited, specific, engagement the point of which would be to, among other things, "keep platforms of connections inside these places, between our culture and theirs." Although Kaplan did stay in line

with the implied interventionist suggestions within “The Coming Anarchy,” by providing a policy suggestion at all is, in itself, a difference from the anarchy thesis. This statement is also important because by mentioning cultural “platforms of connections” Kaplan seems to be expressing more cultural respect for less developed countries than he had within “The Coming Anarchy.” But, despite this seemingly more culturally sensitive Kaplan, in other portions of this interview he made separate comments that could open him up to further racist-accusations: such comments include using the saying “...our kind of people...”⁸⁰ when discussing First World/Third World differences, or alluding that places he is reporting on are sub-civilized:

Kaplan: Yes. While the middle class expands in places like India, the poor and the sub-proletariat expands at an even faster rate. It’s like the veneer of civilization, of functional society, is getting thinner and thinner and thinner...⁸¹

This comment may have gone unnoticed had the interviewer not made an effort to correct himself when he almost made a similar remark:

Gergen: From your book, you seem to suggest that a place like West Africa which has only a very thin civiliz -- ah, tradition, there are many good traditions in West Africa...⁸²

In conclusion of the examination of this interview, despite his mention of disease and other anarchy thesis characteristics, ultimately the new or modified “thesis” he is presenting, that of an economic-development-caused tumultuous few decades with the possibility of “weak democratic regimes” and a peaceful long-term future, is very different from the world-engulfing anarchy thesis he presented in 1994.

Just three months after this interview, in June of 1996,⁸³ Kaplan seems to cut all ties with the anarchy thesis by stating that “The Coming Anarchy,” was “theoretical and programmatic” and that within his book *The Ends of The Earth*, “as the story progresses, the [anarchy] theory increasingly dissolves.” When specifically asked

whether or not he still foresaw anarchy he further severs ties with the original thesis by responding:

Not in the way people think. Usually, say ‘anarchy’ and people think of Liberia, which is true as far as it goes. But I think it’s more accurate to say that we are seeing the weakening of the nation-state, and what will follow is a period of imperfect experimentation with new forms of social and political organization, and we simply can’t know what will eventually emerge.⁸⁴

With similar reference to the nation state, Kaplan no longer preached its absolute deterioration but rather just stated, “nothing is sacred about the nation-state.” And as for what Kaplan envisioned as the “most serious issue facing the world” he no longer cited resource scarcity or ethnic conflict (regarding which, Kaplan toned down his original message of inevitable ethnic violence by simply stating that “...culture plays a key role in determining whether or not societies can handle demographic, environmental, technological and political change”) but rather, in response to this question, Kaplan explained “The optimists are correct, insofar as economies are growing all over the world. But it’s precisely for that reason that we’re entering what will likely be a period of real instability.” This instability, Kaplan continued, would result from an inevitable economic disparity because “The more development, the more disparity” which will yield “lots of ambitious and frustrated people,” people whom he refers to as the “sub-proletariat.” This “sub-proletariat” would be frustrated because while they live in “huge shantytowns in Africa and Asia, or [are] scrounging for a living in Central Asia...television tells them how well everyone else is doing.”

The relevant pieces of information within this interview are less the obvious differences between Kaplan’s new “The Coming Disparity-Caused-Television-Informed-Ambitious-and-Frustrated-Instability” ideas that he presented in this interview and the original anarchy thesis, but rather, the fact that he called the anarchy thesis “theoretical” and that he didn’t interpret anarchy as “anarchy,” per se, but rather

as a weakening of the nation state followed by “a period of imperfect experimentation with new forms of social and political organization” about which “we simply can’t know what will eventually emerge.” These two shifts in Kaplan’s opinions, that “The Coming Anarchy” was no longer a report on world “realities”⁸⁵ as he claimed before but that it was “theoretical,” and that he developed a new definition and use of the word anarchy, are important because not only do they contrast with the anarchy thesis but also, as will be shown, they contrast with his opinions regarding “The Coming Anarchy” in future interviews and elsewhere.

Two years later in a Fall 1999 interview,⁸⁶ Kaplan, when asked “How would you assess the state of the world at the turn of the century?” stated that he believed the world to be “no more stable or unstable than it has been in other times in history,” but “because there are now six billion of us...the same level of political instability exacts much greater consequences.” Additionally, Kaplan stated that, “...not only are there six billion of us, but more than in any time of history are we urbanized, so we are in big cities, so we are in need of big complex infrastructure, of sewage, of electricity, of potable water that we never had before....” Further, in the interview Kaplan seems to dodge questions regarding other anarchy thesis issues, like ethnic or religious conflicts,⁸⁷ focusing more on his opinions regarding the weakening nation state and the difficulty of combating non-state adversaries. On the role of the U.S. as a hegemonic power Kaplan commented that “Isolationism is simply not an option,” but otherwise the US being the lone superpower “means nothing more or less than it meant for the British empire at the end of the nineteenth century when there was no challenge on the horizon for the British navy.” And on the role of the military in the future Kaplan stated, “The power of the military is going to increase. There is a basic contradiction about time. We live in an age of democratization, but at the same time

military and security services are increasingly powerful within governments themselves...” When describing his, then upcoming, *The Coming Anarchy*, Kaplan stated:

It deals with a number of topics. It deals with the part of the world that is not part of this new globalized area. It deals with the whole problem of democracy. It deals with the whole problem of mass murder. There are different essays that deal with different elements. In the first few essays I kind of describe the problem as a foreign correspondent and in the last I kind of open avenues in how to deal with them.

Lastly, when responding to the question, “What are some security threats you see in the future?” Kaplan focused on his opinions that “the spread of free markets does not necessarily mean the spread of civil society,” that there are “all kinds of criminal groups that take advantage of globalization,” and that now “weapons of mass destruction...are a greater threat, because they can now be used by non-state actors.” Regarding weapons of mass destruction Kaplan concluded, “The chances of a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, that is not a test, is probably greater now than during the Cold War.”

There are many areas of this interview that are relevant to this refutation. First, by stating that the world is “no more stable or unstable than it has been in other times in history” and that the US as a superpower in the 21st century means nothing more than when the British navy was unchallenged at the turn of the 19th century, Kaplan, in addition to challenging the argument that some might propose that the world today might be slightly more stable today than it was, say, during the First and Second World Wars, challenges his own opinions that the world is on the brink of inevitable anarchy or that, as he claimed in the previous interview, “the next few decades are going to be [the] most tumultuous in human history.” Second, Kaplan’s references to urbanization problems like sewage, electricity, and potable water, combined with his lack of emphasis on ethnic and religious conflict, differ greatly from the image of

tribal groups warring over limited scarce resources; in addition, for Kaplan, it seems that resource scarcity has been trumped by infrastructure issues such as electricity. Third, by stating, “The power of the military is going to increase” Kaplan contradicts one of the pillars of the anarchy thesis - that private armies, security firms and military entrepreneurs are going to become more powerful than state armies. As he stated in “The Coming Anarchy”:

As small-scale violence multiplies at home and abroad, state armies will continue to shrink, being gradually replaced by a booming private security business, as in West Africa, and by urban mafias, especially in the former communist world, who may be better equipped than municipal police forces to grant physical protection to local inhabitants.

Similarly, with this new opinion of the fate of state controlled military, Kaplan even contradicts all of his lengthy quotations of Van Creveld within “The Coming Anarchy” - “Van Creveld warns them that huge state military machines like the Pentagon’s are dinosaurs about to go extinct, and that something far more terrible awaits us.”; “the period of nation-states and, therefore, of state conflict is now ending”; “Armed conflict will be waged by men on earth, not robots in space. It will have more in common with the struggles of primitive tribes than with large-scale conventional war.”; “...listen closely to Van Creveld: ‘Once the legal monopoly of armed force, long claimed by the state, is wrested out of its hands, existing distinctions between war and crime will break down....’” Fourth, by stating that weapons of mass destruction and criminal groups are future security threats, Kaplan again leaves behind much of his original anarchy thesis. Lastly, all of these contradictions may seem irrelevant considering Kaplan’s statement in the previous interview that “The Coming Anarchy” was “theoretical,” but Kaplan contradicts himself there as well. As quoted above, when Kaplan discussed his soon to be released *The Coming Anarchy* he described “The Coming Anarchy” not as an obscure

theory but rather he presented it in a much more serious tone, labeling it as a foreign correspondent's description of "the problem." This issue of the different ways Kaplan describes "The Coming Anarchy" is even further confused by how he presents the article in what is to be examined here next, the preface to *The Coming Anarchy*.

In the Preface to *The Coming Anarchy* Kaplan specifically addresses "The Coming Anarchy." About the article, Kaplan concedes that "Africa is not a bellwether for politics of the rest of the world, as I once indicated six years ago when I wrote the article," but he still believes that "...so-called democratic success stories like Nigeria are epiphenomena in a larger pattern of demographic and environmental upheaval." Regarding population, Kaplan notes that "Many of the statistics in my article are now out-of-date" but he contends that, "the worldwide fall in the rate of population increase does not affect my thesis" because the anarchy thesis "is less concerned with the world's population in the distant future than with steep, absolute rises in population in the world's poorest countries in the near future and how that interacts with soil depletion, ethnic-tribal divides, and so on to produce unrest." Kaplan continues to discuss "The Coming Anarchy" stating that it, along with the other first few essays in the book, identifies "the terrors of the post Cold War" and that these "essays are realistic in the sense that they seek to be an unrelenting record of uncomfortable truths, of the kind that many of us implicitly acknowledge but will not publicly accept." Kaplan further introduces "The Coming Anarchy," and defends his anarchy thesis with the following statements:

The overall thesis of a bifurcated world divided between societies like ours, producing goods and services that the rest of the world wants, and those mired in various forms of chaos has held, if not been amplified since then.

The concrete reality of the phenomenon it ["The Coming Anarchy"] describes is undeniable: for every sixty-five dollars earned in rich countries, one dollar is earned in poor ones, and the gap is widening.

That division is not only between “North” and “South,” but within countries and regions themselves, including the United States, where an upper-middle techno-class joins the global economy, while a vast realm of the citizenry has seen little rise in their salaries and own no stock or mutual funds.

Lastly, prior to boasting that “The Coming Anarchy” has been “...translated into over a dozen languages and reprinted constantly...” Kaplan assured the reader as to the authenticity of the articles content:

The realism exhibited here may appear radical to those in the literary, journalistic, and academic communities, but I can assure the reader that they track well with the analyses of the military and intelligence communities, where accountability is based less on false displays of idealism than on the ability to pinpoint troubled spots a few years down the road.

Kaplan’s presentation of “The Coming Anarchy” here is, to say the least, deceptive. The preface’s other misleading statements and the fact that the article has been translated in to many languages and reprinted constantly marginalize Kaplan’s concession that Africa is not a bellwether for the rest of the world. In addition to his misleading statements, in the preface Kaplan seems to deliberately modify his original anarchy thesis, or at least its general interpretation, in an attempt to force his 1994 prophecy to resemble 2001 facts.

Regarding the preface’s misleading statements, those that that are most salient are those that contradict his earlier interview comments, for example, in his description of “The Coming Anarchy” (that it identifies “the terrors of the post Cold War,” that his essays are “realistic in the sense that they seek to be an unrelenting record of uncomfortable truths...”, or that it describes “concrete reality”) Kaplan is definitely *not* presenting the anarchy thesis as “theoretical”⁸⁸ as he did in the June 1996 interview. Similarly, by assuring the reader that “The Coming Anarchy” and his other works “track well with the analyses of the military and intelligence communities” Kaplan is further attempting to present the anarchy thesis as factual.

Regarding Kaplan's alteration of the anarchy thesis there are at least three specific positions of the preface that demand attention. Firstly, although his comment regarding the rate of population growth in the preface matches well with his April 1996 interview comment⁸⁹ about rapid population growth and doubling rates, this was a change in the anarchy thesis, which previously referred to increasing birth rates and doubling periods with only casual emphasis on their rapidity; presented in "The Coming Anarchy" via two sentences only: "In twenty-eight years Guinea's population will double if growth goes on at current rates"; "...in the next twenty years, at current growth rates, the population of many Arab countries will double." Secondly, Kaplan's comment that the "overall" focus of the anarchy thesis was about "a bifurcated world divided between societies like ours...and those mired in various forms of chaos..." is incorrect. As we know from the general interpretation of the anarchy thesis this was not the anarchy thesis' overall message. The third and most bizarre misrepresentation of the anarchy thesis and "The Coming Anarchy" which Kaplan presented in the preface was his comment about the "concrete reality of the phenomenon it ["The Coming Anarchy"] describes." "The Coming Anarchy" and the anarchy thesis, as they were interpreted by Kaplan's critics and supporters, had very little to do with the amount of money earned in rich countries versus poor ones, and had even less to do with U.S. citizens' lack of stock or mutual funds or an emerging "techno-class."

In conclusion of this examination of the preface: despite Kaplan's previous comment that "The Coming Anarchy" was theoretical, in the preface Kaplan presented the article as fact, and although "The Coming Anarchy" did mention population and doubling rates and disparities between the First and Third Worlds, and although the article did make reference to "Fukuyama's Last Man" being "pampered by technology," these issues were, by no means, the forefront of the article nor the

anarchy thesis. For Kaplan to claim successes in prophesizing these issues misrepresents the anarchy thesis and attempts to further impress upon the reader that “The Coming Anarchy” is a work of fact. And, in a last criticism, this preface notes nothing of the drift of Kaplan’s own opinion away from the anarchy thesis that he demonstrated in the previous interviews, and by reprinting the article without significant changes, or further caveats regarding the anarchy thesis, Kaplan is in fact demonstrating an almost complete reversal in his previously expressed opinions towards it. A reversal that is supported by his April 2001 post-*The Coming Anarchy* interview, examined below.

In this April 2001 interview,⁹⁰ Kaplan presents further evidence of a reverse of opinion re-embracing the anarchy thesis by citing “urbanization, big youth bulges,” “water shortages,” “ethnic, regional, global entities, [and] city-state identities,” which will create a situation where the “post-colonial gridwork of nation states will unravel further and take in big countries.”

We’re still living in the post-colonial era...What we saw in the last decade was only the partial crumbling of it. We saw places with small populations – Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and others unravel. What I am saying is this: When you put together urbanization, big youth bulges, water shortages, crumbling infrastructure, the post-colonial gridwork of nation states will unravel further and take in big countries. A lot of these countries are artificial: Their borders were foisted on them by colonialists. They have been around for enough decades that they have some validity. Nevertheless, ethnic, regional, global entities, city-state identities, all create a far more nuanced understanding of what people think they are than the old nation-state gridwork.

Although citing youth bulges instead of overpopulation and infrastructure instead of resource scarcity, in this interview Kaplan sounds more like his 1994 self and less like the 1996 or 1999 Kaplan who was calling the anarchy thesis “theoretical” and replacing the environment as a security threat with other threats like weapons of mass destruction. Interestingly, with his comment of nations unraveling and taking in big

countries Kaplan comes off as being even more aligned with the anarchy thesis here than he did in the preface of *The Coming Anarchy* or in any of the other interviews examined here.

The last Kaplan interview that is examined here was conducted in February of 2002,⁹¹ one year after the republication of “The Coming Anarchy,” 10 months after the April 2001 interview, and six months after the events of September 11th 2001. In this interview, Kaplan is specifically asked “You wrote an article in The Atlantic Monthly back in 1994...[w]here do you see the world today, in comparison to when you first wrote that article in 1994?” To which Kaplan responded:

I think in general the article has been born out. Many of the things I wrote about in Africa have in fact come true in the specific countries. I think that there are greater economic disparities, not only between continents, but within continents and within countries. I think that the next ten years are going to be categorized by a seamless instability in many parts of the world, a mini-chain reaction. Every place influences every other place. There are too few and too feeble global mechanisms to control things.⁹²

Other questions prompted Kaplan to share his opinions that “Poverty is in fact, very stabilizing” and that “This is the most dangerous time in history” because development, Kaplan stated, “causes upheaval and terrorism.” He elaborates on his development-instability theory by stating, “What happens is that development leads to rising expectations that overwhelm governments and regimes and lead to tumultuous change.” These rising expectations, according to Kaplan, do not just separate the globe into rich and poor but rather, these rising expectations splitting countries themselves because “Even in poor countries in the poorest parts of Africa, the rich are getting richer, the poor are getting poorer.”

When asked another direct question relating to the anarchy thesis Kaplan produced a very confusing answer that seemingly dodges the resource scarcity issue, downplays the role of the increasingly hazardous environment, and instead focuses more on urbanization and demographic youth bulges within developing countries:

Question: We have seen great sources of stress in the undeveloped world, which has the greatest population growth. How does this shape up in terms of battle for the earth's resources? I am thinking of some of the environmental stresses that we have seen, whether it is water or natural resources.

Kaplan: Well, first, keep in mind that while the world population as a whole is aging, we are going to see what is called 'demographic youth bulges.' We will see the explosion of the population of young males between the ages of 15 and 30 in several dozen of the most unstable countries to begin with, over the next few years. If you think about it, it is that age group that causes political upheaval. China is the best example of your question. You now have two-thirds of the Chinese population living in environmentally fragile areas. There are places where human beings never lived in economic concentrations before. Even if you have a continuation of the same weather and seismic patterns, with the same kinds of floods etc., you are going to see a lot of instability because of weather patterns that have continued through history. But never before in history have these areas been populated in such urban concentration.⁹³

Despite another shift away from the anarchy thesis and back towards his disparity-caused-frustration-instability theory, and despite the fact that where he originally stated that "urban poverty is socially destabilizing,"⁹⁴ and here states that "Poverty is in fact, very stabilizing," and despite that previously he said that the world is "no more stable or unstable than it has been in other times in history,"⁹⁵ and here he states that "This is the most dangerous time in history," and even despite his seeming avoidance of discussing the role of resource scarcity and instead presetting a long and confusing response about China's urbanization, the most important part of this interview to this refutation is Kaplan's response to the question regarding where he sees the world today in comparison to when he first wrote the "The Coming Anarchy" in 1994. As noted above, to this question Kaplan responded, "I think in general the

article has been born out.” This response epitomizes Kaplan’s misrepresentation of the anarchy thesis. It seems as though he does not even know what the characteristics of his anarchy thesis are: in support of his response he cites economic disparity, which was barely a peripheral component of the anarchy thesis, and he even cites the future as evidence, “I think in general the article has been born out...I think that the next ten years are going to be categorized by a seamless instability....” The article has not, in general or otherwise, been “born out.” In 2002, when Kaplan made this statement, there may have been examples which one could point to as evidence of anarchy, just like one could do so today, or just as Kaplan did in 1994, but that does not even remotely suggest that the anarchy thesis has come to fruition.

What the examination of these interviews and other sources show is that Kaplan’s own opinion of the anarchy thesis is varied and seemingly confused. In 1994 when he produced “The Coming Anarchy”, he was strongly advocating the imminence of his well-defined anarchy thesis. In April of 1996, although still promoting some aspects of the anarchy thesis, he deviated from it focusing more on the *rate* of population growth, the need for a Third World middle class, and development as instigator of conflict in the near future but that the long term may be fine. In June of that same year, Kaplan had seemingly rejected the anarchy thesis, calling it theoretical, changing the definition of anarchy, and focusing entirely on economic disparity as the cause for future instability. In the Fall of 1999, in addition to further challenging the anarchy thesis with his opinions that state military power was going to increase, and that the real security challenges of the 21st century were weapons of mass destruction, Kaplan stated that the world was not in fact more or less unstable than any other time in history, but, in this same interview, Kaplan also supported the anarchy thesis by stating that that population growth was going to exacerbate normal instabilities and

that the “The Coming Anarchy” was written in the theme of a foreign correspondent. In the 2001 preface to *The Coming Anarchy*, despite making some concessions, Kaplan supported the validity of the anarchy thesis saying, among other things, that it “track[s] well with the analyses of the military and intelligence communities,” and even manipulated the content of the thesis so to identify successful predictions therein. In April 2001, Kaplan continued his re-embrace of the anarchy thesis, particularly with a comment regarding the possibility of nations unraveling and taking in big countries. In February of 2002, despite some contradictory comments to the anarchy thesis regarding poverty and development, Kaplan again expressed support for it, not only by adopting his old view that “This is the most dangerous time in history” but even going so far as to say that the anarchy thesis has in general “been born out.” Although this summary misses a great deal of the evidence against Kaplan’s shifting opinions, it does present some examples of his inconstancies, contradictions, misrepresentations, and ever-changing interpretations of the anarchy thesis. These shifting opinions are important to this refutation because, for among other reasons, it demonstrates that this author himself does not entirely support the content of his work.

Now that the examination of these interviews and other sources has revealed Kaplan’s changing opinion regarding the anarchy thesis, Kaplan’s perceptions of himself as a writer will be discussed. While the approach of the above portion of this subsection examined the literature in chronological order, the approach that this examination will take is it by focusing on comments Kaplan made during his June 1996 interview and juxtaposing that interview with other relevant sources. As the following paragraphs will show, this examination may prove more essential to this refutation’s literature review than much of the other material presented thus far.

Twice in this literature review, there have been references to the importance of what genre Kaplan's writing is classified. While it may appear inconsequential, the categorization of Kaplan's work has become an absolutely essential topic to be addressed in this refutation. This is because of Kaplan's June 1996 interview, in which he stated:

I'm a travel writer, and the genre of travel writing allows you to contradict yourself, to be flexible, to revise your opinions as you move along. Nobody expects a travel experience to reinforce any particular idea.⁹⁶

This is an outstanding comment and serves not only as a reflection of Kaplan's work but, if it is believed, to the creation of this refutation as well. It is so to this refutation because if one is to believe that Kaplan is exclusively considered a travel writer, and that as such he is not only allowed to contradict himself, but that his travel experience, hence his writing, is not expected to reinforce any particular idea, then the production of a refutation of his work is superfluous.

In defense of the necessity of this refutation, this examination will demonstrate 1) that Kaplan does not present himself exclusively as a "travel writer," and that regardless of how he presents himself, he presents *The Coming Anarchy* in a manner different from his other works which negates his claimed "flexible" writing genre; 2) that regardless of how he has presented himself, he is not perceived by many of his readers to exclusively be a travel writer, 3) that even if he is exclusively a travel writer, by definition travel writers are not permitted the lax authenticity that Kaplan implies, 4) Kaplan's biography does not present him exclusively as a travel writer and 5) even if he is exclusively a travel writer, travel writers are still important to the formation of public opinion and as such are not permitted the lax authenticity that Kaplan implies.

To demonstrate the different ways that Kaplan presents himself as an author the prefaces and introductions of each of Kaplan's published books will be examined, in chronological order, here. Additionally, this examination of the prefaces of Kaplan's books will also be used to briefly demonstrate the different way *The Coming Anarchy* was presented to the reader compared to the majority of his other works.

Within the preface to his first book, *Surrender or Starve* (1988), Kaplan subtly likens himself to a journalist and states that the objective for creating the book is more than mere travel writing: "The overwhelming majority of U.S. journalists have reported on Ethiopia from one side only...I wanted to show the story from the other side, in order to redress a grievous imbalance in news coverage." Similarly, in the preface to *Soldiers of God* (1990) Kaplan likens himself to a journalist, "I had gone with another journalist to visit the headquarters in Peshwar of the Mujahidin warlord of eastern Afghanistan," he calls his work "reporting," "I never gave sufficient attention in my reporting to the incubating menace posed by some of the most radical elements attracted to the Mujahidin from other parts of the Islamic world," and again refers to his work as more than simple travel writing by stating that the book "Provides the historical context for the emergence of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden's terrorist network." In the preface to *Balkan Ghosts* (1993), Kaplan goes against his past journalistic allusions, referring to himself only as a "freelance writer," and specifically calls the work a "travel book." Within the preface to *The Arabists* (1993) Kaplan states that his book "is neither pure history nor pure journalism but a mixture of both," omitting any reference to travel writing. Within the preface to *The Ends of the Earth* (1996) Kaplan returns to the journalistic allusion by again likening his work to reporting: "Jack London writes in *Martin Eden* that 'a reporter's work is all hack from morning to night...it is a whirlwind life, the life of a moment, with

neither past nor future...’ I have attempted to escape this restriction....” Despite this subtle comparison, Kaplan does state that the work is “a travel book,” only to again trespass outside of the realm of travel writing stating that the book “...folds international studies into a travelogue....” Within the preface of *An Empire Wilderness* (1999) Kaplan omits any reference to the book being written in the form of travel writing, such as he had in previous books’ preface’s, but instead states that “This book is not about the decline of the United States; it is about its transformation.” Within the preface to *Eastward to Tartary* (2000) Kaplan conforms to the boundaries of the travel-writing field by stating his objective to creating as being “to record a journey.” Within *The Coming Anarchy* (2001), Kaplan again likens himself to a journalist stating, “As a journalist I covered Eastern Europe when it was unfashionable to do so...I also covered the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan...I covered the horn of Africa.” He omits any reference to travel writing, replacing “travel book” with “...this book,” referring to “The Coming Anarchy” not as “my travel article” but as “...my article...” and referring to himself, not as a travel writer, but simply as a “...full-time writer....” Within *Warrior Politics* (2002) not only does Kaplan outright call himself a journalist, but he even states that he is going outside the boundaries of journalism into academia: “William Whitworth, the editor emeritus of *The Atlantic Monthly*, encouraged in me the notion that a journalist could and should delve into subjects normally reserved for scholars.” Within this same preface Kaplan also refers to himself as a reporter: “The perspective I offer is based on a different kind of education: that of a quarter-century’s work mainly as a reporter overseas.” Conversely, within the preface to *Mediterranean Winter* (2004) Kaplan switches back to travel writing stating that, “This book is about a trip I took through Tunisia and Sicily....”

This examination of the prefaces of Kaplan's books not only shows the varied ways in which Kaplan presents himself as an author but also reveals an important aspect of the way *The Coming Anarchy* was presented. This different way in which *The Coming Anarchy* was presented makes irrelevant any claims to Kaplan's belonging to a "flexible" genre. In the majority of his books' prefaces, Kaplan presented some form of a disclaimer admitting his inclusion of subjectivity, interpretation, and other non-objective characteristics, in one he even published corrected versions of reprinted text and included modified opinions. In *Surrender or Starve* Kaplan stated, "If the reader finds this book polemical, be advised that I meant it that way."; In *Soldiers of God* he said, "I was a younger less mature writer when I wrote *Soldiers of God*...and my lack of objectivity shows," he even specifically noted that, "*Soldiers of God* is not a primer for current or future policy in Afghanistan." In *Balkan Ghosts* Kaplan calls the work an "idiosyncratic travel book..." and "a subjective, broad-brush travel book" again making emphasis that it is "not a policy book"; In *The Arabists* not only did he state that his "story represents one angle of vision" and that "there are others" but also, within the preface to the paperback edition of the book, published in 1995, he stated that he made modifications to the text to correct mistakes and changes in his opinion, "This text is slightly revised from the hardcover edition. A number of errors of fact have been corrected. Ideas that occurred to me since the hardcover appeared have been added."; In *The Ends of the Earth* he noted that the work was "subjective," "idiosyncratic" and was not comprehensive; similarly, in *An Empire Wilderness* Kaplan called the book "subjective" non-comprehensive and subject to his interpretations, he also made an effort to underscore the fact that his opinions are not that of an expert, "This is not a specialist's book."; In *Warrior Politics*, Kaplan noted that the "...opinions stated

herein are mine alone, as are the mistakes...” and admitted that “I cannot hope to match the erudition of those who have spent a lifetime studying the great books.” Comparing the prefaces of these books to the way in which *The Coming Anarchy* was presented demonstrates that *The Coming Anarchy* was presented as factual, while his other books were clearly identified as Kaplan’s opinions or interpretations, making irrelevant any claims to travel writing’s permitted “flexibility.” In the preface to *The Coming Anarchy* Kaplan stated that the book conveys “concrete reality” and accurately presents the “dire description of Africa.” Kaplan goes on to describe the essays within the book as “realistic in the sense that they seek to grapple with how the world actually works.” Within this preface not only does Kaplan *not* mention the possibility of subjectivity, interpretation, and not only does he fail to admit that he does not “match the erudition” of experts and that the work is not a “specialist’s book,” but instead, Kaplan makes an affirmation in the completely opposite direction of a warning of subjectivity stating, “...I can assure the reader that they [the essays] track well with the analyses of the military and intelligence communities....” Lastly, with regard to the presentation of *The Coming Anarchy*, as was noted above, within the preface to the paperback edition to *The Arabists* Kaplan noted that he had corrected errors and introduced new ideas to the original text, why then, did Kaplan not do the same in *The Coming Anarchy* and correct his own admitted errors and introduce his new opinions regarding the anarchy thesis that he expressed in numerous interviews in-between the publication of “The Coming Anarchy” and *The Coming Anarchy*? Regardless of the answer to this question (why Kaplan corrected and modified one republished work and not another) the outcome is still the same: Compared to the majority of his other published books, where he included disclaimers of subjectivity in the prefaces and even corrected and modified errors and opinions in

the text, in his presentation of *The Coming Anarchy*, where Kaplan implied that the text was fact and republished the work unchanged despite admitted changes in his opinions of the anarchy thesis, Kaplan presented *The Coming Anarchy* differently to the reader than the way in which he presented his other works, and did so in a way that negates any perceived flexibility in the genre that he associates himself with.

The benefit of this examination of Kaplan's books' prefaces is two-fold. Firstly, it demonstrates that Kaplan is inconsistent in his description of himself as an author - Sometimes calling himself a journalist who is reporting on such topics as serious as bin Laden's terrorist network, or for reasons as serious as to "redress the grievous imbalance in news coverage." Other times calling himself a journalist attempting to "delve into subjects normally reserved for scholars." Sometimes calling himself a travel writer who is simply presenting his subjective opinions in works that are not produced by a specialist. And sometimes even, as with *The Coming Anarchy*, presenting himself as conveying hard facts on par with the reports of military or intelligence communities. Secondly, this examination also demonstrates the more factual way in which *The Coming Anarchy* was introduced to the reader compared to the Kaplan's presentations of his other books, which further support the need for its formal refutation.

As was noted in the section outlining support for Kaplan as an author and journalist, many of Kaplan's readers do not view him exclusively as a simple travel writer. To underscore this, recall that Kaplan was described by some supporters as a "historian,"⁹⁷ a "respected journalist,"⁹⁸ who produces "solid journalism,"⁹⁹ and a "respected journalist who reports on international issues,"¹⁰⁰ who "ranks easily among the best journalists in the world."¹⁰¹ Other supporters flat out denied his work being associated to travel writing: "This is not travel writing, but sharp, often uncomfortable

observations about U.S. foreign policy and trends in American life.”¹⁰² Kaplan was also labeled as “a serious geopolitical thinker,”¹⁰³ and “one of America’s most engaging writers on contemporary international affairs.”¹⁰⁴ While the list of non-travel-writer descriptions of Kaplan continues, it needs not be restated in its entirety here. The point of it is, regardless of how Kaplan occasionally presents himself in some of his books’ prefaces and elsewhere, he is not considered by many who review his work, to exclusively be a travel writer, and, therefore, is not permitted any flexibilities that Kaplan claims the genre bestows.

However, regardless of how Kaplan presents himself, and regardless of what genre of writing his readers place him in, Kaplan’s statement that because he is a travel writer he is allowed to contradict himself and that, “Nobody expects a travel experience to reinforce any particular idea”¹⁰⁵ is false for three final reasons. First, quite simply, nowhere in the definition of the genre of travel writing does it state that a travel writer is permitted the flexibility that Kaplan seems to extend himself.¹⁰⁶ Second, within many of Kaplan’s published books Kaplan’s biographical blurb is presented which, with some minor variation from book to book, states that “Robert D. Kaplan is a correspondent for *The Atlantic Monthly* and the best selling author of many previous books on foreign affairs and travel....”¹⁰⁷ If Kaplan were exclusively a travel writer then, it would be assumed, his biography would state as much. Third, it is just as important for travel writing to be accurate and non-contradictory as it is for a journalistic report or scholarly work because it influences students and public opinion, and has even influenced scientific thought - evidence of this with specific regard to Kaplan’s work as a travel writer, can be seen in a quote from a Ph.D. dissertation of a University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill student entitled “A vast howling wilderness: Eighteenth-century narratives of travel to Africa” :

European narratives of travel to Africa multiply greatly in the eighteenth century...most of these travel narratives are highly conventionalized: open almost any of them and you will find similar, repeated images of impenetrability, of abundant and violent wildlife, of indolent and savage peoples. These repeated images paint, by the end of the century, the comprehensive portrait of Darkest Africa familiar from the nineteenth century. The stereotypes of Africa and Africans that emerge from the travel literature make their way into the scientific work of Buffon, for example, and the pseudo-scientific work of early race theorists like Edward Long. They also make their way into the popular imagination; many are still common today in popular culture representations of Africa...these stereotypes [continue] from the pre-colonial travel narratives through to the post-colonial world...Robert Kaplan's seminal essay 'A Coming Anarchy,' [is travel writing that similarly influences]...contemporary American perceptions of Africa, weaving constantly back to nineteenth- and eighteenth-century iterations of the same perceptions.¹⁰⁸

In conclusion to this necessary rebuttal to Kaplan's statement that he is exempt from the rules of professional writing because he is a travel writer, and in turn, in defense of the creation of this refutation of Kaplan's work, Kaplan's June 1996 statement is false because of the following. 1) As was presented, not only does Kaplan not present himself consistently and exclusively in his work as a travel writer, but even, within the preface to *The Coming Anarchy* he omits any reference to travel writing and specifically states that the book's content is reliable. 2) Kaplan is not considered to exclusively be a travel writer by his readers; therefore, he cannot be reckless in his writing. 3) Kaplan's own biographical blurb does not present him exclusively as a travel writer. 4) Even if Kaplan did present himself exclusively as a travel writer and even if his readers considered him as such, by definition a travel writer is not extended the liberties Kaplan implies. 5) Even if Kaplan did present himself exclusively as a travel writer and even if his readers considered him as such, travel writers do have an effect on public opinion, and have even affected scientific thought, therefore must be accurate and corrected when necessary - as is the case with "The Coming Anarchy" and this refutation.

II.D.iii) II.D. Footnotes

¹ “He [Kaplan] is, informally at least, a Straussian realist. He believes that there is an accumulated wisdom of the ages...Kaplan realizes that much of that wisdom lies not in books of philosophy, history and memoir, but in fiction...listen to the scintillating opening of “The Coming Anarchy” and Kaplan’s method emerges...Kaplan merges literature and analysis, storytelling and philosophy, observation and history in a way that few writers even dare nowadays. Such an ambitiously eclectic approach is bound to cut a few scholarly corners.” - Garfinkle, Adam. “The Sky Is Always Falling” The New York Times, March 19, 2000. Section 7; Page 27; Column 2; Book Review Desk. Copyright 2000 The New York Times Company.

² “In general, Kaplan’s style of analysis is the reverse of historical scholarship. It consists of leaping from a limited number of observations to wild speculations of the broadest conceivable nature,” - Kagan, Robert. “Inside the limo” The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

³ “...Kaplan rather clumsily explains...” - Kagan, Robert. “Inside the limo” The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

⁴ Kagan, Robert. “Inside the limo” The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

⁵ “Scientifically created capability so dominates nature that both nature and science become invisible; most people riding in the limo generally have no idea how it all works. Only this ubiquitous invisibility could fool one into believing that differences among people or cultures observed through casual travel could reveal answers that have eluded serious scholars for centuries. There is a limit to lay knowledge and journalistic queries and Kaplan reaches it.” - Pritchett, Lant. Finance & Development. Review: *The Ends of the Earth: From Togo to Turkmenistan, From Iran to Cambodia--A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy* Washington: Mar 1997. Vol. 34, Iss. 1; pg. 51, 1 pgs

⁶ “In the 1990s, when the United States was riding the crest of a financial boom, and celebrating the ‘end of history’, after the spectacular collapse of its Cold War foes, the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe, Kaplan was coming across like a party-pooper, raining on the victors’ parade with his pessimistic essays.” - Lim, Richard. “Evil’s out there, it never sleeps” The Straits Times (Singapore), September 15, 2002. Copyright 2002 Singapore Press Holdings Limited.

⁷ Kagan, Robert. “Inside the limo” The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

⁸ Kagan, Robert. “Inside the limo” The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

⁹ Kagan, Robert. “Inside the limo” The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

¹⁰ Kagan, Robert. “Inside the limo” The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

¹¹ “...an outsized ego and a tendency to follow his theories beyond the bounds of common sense...” Shane, Scott. ““Coming Anarchy”: A very grim world” The Sun. Baltimore, Md.: Feb 13, 2000. pg. 11.F

¹² “Kaplan appears to believe that realists have a monopoly on the appreciation of tragedy, that believers in progress cannot acknowledge the enduring ‘reality of human evil’ This is a self-serving and inaccurate conceit. Those who seek to improve the human condition may be as aware of the darker sides of life as any realist. Idealism is not a variety of innocence.” - Kagan, Robert. “Inside the limo” The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

¹³ “Nevertheless, Kaplan has written a lively, interesting, and engaging travelogue of contemporary times. It is a refreshing antidote to the doubly distanced reports on conditions in developing countries that are produced through official channels. But this laudable, well-meaning, and influential book remains both deeply ambivalent about development itself and glaringly naive about basic development issues.” Pritchett, Lant. Finance & Development. Review: “The Ends of the Earth: From Togo to Turkmenistan, From Iran to Cambodia--A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy” Washington: Mar 1997. Vol. 34, Iss. 1; pg. 51, 1 pgs

¹⁴ Serwer, Andrew E. “The end of the world is nigh - Or is it?” Fortune. New York: May 2, 1994. Vol. 129, Iss. 9; pg. 123, 2 pgs

¹⁵ “Robert D. Kaplan (Op-Ed, Jan. 14) has succumbed to the inscrutability that his previous writing imposed on the Balkans. Only an obsession with order at any cost that sees dangerous anarchy lurking everywhere could fail to see the opposition protest in Belgrade as the most encouraging news to come from that city in more than a decade.” - Pasic, Amir. “For Serbs, Democracy Is Risky but Worthy”

January 19, 1997. Section 4; Page 14; Column 4; Editorial Desk. The New York Times. Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company.

¹⁶ "THE CURRENT issue of Atlantic Monthly, an influential US publication, is almost entirely devoted to a preview of the 21st century. Its main contributor, Robert Kaplan, depicts a world devoured by anarchy, with nations breaking up, borders crumbling and bands of marauders roaming free. The euphoria generated by the end of the Cold War is over, and America's intellectuals are now consumed by a sense of foreboding." - Eyal, Jonathan. "No one cares until it's war; Conflict prevention is fine in theory. But the West cannot make it work" The Independent (London). March 10, 1994. p. 21.

Copyright 1994 Newspaper Publishing PLC.

¹⁷ Kagan, Robert. "Inside the limo" The New Republic. Washington: Apr 10, 2000. Vol. 222, Iss. 15; pg. 32, 9 pgs

¹⁸ O'Mara, Richard. "Feel Lousy About the Future? Dr. Doomsayer Says It Can Only Get Worse" The Sun. Baltimore, Md.: Nov 13, 1994. pg. 4.E

¹⁹ Pritchett, Lant. Finance & Development. Review: "The Ends of the Earth: From Togo to Turkmenistan, From Iran to Cambodia--A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy" Washington: Mar 1997. Vol. 34, Iss. 1; pg. 51, 1 pgs

²⁰ Ringle, Ken. "Oracle of a New World Disorder; Robert Kaplan's Global Journeys Took Him Into the Culture of War" The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Feb 21, 2002. pg. C.01.

²¹ "Kaplan, a journalist and master travel writer...[whose] observations combine down-to-earth political science, geography, sociology, and historical context...Moreover, his work is taken seriously by key Washington decision makers...Kaplan is a pleasure to read. His elegant style blends the color of a fine travelogue with the depth of a renaissance scholar." - Jager, Elliot. "Don't go down that road" June 23, 2000. p. 13B. The Jerusalem Post. Copyright 2000 The Jerusalem Post.

²² "Unlike most political or cultural inquiries, the work of savvy, scholarly travel journalist Robert D. Kaplan features intimate, on-location scrutiny of the people who actually inhabit and animate such neglected and often lawless locales in order to regain an understanding of their potential." - White, Timothy. "Books Provide Insight Into Turmoil In Balkans" Billboard June 07, 1997. Copyright 1997 Billboard Publications, Inc.

²³ Khanna, Parag. "Tragic realism; Robert D Kaplan's books may be out of print in Britain, but he is emerging as one of the most influential commentators on the new world order" New Statesman February 25, 2002. Copyright 2002 New Statesman Ltd.

²⁴ "My respected journalistic colleague and historian Robert D. Kaplan recently took a revealing trip through West Africa by foot and by bus." - Geyer, Georgie Anne. "Forces of Anarchy Seen In Rwanda's Grisly Events" Times-Picayune April 19, 1994. p. B07. Copyright 1994 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co.

²⁵ "A respected journalist who reports on international issues, Kaplan believes that our system of nation-states, particularly in the developing world, will soon break up as disease, environmental crises, and tribalism force millions into lives of poverty, migration, and criminality." - Serwer, Andrew E. "The end of the world is nigh - Or is it?" Fortune. New York: May 2, 1994. Vol. 129, Iss. 9; pg. 123, 2 pgs

²⁶ "As with all of Kaplan's work, solid journalism combines with a gloomy sense of history to produce a worthy study." - Kirkus Reviews, August 15, 2000. Copyright 2000 Kirkus Service, Inc.

²⁷ "Today, Mr. Kaplan, a correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly and author of nine previous books, ranks easily among the best journalists in the world: astute, informed, prescient, wise." - Gold, Philip. "TAKING CHARGE of our violent world; Political lessons from the classics" The Washington Times, December 30, 2001. Section: Part B; Books; Pg. B8. Copyright 2001 News World Communications, Inc.

²⁸ "To put it simply, the writer, who comfortably blends academic references with the observations of a journalist reporting on travel, presents a counterweight to the euphoria released when the wall in Berlin came tumbling down in 1989." - Provizer, Norman. "End of the Cold War Offers Harsh Lessons" March 5, 2000. p. 3E. Denver Rocky Mountain News (Colorado). Copyright 2000 Denver Publishing Company.

²⁹ O'Mara, Richard. "Feel Lousy About the Future? Dr. Doomsayer Says It Can Only Get Worse" The Sun. Baltimore, Md.: Nov 13, 1994. pg. 4.E

³⁰ "A widely traveled journalist with an exceptional appetite for background reading, Kaplan plausibly portrayed the future of the Third World - and of expanding enclaves within the First World - as a maelstrom of 'environmental degradation . . . disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels.' - Scialabba, George.

"Dark journey: a journalist's tour of our coming apart" September 27, 1998 The Boston Globe. p. F2 Copyright 1998 Globe Newspaper Company.

³¹ "...his predictions have come true before. A nomadic iconoclast, Kaplan has spent two decades wandering through Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans, writing magazine articles and books. In the 1980s he warned that Saddam Hussein would become a serious menace in the Gulf region. In late 1989, while the world was celebrating the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Kaplan wrote that an equally important story was brewing in the Balkans, where timeless hatreds would again erupt into conflict." - Serwer, Andrew E. "The end of the world is nigh - Or is it?" Fortune. New York: May 2, 1994. Vol. 129, Iss. 9; pg. 123, 2 pgs

³² "Mr. Kaplan is a knowledgeable and forceful polemicist who mixes the attributes of journalist and visionary." - Bernstein, Richard. "Books of the Times; Dashing Shortlived Hopes of Global Harmony" The New York Times, February 23, 2000. Section E; Page 9; Column 1; The Arts/Cultural Desk. Copyright 2000 The New York Times Company.

³³ "...it will surely turn out to be one of the most useful books about the 21st century to have been written in the 20th. In the confusion ahead, Kaplan's will be a voice worth listening for." - Scialabba, George. "Dark journey: a journalist's tour of our coming apart" September 27, 1998 The Boston Globe. p. F2 Copyright 1998 Globe Newspaper Company.

³⁴ Serwer, Andrew E. "The end of the world is nigh - Or is it?" Fortune. New York: May 2, 1994. Vol. 129, Iss. 9; pg. 123, 2 pgs

³⁵ Gold, Philip. "TAKING CHARGE of our violent world; Political lessons from the classics" The Washington Times, December 30, 2001. Section: Part B; Books; Pg. B8. Copyright 2001 News World Communications, Inc.

³⁶ Garfinkle, Adam. "The Sky Is Always Falling" The New York Times, March 19, 2000. Section 7; Page 27; Column 2; Book Review Desk. Copyright 2000 The New York Times Company.

³⁷ Rozen, Laura. "Robert Kaplan; The controversial 'Balkan Ghosts' put him on the map. His opinionated, darkly seductive reports of an unraveling world have kept him there." April 17, 2001. (<http://archive.salon.com/people/bc/2001/04/17/kaplan/print.html>)

³⁸ Ringle, Ken. "Oracle of a New World Disorder; Robert Kaplan's Global Journeys Took Him Into the Culture of War" The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Feb 21, 2002. pg. C.01.

³⁹ "Robert D Kaplan has been enchanting and distressing armchair policy wonks and foreign policy makers in about equal measure since his long essay 'The Coming Anarchy' was featured on the cover of the Atlantic Monthly in 1994." - Khanna, Parag. "Tragic realism; Robert D Kaplan's books may be out of print in Britain, but he is emerging as one of the most influential commentators on the new world order." New Statesman. February 25, 2002. Copyright 2002 New Statesman Ltd.

⁴⁰ "The book that put Kaplan on the map - President Clinton is said to have been influenced by it - was Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History." - Jager, Elliot. "Don't go down that road" June 23, 2000. p. 13B. The Jerusalem Post. Copyright 2000 The Jerusalem Post.

⁴¹ "Today, Mr. Kaplan, a correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly and author of nine previous books, ranks easily among the best journalists in the world: astute, informed, prescient, wise." - Gold, Philip. "TAKING CHARGE of our violent world; Political lessons from the classics" The Washington Times, December 30, 2001. Section: Part B; Books; Pg. B8. Copyright 2001 News World Communications, Inc.

⁴² "Unlike most political or cultural inquiries, the work of savvy, scholarly travel journalist Robert D. Kaplan features intimate, on-location scrutiny of the people who actually inhabit and animate such neglected and often lawless locales in order to regain an understanding of their potential." - White, Timothy. "Books Provide Insight Into Turmoil In Balkans" Billboard June 07, 1997. Copyright 1997 Billboard Publications, Inc.

⁴³ "That is not exactly the question that Robert D. Kaplan addresses in 'The Coming Anarchy,' his analytically daring collection of essays on the face of global things to come, but it lurks nonetheless." - Bernstein, Richard. "Books of the Times; Dashing Shortlived Hopes of Global Harmony" The New York Times, February 23, 2000. Section E; Page 9; Column 1; The Arts/Cultural Desk. Copyright 2000 The New York Times Company.

⁴⁴ "...many in the academic world embrace Kaplan as an insightful generalist..." - Khanna, Parag. "Tragic realism; Robert D Kaplan's books may be out of print in Britain, but he is emerging as one of the most influential commentators on the new world order" New Statesman February 25, 2002. Copyright 2002 New Statesman Ltd.

⁴⁵ "Kaplan is an eloquent pessimist." - Jeff Zaleski, Paul Gediman, Charlotte Abbott, Sarah Gold. Review: "The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War" Publishers Weekly. New York: Dec 20, 1999. Vol. 246, Iss. 51; pg. 63, 2 pgs

⁴⁶ “Kaplan, a journalist and master travel writer...[whose] observations combine down-to-earth political science, geography, sociology, and historical context...Moreover, his work is taken seriously by key Washington decision makers...Kaplan is a pleasure to read. His elegant style blends the color of a fine travelogue with the depth of a renaissance scholar.” - Jager, Elliot. “Don’t go down that road” June 23, 2000. p. 13B. The Jerusalem Post. Copyright 2000 The Jerusalem Post.

⁴⁷ “Mr. Kaplan is a fine story teller, and he is an exciting and punctilious teacher as well.” - Pakenham, Michael. “Earth’s prospects for the 21st century: Are massive chaos and anarchy inevitable?” The Sun. Baltimore, Md.: Mar 17, 1996. pg. 4.F

⁴⁸ “Kaplan, a journalist and master travel writer...[whose] observations combine down-to-earth political science, geography, sociology, and historical context...Moreover, his work is taken seriously by key Washington decision makers...Kaplan is a pleasure to read. His elegant style blends the color of a fine travelogue with the depth of a renaissance scholar.” - Jager, Elliot. “Don’t go down that road” June 23, 2000. p. 13B. The Jerusalem Post. Copyright 2000 The Jerusalem Post.

⁴⁹ “Kaplan clearly has subtle descriptive powers, and where they are put to full use this book comes alive.” - Bennett, Philip. “Viewing the world through a dark crystal ball” May 20, 1996, The Boston Globe. p. 31. Copyright 1996 Globe Newspaper Company.

⁵⁰ “He has read widely and writes superbly.” - Shane, Scott. “‘Coming Anarchy’: A very grim world” The Sun. Baltimore, Md.: Feb 13, 2000. pg. 11.F

⁵¹ “From the beginning, the book is hideously grim. Savagery, brutality, poverty, virtual anarchy pervade. In West Africa, though scrupulously sensitive to the needs and sovereignty of native Africans, Mr. Kaplan reports the excruciating failures of post-colonial government, widespread decay into violence, tribal warfare, thugocracy.” - Pakenham, Michael. “Earth’s prospects for the 21st century: Are massive chaos and anarchy inevitable?” The Sun. Baltimore, Md.: Mar 17, 1996. pg. 4.F

⁵² “So where does it all lead? Mr. Kaplan works hard never to over generalize. The book’s greatest grace is the modesty of its prognostic declarations.” - Pakenham, Michael. “Earth’s prospects for the 21st century: Are massive chaos and anarchy inevitable?” The Sun. Baltimore, Md.: Mar 17, 1996. pg. 4.F

⁵³ “And, West Africa’s future, eventually, will also be that of most of the rest of the world.” - Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. p. 9.

⁵⁴ “Africa suggests what war, borders, and ethnic politics will be like a few decades hence. To understand the events of the next fifty years, then, one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war.” - Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. pp. 18-19.

⁵⁵ “...rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh...” Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. p. 20

⁵⁶ “...Homer-Dixon explains how the per capita availability of arable land in interior China has rapidly declined at the same time that the quality of that land has been destroyed by deforestation, loss of topsoil, and salinization.” - Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. p. 21

⁵⁷ “It is time to understand ‘the environment’ for what it is: the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh--developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts--will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate...” - Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. pp. 19-20

⁵⁸ “Whereas rural poverty is age-old and almost a ‘normal’ part of the social fabric, urban poverty is socially destabilizing.” - Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. p. 35

⁵⁹ West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real ‘strategic’ danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.” - Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. p. 7.

⁶⁰ “Africa suggests what war, borders, and ethnic politics will be like a few decades hence. To understand the events of the next fifty years, then, one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war.” - Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. pp. 18-19.

- ⁶¹ "It is time to understand 'the environment' for what it is: the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh--developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts--will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate..." - Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. pp. 19-20
- ⁶² "...weakening traditional loyalties to the state..." - Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. p. 27.
- ⁶³ "Yet the reality was more subtle: as in West Africa, the border was porous and smuggling abounded, but here the people doing the smuggling, on both sides of the border, were Kurds. In such a moonscape, over which peoples have migrated and settled in patterns that obliterate borders, the end of the Cold War will bring on a cruel process of natural selection among existing states." - Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. p. 7.
- ⁶⁴ "If crime and war become indistinguishable, then 'national defense' may in the future be viewed as a local concept. As crime continues to grow in our cities and the ability of state governments and criminal-justice systems to protect their citizens diminishes, urban crime may, according to Van Creveld, 'develop into low-intensity conflict by coalescing along racial, religious, social, and political lines.'" - Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. p. 49
- ⁶⁵ Rosner, Jeremy D. "Is Chaos America's Real Enemy? The Foreign Policy Idea Splitting Clinton's Team" *The Washington Post*. Washington, D.C.: Aug 14, 1994. pg. c.01
- ⁶⁶ Dabelko, Geoffrey D. "The Environmental Factor." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Autumn 1999): p 14.
- ⁶⁷ David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. "The News Hour with Jim Lehrer." US Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.
- ⁶⁸ "I deliberately picked out the most difficult trouble spots in the world..." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.
- ⁶⁹ "...when you've got places...who are doubling their populations every thirty years on top of an already depleted rain forest and whatever, on top of already weak infrastructures without an institutional tradition, it's bad. It's bad...In all the places where we have seen the most internecine violence in the past two decades...are all places who have high population growth rates for the fifteen or twenty years before these revolutions occurred." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.
- ⁷⁰ "All the new babies in the world are being born in poor African countries, in subcontinental India, and in the poorest parts of our own societies." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.
- ⁷¹ "AIDS is a product of the cycle of poverty, deforestation, migration and other pathologies of sub-Saharan Africa..." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.
- ⁷² "There are more viruses in the wake of AIDS" - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.
- ⁷³ "...a critical mass of the third world -- so far behind that they won't be able to catch up." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.
- ⁷⁴ "As governments collapse and even as weak democratic regimes try to take over in these places, they are perfect petri dishes for the rise of organized crime networks, which are another threat to us." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.
- ⁷⁵ "We should care for our own naked self-interest." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.
- ⁷⁶ "If the third world doesn't make it as a middle class place, or at least a large part of the third world, we are not going to be able to grow at three percent growth rates into the future." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.
- ⁷⁷ "...strictly from an economist's point of view, our market in the future is the third world." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.
- ⁷⁸ "The long range future may be fine, but the next few decades are going to be most tumultuous in human history. And that is because humanity is economically developing at a faster rate than ever

before. That is where the optimists are right. But the optimists do not think historically. Because the faster development occurs -- development is always uneven, cruel, painful and violent. So development always bring political upheaval in its wake." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.

⁷⁹ "...we are not going to be able to pivotally affect the future of sub-Saharan Africa. But just because we can't solve problems everywhere doesn't mean we can't be engaged in a few select places here and there, that also track with our self interest so that we can justify it in terms of Congress and the public, and therefore keep platforms of connections inside these places, between our culture and theirs." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.

⁸⁰ "I deliberately picked out the most difficult trouble spots in the world because that is where ninety-five out of every one hundred births are occurring. All the new babies in the world...are being born in poor African countries, in subcontinental India, and in the poorest parts of our own societies. And though much of world -- our kind of people -- are going through a communications revolution...one part of the world is going in one direction, but a large swath of humanity is going in another." - David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.

⁸¹ David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer U.S.A. Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.

⁸² David Gergen, Robert D. Kaplan. Interview. "The News Hour with Jim Lehrer." US Public Broadcasting System – Television. April 5, 1996.

⁸³ Mirsky, Yehudah. Forward. "Following 'The Revolution of Rising Expectations'" New York, N.Y.: Jun 14, 1996. Vol. C, Iss. 31,084; pg. 13

⁸⁴ Mirsky, Yehudah. Forward. "Following 'The Revolution of Rising Expectations'" New York, N.Y.: Jun 14, 1996. Vol. C, Iss. 31,084; pg. 13

⁸⁵ "...Kaplan says, 'telling the truth about dysfunctional cultures opens you to a charge of bias. But if we refuse to recognize such realities, how can we possibly address the problems they breed?'" - Ringle, Ken. "Oracle of a New World Disorder; Robert Kaplan's Global Journeys Took Him Into the Culture of War" The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.: Feb 21, 2002. pg. C.01.

⁸⁶ Center for Defense Information. "ADM's Joe Sottile interviews Robert Kaplan, author of *The Coming Anarchy*, for *Understanding Human Security*" Fall 1999.

⁸⁷ "Dodged" because of his answer to the following question: "CDI: Can you identify a couple of trends, for example ethnic or religious conflicts, which do not fit in tradition notions of security challenges? Perhaps affecting the way foreign policy decision makers approach the next decade or two. KAPLAN: For the last three hundred years, foreign policy practitioners had thought about security in terms of nation states, one nation state versus the other, one constellation of nation states competing with another constellation of nation states, and that has give rise to the notion of power politics. And that is what sort of has been the organizing principle of foreign policy the last few hundred years. That still works obviously, because there are lots of powerful nation states out there that have conflicting views of lots of things. But increasingly we see the weakening of nation states. The weakening from the top by global corporations, international trading groups, but we also see the weakening at the bottom through wars, refugee migrations, civil conflict. So increasingly we have non-state adversaries who want to kill us, terrorist groups for instance, who are not part of any bureaucratic mechanism of the state. They don't own territory, they do not have an address. So, for instance, when the U.S. government, as it did about a year ago, announced that it had destroyed the infrastructure of Osama Bin Laden terrorist network, some of the hardware and infrastructure, what did that mean? It meant that they had destroyed a bunch of blow-up tents in the dessert of Afghanistan that you and I could put back together in about two hours. So increasingly these people don't have an infrastructure that is destroyable. They only way to get them, is to kill them. So I think the more unconventional the threat, the more assassinations will come back." - Center for Defense Information. "ADM's Joe Sottile interviews Robert Kaplan, author of *The Coming Anarchy*, for *Understanding Human Security*" Fall 1999.

⁸⁸ Mirsky, Yehudah. Forward. "Following 'The Revolution of Rising Expectations'" New York, N.Y.: Jun 14, 1996. Vol. C, Iss. 31,084; pg. 13

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- ⁹³ Puplava, James J. Interview Robert D. Kaplan. February 23, 2002. Financial Sense Online. (<http://www.financialsense.com/transcriptions/Kaplan.htm>)
- ⁹⁴ Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. p. 35.
- ⁹⁵ Center for Defense Information. "ADM's Joe Sottile interviews Robert Kaplan, author of *The Coming Anarchy*, for *Understanding Human Security*" Fall 1999.
- ⁹⁶ Mirsky, Yehudah. Forward. "Following 'The Revolution of Rising Expectations'" New York, N.Y.: Jun 14, 1996. Vol. C, Iss. 31,084; pg. 13
- ⁹⁷ "My respected journalistic colleague and historian Robert D. Kaplan recently took a revealing trip through West Africa by foot and by bus." - Geyer, Georgie Anne. "Forces of Anarchy Seen In Rwanda's Grisly Events" Times-Picayune April 19, 1994. p. B07. Copyright 1994 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
- ⁹⁸ "A respected journalist who reports on international issues, Kaplan believes that our system of nation-states, particularly in the developing world, will soon break up as disease, environmental crises, and tribalism force millions into lives of poverty, migration, and criminality." - Serwer, Andrew E. "The end of the world is nigh - Or is it?" Fortune. New York: May 2, 1994. Vol. 129, Iss. 9; pg. 123, 2 pgs
- ⁹⁹ "As with all of Kaplan's work, solid journalism combines with a gloomy sense of history to produce a worthy study." - Kirkus Reviews, August 15, 2000. Copyright 2000 Kirkus Service, Inc.
- ¹⁰⁰ Serwer, Andrew E. "The end of the world is nigh - Or is it?" Fortune. New York: May 2, 1994. Vol. 129, Iss. 9; pg. 123, 2 pgs
- ¹⁰¹ "Today, Mr. Kaplan, a correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly and author of nine previous books, ranks easily among the best journalists in the world: astute, informed, prescient, wise." - Gold, Philip. "TAKING CHARGE of our violent world; Political lessons from the classics" The Washington Times, December 30, 2001. Section: Part B; Books; Pg. B8. Copyright 2001 News World Communications, Inc.
- ¹⁰² Rozen, Laura. "Rober Kaplan; The controversial 'Balkan Ghosts' put him on the map. His opinionated, darkly seductive reports of an unraveling world have kept him there." April 17, 2001. (<http://archive.salon.com/people/bc/2001/04/17/kaplan/print.html>)
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- ¹⁰⁴ Garfinkle, Adam. "The Sky Is Always Falling" The New York Times, March 19, 2000. Section 7; Page 27; Column 2; Book Review Desk. Copyright 2000 The New York Times Company.
- ¹⁰⁵ Mirsky, Yehudah. Forward. "Following 'The Revolution of Rising Expectations'" New York, N.Y.: Jun 14, 1996. Vol. C, Iss. 31,084; pg. 13
- ¹⁰⁶ Definition of Travel Writing made available by Writer's Encyclopedia, Writer's Digest Books; F&W Publications, Inc., Cincinnati, Ohio. (<http://www.writersmarket.com/encyc/t.asp>) for more information contact the Society of American Travel Writers, 4101 Lake Boone Trail, Suite 201, Raleigh, NC 27607.
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- ¹⁰⁸ Beus, David Lynn, Ph.D., PHD DISSERTATION: "A vast howling wilderness: Eighteenth-century narratives of travel to Africa" The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2002, 357 pages; AAT 3070822

CHAPTER 3

THREE-PRONGED METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO REFUTATION

III.A) Historical Comparison

III.A.i) Non-Nation State Global Conflict Status; Increasing, Decreasing, or Stagnant?

Regardless of their causes, in “The Coming Anarchy” Kaplan is ultimately referring to anarchy resulting from conflicts between groups, not nations, spreading globally. Therefore, adopting a historical-descriptive approach, this section examines the history and current status of non-nation state¹ conflict in order to present evidence contrary to Kaplan’s prediction of increasing global conflict. It is appropriate to mention here a concept that Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff eloquently capture in their *Contending Theories of International Relations*, which reads:

...most experienced scholars in international relations realize that a knowledge of history is essential because it broadens immensely the database from which extrapolations into the future are to be made, and it also refines our ability to formulate hypotheses that approximate social reality.²

If Kaplan had appreciated the importance of the historical-descriptive approach and applied it to his thesis then, as will be shown, the preface to his 2001 republication of the 1994 article *should* have noted that the state of non-nation state conflict, at present or in 2001, does not support his anarchy prophecy. In other words,

Kaplan's omission of the history and trend in non-nation state conflict renders his "extrapolations into the future" to be something quite far from a hypothesis that "approximates social reality."

To present the fact that Kaplan's thesis does not represent the reality of global conflict the following question will be used to direct the explanation of this section's findings:

What, according to contemporary conflict studies, is the global status of conflicts to which non-nation states are a party? Is it increasing as Kaplan implies, or is it decreasing or stagnating?

The answer to this question refutes the anarchy thesis because of the logical path which follows from a "decreasing" or "stagnating" answer – if this type of conflict is in fact decreasing, or even stagnating, then it cannot be argued that the world is becoming less stable or, rather, more anarchic via non-nation state conflict.

In order to respond to this question, this section is presented as follows: first, the three contemporary works that compile or interpret conflict datasets which are used here are identified, and the methodology used in this section is briefly discussed; second, each works' findings are presented; and third, how these findings relate to this refutation and to Kaplan's predictions is discussed. It should be noted however, that although the endeavor of reviewing past occurrences of violent conflict is being presented here as evidence against a claim about Kaplan's predictions, this section itself is not attempting to posit an alternate vision of the future. Rather, by presenting information about past violent conflict, this section is attempting to illustrate the lack of evidence supporting Kaplan's prophesy by putting the present-day status of global conflict in historical context for, as one of the authors of a study examined in this section states "The study of patterns of armed conflict is not just of historical interest, but also a matter of current concern." (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 616).

The three studies that are examined here are: The Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP), produced by Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research,³ the study produced by Stanford University's Department of Political Science authored by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin,⁴ and the latest work within the "Peace and Conflict" series, produced by The University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM).⁵ Before discussing these studies' findings, it is necessary to discuss this section's methodological approach, namely, why multiple studies are necessary, as opposed to presenting the findings of just one, and why these three particular studies were selected.

Why Multiple Studies?

Although there are some obvious reasons why presenting the findings of multiple sources to illustrate an assertion is better than depending upon just one, with regard to violent conflict studies and to Kaplan's work there are specific, less obvious, reasons that make it necessary to draw upon multiple sources. Firstly, there is a significant problem within the violent conflict dataset literature that requires a multiple study approach. This problem stems from the fact that so many conflict datasets exists that it is difficult to identify a single one, which could be deemed the authority. In Andrew Mack's article, "Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community," which questions the utility of conflict studies produced by the academic community for policy makers, he points out, "Researchers have created more than a dozen different armed conflict datasets, but have significantly failed to provide policy makers with any guidance on which is the most appropriate for their needs" (Mack, 2002) This statement is similarly applicable to this section's situation where, like the objective of the policy makers to which Mack is referring, an attempt at identifying trend is being made. Mack specifically discusses this trend issue when he states:

The absence of official statistics on armed conflict, or of a single authoritative non-official source of data that has the backing of the research community, means that the policymakers not only have no guidance as to what data source to use, they often have little idea of trends in armed conflicts either.⁶

In short, because of the absence of a single official source of conflict data from which a trend can be identified, policy makers have difficulty identifying conflict trends. For this same reason is necessary for this work to draw from the findings of multiple conflict studies to attempt accuracy in identifying trend.

Secondly, there are severe terminology, or typology, challenges presented in the attempt to compare Kaplan's prophecy to quantitative studies regarding violent conflict. Due to the fact that Kaplan is so vague, or rather so all-inclusive, with regard to the type of conflicts that accompany the anarchy he foresees, it is necessary to include studies that address different areas of the conflicts within Kaplan's future. For example, Kaplan defines future wars under the umbrella term "subnational,"⁷ the challenge this poses when attempting to place Kaplan's work next to empirical studies is attempting to categorize such typology. Where would such typology fall under the criteria of a quantitative study on the history of conflict? Meaning, by "subnational" is Kaplan prophesizing non-nation state conflict where the parties are exclusively non-state actors? Where one party may be claimant to government control? Or, is he referring to conflict where the parties have some other affiliation? These are examples of typology differentiation that quantitative studies must make to give their studies parameters, which Kaplan blatantly omits. Due to this terminology/typology challenge, if this refutation were to present the findings of a study who's criteria only included non-nation state conflicts where at least one of the conflicting party's had claim to the state, then this section could be deemed inapplicable because "subnational" conflict could include conflicts where neither party were affiliated with

government forces. As a result of this typology challenge, it is obvious that a single empirical study on conflict would not suffice because many types of conflict would be excluded from the study, making this refutation vulnerable to the claim that many of the conflicts Kaplan foresees are not represented.

The methodological approach of this section, of utilizing, comparing, or presenting a cumulative survey of the findings of previous quantitative endeavors is not original in the field of conflict studies. An example of such a methodology in conflict studies can be found within such work as Ward and Bakke (2005) which provides “a survey of three major efforts to understand the onset of civil conflict,” by comparing the findings of Collier & Hoeffler (2004) Fearon & Laitin (2003) and Goldstone et al. (2000). Similarly, current studies on the history of violent conflict have drawn upon past conflict studies in the creation of their datasets. Examples of this can be found in the UCDP in which they “generated a ‘candidate database,’ drawing on information found in a dozen datasets” (Gleditsch et al., 2002: 618), and the Correlates of War Project where “the first step of Small & Singer (1972: 18-19) was to list in chronological order all the deadly quarrels that had been identified as wars by Write (1942/1965) and Richardson (1960), and others.” (Gleditsch et al., 2002: 618, footnote 5).

Why These Three Specific Studies?

Now that a sufficient explanation has been presented for why multiple studies have been drawn upon in the creation of this section (the lack of a single “official” dataset, Kaplan’s typology challenges, and that the methodology of drawing upon the findings of multiple conflict studies is commonly exercised in the field of conflict studies), the question of why *these three* particular studies were selected can be

briefly addressed. The reason these three specific studies were selected is twofold: first, each of the three studies are either, themselves cumulative studies of other findings, or are the collaborative works of respectable institutions, and second, together these studies complement each other with regards to Kaplan's typology challenge via their different coding systems.

As stated, for the most part, the studies themselves include the data of other studies, or are the works of collaborative efforts of respectable institutions. For example, Marshall and Gurr's Peace and Conflict series "is based on analyses of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management's (CIDCM) data resources, including Armed Conflict and Intervention, International Crisis Behavior, Minorities at Risk, Polity IV, and State Failure project databases" as well as Barbara Harff's risk assessment presented in "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955,"⁸ and others.⁹ Similarly, the UCDP is produced as part of a collaborative project between the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and the Department of Sociology and Political Science of the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. And, lastly, Fearon and Laitin's work is, in part, an expansion of Singer and Small's 1994 "Correlates of War Project."

The second reason for why these three studies in particular have been selected to be used in this refutation is that together they cover most of the vagaries within Kaplan's typology of conflict by having varied typology between themselves. For example, as Mack points out, the UCDP does not include "data on violent inter-communal conflicts – i.e. those which a state is not a party." (Mack 2002: 518) But,

Fearon and Laitin's study does include conflicts in which the state could be neither party; specifically, one of the criterion Fearon and Laitin use to define "violent civil conflicts" are conflicts which involve "fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies." (Fearon, Laitin 2003a: 76) In short, by using multiple studies' datasets this section avoids the risk of any one particular study having a unique coding system which may skew the interpreted trend; that is, unless all the datasets have the same coding system, which in this case, they do not. This is a rare occasion where a comparative presentation of quantitative studies is actually *strengthened* by the variations in each study's coding systems.

Individual Studies' Findings

Now that the reasons why multiple studies are necessary for this refutation and why these three studies were specifically selected, the presentation of their findings, and how those findings relate to Kaplan's anarchy thesis may commence.


III.A.i.a) The Uppsala Conflict Data Project

The UCDP's annual updates to their ongoing conflict dataset are published in the *Journal of Peace Research*. It is from this journal that the key points of the UCDP's study conveyed in this section, which are relevant to this refutation, are derived. The areas of the UCDP that are relevant to this refutation are their 1946-2004 dataset on "Armed Conflict,"¹⁰ "Internal Armed Conflict,"¹¹ "Extrastate Conflict,"¹² and "Internationalized Internal Conflict."¹³ These types of conflict were selected because, out of the UDCP conflict typology, they most closely identify with the conflicts that Kaplan describes in "The Coming Anarchy," as opposed to, say, "Interstate Conflict"

for example. The findings of the UCDP's study are as follows: Regarding internal armed conflict, the UCDP researchers find that "Most conflicts are internal..." (Eriksson, Wallensteen, 2004: 625) and the researchers can "confirm the common observation that internal conflict has been the dominant form of conflict throughout most of the post-World War period, and certainly since the late 1950s." (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 623). Regarding 2004 data on armed conflicts the UDCP researchers state that "In 2004, there were 30 active armed conflicts, up by one from 2003" (Harbom, Wallensteen, 2004:623) but, they continue, "Despite this slight increase, the number remains at a level corresponding to the low figures of the 1970s, and the probability of any state being involved is the lowest since the early 1950s." (Harbom, Wallensteen, 2004:623). Regarding conflict and stability, in the 2003 report the UDCP researchers stated, "The post-World War II period begins with 17 ongoing armed conflicts and a local peak at the start of the Cold War (in 1949), which is not exceeded until the early 1960s. The number of armed conflicts rises through the Cold War and a little beyond (with a high of 55 ongoing conflicts in 1992). It then drops precipitously. In 1998, there was a slight increase, but on the whole this curve has been flat since 1995." (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 620) Ultimately, the researchers simply conclude that presently, "the number of conflicts remains at a much lower level than at the end of the Cold War and has been fairly stable since 1995." (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 616).

The graph below, modified from its original version, presents a visual representation of the findings of the Uppsala Conflict Data Project regarding internal and internationalized conflicts. Although this graph doesn't present all of the types of conflict discussed in the project's study, if one recalls Kaplan's numerous references to subnational conflict (internal) and conflict spilling over national borders

(internationalized), it is sufficient to demonstrate a marked decrease in at least two types of conflict which fall within Kaplan's anarchy thesis.




III.A.i.b) Stanford University, Department of Political Science; Fearon & Laitin Study

The findings of the study produced by Stanford University's Department of Political Science, authored by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, were first published in the *American Political Science Review*. It is from this work, and its supplement, available online through Stanford University,¹⁴ that the key points of Fearon and Laitin's study conveyed in this section, which are relevant to this refutation, are derived. The area of Fearon and Laitin's study that is relevant to this refutation is their 1945-1999 dataset on "violent civil wars"¹⁵ and their findings are as follows. Fearon and Laitin's study finds that "In absolute terms, the largest number of civil wars began in the 1990s (31), followed by the 1960s and 1970s (19 and 25

respectively).” (Fearon, Laitin, 2003a: 77). What the study attributes this large amount of 1990s civil war to is not an increase in the emergence of civil war, but rather an accumulation of new and ongoing civil wars, “The prevalence of internal war in the 1990s is mainly the result of an accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 1950s rather than a sudden change associated with a new, post-Cold War international system” (Fearon, Laitin, 2003s: 88). Fearon and Laitin continue on this issue, and expand on the decline of civil war, by stating that their findings indicate, “...that, contrary to popular belief, the prevalence of civil wars in the 1990s is *not* due to effects of the end of the Cold War. The 1999 level of 25 ongoing wars had already been reached by the mid 1980s. Conflicts associated with Soviet collapse were partially responsible for the sharp increase in the early 1990s, but a marked *decline* has followed” (Fearon, Laitin, 2003a: 77). Regarding conflict and stability, or rather instability, Fearon and Laitin find that the world is not getting more unstable (more prone to civil war) as some posit, but rather that the world has been at the same risk of civil violence since at least the 1970s, “Decolonization from the 1940s through the 1970s gave birth to a large number of financially, bureaucratically, and militarily weak states. These states have been at risk for civil violence for the whole period, almost entirely in the form of insurgency, or rural guerrilla warfare” (Fearon, Laitin, 2003a: 88). Fearon and Laitin conclude that because of the accumulation of civil wars “One might conjecture that more and more civil wars are breaking out over time, thus producing the secular increase,” to this they simply state, “This is incorrect” (Fearon, Laitin, 2003: 77).

The graph below, modified from its original version, presents a visual representation of Fearon and Laitin’s findings regarding what they define as civil wars. Such conflicts certainly fall within Kaplan’s anarchy thesis and, as can be seen, have been experiencing a significant global decline.



III.A.i.c) Peace and Conflict 2005

The findings of the study produced by The University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), authored by Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, are a series, previously published in 2001 and 2003, with the latest findings being published in CIDCM’s “Peace and Conflict 2005.” It is from this work that the key points of Marshall and Gurr’s study conveyed in this section, which are relevant to this refutation, are derived. The area of Marshall and Gurr’s study that is relevant to this refutation is their 1946-2004 dataset on “Violent Conflict”¹⁶ and their subcategory of “societal warfare,” their findings are as

follows. Regarding major armed conflict “Despite the prevailing sense of global insecurity, the positive trends traced in previous editions of this report have continued into early 2005.” (Marshall, Gurr, 2005: 1) Specifically, “The global trend in major armed conflict has continued to decrease markedly in the post-Cold War era both in numbers of states affected by major armed conflicts and in general magnitude. According to our calculations, the general magnitude of global warfare has decreased by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s, falling by the end of 2004 to its lowest level since the late 1950s...” (Marshall, Gurr, 2005:11). Marshall and Gurr expand on this positive trend stating that “The era of interdependence is giving way to an era of globalization and the downward global trend in major armed conflicts is an important barometer of the globalization trend. We proposed in our previous reports, *Peace and Conflict 2001* and *2003*, that ‘if [the three positive trends of lessened armed conflicts, more frequent resolutions of self-determination conflicts, and increased numbers of democratic governments] continue in the first decade of the new century, [they] will establish a world more peaceful than at any time in the past century.’ The three trends are continuing through 2004 and we stand by our claim...” (Marshall, Gurr, 2005: 14). Regarding stability however, Marshall and Gurr identify that “the positive trends coexist with counter-trends that present major challenges to the emerging global community” (Marshall, Gurr, 2005: 14) such “counter-trends” include the increased concentration of armed conflict in Muslim countries¹⁷ as well as recognizing weak states in the developing world as potentially destabilizing factors, or “global threats” (Marshall, Gurr, 2005:14), which must be taken into consideration when viewing this otherwise downward trend in violent conflict.

The graph below, modified from its original version, presents a visual representation of the Peace and Conflict 2005 report regarding what it labels as societal warfare as well as total warfare. Recalling Kaplan's references to ethnic conflicts, conflicts regarding the disparities, and others similar types of conflicts, the significant drop in societal warfare presents evidence contrary to Kaplan's anarchy thesis. Additionally, although interstate conflict is not a focus of this section, total warfare was included in this graph because the fact that even when societal conflicts are combined with all interstate conflicts and a marked decline is still evident, further underscores the global conflict evidence contrary to Kaplan's anarchy thesis.



Historical Comparisons: Non-Nation State Conflicts: Concluding Remarks

Now that each study's relevant points have been addressed individually, a cumulative picture, which is starkly different to Kaplan's vision of global anarchy, of the present state of non-nation state conflict takes form. Recall that the UCDP study

finds that the number of conflicts, whether they be defined as “armed conflict,” “internal armed conflict,” “extrastate conflict,” or “internationalized internal conflict,” remains at a much lower level than at the end of the Cold War and has been fairly stable since 1995; recall that in studying “violent civil wars” Fearon and Laitin’s findings conclude that although there was a sharp increase in the early 1990s, a marked decline in violent civil wars has followed; and lastly, recall that the findings of the Peace and Conflict 2005 report which states that the global trend in major armed conflict has continued to decrease markedly in the post-Cold War era. Individually and combined these three studies present historic evidence that is contrary to Kaplan’s prophecy of an increase in global conflict. In fact, as noted by the UCDP authors, and making specific reference to Kaplan himself, this picture of the status of non-nation state conflict is “more consistent with the optimistic assessments of world politics that emphasize the spread of liberal factors (Gurr, 2000; Russett & Oneal, 2001; Weede, 1996) than with realist, structural, or cultural interpretations that emphasize raising anarchy (Mearshimer, 1990; Kaplan, 1994; Huntington, 1996)” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 623).

III.A.ii) III.A. Footnotes

¹ Although in addition to intrastate conflicts, international terrorism is also an example of non-nation state groups being party to a conflict it is not covered in this refutation because Kaplan pays only minimal attention to it; in fact he only devotes one sentence to the issue: “Loose and shadowy organisms such as Islamic terrorist organizations suggest why borders will mean increasingly little and sedimentary layers of tribalistic identity and control will mean more.” As he does not present international terrorism as substantial evidence to support his thesis it is not necessary to discuss it in this refutation.

² Dougherty, James, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. “Contending Theories of International Relations; a comprehensive survey” fifth edition, Addison Wesley Longman, Inc. 2001. P. 21.

³ In addition to accessing the UCDP data and interpretations via the UCDP webpage, available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se>, the publication *Journal of Peace Research* was also utilized in compiling information for this section; specifically referenced were the following *Journal of Peace Research* articles:

- Eriksson, Mikael. Peter Wallensteen. 2004. “Armed Conflict, 1989–2003.” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 5, 625-636 (2004) Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict, 1946–2001: A New Dataset.” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 615-637 (2002) Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
- Harbom, Lotta. Peter Wallensteen. 2005. “Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946-2004” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42, No. 5, 623-635 (2005) Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

⁴ The works of Fearon and Laitin referenced for this section are specifically:

- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” *American Political Science Review* Vol. 97, No.1, 75-90. February 2003.
- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Additional Tables for ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’” February 6, 2003. (<http://www.Stanford.edu/group/ethnic/workingpapers/htm>).

⁵ The latest work from the CIDCM’s “Peace and Conflict” series is Marshall and Gurr’s 2005 work:

- Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr. “Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy” Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA (Publication Date: May 2005)

⁶ Mack, Andrew, 2002. “Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community,” *Journal of Peace Research*.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 5, 515-525 (2002) Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

⁷ “Future wars will be those of communal survival, aggravated or, in many cases, caused by environmental scarcity. These wars will be subnational, meaning that it will be hard for states and local governments to protect their own citizens physically.”

⁸ Harff, Barbara. “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955.” *American Political Science Review*, vol.97 (February 2003), pp. 57-73.

⁹ For a full listing of the works included in the Peace and Conflict 2005 report see page 92 of Marshall & Gurr (2005)

¹⁰ “An *armed conflict* is defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related-deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state. A state is defined as an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory, or a non-recognized government whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory....” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619) Definitions from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) are available on the UCDP webpage at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se> and at the Armed Conflict webpage at <http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict>.

¹¹ “Internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states. The term Internal armed conflict may also be used to denote [Internationalized internal armed conflict and Internal armed conflict]...” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619)

Definitions from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) are available on the UCDP webpage at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se> and at the Armed Conflict webpage at <http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict>.

¹² “Extrastate armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619). Additionally in the UDCP “...International conflict...includes” Interstate and Extrastate armed conflict. (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619) Definitions from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) are available on the UCDP webpage at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se> and at the Armed Conflict webpage at <http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict>.

¹³ “International internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with intervention between from other states.” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619) Definitions from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) are available on the UCDP webpage at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se> and at the Armed Conflict webpage at <http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict>.

¹⁴ Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Additional Tables for ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’” February 6, 2003. (<http://www.Stanford.edu/group/ethnic/workingpapers/htm>).

¹⁵ “...we constructed a list of violent civil conflicts that we presently believe to meet the following primary criteria. (1) They involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels)...These criteria are broadly similar to those stated in the Correlates of War (COW) project, Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and several others.”(Fearon, Laitin, 2003: 76)

¹⁶ “Only countries with at least 500,000 total populations in 2004 are included in this study (161 total in 2004); interstate and societal wars must have reached a magnitude of over 1,000 directly-related deaths to be listed.” (Marshall, Gurr 2005: 11 footnote 1)

¹⁷ Marshall and Gurr define “Muslim country” “as any country where at least forty percent of the population professes one of the sects of Islam.” (Marshall and Gurr, 2005: 6)

III.B) Quantitative; West Africa Data

The objective of this section of the refutation is to present either global, regional or, where available, country-level (specifically regarding the West African countries of Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria) data, supplemented, when appropriate, with other studies' findings, in order to convey the present-day status of specific environmental, demographical, and disease-related indicators so to compare them with claims made within Kaplan's anarchy prophecy. To accomplish this task, this section is comprised of several issue-specific subsections. Each subsection is presented in a formulaic pattern where first, the specific issue is introduced and Kaplan's assertions of their status is identifying through quotes from "The Coming Anarchy"; second, when appropriate, a statement or statements from contemporary studies on the issue will be presented to provide a glimpse into scholar's opinions of the status of that issue; and third, quantitative information on the status of the issue will be presented at either country or regional level to present a comparison of Kaplan's assertions, to that issue's current status.

III.B.i) Environment

As is obvious to the reader of "The Coming Anarchy," one of the pillars of Kaplan's anarchic prophecy is "the environment." Here Kaplan's assertions regarding specific environmental issues will be presented and compared with current studies' findings and quantitative data on those issues. The specific environmental issues that are to be examined here are deforestation, desertification and soil degradation, and pollution.

III.B.i.a) Deforestation

Kaplan makes many statements regarding deforestation in West Africa throughout “The Coming Anarchy.” Such statements include assertions about the effect of deforestation on the rural populations in Africa,¹ country-specific statements,² and unspecific general statements about the rate of deforestation – for example Kaplan using such phrases as “an alarming rate”³ or “madcap speed.”⁴

The opinions of scholars and environmental news sources on deforestation do provide support for Kaplan’s concerns. This support is both on the global scale, “By most estimates, the world’s forests continue to disappear at an alarming rate”⁵ and on a regional scale,

...increasing pressures on forests are undermining the sustainable production of goods and services in the [West African] subregion. From being exporters of tropical logs in the 1980s and 1990s, many countries are finding that their forests resources have depleted to such an extent that they are unable to meet even the domestic demand for wood and wood products...The increasing pressure on forests and woodlands manifests as rapid deforestation and degradation.⁶

Although the accuracy of deforestation statistics for West Africa is contested by some (Fairhead, Leach 1998), and the preliminary announcements of a recent UN study to be released in January 2006 have declared a slowing deforestation rate,⁷ overall, much of the data does support a pessimistic view of the deforestation trends in the West African region. For example, according to the United Nations Statistical Division⁸ data, as depicted in chart 1 (appendix chart 1) between 1990 and 2000 the change in land-area covered by forest for some West African countries has decreased by nearly 30 percent.

III.B.i.b) Desertification and Soil Degradation

Closely associated with deforestation are the phenomena of desertification and soil degradation, about which “The Coming Anarchy” also discusses. Within the text,

Kaplan refers to desertification and degradation by asserting that, in combination with deforestation, desertification drives African peasants out of the countryside,⁹ that “deforestation has led to soil erosion,” that the futures’ poor will be “...doomed by a lack of...soil to till”¹⁰ and, in quoting Homer-Dixon, Kaplan also makes reference to humanities degradation of the “earth’s best soil.”¹¹

According to reports prepared by reputable international organizations, the status and negative effects of desertification and soil degradation, like deforestation, are quite grim. According to the World Bank, this grim status is a global phenomenon, “Drylands cover more than 40% of the world’s surface but are increasingly being affected by desertification.”¹² A worldwide condition underscored by a UNEP report that states:

Land degradation has affected some 1900 million hectares of land world-wide. In Africa an estimated 500 million hectares of land have been affected by soil degradation, including 65% of the region’s agricultural land. The rate at which arable land is being lost is increasing and is currently 30-35 times the historical rate. The loss of potential productivity due to soil erosion worldwide is estimated to be equivalent to some 20 million tons of grain per year. And this is happening worldwide, not just in Africa or Asia.¹³

The bleak news conveyed in this description of the global status of desertification and soil degradation within this UNEP report is similar to the forbidding status of desertification and soil degradation specifically within the region of West Africa. A regional report created by the FAO describes the desertification situation in West African in such prose that it could easily be mistaken for a passage from “The Coming Anarchy”:

Desertification is one of the critical problems facing most countries in West Africa...periodic fluxes in climatic conditions aggravate the situation, undermining the productivity of crops and livestock and resulting in drought and famine. When the land eventually becomes uncultivable, the population is often forced into internal and cross border migration, which in turn can further strain the environment and cause social and political conflicts. The indirect economic and social

costs suffered outside the affected areas, including the influx of “environmental refugees” and losses to national food production, is considerable.¹⁴

The data demonstrating the status of desertification and soil degradation is scarce, dated, and questionable, but if these sources are even remotely accurate, there is cause for concern over the levels of desertification and soil degradation in West Africa. Chart 2 (appendix chart 2), which presents data from the Land and Water Development Division of the FAO on soil degradation, visualizes the extent of soil degradation in West Africa. Similarly, the findings of a Texas Tech University study on desertification,¹⁵ depicted in chart 3 (appendix chart 3), claims that as much as 80 percent of Nigeria’s rangeland and over 40 percent of the rainfed cropland in Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Benin has been desertified.

III.B.i.c) Pollution

Air pollution is another area of environmental degradation that Kaplan presents as a contributing factor to his anarchy thesis. He does this by referencing specific West African countries’ cities, such as Lagos “whose crime, pollution, and overcrowding” according to Kaplan, “make it the cliché par excellence of Third World urban dysfunction.”¹⁶ Similarly, Kaplan labels African cities in general, as well as other countries’ cities like India and China, as having the “worst air quality of any cities in the world.”¹⁷ Lastly regarding Kaplan’s pollution statements within “The Coming Anarchy,” Kaplan also cites air pollution as being, along with other environmental and related issues, one of the factors that will create “the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate.”¹⁸

As with the previous environmental issue discussed thus far, the opinions of scholars and the studies of international organizations coincide with Kaplan's general opinion of deteriorating air quality. For example, the World Health Organization, which makes a differentiation between outdoor and indoor air pollution, states that outdoor air pollution "remains a serious problem in cities throughout the world, particularly in the megacities of developing countries and it is estimated that a quarter of the world population is exposed to unhealthy concentrations of air pollutants." Regarding indoor pollution, the WHO states that such pollution "can lead to acute lower respiratory infections in children under five, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and lung cancer...in adults," the resulting effect of such respiratory infections is that they "continue to be the biggest killer of young children and cause more than 2 million annual deaths." The WHO makes it a point to note that "this toll almost exclusively falls on children in developing countries,"¹⁹ like those of West Africa.

Similarly, within a report created by The Stockholm Environment Institute, a subsection entitled "The case of West Africa" states that the current status of air pollution in Africa on the whole is not only a current problem but if industrialization trends on the continent continue, there will be large increases in emissions that will only contribute to the current degradation of air quality.

Air pollution is an increasingly important environmental problem in Africa. Emissions of sulphur dioxide have been rising steadily as industrialization occurs. Projections indicate that potentially large increases in emissions may occur during the next twenty to fifty years if current development patterns persist.²⁰

Discussing urban air pollution, a United Nations University publication (Ayes, Weaver, 1998) describes air pollution in urban areas as "a major problem,"²¹ a statement that is easily reinforced with news reports out of African cities such as

Lagos where in October 2005, authorities were forced to close schools due to a pollution-caused “dense cloud of smog” which “blanketed large parts of the city.”²²

Although it is understood that there is also pollution in rural areas, because of Kaplan’s focus on urban area air pollution within “The Coming Anarchy” the data presented here to convey the current situation of air pollution within West Africa also focuses on urban areas. Specifically, the urban concentration of two of the six most common air pollutants,²³ nitrogen dioxide²⁴ (NO₂) and Sulfur dioxide²⁵ (SO₂) is presented for West Africa, as well as for other countries²⁶ to place the region in global context. Additionally, in response to questions regarding the omission of the other four common pollutants in this analysis, focusing on the NO₂ and SO₂ pollutants exclusively does correspond with the UNSD’s “Main Environmental Indicators” study which also only provides air pollution information on Sulfur dioxide and Nitrogen oxides emissions.²⁷

Looking at the levels of NO₂ and SO₂ for West Africa for a single year does not provide much information with regards to the region’s pollution status (appendix charts 4a and 4b) but when presented along side other developing countries²⁸ with comparable urban populations for the same year (appendix table 1), in order to place West Africa’s levels of pollution into a general context,³ it is easy to see that West Africa has marginally higher urban NO₂ concentrations for nearly all comparison countries and substantially higher urban SO₂ concentrations for all comparison countries (appendix charts 5 and chart 6). The large difference between West Africa and other countries in urban SO₂ concentrations is even further underscored when the

³ Although it is understood that with regard to NO₂ and SO₂ levels, other factors, such as fuel combustion from industry, fuel combustion from electric utilities, number of automobiles and non-road vehicles, as well as many other factors would be needed to be taken into consideration in order to create an as-close-to-accurate country comparison, here, the intent of the comparison is merely to place the status of air pollution in West Africa into a general context. To accomplish this, a comparison based on urban population is sufficient.

region is compared to select developed countries (appendix chart 7). Although such a developed/developing country comparison may be accurately accused of being inappropriate (because of vastly different environmental protection laws and other factors), such a comparison does provide insight into why a journalist from a developed country would view the developing world's air quality as being highly polluted, and West Africa specifically as being dangerously so.

III.B.ii) Population

Like the environment, population issues, globally, regionally, and country specific, form another pillar of Kaplan's anarchy thesis. Here Kaplan's assertions regarding specific population issues will be presented and compared with current quantitative population data and projections. The specific demographic issues that are to be examined for West Africa are birth rates, net population growth, doubling dates, and internal migration and urbanization.

III.B.ii.a) Birth rates

Kaplan makes numerous references to birthrates throughout "The Coming Anarchy." He does so by making globally comparative statements, such as asserting that Sub-Saharan Africa has "the world's highest birth rates,"²⁹ or describing birthrates on the continent and in West Africa with general adjectives, such as "soaring,"³⁰ "surging,"³¹ or even, reminiscent of Paul Ehrlich, "exploding."³²

Looking at births per 1,000 population³³ on a regional scale (appendix chart 8), it is apparent that the data for West Africa, with the second highest region for births per 1,000 population (beaten only by Middle Africa), does support Kaplan's "world's highest birth rates" statement. However, when reviewing a graph depicting the UNSD's data and projections³⁴ for crude birth rates (appendix graph 1), total fertility

rates (appendix graph 2), and net reproduction rates (appendix graph 3), one can see that the projected overall trend for births, fertility, and reproduction rates, for every country in the region is decreasing.

III.B.ii.b) Net population growth

Very much associated with, but still quite different from, the crude birth and total fertility rates is another population issue, which Kaplan includes in his anarchy thesis: net population growth.⁴ Kaplan discusses net population growth for West Africa via country specific statements like “[t]he yearly net population growth is 3.6 percent. This means that the Ivory Coast’s 13.5 million people will become 39 million by 2025...”³⁵ as well as through general terms such as “increase,”³⁶ “growth,”³⁷ and “overpopulation”³⁸ for the region on the whole.

When today’s population data is reviewed for the region however, quite a different demographic picture can be seen. Not only is Cote d’Ivoire’s projected population for 2025 to be over 14 million *less* than Kaplan’s projected 39 million,³⁹ there is also a decreasing trend in, as noted above, the crude birth rates (appendix graph 1) not only for Cote d’Ivoire but for every country in the region as well. With regard to mortality, despite a projected decrease in the crude death rate for the region (appendix graph 4), the overall population growth rate (appendix graph 5) for West Africa still demonstrates a downward trend.

Due to violent conflicts in the region, and other factors, the third component of net population growth, migration, effects different countries in vastly different ways and cannot be meaningfully discussed on a regional scale. However, it can be said that when reviewing UNSD’s migration data on past and projected migration shifts, the

region does have a negative net migration (appendix table 2); meaning, more individuals are emigrating or, according to projections, are expected to emigrate from, the countries in the region then are, or are projected to, immigrate into them.

What all this data means is that where Kaplan uses the term “net population” to support the notion of exploding populations in this region, the current status of net population growth is actually decreasing in the region; the trend for birth rates is decreasing, migration is outward, and the decreasing trend in the death rate is not large enough to compensate for births and migrations combined.

III.B.ii.c) Doubling dates

Within “The Coming Anarchy” Kaplan utilizes a useful equation to illustrate the growth of specific countries’ population, the “doubling date.” By simply dividing 70 by a country’s rate of natural increase (RNI) one can discover how many years it will be before the country’s population is to double in size. Although Kaplan does not present the reader with his doubling date calculations, he does make statements which provide the amount of years before specific countries’ populations are to double, such as “Nigeria’s population...is set to double during the next twenty-five years,”⁴⁰ and “[i]n twenty-eight years Guinea’s population will double if growth goes on at current rates.”⁴¹

Slightly more sophisticated than his usual “soaring populations”⁴² style statements, Kaplan’s use of doubling dates provide him a potent tool to convey the speed with which the populations of West Africa are growing. Potent, meaning that where in the previous population subcategories a decrease in a trend can be presented as evidence contrary to Kaplan’s population prophecies, with regard to the doubling date no such

⁴ Kaplan’s “net population growth” is considered to refer to fertility, mortality and migration. This interpretation of the term is adopted from the definition provided by the PRB’s for “Projected

countertrend exists. For example, using Kaplan's cited countries of Nigeria and Guinea, according to Nigeria's current RNI of 2.4 percent, the country's population is expected to double in size in 29 years. Similarly, Guinea's population with an RNI of 2.7 percent is expected double to in 25 years. The trend is similar for the entire West African region (appendix chart 9) with Benin and Liberia having the shortest doubling times of 24 years; meaning that, by the time a Liberian child born today is 24 years old, their country's population will be double the size it was when they were born.

III.B.ii.d) Internal Migration and Urbanization

"And the cities keep growing." Kaplan makes this intended-to-be-ominous statement referring not only to population growth in West Africa, but also to another demographic trend that he references frequently throughout "The Coming Anarchy," internal migration and urbanization. Often including references to poverty, by using words like "slums,"⁴³ and "shantytowns,"⁴⁴ Kaplan's urbanization comments range from city and country specific, referring to "overcrowding"⁴⁵ in Lagos, urban percent of population in Cote d'Ivoire,⁴⁶ and rural to urban migration in Guinea,⁴⁷ to the African continent in general.⁴⁸

To assess the status of urbanization in West Africa, and to present projected trends, UNSD figures are again utilized here. From looking at the urbanization trend in West Africa (appendix graph 6), it is easy to see that the urban percentage of total population for each country is indeed steadily increasing. Similarly, by cross referencing the urban percentage of total population with the rural percentage of total population (appendix graph 7), it is also easy to see that each country is projected to become over 50 percent urban within the next 21 years; as soon as 2010 for Nigeria, and 2025 for Togo.

Population 2025 and 2050." (Definition provided in the "Terms" section).

To address Kaplan's references to urban poverty, the status of slum population as a percentage of urban population for the years 1990 and 2001, the latest for which such data is made available by the UNSD, was reviewed and is presented in chart 10 (appendix chart 10). From this data, one can see that between 1990 and 2001 each country in the region has acted differently with regard to the amount of their urban population residing in slums, challenging some of Kaplan's all-inclusive general statements. Some countries like Guinea, Liberia, Ghana, and Nigeria have had decreases in their percents of urban population living in slums for the period while others like Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Benin, have had increases in their percent of urban population living in slums; Togo's has remained stagnant. However, it should be noted that even in Liberia, the country with the largest decrease in its urban population living in slums, still has 56% of its urban population living in slums, while none of the others are below 60%, and Sierra Leone leads the group with an awesome 96% of its urban population living in slums.

III.B.iii) Disease

Kaplan asserts that, in addition to having created an "impenetrable boundary," a "wall,"⁴⁹ or even mappable "vectors,"⁵⁰ aided by modern road systems⁵¹ "the unchecked spread of disease"⁵² is not only partly responsible for tough airport "security procedures,"⁵³ and is not only responsible for causing the West African interior to again become "as Graham Greene once observed, 'blank' and 'unexplored,'"⁵⁴ but it is also, in part, what will cause contact with the African continent to be reduced to taking place "through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts,"⁵⁵ and what will, among other things, pose the "core foreign-policy challenge" for the United States "from which most others will ultimately emanate."⁵⁶

The specific diseases, or viruses, to which Kaplan is referring within these quotes, and others from “The Coming Anarchy,” are HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. In this subsection, as with the environment and population subsections above, Kaplan’s issue-specific statements regarding these diseases/virus will be presented, along with data from reputable international organizations so to accurately convey the current status of them in West Africa.

III.B.iii.a) HIV/AIDS

Throughout “The Coming Anarchy” Kaplan’s references to HIV/AIDS regard specific statistics, both globally and country specific,⁵⁷ general adjectives, such as “explosion,”⁵⁸ and statements about the future of the virus “fast-forwarding” on the African continent.⁵⁹ Unfortunately, upon reviewing data produced by UNAIDS for 2001 and 2003, it appears that Kaplan’s assessment of the future HIV/AIDS situation on the Continent, albeit dramatic, is close to the virus’ current reality.

In identifying Africa’s place as the leader in the world’s HIV-positive population in 1994 Kaplan wrote, “Of the approximately 12 million people worldwide whose blood is HIV-positive, 8 million are in Africa.” According to UNAIDS estimates, sub-Saharan Africa alone held 25 of the world’s 37.8 million HIV-positive cases in 2003 (slightly higher than Kaplan’s referenced 66 percent in 1994) making Kaplan’s identification of the African continent having over half of the world’s HIV-positive population still accurate today.

Although the word “explosion” may be over the top when describing the HIV trend for West Africa based on UNAIDS data for 2001 and 2003, it is clear that the virus is far from being under control in the region. For example, upon reviewing the estimated number of people living with HIV in West Africa between these years, one can see that the number of HIV-positive adults and children (appendix chart 11) is

increasing in every country in the region. Similarly, again referencing 2001 and 2003 UNAIDS data, as a percentage of total population the adult (15-49) HIV rate has remained the same or increased for many these countries (appendix chart 12).

In those countries in the region where decreases in this percentage have been observed, Nigeria and Togo, further research shows that these decreases hardly present reason for optimism. Specifically, a UNAIDS report on Nigeria states that “While Nigeria’s infection rate is lower than those of neighbouring countries, it nonetheless represents a higher number of infections, given the large population; the country now has the highest number of HIV/AIDS-infected adults in West Africa.”⁶⁰ Similarly, despite the decrease in the percentage of HIV infected 15 to 49 year-olds in Togo, another UNAIDS report states that in Togo the youth are more effected by the virus than other age groups: “The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Togo especially affects young people, with an estimated prevalence nearing 6%.”⁶¹ So, while chart 12 may demonstrate a decrease in Nigeria, because of the country’s high population it still holds the highest number of infected people in the region, and while a similar decrease may be observed in Togo, that country’s youth, including those below 15 years of age, are more affected by HIV/AIDS than other age groups. For these reasons, neither decrease presents cause for celebration regarding the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the region nor do they, or any other of the data presented here, convey a HIV/AIDS situation in West Africa contrary to the, albeit dramatic, one put forth by Kaplan in “The Coming Anarchy.”

III.B.iii.b) Malaria

From the first sentence⁶² of “The Coming Anarchy,” Kaplan introduces the disease of malaria, a disease that he subsequently maintains as a reoccurring subject in

his work. He attributes the disease with being “most responsible for the disease wall that threatens to separate Africa and other parts of the Third World from more-developed regions of the planet in the twenty-first century.”⁶³ He cites the disease’s presence in the slums of West Africa, “Children defecate in a stream filled with garbage, and pigs, droning with malarial mosquitoes,” as well as its prevalence among the West Africans themselves, stating that “Virtually everyone in the West African interior has some form of malaria.”

In the attempt to present the current situation and trend regarding malaria in West Africa, the data provided by international organizations is less than forthcoming. A quote from UNICEF’s “Trends Over The Decade” conveys the predicament clearly when it states, “No trend data are available on the use of bednets or on malaria treatment.”⁶⁴ Similarly, a briefing on the *World Malaria Report 2005* also acknowledges the difficulties in presenting malaria trends by admitting “overall trends are still hard to prove.”⁶⁵ As for data over time for malaria cases for the specific countries focused on in this thesis, one is limited to figures provided by each country’s respective Ministry of Health, which represent the number of *reported* malaria cases; figures that the United Nations Human Development Report (UNHDR) footnotes “may represent only a fraction of the true number in a country.”⁶⁶ Not only is the chronological data provided by the Ministry of Health of these countries at risk of being unrepresentative of actual numbers of cases and deaths, but also, because of its questionable reliability (exemplified through missing years, spikes, drops and other irregularities in the figures), the data is essentially useless towards an effort to identify a reliable malaria trend in the region – as can be seen in graphs 8, 9, and 10 which respectively depict the number of clinical malaria cases *reported*, the number of

admitted malaria cases *reported*, and the number of malaria deaths *reported* to the WHO for different years (appendix graphs 8, 9, and 10).

The reason for such a scarcity of reliable quantitative information on malaria, aside from unreliable domestic recording measures, is that the largest international offensive against malaria, the Roll Back Malaria Partnership (RBM), had only come into being in 1998 and its data collection branch, the WHO Roll Back Malaria Department, has only begun to “systematically compiled information on malaria burden and control”⁶⁷ since 2002. As the result of this 2002 systematic collection, the *World Malaria Report 2005*, “is the first comprehensive effort” by the largest international effort “to take stock of where the world stands in relation to one of its most devastating diseases,”⁶⁸ it would seem that the Report would serve as the best resource for the purposes of this thesis. However, the quantitative data on malaria contained in this report only addresses three of the eight West African countries focused on in this thesis (Benin, Ghana, and Nigeria) and is therefore insufficient.⁶⁹

It is because of these data availability limitations, which only provide data for limited indicators for a single year, that the progress towards the United Nations Millennium Development Goals for 1990-2005 will be examined to convey the status of malaria in West Africa, as opposed to the trend or comparison methods used elsewhere in this section. Specifically, the progress towards UN Millennium Development goal six (“combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases”), Target eight (“have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases”) will be examined here. The indicators for Target eight are grouped by the UN into two sub-categories, the “[p]roportion of population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures,” for which here will be presented data for the percent of children under five use of insecticide-treated bed nets

(ITNs), and the “Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria,” for which here will be presented data for the malaria-related death rate for the 0-4 age group. The focus here on the under-five age group is not only because under-fives are, in part, the age group that was tracked to assess progress in the UN’s targets eight of the Millennium Indicators,⁷⁰ but it is also due to the fact that children make for the largest group of malaria-related deaths. In fact, according to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, of the “estimated 700,000-2.7 million persons [who] die of malaria each year, 75% of them [are] African children.”⁷¹

As this information relates to “The Coming Anarchy,” it is unfortunate that Kaplan’s statements regarding the prevalence of malaria within the West African population is supported by the UN data. Specifically, the UN data on malaria prevention shows that Benin, with a low 7.4% in 2003, boasted the highest percent of under-fives sleeping under ITNs in the region. Second highest in the region was Cote d’Ivoire with 4.5% of its children under ITNs; none of the other West African countries, for which data was available, are over 2% ITN usage (appendix chart 13). With a UN Millennium goal of having at least 60% of the under-five population sleeping under ITNs by 2005,⁷² the status of malaria prevention in the region, at least regarding ITNs, can hardly be deemed successful. The lack of ITNs and other malaria preventative measures translates directly into high rates of under-five malaria related deaths. These deaths, per 100,000, range from 256 to 1481 and can be seen for the region in chart 14 (appendix chart 14).

Kaplan’s originally assumed to be exaggerated statements regarding the prevalence of malaria in West Africa are in fact supported by many other reports and figures from multiple sources. The National Center for Infectious Diseases, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, “Malaria Risks by Country” classifies “all

areas”⁷³ of each of the West African country discussed in this thesis as being high risk for malaria. Similarly, the WHO Regional Office for Africa lists 100% of the populations of these same countries as being at, at least “endemic risk,” with 3% of Nigeria’s population even surpassing “endemic” by being classified as being at “epidemic risk.”⁷⁴

On a continental scale, a 2005 WHO Regional Committee for Africa Press Release cited malaria as “Africa’s number one killer disease.”⁷⁵ Similarly, a quote from the World Health Organization’s *World Malaria Report 2005* outlines the status of malaria on the African continent as it stands in the global context:

Over 80% of malaria deaths occur in Africa where around 66% of the population is thought to be at risk. In contrast, less than 15% of the global total of malaria deaths occurs in Asia (including Eastern Europe), despite the fact that an estimated 49% of the people in this region are living under threat from the disease. In the Americas 14% of the population are at risk, but the region sees only a tiny fraction of global malaria-related deaths. As these figures make clear, malaria exacts its heaviest toll on the African continent.

This same report does state, however, that substantial progress has been made in the implementation of strategies to counter malaria in Africa and elsewhere. Unfortunately, though, the results of this progress will have to be included in a future assessment of Kaplan’s work and malaria’s status in West Africa for, as The Report acknowledges, “it is too early to measure the precise impact of these efforts in terms of lives saved, [but] there is good reason to believe that real reductions in deaths and disease will be achieved in the next few years.”⁷⁶

III.B.iii.c) Tuberculosis

The last of the so-called “big three,” tuberculosis, is another disease that Kaplan refers to in “The Coming Anarchy.” Although he only mentions the disease by name when discussing its relationship with the HIV virus,⁷⁷ because of its mention at all, it

can be assumed that any of his numerous references to “disease” could either include, or be a direct reference to, tuberculosis.

As opposed to malaria there is, fortunately, ample quantitative data available for tuberculosis. To present the current status of the disease in West Africa, here WHO data provided by the UNSD for two indicators will be examined. These indicators are tuberculosis prevalence rate per 100,000 population and tuberculosis deaths per 100,000 population. Both will be presented for the years 1990 and 2000, and for 2000 through 2003.

As can be seen from the prevalence data for 1990 and 2000 (appendix chart 15), the region is split, with four countries’ prevalence rates increasing, and four countries’ prevalence rates decreasing. However, in comparing the actual increases and decreases for each country, it can be seen that there was an overall increase in the prevalence rate for the region (appendix table 3). In fact, the amount that the rate decreased for the entire region (298) is only slightly higher than the amount that just one country, Cote d’Ivoire, increased (286). As for the prevalence rate per 100,000 population for the years 2000 through 2003 it can be seen that for all but two countries, Ghana and Togo, the rate has increased from 2000 to 2003 (appendix chart 16). Additionally, when examining the figures it can be seen that the overall increases for the region, overshadow the minimal decreases in Ghana and Togo (appendix table 4). While these two countries had decreases of ten and three, respectively, their neighbors demonstrated increases averaging above 65, with Sierra Leone holding the largest increase, from 2000 to 2003, of 110.

Regarding the death rates per 100,000 population for each country for the years 1990 and 2000, it can be seen that, not surprisingly, the same countries, which demonstrated increases or decreases in their prevalence rates, are the same that

demonstrated increases or decreases in their death rates. The result of this is a similar increase/decrease half-and-half split for the region in the death rate (appendix chart 17) as the prevalence rate had (appendix chart 16). However, it is again unfortunate that when the figures on a regional scale are examined it is apparent that there was a larger increase in the death rate than there was a decrease (appendix table 5). Similarly, when the data for death rates for 2000 through 2003 (appendix chart 18) and the numeric change between 2000 and 2003 (appendix table 6) are reviewed it can be seen that the trend is, again not surprisingly, similar to the prevalence rate for the same period. However, one interesting revelation that this data demonstrates is that there are countries that are making substantial progress in the fight against tuberculosis. Benin is a perfect example of progress against the disease. Not only does the country have the lowest number of prevalence and death rates in the region for all years examined, but also with a 1990 to 2000 25% decrease in its prevalence rate and a 50% decrease in its death rates for the same years, not only are less people getting sick from tuberculosis in the country but even fewer people are dying from the disease.

Quantitative; West Africa Data: Concluding Remarks

It was the objective of this section to utilize quantifiable data from reputable international organizations to convey the as close-to-current status of specific environmental, demographical, and disease-related indicators in West Africa so to compare them with claims made within Kaplan's anarchy prophecy. The specific environmental issues that were examined were deforestation, desertification and soil degradation, and pollution. Regarding population issues, birth rates, net population growth, doubling dates, and internal migration and urbanization were examined. And lastly, for disease, the subjects that were examined were the HIV/AIDS virus, malaria, and tuberculosis.

Unfortunately, the current status for nearly all of these issues does convey a Kaplan-esque picture of West Africa. The current statuses of deforestation, desertification and soil degradation, pollution, population doubling dates, urban growth and rural-to-urban population shifts, the HIV/AIDS virus, malaria, and tuberculosis, do not, by themselves, provide significant quantifiable evidence to counter Kaplan's anarchy thesis. As for those demographic issues where the data did demonstrate countertrends to Kaplan's prophecy, namely, decreasing trends in birth rates and net population growth, Kaplan himself, in the preface to *The Coming Anarchy* (as previously mentioned pages 126-127), quite liberally discounts their, and other long-term decreasing trends in population growth, impact on negating his thesis:

...the worldwide fall in the rate of population increase does not affect my thesis. 'The Coming Anarchy' is less concerned with the world's population in the distant future than with steep, absolute rises in population in the world's poorest countries in the near future and how that interacts with soil depletion, ethnic-tribal divides, and so on to produce unrest.⁷⁸

Despite these post-"The Coming Anarchy" modifications to his thesis that half-heartedly address these demographic countertrends (see "Kaplan on Kaplan and the Anarchy Thesis" p 117), there is one demographic indicator that requires further discussion here for it exemplifies a "The Coming Anarchy" flaw identified by many of Kaplan's critics.

It was recognized within the population subsection "Internal Migration and Urbanization" that urban poverty, represented as slum population as a percent of urban population (appendix chart 10), is high in many of the countries of West Africa. However, it was also recognized that for this indicator the countries of West Africa have different trends; for some (Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Benin) the percent of their urban population living in slums is increasing, for others, it is stagnant (Togo), or decreasing (Guinea, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria). The trend variations of this indicator

for different countries of West Africa are not being presented here exclusively as evidence against specific statements made by Kaplan within “The Coming Anarchy” but rather they are being presented as evidence of a larger flaw of his work: generalization. Indeed, there is urban poverty in West Africa, and it is true that for some countries urban poverty, represented by percentage of urban population living in slums, is increasing, however, this is not true for the whole of West Africa, as was shown through decreases, or stagnation, in this indicator for certain countries. Therefore, to generalize that urban poverty, represented by this indicator, is increasing for the entirety of West Africa, as Kaplan implicitly does throughout “The Coming Anarchy,”⁷⁹ is incorrect.

Overall, however, as mentioned above, the majority of the environmental, demographic, and health-related quantifiable data examined, here does, for the most part, support the, albeit embellished, image of West Africa which Kaplan presents in “The Coming Anarchy.”

III.B.iv) III.B. Footnotes

¹ "...desertification and deforestation--also tied to overpopulation--drive more and more African peasants out of the countryside."

² "When Sierra Leone achieved its independence, in 1961, as much as 60 percent of the country was primary rain forest. Now six percent is. In the Ivory Coast the proportion has fallen from 38 percent to eight percent."

³ "...most of the rain forest and secondary bush is being destroyed at an alarming rate."

⁴ "Hardwood logging continues at a madcap speed."

⁵ <http://www.nationalgeographic.com/eye/deforestation/deforestation.html>

⁶ "Forestry Outlook Study for Africa; Subregional Report: West Africa." African Development Bank; European Commission; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2003. (http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/005/Y8732E/Y8732E00.HTM)

⁷ "Deforestation slowing - UN." BBC News. November 14, 2005. (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/science/nature/4436116.stm>)

⁸ "UNSD Main Environmental Indicators: Land Use: Forest Area; Percent Change of Land Area Covered by Forest 1990-2000." United Nations Statistical Division Main Environmental Indicators (<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/q2004indicators.htm>) Also available at: (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_indicator_xrxx.asp?ind_code=25)

⁹ "...desertification and deforestation--also tied to overpopulation--drive more and more African peasants out of the countryside."

¹⁰ "...doomed by a lack of water to drink, soil to till, and space to survive in."

¹¹ "Homer-Dixon points to a world map of soil degradation in his Toronto office. 'The darker the map color, the worse the degradation,' he explains.... 'The population is generally highest where the soil is the best. So we're degrading earth's best soil.'"

¹² "Drylands cover more than 40% of the world's surface but are increasingly being affected by desertification. Desertification is land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting from climatic variations and human activities. It occurs because drylands are extremely vulnerable to over-exploitation and inappropriate land use." (<http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/ardext.nsf/17ByDocName/KeyIssuesDesertification>)

¹³ The United Nations System-wide Earthwatch; UNEP. 1999. Global Environment Outlook - 2000. United Nations Environment Programme. Earthscan Publications, London. (<http://www.unep.org/geo2000>)

¹⁴ "Forestry Outlook Study for Africa; Subregional Report: West Africa." African Development Bank; European Commission; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2003. (http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/005/Y8732E/Y8732E00.HTM)

¹⁵ Dregne, H. E., and N-T. Chou. 1992. Global desertification dimensions and costs. In Degradation and restoration of arid lands. Lubbock: Texas Tech. University.

¹⁶ "This is especially so because Nigeria's population, including that of its largest city, Lagos, whose crime, pollution, and overcrowding make it the cliché par excellence of Third World urban dysfunction, is set to double during the next twenty-five years, while the country continues to deplete its natural resources."

¹⁷ "Consider that Indian cities, like African and Chinese ones, are ecological time bombs--Delhi and Calcutta, and also Beijing, suffer the worst air quality of any cities in the world--and it is apparent how surging populations, environmental degradation, and ethnic conflict are deeply related."

¹⁸ "The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh--developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts--will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War."

¹⁹ "Indoor cooking and heating with biomass fuels (agricultural residues, dung, straw, wood) or coal produces high levels of indoor smoke that contains a variety of health-damaging pollutants. There is consistent evidence that exposure to indoor air pollution can lead to acute lower respiratory infections in children under five, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and lung cancer (where coal is used) in adults. Acute lower respiratory infections, in particular pneumonia, continue to be the biggest killer of young children and cause more than 2 million annual deaths. This toll almost exclusively falls on children in developing countries." - World Health Organization. "Children's environmental health" (<http://www.who.int/ceh/risks/cehair/en/>)

²⁰ "Regional Air Pollution in Africa." The Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) University of York, 1998. <http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/sei/africa/afpoll.html>

²¹ “In many urban areas, air pollution resulting from electric power generation, transportation, local industries, and domestic cooking is already a major problem. In addition to the normal sources, atmospheric pollution is also the result of widespread forest-clearing operations, especially forest burning by small holding farmers and bigger agricultural enterprises.” - Ayres, Robert U., Paul M. Weaver (eds) “Eco-restructuring: Implications for sustainable development” United Nations University Press Tokyo, New York, Paris. The United Nations University, 1998

²² “Schools were closed in Nigeria’s biggest city Lagos on Thursday, in a precautionary measure ordered by the authorities a day after a dense cloud of smog blanketed large parts of the city of more than 15 million people. Officials blamed pollution from car emissions and industrial waste for the thick smoky mist that hung over the northern mainland areas of the city through most of Wednesday, causing panic as it irritated eyes and disrupted breathing.” - “Nigeria: Schools shut in Lagos following smog scare.” Integrated Regional Information Networks. October 13, 2005.

(http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=49534&SelectRegion=West_Africa&SelectCountry=NIGERIA)

²³ The United States Environmental Protection Agency has set air quality standards for six common, or “criteria,” pollutants: 1) Nitrogen oxides (in this work only represented by nitrogen dioxide) 2) Particulate matter, 3) Carbon monoxide, 4) Ozone, 5) Sulfur dioxide, and 6) Lead. - United States Environmental Protection Agency, source available at <http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/6poll.html>

²⁴ “Nitrogen oxides, or NO_x, is the generic term for a group of highly reactive gases, all of which contain nitrogen and oxygen in varying amounts. Many of the nitrogen oxides are colorless and odorless. However, one common pollutant, nitrogen dioxide (NO₂) along with particles in the air can often be seen as a reddish-brown layer over many urban areas. Nitrogen oxides form when fuel is burned at high temperatures, as in a combustion process. The primary manmade sources of NO_x are motor vehicles, electric utilities, and other industrial, commercial, and residential sources that burn fuels. NO_x can also be formed naturally.” - EPA, source available at <http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/nox/what.html>

²⁵ “Sulfur dioxide, or SO₂, belongs to the family of sulfur oxide gases (SO_x). These gases dissolve easily in water. Sulfur is prevalent in all raw materials, including crude oil, coal, and ore that contains common metals like aluminum, copper, zinc, lead, and iron. SO_x gases are formed when fuel containing sulfur, such as coal and oil, is burned, and when gasoline is extracted from oil, or metals are extracted from ore. SO₂ dissolves in water vapor to form acid, and interacts with other gases and particles in the air to form sulfates and other products that can be harmful to people and their environment. Over 65% of SO₂ released to the air, or more than 13 million tons per year, comes from electric utilities, especially those that burn coal. Other sources of SO₂ are industrial facilities that derive their products from raw materials like metallic ore, coal, and crude oil, or that burn coal or oil to produce process heat. Examples are petroleum refineries, cement manufacturing, and metal processing facilities. Also, locomotives, large ships, and some nonroad diesel equipment currently burn high sulfur fuel and release SO₂ emissions to the air in large quantities.” - EPA, source available at <http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/so2/what1.html>

²⁶ The data sources for all NO₂ and SO₂ concentrations presented here are from the following sources: “World Resources Institute, World Resources 1998-99; World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000; WHO, Air Management Information System-AMIS 2.0, 1998; and Global Urban Observatory, Citibase, 1999. via ciesin.org” as sourced by nationmasters.com which also contained the following disclaimers regarding such data, “The values were originally collected at the city level. Each nation varied in terms of the number of cities reported, so this data should be used with some caution. Within each country the values have been normalized by city population for the year 1995, then added together to obtain the total concentration for the given country.” More information is available at <http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php>

²⁷ United Nations Statistics Division “Main Environmental Indicators” <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/q2004indicators.htm>

²⁸ Developing country distinction based on United Nations guidance which reads “There is no established convention for the designation of “developed” and “developing” countries or areas in the United Nations system. In common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania and Europe are considered “developed” regions or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also treated as developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia are treated as developing countries; and countries of eastern Europe and the former USSR countries in Europe are not included under either developed or developing regions.” Source: United Nations. Standard country or

Area Codes for Statistical Use. Series M, No. 49, Rev. 4 (United Nations publication, Sales No. M.98.XVII.9). Available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_dict_xrxx.asp?def_code=491.

²⁹ “Finally my friend the Minister mentioned polygamy. Designed for a pastoral way of life, polygamy continues to thrive in sub-Saharan Africa even though it is increasingly uncommon in Arab North Africa. Most youths I met on the road in West Africa told me that they were from ‘extended’ families, with a mother in one place and a father in another. Translated to an urban environment, loose family structures are largely responsible for the world’s highest birth rates...”

³⁰ “As African birth rates soar and slums proliferate, some experts worry that viral mutations and hybridizations might, just conceivably, result in a form of the AIDS virus that is easier to catch than the present strain.”

³¹ “Summits between African leaders and prominent African-Americans are becoming frequent, as are Pollyanna-ish prognostications about multiparty elections in Africa that do not factor in crime, surging birth rates, and resource depletion.”

³² “To this protean cartographic hologram one must add other factors, such as migrations of populations, explosions of birth rates, vectors of disease. Henceforward the map of the world will never be static.”

³³ 2005 World Population Data Sheet Of The Population Reference Bureau

³⁴ Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>

³⁵ “Fifty-five percent of the Ivory Coast’s population is urban, and the proportion is expected to reach 62 percent by 2000. The yearly net population growth is 3.6 percent. This means that the Ivory Coast’s 13.5 million people will become 39 million by 2025, when much of the population will consist of urbanized peasants like those of Chicago.”

³⁶ “...95% of the population increase will be in the poorest regions of the world...”

³⁷ “But nature is coming back with a vengeance, tied to population growth. It will have incredible security implications.”

³⁸ “Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.”

³⁹ Cote D’Ivoire’s “Projected populations based upon reasonable assumptions on the future course of fertility, mortality, and migration” for 2025 is 25,114,000. Figure and quote from the Population Reference Bureau, PRB 2005 World Population Data Sheet (<http://www.prb.org/datafind/prjprbdata/wcprbdata6.asp?DW=DR&SL=&SA=1>) figure also available via UNSD, Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>).

⁴⁰ “Nigeria’s population, including that of its largest city, Lagos, whose crime, pollution, and overcrowding make it the cliché par excellence of Third World urban dysfunction, is set to double during the next twenty-five years, while the country continues to deplete its natural resources.”

⁴¹ “In twenty-eight years Guinea’s population will double if growth goes on at current rates.”

⁴² “Candidates include Indonesia, Brazil, and, of course, Nigeria. Though each of these nations has exhibited democratizing tendencies of late, Homer-Dixon argues that such tendencies are likely to be superficial “epiphenomena” having nothing to do with long-term processes that include soaring populations and shrinking raw materials.”

⁴³ “As African birth rates soar and slums proliferate, some experts worry that viral mutations and hybridizations might, just conceivably, result in a form of the AIDS virus that is easier to catch than the present strain.”

⁴⁴ “Perhaps 15 percent of Abidjan’s population of three million people live in shantytowns like Chicago and Washington, and the vast majority live in places that are not much better.”

⁴⁵ “This is especially so because Nigeria’s population, including that of its largest city, Lagos, whose crime, pollution, and overcrowding make it the cliché par excellence of Third World urban dysfunction, is set to double during the next twenty-five years, while the country continues to deplete its natural resources.”

⁴⁶ “Fifty-five percent of the Ivory Coast’s population is urban, and the proportion is expected to reach 62 percent by 2000.”

⁴⁷ “In twenty-eight years Guinea’s population will double if growth goes on at current rates. Hardwood logging continues at a madcap speed, and people flee the Guinean countryside for Conakry.”

⁴⁸ “As African birth rates soar and slums proliferate, some experts worry that viral mutations and hybridizations might, just conceivably, result in a form of the AIDS virus that is easier to catch than the present strain.”

⁴⁹ “As many internal African borders begin to crumble, a more impenetrable boundary is being erected that threatens to isolate the continent as a whole: the wall of disease.”

⁵⁰ “To this protean cartographic hologram one must add other factors, such as migrations of populations, explosions of birth rates, vectors of disease.”

⁵¹ “In the capital of the Ivory Coast, whose modern road system only helps to spread the disease, 10 percent of the population is HIV-positive.”

⁵² “Sierra Leone is a microcosm of what is occurring, albeit in a more tempered and gradual manner, throughout West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world: the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war.”

⁵³ “It was apparent that drug smuggling, disease, and other factors had contributed to the toughest security procedures I have ever encountered when returning from overseas.”

⁵⁴ “West Africa is reverting to the Africa of the Victorian atlas. It consists now of a series of coastal trading posts, such as Freetown and Conakry, and an interior that, owing to violence, volatility, and disease, is again becoming, as Graham Greene once observed, ‘blank’ and ‘unexplored.’”

⁵⁵ “Africa’s immediate future could be very bad. The coming upheaval, in which foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts, will loom large in the century we are entering.”

⁵⁶ “It is time to understand ‘the environment’ for what it is: the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh--developments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts--will be the core foreign-policy challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interests left over from the Cold War.”

⁵⁷ “Of the approximately 12 million people worldwide whose blood is HIV-positive, 8 million are in Africa. In the capital of the Ivory Coast, whose modern road system only helps to spread the disease, 10 percent of the population is HIV-positive.”

⁵⁸ “Most youths I met on the road in West Africa told me that they were from “extended” families, with a mother in one place and a father in another. Translated to an urban environment, loose family structures are largely responsible for the world’s highest birth rates and the explosion of the HIV virus on the continent.”

⁵⁹ “And war and refugee movements help the virus break through to more-remote areas of Africa. Alan Greenberg, M.D., a representative of the Centers for Disease Control in Abidjan, explains that in Africa the HIV virus and tuberculosis are now ‘fast-forwarding each other.’”

⁶⁰ Source: “2004 Report on the global AIDS epidemic” quote available at: <http://www.unaids.org/en/geographical+area/by+country/nigeria.asp>

⁶¹ Source: “2004 Report on the global AIDS epidemic” quote available at <http://www.unaids.org/en/geographical+area/by+country/togo.asp>

⁶² “The Minister’s eyes were like egg yolks, an aftereffect of some of the many illnesses, malaria especially, endemic in his country.”

⁶³ “It is malaria that is most responsible for the disease wall that threatens to separate Africa and other parts of the Third World from more-developed regions of the planet in the twenty-first century.”

⁶⁴ <http://www.childinfo.org/eddb/Malaria/trends.htm>

⁶⁵ Anna Wright Consulting. World Health Organization, UNICEF. *The World Malaria Report 2005*; “A 5-minute briefing on the World Malaria Report 2005 from WHO and UNICEF.” (http://rbm.who.int/wmr2005/pdf/adv_e.pdf)

⁶⁶ <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators.cfm?x=82&y=3&z=2>

⁶⁷ “Since 2002, the WHO Roll Back Malaria Department has systematically compiled information on malaria burden and control in a global database.” - Anna Wright Consulting. World Health Organization, UNICEF. *The World Malaria Report 2005*; “A 5-minute briefing on the World Malaria Report 2005 from WHO and UNICEF.” (http://rbm.who.int/wmr2005/pdf/adv_e.pdf)

⁶⁸ *The World Malaria Report 2005* website (<http://rbm.who.int/wmr2005/>)

⁶⁹ RBM focuses on 14 countries in Africa, out of those 14 only Benin, Ghana, and Nigeria, are applicable to this thesis. A list of the African countries which RBM had country-specific data on can be

found at "RBM Country Strategy - Count-Down towards the Abuja Targets" (<http://www.rbm.who.int/countrysupport.html>)

⁷⁰ "Because young children suffer the largest burden, malaria mortality is tracked among children aged 0 to 4, as the number of deaths per 100,000 children. Progress made in the prevention and treatment of malaria is also tracked among young children, on the basis of the percentage of children aged 0 to 4 who sleep under insecticide-treated mosquito nets and the percentage of those with fever who are treated with antimalarial drugs." - United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division. "Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, 1990-2005." p10. (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/goals_2005/goal_6.pdf)

⁷¹ Department of Health and Human Services; Center for Disease Control and Prevention. "Malaria Facts" (<http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/facts.htm>)

⁷² At least 60% according to the 2000 Abuja Summit Targets for coverage. For more information on the Summit Target, see (http://rbm.who.int/docs/abuja_brf2702.htm)

⁷³ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; National Center for Infectious Diseases, Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (<http://www.cdc.gov/travel/regionalmalaria/wafrica.htm#malariarisk>)

⁷⁴ "Malaria Country Profiles." DDC - WHO/AFRO (<http://www.afro.who.int/malaria/country-profile/index.html>)

⁷⁵ "Despite Challenges, WHO Records Steady Progress In Africa In 2004" 2005 WHO Regional Committee for Africa Press Releases. August 22, 2005.

(http://www.afro.who.int/press/2005/regionalcommittee/pr01_20050822.html)

⁷⁶ Anna Wright Consulting. World Health Organization, UNICEF. *The World Malaria Report 2005*; "A 5-minute briefing on the World Malaria Report 2005 from WHO and UNICEF." (http://rbm.who.int/wmr2005/pdf/adv_e.pdf)

⁷⁷ "Alan Greenberg, M.D., a representative of the Centers for Disease Control in Abidjan, explains that in Africa the HIV virus and tuberculosis are now 'fast-forwarding each other.' Of the approximately 4,000 newly diagnosed tuberculosis patients in Abidjan, 45 percent were also found to be HIV-positive."

⁷⁸ Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. Preface, p. xiv.

⁷⁹ Implications of West Africa broad increases in poverty can be found in such statements as: "Poverty and illiteracy are watered-down versions of what obtains in Algeria and Egypt (to say nothing of West Africa), making it that much harder for religious extremists to gain a foothold." And: "Each time I went to the Abidjan bus terminal, groups of young men with restless, scanning eyes surrounded my taxi, putting their hands all over the windows, demanding "tips" for carrying my luggage even though I had only a rucksack. In cities in six West African countries I saw similar young men everywhere--hordes of them. They were like loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a fluid that was clearly on the verge of igniting."

III.C) Point-by-Point Methodological Approach to Accuracy and Omissions

Despite the broad scope of this thesis (a direct result of the broad scope of Kaplan's work), there are many assertions within "The Coming Anarchy" that reference countries or subjects which were not addressed by either of the preceding two sections. To identify these assertions, Kaplan's work has been broken down into issue-specific statements and categorized as to belonging to the three groups focused upon in this refutation: the environment, population, and disease (appendix point-by-point).¹ As each of these issue-specific statements is being presented by Kaplan as evidence to support his anarchy thesis, it is necessary to address the factual accuracy of their content. To do so, each statement has been researched, and each claim compared with its relevant history, status, or projection, as it is presented in newspaper and journal articles, international organizations' publications and data, as well as policy and governmental papers. In addition to verifying, or refuting, these issue-specific statements, this section will also present relevant contextual and causal omissions concerning these statements and subjects that were omitted from Kaplan's work; while the purpose of assessing the accuracy of Kaplan's claims is to ensure their correctness, the purpose of presenting omitted fact is to ensure the accuracy of the context in which they are presented and the conclusions drawn from them.

Two caveats must be presented before addressing the first group of assertions. There are numerous subjective statements presented by Kaplan within "The Coming Anarchy." Although Kaplan presents these statements as evidence to support his thesis, because of their subjectivity, their verification or refutation does not contribute to this thesis. As an example of such subjectivity, with reference to urbanization in Egypt, Kaplan states, "...in Egypt, parts of whose capital city, Cairo, evince worse

crowding than I have seen even in Calcutta....”² To address an assertion that is based on what Kaplan has *seen*, or any similarly subjectivity-based assertion, despite the fact that he is presenting it as evidence towards the anarchy thesis, would provide meaningless result for this refutation.

Secondly, just as Kaplan presents subjective statements as evidence for his thesis, he also makes assertions containing unqualified terminology, which make the content of the statement meaningless to either his thesis or this refutation. These types of assertions are nearly impossible to verify or refute and as such will not be addressed here either. For example, referring to the Turkish-Iranian border Kaplan states, “people have migrated and settled in patterns that obliterate borders.”³ Without a qualified meaning for “obliterate” this statement cannot be verified, save for a declaration from these countries’ governments that the “obliteration” of their borders is in fact occurring. Nor can this statement, save for 100% certainty that all who travel between these countries do so through legitimate ports of entry, can it be refuted. Although a study could be conceived to address this type of assertion, not only do time and length limitations prohibit such an undertaking, but also due to its subject matter, the inclusion or omission of such a statement does not significantly add or detract from either this or Kaplan’s, work.⁴

III.C.i) Accuracy

As stated, the objective of this subsection is to research the accuracy of Kaplan’s assertions regarding those subjects that constitute the focus of this refutation, (the environment, population, and disease), which were not previously addressed elsewhere in this thesis.

III.C.i.a) Environment-Related Assertions

Assertions made by Kaplan regarding the environment, which were not previously addressed in this thesis, have been grouped here as belonging to one of two categories: water, and land. In this subsection, each statement within these two categories will be presented along with relevant information assessing the assertion's accurateness.

Those statements identified as belonging to the "water" category regard many different countries and regions, and refer to such extremes as deficiency and overabundance. One such overabundance statement made within "The Coming Anarchy" was, "The National Academy of Sciences reports that 'as many as one billion people, or 20 per cent of the world's population, live on lands likely to be inundated or dramatically changed by rising waters....'" Research shows that a more recent National Academy of Sciences report verifies their 1994 appraisal of the threat of rising water. The report, entitled *Abrupt Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises*, stated that "large changes in the ice sheets could affect...sea level." Despite the report's admission that "[t]here are no credible scenarios of these consequences" it did state that such change would affect "widespread regions of the globe."⁵ As further evidence of support for Kaplan's assertion regarding rising global waters, a 2005 report presented in *Ecological Restoration* states, "melting Arctic sea ice could add 6 inches to earlier estimates of a 16- to 36-inch rise in sea levels during this century."⁶

Similarly, Kaplan also presented country-specific claims about rising water levels, specifically citing Egypt and Bangladesh as at-risk areas.⁷ According to an article from the *New Scientist*, support for classifying Bangladesh as an at-risk area for flooding is not only presented by the country's historical record, where "[e]ach year roughly a fifth of Bangladesh is flooded" and "in 1988 and 1998 over two-thirds

of the country was under water at some point,”⁸ but also by “the latest climate models,” which predict that “[f]looding in the country is set to increase by up to 40 per cent this century as global temperatures rise....”⁹ Research also shows that issues regarding the Nile Delta are what makes Egypt, like Bangladesh, an “at-risk” country as well. As an article from London’s *The Guardian* states, “sea level rise compounded by subsidence in the Nile delta could reach a metre by 2100, which would submerge...a swath of the densely populated region.”¹⁰ Regardless of the speed with which such a rise might occur, the article continues, even a slow encroachment of the sea poses a threat to the region by destroying the delta’s crop fertility¹¹ via salinization.

On the opposite side of the spectrum, Kaplan’s assertions regarding water also include deficiencies. He states that such countries and regions as India, Central Asia, Saudi Arabia, and Southwest United States will experience water shortages.

Regarding India, Kaplan wrote that the country “receives 70% of its precipitation from the monsoon cycle, which planetary warming could disrupt.” Whether it is planetary warming or, as an article from *India Today* posits, warming due to “shifts in micro-climates,”¹² there is, according to *USA Today*, evidence that “temperatures in southern Asia over the past five decades are the warmest in 1,000 years,”¹³ and that, related or not, India’s monsoon cycle is disrupted. Disruption, which was described by the *Indian Express* as “[u]nprecedented floods in Mumbai; dry spell in June followed by a wet July; and again a dry August,”¹⁴ or by the *India Today* as “[o]n the one hand, excessive rains have flooded Assam, Bihar and Gujarat while a turgid Pareechu river is threatening Himachal Pradesh. And on the other, many parts of the country received deficient rainfall.”¹⁵

With as much as 60 percent of India's agricultural land being rainfed¹⁶ and as much as 70 percent of the country's population being dependent on agriculture¹⁷ the impact of erratic trends in the monsoon cycle can result in devastating effects for the country. Devastating effects such as those that occurred in 2002 when, according to the *New Scientist*, the monsoon rains fell drastically short resulting in "rainfall at between 10 and 20 per cent of the seasonal average" and India's "worst drought for more than a decade." The lack of water made rivers and reservoirs recede, cattle die "from want of fodder," and "grain, pulse, oilseed and coarse cereal crops wither and die around the country."¹⁸

Lastly regarding water shortage and India, Kaplan's statement that "[g]iven that in 2025 India's population could be close to 1.5 billion, that much of its economy rests on a shrinking natural-resource base, including dramatically declining water levels..." is, in part, supported by the results of an irrigation water supply risk analysis, presented in the *Journal of the American Water Resource Association*, which "suggest that, due to the limited water availability, restricted water infrastructure development, and rapid growth of industrial and domestic water demands, irrigation water scarcity will grow in the next 25 years" at which time "the effect of irrigation water shortage and associated risk on irrigated food production will be more serious, especially in...India."¹⁹

Kaplan also asserts that in "the twenty-first century water will be in dangerously short supply in such diverse locales as Saudi Arabia, Central Asia, and the southwestern United States." Regarding the United States, such a statement finds support in an article from *The Christian Science Monitor* written by Pat M. Holt, former chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Citing depletions of the Rio Grande, the Ogallala Aquifer, the Colorado River, and elsewhere, Holt writes,

“rainfall is insufficient to maintain a balance. Rivers are running dry,” and that the water sources in Southern California are so low that the area “doesn't have nearly enough to support its population.”²⁰ Similarly, an article in Montreal's *The Gazette* also supports that there is a risk of water shortage in the US by stating that “[g]roundwater is under such a strain in the U.S. Midwest that the water table is declining by three metres per decade.”²¹

From these same two articles, support for claims that Saudi Arabia will experience water shortages can also be found. Citing a UN report, the *Gazette* article states that reductions in groundwater levels could be catastrophic for the country, considering that “[a]bout 96 per cent of Saudi Arabia's water... comes from below ground....”²² Holt emphasizes the future risk of Saudi Arabia's water troubles by making reference to the trend of water shortages in the country's and the region's history by describing one of the more unusual proposals to alleviate the water problem in the region, “[a]t one time...there was a serious suggestion that Antarctic icebergs be wrapped in plastic and towed to Saudi Arabia.”²³ Lastly, an article from the *Journal of Water Resources Planning & Management* elaborates on the specific threats climate change and water shortages could hold for the region, “[c]limate change is expected to further exacerbate existing water shortages in the region, with a maximum 15% decline in available water and a 5% increase in agricultural demand predicted for 2020.”²⁴

There is also support for the claim that there will be water shortages in Central Asia, the third region included in Kaplan's, above-referenced, “[i]n the twenty-first century” statement. Specifically, a 2004 *Journal of International Affairs* article references changes in the ice caps of the Pamir Mountains, the seasonal thawing of which “feed the Vakhsh, Bartang, Kowchek, and Vakhan tributaries, and eventually

the Panj River.” Changes that, according to the Journal, are resulting in “frequent, drought and high temperatures...in the shadow of the Hindu Kush and Pamir ranges of Central Asia.”²⁵ Similarly, a 2004 World Watch Update states that decreases in the Aral Sea, decrease of “more than 40 feet” or “two-thirds of its water,” have prompted a World Bank operation to construct “an eight-mile dike to restore the northern part of the sea.”²⁶

Kaplan’s environment-related assertions regarding water deficiencies emphasize, implicitly or explicitly, conflict resulting over shortages. Two such conflicts explicitly mentioned in “The Coming Anarchy” were between Hungary and Slovakia, and Egypt and Ethiopia. Regarding Hungary and Slovakia Kaplan stated, “[e]ven in Europe tensions have arisen between Hungary and Slovakia over the damming of the Danube....” It is correct that “tensions” surround the damming of the Danube. These tensions have come to form in street protests,²⁷ in negotiations before the European Community, in a case before the International Court of Justice in the Hague, nearly came to form through violence when Hungarian extremist elements “spoke of blowing up the obstructing dam,”²⁸ and even received protests from other governments like “Romania, the United States, and the European Union.”²⁹ The author of a 1992 article from *The New Republic* even goes further than the word “tension” by making reference to the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand stating, “history shows that pooh-poohing local strife in this part of the world is not wise...”³⁰

Regarding potential conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia, Kaplan stated, “war could erupt between Egypt and Ethiopia over Nile River water.” Considering, as an article from *The Journal of Modern African Studies* does, that “Egypt has never hesitated to use the threat of war to prevent upstream countries from taking actions that might adversely affect the lives of all Egyptians,”³¹ there is support for the

assertion that there is the potential of conflict between Egypt, for which, according to *The Wall Street Journal*, the Nile is its “sole water source, and 95% of its 61 million people live along the river,”³² and Ethiopia, which, according to *Africa Analysis*, “supplies 86% of the Nile water reaching Egypt.”³³ From recent history, examples of Egypt’s threats of war regarding the Nile were not only projected against Ethiopia, as in 1997 when “Muhammed Al-Amir Othman, executive director of the Aswan dam” warned that a “breach of the 1959 [Nile Water Agreement] treaty is like a breach of our border,”³⁴ but also against other countries along the Nile, such as Kenya when in 2004 “Egypt’s water resources minister, Mahmoud Abu Zeid, announced that Kenya had issued a ‘declaration of war’ against Egypt in demanding that the 1929 Nile Basin Treaty be scrapped.”³⁵

Kaplan’s environment-related statements grouped in this subsection as belonging to the “land” category are with reference to China, India, and Pakistan. Regarding China, Kaplan stated that “...per capita availability of arable land in interior China has rapidly declined....” This assertion, despite a FAO-estimated 4.2 percent increase in the amount of overall agricultural area in China since 1990,³⁶ finds support from the findings of a report by the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The report found, according to *The People’s Daily*, that by 2030 China’s “per capita water-resource and arable land will shrink to some 1760 cubic meters and 1.1 Mu respectively, all approaching towards the international alert line.”³⁷

Similarly, support in the form of per capita data can also be found for Kaplan’s assertion regarding India, about which he states, “India’s oft-trumpeted Green Revolution has been achieved by overworking its croplands and depleting its watershed.” A report in the New York edition of *India Abroad* describes the status of India’s per capita cropland as follows:

The continuing shrinkage of cropland per person now threatens India's food security. In 1960, each Indian had an average of 0.21 hectares of grainland. By 1999, the average had dropped to 0.10 hectares per person, or less than half as much. And by 2050, it is projected to shrink to a meager 0.07 hectares per person. At this point, an Indian family of five will have to produce its wheat or rice on 0.35 hectares of land.³⁸

Not only is India's cropland "shrinking" but also, according to a study presented in *The World Bank Research Observer* "...since the advent of the Green Revolution...intensification, especially in the wheat-rice system, resulted in resource degradation in both [India's and Pakistan's] Punjabs."³⁹ Regarding Kaplan's "watershed" comment, according to a report issued by India's Ministry of Environment and Forests, in acknowledgment of the depletion of the Indian watershed in 2001 the Indian Government established the "'Common Approach to Watershed Programmes of the country'...being implemented through the relevant Ministries of Agriculture, Rural Development, Environment and Forests and other relevant institutions."⁴⁰

With reference to land in Pakistan, Kaplan paints a picture of an irrigation-dependent country by stating that "...65% of its land [is] dependent on intensive irrigation," a picture that is supported by other sources. Specifically, a 2003 FAO technical paper not only stated that "Pakistan agriculture is predominantly irrigated" by "one of the largest integrated irrigation networks in the world," but also that "about 79 percent of the total wheat crop," the country's leading food grain, "comes from irrigated fields."⁴¹ Similarly, a 2002 article from *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, states that in "Pakistan's Punjab province, the agriculturally dominant province in the country...that is often described as Pakistan's breadbasket. Over 80% of the cropped area of the province is irrigated."⁴²

Lastly, regarding environment-related land issues in Pakistan, Kaplan claimed that the country is experiencing “wide scale deforestation.” A paper submitted to the twelfth World Forestry Congress, held in Quebec in 2003, supports this assertion stating, “Pakistan faces immense problems of deforestation and forest degradation. Less than five percent of its total area is under forests. The rate of deforestation of 1.5% is very high and alarming.”⁴³ This assessment is confirmed by the Sustainable Development Department of the FAO, which even goes so far as to state that Pakistan’s forests are “near extinction.”⁴⁴

III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions

Kaplan made global, regional, and country-specific demographic/population-related statements in “The Coming Anarchy” that were not addressed elsewhere in this thesis. Beginning with global, this sub-section will address each of these assertions.

The global statements made by Kaplan regard world population, and population growth in poorer regions of the world. Kaplan’s statement that “Over the next fifty years the earth’s population will soar from 5.5 billion to more than nine billion” is easily verified by referencing either the US Census Bureau’s International Data Base or the UN’s World Population Prospects. With population projections of 9,224,375,956⁴⁵ and 9,075,903,000,⁴⁶ respectively, both organizations affirm that the total midyear population for the world in 2050 is indeed projected to “more than nine billion.” The accuracy of Kaplan’s other demographic/population-related global assertion, that “...95 percent of the population increase will be in the poorest regions of the world,” is explored here by contrasting the 2050-projected population of the world’s more developed regions against that of the world’s less developed regions. With a projected population for the more developed regions at 1,236,200,000, and


7,839,702,000 for the less developed,⁴⁷ referencing the total population above one can see that 86% of the projected population growth is expected to occur within the less developed regions of the world. Assuming that the majority of the population growth in both the more, and less, developed regions is occurring among the less wealthy segments of society, an assumption, which follows the usual demographic trend, Kaplan's 95%, may not be too far off from 2050's projected reality.

Regional demographic/population-related assertions made by Kaplan regard West Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Arab world. Despite the abundant amount of population data already presented about West Africa, there were some statements made by Kaplan concerning the region that were not addressed above. Such statements like, "In cities in six West African countries I saw similar young men everywhere--hordes of them," where Kaplan implies that the age distribution of the region's population is composed highly of young males. To determine the accuracy of this implication the demographic tool of a population pyramid can be used to convey the age distribution of the eight West African countries upon which this thesis focuses; (Kaplan does not identify his "six West African countries" by name). From reviewing these population pyramids for the region, for both 1994 (the year that "The Coming Anarchy" was published) and 2005 (appendix chart 19), not only is it clear that there is a large population of young men and over all youth within these countries (in proportion to the older segments of their societies), but also, as indicated by the wide bases of these pyramids, it is apparent that the youth will form a considerable proportion of these countries populations for the foreseeable future.

Another population-related statement that Kaplan makes with regard to West Africa refers to population density and the way in which density and political borders, in his opinion, are not mutually reflective; or in his words:

Part of West Africa's quandary is that although its population belts are horizontal, with habitation densities increasing as one travels south away from the Sahara and toward the tropical abundance of the Atlantic littoral, the borders erected by European colonialists are vertical, and therefore at cross-purposes with demography...


To assess the accuracy of this horizontal populations/vertical borders statement one can, as Kaplan supposedly did,⁴⁸ compare a West Africa political map to a satellite map⁴⁹ depicting the population density for the region (right). Such an exercise does make it apparent that there are, what could be called, gaps in the population density, especially on what appears to be the northern boarder of Cote d'Ivoire (circled). Similarly, the population distribution over the coastal areas of Togo, Benin, and southwestern Nigeria does appear to "cross over" the boarders of those countries (dashed circle).



Kaplan's statements regarding the region of Sub-Saharan Africa refer to population growth and the arguably related subject of polygamy. Kaplan's population growth reference specifically targets urban growth for the entire area of Sub-Saharan Africa, which was not addressed in the above urbanization section. Kaplan ominously wrote, "the cities keep growing"⁵⁰ to convey his assertion that there is a consistent trend of urban growth in the region. Although data does support that overall population growth in the urban centers of sub-Saharan Africa is indeed increasing,

verifying Kaplan's limited comment that the "cities keep growing," the Population Reference Bureau's 2005 World Population Data Sheet reminds us that there is still a large rural population in Sub-Saharan Africa (below).

Regarding polygamy in the region, Kaplan states, "...polygamy continues to thrive in sub-Saharan Africa even though it is increasingly uncommon in Arab North Africa." The assertion that polygamy is more common in sub-Saharan Africa than it is in North Africa is verified by



the UN's publication *The World's Women 1995: Trends and Statistics*, which cites that, with the exception of Madagascar, the percentage of married women living in polygamy for those sub-Saharan countries surveyed was substantially higher than the surveyed area of Northern Africa (appendix table 7).

The last region about which Kaplan makes demographic/population-related assertions is the Arab world.⁵¹ About the region, Kaplan states that the countries of the Arab world are experiencing "...mass migrations into the cities," that the region has "a soaring birth rate of more than 3.2 percent" which will result in the doubling of the populations of "many Arab countries" in "the next twenty years."⁵²

To examine Kaplan’s “mass migrations into the cities” statement, a multi-step endeavor was undertaken. First, the estimated figures for both the urban and rural population for all countries that comprise the Arab world were assembled from UN data. Second, this urban and rural data was then compared against each other for each country to determine if indeed there was a sudden spike in urban population growth and a sudden decrease in rural population, as one would expect would to occur in the event of an in-country rural-to-urban mass migration like Kaplan implies (appendix chart 20). However, although the charts do reveal steadily increasing urban populations, for which natural population growth has to be assumed to be a great contributor, for the most part no such spike or decrease is immediately evident from such a comparison. As a result of this lack of a graphically observable mass-migration a third step was undertaken. In an attempt to discover periods of high urban population growth over a short period of time as, again, would be indicative of a mass migration, the percent change in urban population growth for each five-year segment was calculated and analyzed (appendix table 8). Interestingly, what this analysis revealed was that many of these countries had experienced the height of their urban population increases as far as 50 years ago (identified in the table by yellow highlight) and many of these countries have actually been experiencing steady *decreases* in their growth rates (identified in the table by blue highlight). In fact, only four countries in the Arab world have shown urban population trends which could be loosely interpreted as “mass migration.” Opposed to the other countries of the Arab world, which have exhibited declines in the increases of their urban population growth, these four countries, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen, have each experienced increases in their urban population growth percentages since the early to mid 1980s (identified in the table by tan highlight). From this analysis, it appears that the quantifiable data

does not support Kaplan's assertion that there was a mass migration into the cities of the Arab world around the 1990's, or today. In fact, the overwhelming majority of these countries have been experiencing decreases in their rates of urban population growth.

Another interesting fact reveals itself when analyzing the data applicable to Kaplan's statement that the Arab world has "a soaring birth rate of more than 3.2 percent." Specifically, Kaplan's use of the word "soaring" is slightly misleading for, although he may consider the population of the region to be "soaring," the birth rates for countries in the Arab world have been decreasing in the region since the 1950s and 1960s (appendix table 9a, note that Kaplan's cited 3.2% is per 100). Obviously, these per-country decreases have had the cumulative impact of a declining birth rate for the entire region (appendix table 9c) which inexorably affects Kaplan's statement that in "next twenty years, at current growth rates, the population of many Arab countries will double." According to present day growth rates only one country's (or rather territory's) population is projected to double in the next twenty years. Additionally, average-doubling time for the region is 34 years (appendix table 10).

The several country-specific demographic/population-related statements which Kaplan makes in "The Coming Anarchy," that are to be addressed here, regard the countries of Sierra Leone, the Cote d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Brazil, China, India, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan.

When researching Kaplan's statement regarding Sierra Leone, about which he asserts that "400,000 Sierra Leonians are internally displaced," an unfortunate fact is discovered. Not only were nearly half a million Sierra Leonians internally displaced in 1994, but also, since Kaplan's statement many more have become displaced. According to the CIA Fact Book:

The 1991 to 2002 civil war between the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and the displacement of more than 2 million people (about one-third of the population), many of whom are now refugees in neighboring countries.”⁵³

Related to population migration, conflict caused or otherwise, and with reference to another West African country, Kaplan states that in Cote d’Ivoire “between a third and a half of the country’s population is now non-Ivorian....” Although Kaplan’s 1994 references are unavailable for comparison, the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, puts the current status of non-Ivorian Africans living in Cote d’Ivoire at around five million and the non-African expatriate community at “roughly 20,000 French and possibly 100,000 Lebanese.” With a current population of 18,154,000,⁵⁴ the non-Ivorian population in Cote d’Ivoire today appears to be closer to 28%. It should also be noted that the Bureau of Public Affairs states that “As of mid-November 2004, thousands of expatriates, African and non-African, had fled from the violence in Cote d’Ivoire,”⁵⁵ an unfortunate reality which further reduces this figure.

Among Kaplan’s many population growth statements, he cites Indonesia, Brazil, and Nigeria as having “soaring populations.”⁵⁶ The fact is, however, that two of these three countries, Indonesia at a 1.13% population growth rate and Brazil at a 1.26% population growth rate, have rates below that of the 1.34% average for a country within the Less Developed Regions of the world. With a 2.09% growth rate Nigeria, however, towers over this average.

Population migration and population growth are the subjects of Kaplan’s statements regarding China within “The Coming Anarchy.” He states that the country is projected to have “a population of 1.54 billion by the year 2025” and that within it “...large scale population movements are underway, from inland...to coastal...”

With current projections placing China's 2025 population at 1,441,426,000,⁵⁷ Kaplan's 1.54 projection is close to accurate. Similarly, there is much support for his statement regarding the country's internal migration patterns. A report presented at the 2005 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regional Conference on Migration and Development in Asia identifies the trends of, and policy concerns regarding, the type of migration Kaplan refers to:

The most populous nation of the world, China also experiences the most extensive internal migration today. In 2003, the so-called floating population, i.e. people who are not permanently registered in their current place of residence, reached 140 million, most of them rural labourers moving from the countryside to cities and coastal areas. For instance, as many as 114 million rural labourers participated in internal migration in 2003. Such internal rural labour migration and related issues, especially regarding poverty reduction, has become one of most significant research and policy concerns in China in recent years.⁵⁸

Urban growth and ethnic composition, not internal migration, are the demographical subjects of Kaplan's statements regarding Turkey in "The Coming Anarchy." Addressing urban growth in the country, Kaplan writes, "In 1980, 44 percent of Turks lived in cities; in 1990 it was 61 percent. By the year 2000, the figure is expected to be 67 percent. Villages are emptying out..." With slight variation, according to the UN Population Division, Kaplan's 1980 (43.8%) and 1990 (59.2%) figures are correct. However, his year 2000 figure of 67% is slightly higher than the actual figure for Turkey's 2000 urban population, 64.7%.⁵⁹ Despite this difference, the assumed general point, which Kaplan is trying to make, that the percentage of Turkey's population residing in urban areas is steadily increasing relative to its rural population, is correct. Similarly, in his assertion about the ethnic composition of Turkey vis-à-vis Kurds that, "[a]bout half of the world's 20 million Kurds live in 'Turkey'" is, according to the Federations for American Scientists, also correct.⁶⁰

The final country-specific demographic/population-related assertions made by Kaplan that are to be addressed here are relatively simple to verify. Regarding population projections for India, Kaplan states that “in 2025 India’s population could be close to 1.5 billion.” Based on current projections India’s 2025 population is expected to be about 1.39 billion.⁶¹ Similarly, regarding population growth in Pakistan, Kaplan writes that in 1994 the country had a “population growth of 2.7%.” According to the UN Population Division, the population growth rate for Pakistan for 1990 – 1995 was 2.42%, a rate that has since decreased to 2.04% in 2005.⁶²

III.C.i.c) Disease-Related Assertions

Although the disease-related assertions made by Kaplan to be discussed here regard those same diseases discussed in the West Africa section above, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, this section concentrates on statements about those diseases that were not addressed elsewhere in this refutation.

In addition to stating that polygamy is “largely responsible for the world’s highest birth rates” (addressed above) Kaplan also asserts that the practice is largely responsible for “the explosion of the HIV virus on the continent.”⁶³ Such a view is supported by many, from academics to officials of governmental and non-governmental organizations, who are active in the battle against HIV/AIDS.

Within the African continent, support for the claim that polygamy contributes to the spread of HIV/AIDS comes from such countries and offices like, Swaziland’s Ministry of Health, where representative of which stated that “[t]raditional practices such as polygamy have contributed to the spread of the virus,”⁶⁴ from a report out of Nigeria’s Department of Community Medicine, College of Medicine, which concluded that “[t]he government should place a ban on polygamy because of the

HIV/AIDS scourge,”⁶⁵ out of Uganda, where the Minister of Labor and Industrial Relations “identified polygamy as one of the causes of HIV/Aids in the country,”⁶⁶ and Malawi, where the First Lady went as far as to accuse “chiefs who promote customs like initiation and polygamy of being death mongers, saying the practices help fuel the spread of HIV/Aids.”⁶⁷

Similar conclusions are made by other national and international HIV/AIDS organizations. In Papua New Guinea, the director of the National AIDS Council Secretariat, a branch of the PNG National AIDS Council, stated that because of the combination of HIV/AIDS and polygamy “whole families could be wiped out by the deadly virus.”⁶⁸ Even a 2005 UNAIDS policy position paper, cited practices around marriage, and “harmful traditional practices” like polygamy, as part the organization’s “essential HIV prevention policy and programmatic actions” which, in addition to other gender equality, norms, and relations, need to be addressed to effectively combat HIV/AIDS globally.⁶⁹

Not only did Kaplan cite polygamy as a contributor to the spread of HIV/AIDS but, within “The Coming Anarchy,” he also asserted that “some experts worry that viral mutations and hybridizations might, just conceivably, result in a form of the AIDS virus that is easier to catch than the present strain.” Mutations are in fact a very real threat to prevailing over HIV/AIDS. This is exemplified by the February 2005, discovery of a “new strain of HIV, found in a man in New York, that leads to the rapid onset of AIDS and is resistant to virtually all known ARVs.”⁷⁰ Random mutations, like the New York case, are not the only cause these types of ARV resistant HIV strains, but also, the practices of health providers in the Third world greatly contribute to such mutations. As the *Christian Science Monitor* reports, “Public health experts have long worried about the rise of resistant strains of HIV, the

virus that causes AIDS, if medications, called antiretrovirals (ARVs), were inappropriately administered in the developing world.”⁷¹ Interestingly enough, with regard to the title of the work being refuted here, critics label such inappropriate ARV administration practices, which include not providing patients adequate information, failing to monitor patients for toxic side effects, or even failing to prescribe the full drug regimen, as therapeutic “anarchy.”⁷²

Regarding malaria, Kaplan states, “[c]arried by mosquitoes, malaria, unlike AIDS, is easy to catch. Most people in sub-Saharan Africa have recurring bouts of the disease throughout their entire lives, and it is mutating into increasingly deadly forms.” Although Kaplan makes several debate-worthy implicit and explicit claims in these two short sentences this subsection will primarily address Kaplan’s assertion regarding malaria mutation.

The research presented here shows that the mutation of malaria is in fact not only a commonality, but also proves to be very serious hindrance in the fight against the disease. Although the diseases can “easily build-up a resistance to one drug through random genetic mutations,”⁷³ malaria mutations aren’t limited to how the disease responds to drugs. In fact, according to David Nabarro, former head of the WHO’s Roll Back Malaria project, the disease mutates in response to its environment, “malaria is a very, very different disease in different settings,”⁷⁴ and even, according to the daily *International Pharma Alert*, in response to its host, “once inside the body the malaria parasite mutates and changes into a variety of different strains.”⁷⁵

The whether or not these mutations result in “increasingly deadly forms” of malaria, as Kaplan states, is debatable, but in relation to the responsiveness of drugs to the disease, there is no doubt that new strains, like the one discovered in Thailand in June 2005,⁷⁶ could be more resistant to known anti-malarials. In fact, according to

Vaccine Weekly, it was also in Thailand “that the malaria parasite first began to develop immunity to chloroquine,”⁷⁷ one of the previous champions in the fight against the disease. These Thai-originating malarial mutations have now become so common that resistance to chloroquine, up to 90% in some areas,⁷⁸ is deemed to be “widespread.”⁷⁹ A report in the *New York Times* went so far as to state that because malaria “keeps mutating to create drug-resistant strains...Chloroquine, the synthetic quinine extolled as a miracle drug 30 years ago, is now all but useless.”⁸⁰ These malarial mutations aren’t only changing the effectiveness of older anti-malarial drugs, but also newly discovered ones as well. The unfortunate reality is that, due to mutations, malaria “has developed resistance to almost every anti-malarial drug introduced in the past 30 years [and] Although atovaquone is one of the most recent drugs on the market, there is significant evidence that malaria parasites are quickly developing resistance to that drug as well.”⁸¹

The result of the developed resistance to anti-malarials has been that, again according to the *New York Times*, “[v]irtually all malaria experts agree that new malaria regimens must consist of more than one drug. Instead, they should be cocktails of two or three, as is common in AIDS and tuberculosis treatment.”⁸² However, because a “mutation resistant to one drug may affect all the drugs in its class”⁸³ rendering them all ineffective, and because the increase in the number of drugs would inevitably increase the cost of treatment, optimism for such a malaria cocktail reducing the disease in the Third world regions that Kaplan focuses upon, would be unfounded.

Other reliable sources which identify further malaria-related challenges, like the fact that from an infected mosquito “just one bite spells trouble,”⁸⁴ and that “rural people without windows or bednets may catch it [malaria] five or six times each rainy

season,”⁸⁵ affirm Kaplan’s other assertions that the disease is “easy to catch” and that “[m]ost people in sub-Saharan Africa have recurring bouts of the disease throughout their entire lives.”

Regarding tuberculosis, in “The Coming Anarchy” Kaplan quoted a Center for Disease Control representative who explained “that in Africa the HIV virus and tuberculosis are now ‘fast-forwarding each other.’”⁸⁶ This assertion, that the two afflictions are “fast-forwarding each other,” was not addressed in either of the previous sections that covered tuberculosis and HIV for West Africa. Originally, due to its vagueness, it was not fully understood what this statement meant until the research performed to address the claim showed that indeed HIV and tuberculosis do have a relationship which could be described as mutually “fast-forwarding.”

The way that HIV “fast-forwards” tuberculosis is through the concept of opportunistic infections, infections that usually do not pose a great threat to those with healthy immune systems but can be deadly to those with HIV. Because people with HIV are more susceptible to such opportunistic infections, the rise in tuberculosis is, according to the WHO, partly caused by “the AIDS pandemic.”⁸⁷ Not only is the disease “exacerbated greatly by the HIV pandemic,”⁸⁸ as some scholars say, but also, according to a *Washington Post* report on the treatment of tuberculosis, “[w]ithout the global human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) epidemic, tuberculosis incidence would be falling...the HIV epidemic is... increasing incidence of TB overall.”⁸⁹

Although the concept of infectious diseases, and how HIV is “fast-forwarding” tuberculosis is easily enough understood – that those who have weak immune systems are more susceptible to contract, and die from, certain infections than those with stronger immune systems – the relationship of how tuberculosis “fast-forwards” HIV is less obvious. The findings of a study performed by the National Institute of Health

states that “[i]n HIV-infected people who develop active tuberculosis (TB), levels of HIV in the bloodstream increase five- to 160-fold...”⁹⁰ The reason for this increase, or this “fast-forwarding” of HIV is, as the NIH report explains, “[t]he normal efforts of the immune system to mobilize itself and fight an invader may also result in the increased production of HIV...[the] active TB disease boosts HIV levels in the blood...”⁹¹

The combined result of this relationship between tuberculosis and HIV is that, as the numbers of those who have weakened immune systems increase, as is the case of those with HIV/AIDS, the number of those who are susceptible to contracting tuberculosis also increases. Similarly, once an individual with HIV contracts active tuberculosis, the level of HIV in the bloodstream increases. Therefore, as previously stated, the relationship between tuberculosis and HIV could be, as it was in “The Coming Anarchy,” described as mutually “fast-forwarding.”

Accuracy Subsection Concluding Remarks

What the above subsection reveals is that there is support for an overwhelming amount of Kaplan’s assertions within “The Coming Anarchy.” Regarding his environment-related assertions it was shown that there is support that climatic changes could alter global sea water levels affecting widespread regions of the earth’s land and costal population. In Bangladesh, there is a recent history of major flooding and such events are expected to increase this century. Egypt’s Nile Delta is also at risk of flooding. For both countries, even if complete or partial submersion were discounted as a threat, salinization of their croplands due to rises in sea levels would produce devastating effects. Conversely, water shortages have occurred elsewhere and are expected to worsen. In India, water shortages have resulted from recent erratic trends in the monsoon season. It is thought that these erratic trends are a direct result

of either global or microclimate changes which have resulted in Southern Asia being warmer in the past five decades than it has been in the past 1,000 years. In the United States, it is said that rainfall is insufficient to maintain a balance between consumption and repletion, and that in the Midwest and the Southwest, such as in Southern California, there are not enough local water resources to support their populations. In Saudi Arabia water shortage was so much of an issue that, in the 1970s, policy discussions of towing icebergs to the region were held. Similarly, substantial reductions in seasonal accumulation on the ice caps of the Pamir Mountains and related decreases in the level of the Aral Sea have been said to cause water shortages in Central Asia. Hungary and Slovakia did have tensions over the damming of the Danube. Egypt has made implicit military threats regarding Ethiopia's Nile intentions upriver by likening a breach of the Nile Water Agreement to a breach of its borders. Per capita water-resource and arable land is decreasing in China. India's land has been degraded as a result of the Green Revolution, and a governmental body has been created to address watershed issues in the country. Lastly, Pakistan's agriculture is predominantly irrigated and there has been wide-scale deforestation in the country.

What the examination of population and demographic data shows is that despite a handful of errors regarding mass migration in the Arab world, the national composition of the population of Cote d'Ivoire, and slightly overestimated population growth rates, Kaplan is overwhelmingly correct regarding his demographic/population related assertions. The world population is projected to be over nine billion by 2050, with the vast majority of the growth in the poorer regions of the world. The countries that comprise the region of West Africa do have predominantly young populations with, save war-torn Liberia, large male populations. There do appear to be patterns of population density in West Africa that "cross"

political borders. Polygamy is more common in sub-Saharan Africa than it is in North Africa, and the populations of the urban centers in the region are increasing. There are hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people in Sierra Leone. At 1.44 and 1.39 billion respectively, population projections for China and India in 2025 are close to Kaplan's stated 1.5 billion. There is a migratory trend in China from the interior to the coastal areas. And the urban centers of Turkey are increasing.

There is also much support for Kaplan's disease-related assertions as well. Polygamy is said to contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS. Evidenced by, among other things, the February 2005 discovery of a new strain of HIV, mutations of the virus do occur. Malarial mutations in response to drugs, the environment, and to its host, are a commonality and do result in new strains, like that discovered in Thailand in June 2005. The disease can be contracted through a single mosquito bite and inadequate prevention does result in individuals of Sub-Saharan Africa contracting the disease over and over again. Lastly, because of the dual phenomena of opportunistic infections and that active tuberculosis increases levels of HIV in the bloodstream, the two diseases do have a relationship that could be described as mutually "fast-forwarding."

However, the fact that external sources corroborating many of Kaplan's assertions exist, only demonstrates that *those assertions* can be considered, by some, to be "accurate" and do not in themselves contribute to the validity of the anarchy thesis. A major reason that the accuracy of Kaplan's assertions does not contribute to the anarchy thesis is that, although the individual statement may be deemed correct, there are factors surrounding the context of those statements, as well as their causal relationship to Kaplan's anarchy conclusion which were omitted in "The Coming

Anarchy.” Such factors greatly challenge the conclusion of the anarchy thesis. It is in the following subsection that the relevant of these omissions will be presented.

III.C.ii) Omissions

There are numerous relevant contextual and causal omissions within “The Coming Anarchy.” The inclusion of such omissions, not only alters the apparent accuracy of Kaplan’s individual assertions, as the contextual omissions do, but also, demonstrates the conclusions drawn from those assertions, and other aspects of the anarchy thesis, to be lacking.

III.C.ii.a) Contextual Omissions

As is known, context may dramatically change the interpretation of a statement, even though the statement itself may be technically correct. This is true regarding many of the above-mentioned assertions within “The Coming Anarchy.” This subsection addresses a few of these contextual omissions so to present a “sampling” of the general contextual omission error within “The Coming Anarchy.”

Regarding Kaplan’s environment-related assertions, there are many claims that, without the presentation of their contexts, convey a one-sided point of view regarding their subject matter. Those that will be addressed here regard water-motivated interstate conflict, water shortage, climate change, and select land issues.

Regarding Kaplan’s assertion that interstate conflicts may result from water shortages, the following contextual issues must also be acknowledged. First, regarding Kaplan’s example of looming interstate conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia, one of the many contextual omissions in this situation is that Ethiopia’s development of a voice with regard to the distribution of the Nile is a sign of

increasing development for the country itself; as an article from the Wall Street Journal states:

Though downstream, Egypt dominates the Nile and uses the lion's share of its water. Yet Egypt's water has been relatively secure because its African neighbors were economic basket cases, embroiled in civil wars and too weak to control or dam tributaries. But that's no longer true. Ethiopia, with its civil war over, is awakening economically.⁹²

In short, the fact that Egypt may have to renegotiate its treaties regarding the Nile could be interpreted as evidence of development in its neighbors and therefore could be regarded as a positive event. Without this contextual information though, disputes over the distribution of the Nile could be, as Kaplan does, presented as a situation containing only negative factors.

Second, regarding Kaplan's example of "tensions" between Hungary and Slovakia, a much more obvious contextual omission, presents itself. There is a deep political history between these two countries which was only addressed by Kaplan in the following way: "Even in Europe tensions have arisen between Hungary and Slovakia over the damming of the Danube, a classic case of how environmental disputes fuse with ethnic and historical ones." However, a more thorough review of the historical context between Hungary and Slovakia, vis-à-vis the Danube, makes some reject that water was an issue at all, as an article from the *UNESCO Courier* stated, "this case was about politics, not water."⁹³ Based on this contextual information, one could posit that to say the tensions between Hungary and Slovakia were about water would be similar to saying that the 1969 war between Honduras and El Salvador was about soccer.

A last, and very important, point regarding contextual omissions and water-shortage-related interstate conflict that Kaplan failed to include in "The Coming Anarchy" is that, according to the Environmental Change and Security Program of the

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “[n]o nations have gone to war specifically over water resources for thousands of years.”⁹⁴

There are other, not conflict related, contextual factors that Kaplan omits in his assertions regarding water shortage as well. The first of these regards the context of cooperation, and its benefits, in dealing with shortage-related challenges. Using Kaplan’s Egypt and Ethiopia example, cooperation between the two countries, and indeed all the riparian countries of the Nile, was exhibited prior to his 2001 publication of *The Coming Anarchy* and is described in the publication *Africa Analysis* as follows:

...the 1999 Nile Basin Initiative, known as Nile 2020...set out, with a remarkable degree of apparent co-operation, to promote the sustainable development of the Nile and to safeguard its future. According to the initiative, Nile Basin countries would collaborate to introduce initiatives to increase water resources. No water project in any one country should threaten the water supplies of any other. Nile 2020, it was said, could bolster hydro-power and food production while improving transportation, industry and trade for all riparian states. At the same time, it would conserve the Nile environment, including Lake Victoria and the vast wetlands of the Sudd in southern Sudan.⁹⁵

Similar water-shortage cooperation is forming with reference to Kaplan’s Central Asia example as well, as described by the *Economist*:

Kazakhstan has recently agreed to start paying Kirgizstan for the maintenance of dams and reservoirs on the Chuy River. This may set a precedent for similar agreements on the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, although Uzbekistan remains opposed to anything of the sort. At the local level, water-user associations responsible for the management and maintenance of irrigation canals have been set up with foreign help. These associations also collect fees from farmers for this service, a first for the region. Similar structures have been set up for drinking water.⁹⁶

In fact, from 1945 –1999, again according to the Environmental Change and Security Program, “instances of cooperation between river-sharing nations outnumbered conflicts by more than two to one.”⁹⁷ Examples of such cooperation can be found between such countries as Israel and Palestine, Israel and Jordan, India and

Pakistan, all 10 countries that share the Nile Basin, many Southern African countries, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand.⁹⁸ However, by omitting such contextual information regarding the history of cooperative agreements between river-sharing nations, as occurred within “The Coming Anarchy,” one could present multiple state dependence on a single water source as purely ominous.

Other contextual factors omitted from “The Coming Anarchy” that regard water shortages reference managerial and technological, not environmental, issues. As the *Economist* stated regarding management for Central Asia, “[t]here would be no shortage of water in Central Asia if it were properly managed.”⁹⁹ Or as an article from the *Financial Times* states regarding desalinization technology, “[m]ore than Dollars 70bn (Pounds 38bn) will be spent worldwide over the next two decades on desalination plants and equipment....¹⁰⁰ Although this 70 billion figure was only recently disclosed by the US Department of Energy’s Sandia National Laboratories,¹⁰¹ therefore could not have been included in “The Coming Anarchy,” presenting water shortage assertions without the issue’s technological context, as Kaplan does, is misleading.

Last, with regard to Kaplan’s water-related assertions, is the indirectly associated issue of what Kaplan refers to as “planetary warming.” Kaplan’s statements about water shortages in Central Asia, rising sea levels, and changing monsoon cycles in India are all, according to Kaplan, associated with increases in the global temperature. However, Kaplan fails to convey the context of this issue by not addressing either the contribution that developed countries’ consumptions habits add to global warming, or the fact that the fates of such places like Bangladesh and the Nile Delta are intertwined with the decisions made by such actors. As the author of an article from the London *Guardian* states with reference to climate talks at the Hague in 2000:

Countries which stand to suffer most if the Hague meeting fails are those with the smallest voice. Islands in danger of being submerged, from the Pacific to the Caribbean, may make eloquent appeals; Egypt, Bangladesh and Vietnam may remind the world that the lives of billions will be defined by these talks. But in the end, the fate of such countries lies in the hands of the polluters. The UK produces as much carbon as the whole of Africa.¹⁰²

Moving from water to land assertions, technological context is also omitted when Kaplan presents environment-related statements regarding cropland issues. When discussing per capita arable land Kaplan fails to mention that advances in agricultural technologies have reduced the amount of cropland needed per person. For example an article from the *Washington Post* states,

In the past two generations, the amount of cropland cultivated per person in America has fallen by half, even as Americans eat better and export more...as a result of more efficient methods of raising feed grains as well as in the use of that feed by livestock, 50 million acres have been spared in the United States alone, an area equal to one and a half times the entire state of Iowa -- or 24 Yellowstone National Parks. The adoption of intensive technologies by wheat growers in India has spared 100 million acres of land since the 1960s that otherwise would have been needed for new production. Much the same argument can be made about genetically modified crops, which have...the potential to...spare more land by increasing yields.¹⁰³

But technology isn't the only contextual omission Kaplan makes regarding croplands. With specific reference to China, the country that Kaplan's per capita comment was directed towards, markets could prove to be an answer to any land, or even water, resource issue the country may encounter in the future. As a report from the research Chinese Academy of Sciences recommended, the effective way to alleviate the countries agricultural problems is to "...improve the utility of the current water and land resources by making full use of the markets, both domestic and international.¹⁰⁴ By omitting completely the context of, among other things, technology and markets, Kaplan's land-related assertions, although they may be in

themselves correct, Kaplan only presented one version of potential agricultural challenges.

The contextual omissions regarding agricultural and water issues are equally applicable to Kaplan's demographic/population-related assertions. Because the implicit threat of increased population is a lack of resources to accommodate that population's needs, omitting technological issues regarding things that would make such accommodation possible, like increased agriculture production and advances in water desalinization processes, does not convey the contextual reality of the situation.

Also regarding demographic/population-related assertions, Kaplan omits the aid of international organizations or international efforts with response refugees. As was evidenced with the 2004 earthquake and resulting tsunami in the Indian Ocean, and the 2005 earthquake in South Asia, although there may be some debate with regard to the effectiveness of international cooperation, it cannot be plausibly said that all of the victims of these natural disasters were left entirely to their own devices to ensure their survival. Although these two events happened after Kaplan's *The Coming Anarchy*, it is a contextual omission of the work to not include the expected efforts of international cooperation, or at least the response of international actors such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or the International Red Cross, when discussing catastrophe-resultant refugees.

Lastly, with regard demographic/population-related assertions, Kaplan omitted to place population growth rates and birth rates for West Africa into context by not stating that these rates' trends are in decline. This omission, and Kaplan's brief 2001 response to it in the forward of *The Coming Anarchy*, has been discussed elsewhere in in this thesis and therefore will not be repeated here (see the "population" subsection

in the “Quantitative West Africa” section, and the “accuracy” subsection in this section for more information).

There are also contextual omissions with regard to Kaplan’s disease-related assertions. Regarding HIV/AIDS, some of Kaplan’s contextual omissions are with reference to transmission of the HIV virus. Although polygamy may be considered by some to increase HIV transmission, not only are there many other factors regarding transmission, like “religion, wealth, age at sexual debut, and self-perceived risk of HIV infection,”¹⁰⁵ which Kaplan did not discuss in “The Coming Anarchy,” but also, there are contextual factors concerning polygamy itself which Kaplan omitted. For example, a Harvard University study that examined risk factors for extramarital sex among Nigerian men found that the extramarital sex and, therefore, the likelihood of HIV transmission, varies depending on the number of wives a polygamist man had: “Logistic regression models showed that men with 3 or more wives were at the greatest risk for extramarital sex, followed by monogamous men, when compared with men with 2 wives,” wrote T.M. Mitsunaga and colleagues at Harvard University.”¹⁰⁶

Regarding Kaplan’s malaria assertions, some contextual omissions are with reference to mutations, medical advances, and drug policy. Although it is accurate for Kaplan to state that malaria is mutating into “increasingly deadly forms” – if one reads “increasingly deadly” to mean “increasingly drug resistant forms” as the previous subsection has – a contextual omission regarding mutations is that mutations benefit as well as hinders the fight against disease. In fact, “[v]irtually all vaccines -- polio, mumps, measles and rubella (German measles) -- have been fashioned by mutating disease microbes to induce defenses in humans,”¹⁰⁷ and a similar strategy is what some hope will lead to the discovery of malarial vaccine as well.

Medical advances are another area of context that Kaplan omits in his pessimistic reporting on malaria, as well as the other diseases. Although the 2005 research from Dartmouth Medical School that discovered “how malaria parasites form mutations that make them stubbornly resistant to drug therapy,” which “may hold the key” for new treatments for the disease,¹⁰⁸ was after the publication of either Kaplan’s article or book, to omit the possibility of medical advances against the disease again presents only a one-sided point of view, and does not, like Kaplan’s other omissions, present the true context of the situation.

The last contextual omission that Kaplan made regarding malaria in “The Coming Anarchy,” to be discussed here, is with reference to his statements about the prevalence of malaria in West Africa¹⁰⁹ and the Third World.¹¹⁰ Although Kaplan belabors the point that malaria is widespread in the Third World, he omits the external context for why the disease is so prevalent in Africa and other Less Developed countries. Quoting Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University’s Center for International Development, an article from *Vaccine Weekly* sheds light on the context for malaria’s pervasiveness in the Third World: “With more than 90 percent of the cases occurring in the poorest parts of Africa, there is no financial incentive for international drug companies to pursue costly research.”¹¹¹ A Washington Post article also contributes to the development of the context, which Kaplan omitted, by stating, “a major reason for the recent increase in malaria is a failing drug policy.”¹¹² The result of these two factors – the lack of the development of an effective inexpensive anti-malarial, possibly related to low incentives for drug companies to perform the necessary research to develop one, and a drug policy which is unable to remedy the problem – is that countries of the Third World are forced to use existent inexpensive drugs which are also known to contribute to the increase of resistant strains; for example, an article

from the *New York Times* states, “Chloroquine costs only 20 cents and, to the dismay of health experts, is still bought by poor Africans because it is cheap and temporarily lowers fevers, even as it helps spread chloroquine-resistant strains.”¹¹³ Complex issues like these, that form only part of the context of malaria in the Third World, are completely omitted by Kaplan’s simple causation: “The deforestation has led to soil erosion, which has led to more flooding and more mosquitoes. Virtually everyone in the West African interior has some form of malaria.”

Not only does the presentation of these few contextual omissions by Kaplan alter the interpretations of many of his previously addressed, otherwise factually accurate, statements, but also, by introducing alternate points of view regarding such things as agriculture and water, these contextual omissions even challenge the basis of Kaplan’s resource scarcity/conflict argument. To oversimplify the issue – if there is no shortage, there is no conflict over resources, no scarcity-related migration, no resource-refugee-related clash of cultures, no scarcity-related obliteration of borders, etc.

III.C.ii.b) Causal Omissions and Unanswered Questions

The causal omissions to be addressed here are presented in three related but separate groups. The first, addresses causal omissions with regard to the environmental debates’ “third wave” scholars; the second, addresses causal omissions specifically with reference to some of Kaplan’s assertions; and the third addresses causal omissions between Kaplan’s “evidence” and his conclusions.

The first group of omissions is embodied in the literature of the environmental security debates’ “waves” (first introduced in this refutation in the “Direct Criticism” subsection, see page 41, footnote 75). Briefly, the “waves” of the environmental security debate are as follows: The “first wave” “argued for a broad redefinition of

security [and] sought to place the physical health of the individual or the society, rather than just the territory of the state, at the center of what was to be secured,”¹¹⁴ (e.g. Jessica Tuchman Matthews). The “second wave,” “narrowed the scope to focus on environmental stress that causes or triggers violence”¹¹⁵ (e.g. Homer-Dixon and Kaplan). Lastly, the “third wave,” “now seeks to examine why the environment contributes to conflict in specific cases but not in others”¹¹⁶ (e.g. State Failure Task Force). It is within the “third waves” response to the second, where causal omissions relating to the types of assertions made by Kaplan are identified. A few of these omissions are:

- In conflict areas there are often other, more convincing explanations, for their beginnings than the environment or population growth.
- Not all areas with environmental problems or high population growth fall into conflict.
- There are so many intervening variables that it is difficult to see the independent contribution of the environmental and demographic ones.

Associated with this first group of omissions, as well as with some of the above listed contextual ones, the second group of causal omission presented here regard specific assertions within “The Coming Anarchy,” with reference to the relationships between what has brought about the salient result of the subjects he addresses. In the form of questions, just a few of these omissions are as follows:

- Is urban population growth the problem in developing countries or is the problem one of civil planning?
- Is the environment exclusively responsible for water shortages or, as mentioned in the Central Asia example, is poor water management to blame?
- Is population growth in developing countries a problem or is it an issue of gender inequality and empowerment?
- Is deforestation an environmental security concern or is the problem more reflective of a lack of economic development or corruption issues that motivate and permit illegal logging to continue?

- Are the salient features of “The Coming Anarchy,” (the pervasiveness of disease, widespread poverty, etc.) the problem, or is it a problem of media-encouraged, developed countries’ prejudiced and xenophobic perceptions contributing to isolationist apathy to the plight of fellow human beings in developing countries?

The third group of Kaplan’s causal omissions is with regard to the conclusions within the “The Coming Anarchy.” Throughout the work, Kaplan draws conclusions from subjective information without presenting a credible causal relationship between them.¹¹⁷ This is nowhere more evident than in his conclusion regarding West Africa the rest of the world.

Within “The Coming Anarchy,” Kaplan asserted that the state of the West African region, and other less developed regions belabored by environmental and demographic challenges, was the precursor to the future state of the rest of the world.¹¹⁸ He did this explicitly through such statements as, “...West Africa’s future, eventually, will also be that of most of the rest of the world.” And, “Africa suggests what war, borders, and ethnic politics will be like a few decades hence.” However, although Kaplan did mention facts such as population growth in India and China, and deforestation in Pakistan, he omitted the presentation of a causal relationship between the state of West Africa, and the future state of the rest of the world. He instead made leaps from events in West Africa, and elsewhere, to the future of other countries, such as: “[i]n Abidjan, effectively the capital of the Cote d’Ivoire, or Ivory Coast, restaurants have stick- and gun-wielding guards who walk you the fifteen feet or so between your car and the entrance, giving you an eerie taste of what American cities might be like in the future.” And, “[t]he intense savagery of the fighting in such diverse cultural settings as Liberia, Bosnia, the Caucasus, and Sri Lanka--to say nothing of what obtains in American inner cities--indicates something very troubling....” In these statements, and others throughout “The Coming Anarchy,”

Kaplan explicitly presents links between West Africa and the future state of the world without also identifying a causal relationship between the two.

Like Kaplan's contextual omissions not only do these causal omissions presented here, those identified by the "third wave," those that apply directly to his factual assertions, and those that apply to the conclusions within the "The Coming Anarchy," challenge the basis of his anarchy argument, but are also merely examples of the numerous others omissions that exist within his work.

III.C.iii) III.C. Footnotes

- ¹ Although it is acknowledged that there are other statements made by Kaplan in “The Coming Anarchy” that do not belong to the categories of the environment, population, and disease, such as those which refer to crime, religion and ethnicity, and government control, these statements are not addressed here due to time and length limitations.
- ² “While the world has focused on religious perversity in Algeria, a nation rich in natural gas, and in Egypt, parts of whose capital city, Cairo, evince worse crowding than I have seen even in Calcutta, Turkey has been living through the Muslim equivalent of the Protestant Reformation.”
- ³ “In such a moonscape, over which peoples have migrated and settled in patterns that obliterate borders, the end of the Cold War will bring on a cruel process of natural selection among existing states.”
- ⁴ Although statements have been addressed elsewhere in this refutation where Kaplan has used unqualified terminology (IE “overpopulation”) those statements, or subjects, were deemed more relevant to this refutation and therefore addressed based on their general meaning.
- ⁵ *Abrupt Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises*. Produced by the Committee on Abrupt Climate Change, Ocean Studies Board, Polar Research Board, Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, Division on Earth and Life Studies, and the National Research Council. National Academy Press. Washington, D.C., 2002. (<http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10136.html>)
- ⁶ “Scientists Foresee Increase in Sea Levels.” Ecological Restoration. March 2005.
- ⁷ “...rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh...”
- ⁸ Leahy, Stephen. “Rising rivers will wreck Bangladesh.” *New Scientist*. April 12, 2003.
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- ¹² “Delhi summers should be dry and hot; instead rains periodically sweep the city. But in Kerala, the monsoon is late. What's happening? Forget global warming or the melting of the polar ice caps. The truth might be nearer to home. Meteorologists believe the shifts in micro-climates -- the conversion of once green cities to concrete jungles for instance -- could hold the key.” – Menon, Subhadra. “India is getting warmer. Is it proof of climate change?” *India Today*. 1997
- ¹³ Friend, Tim. “In Tibetan ice, a chilling history of global warming” *USA Today*. September 18, 2000.
- ¹⁴ “Erratic Monsoon a Fallout of Global Climate Change” *Financial Express* The Indian Express Online Media Ltd. September 5, 2005.
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- ¹⁶ “With 60 per cent of agricultural land in India being rainfed, some regions are very vulnerable to erratic rains.” – Bhupta, Malini. Malini Goyal. “The Season for worries.” *India Today*. 1997.
- ¹⁷ “Some 70 per cent of India’s one billion people are dependent on agriculture and the crops rely heavily on the four-month monsoon lasting from June to September...” – Tata, Padma. “Drought hits India.” *New Scientist*. August 03, 2002.
- ¹⁸ Tata, Padma. “Drought hits India.” *New Scientist*. August 03, 2002.
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- ²⁰ Holt, Pat M. “Our diminishing water.” *Christian Science Monitor*. May 31, 2001.
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- ²² Varner, Bill. “Groundwater levels dropping dramatically: UN report highlights severe problem in both big cities and impoverished nations.” *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec). June 6, 2003.
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- ²⁴ Bou-Zeid, E.. M. El-Fadel. “Climate Change and Water Resources in Lebanon and the Middle East.” *Journal of Water Resources Planning & Management - ASCE*. September/October 2002.
- ²⁵ Gerstle, Daniel J. “The Pamir Paradox: Water Insecurity and Hunger at the Source of Central Asia's Rivers.” *Journal of International Affairs*. Spring 2004.
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- ⁴⁶ Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
- ⁴⁷ Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
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- ⁵¹ In line with normal interpretation of the region "the Arab world," the region is considered to consist of the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Occupied Palestine Territory, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, The United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

⁵² “Much of the Arab world, however, will undergo alteration, as Islam spreads across artificial frontiers, fueled by mass migrations into the cities and a soaring birth rate of more than 3.2 percent...[in] the next twenty years, at current growth rates, the population of many Arab countries will double.”

⁵³ CIA World Fact Book (<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sl.html>)

⁵⁴ Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>

⁵⁵ “Of the more than 5 million non-Ivoirian Africans living in Cote d'Ivoire, one-third to one-half are from Burkina Faso; the rest are from Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Benin, Senegal, Liberia, and Mauritania. The non-African expatriate community includes roughly 20,000 French and possibly 100,000 Lebanese. As of mid-November 2004, thousands of expatriates, African and non-African, had fled from the violence in Cote d'Ivoire.” - Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm>)

⁵⁶ “Candidates include Indonesia, Brazil, and, of course, Nigeria. Though each of these nations has exhibited democratizing tendencies of late, Homer-Dixon argues that such tendencies are likely to be superficial ‘epiphenomena’ having nothing to do with long-term processes that include soaring populations and shrinking raw materials.”

⁵⁷ Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>

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Note: the reference for the migration figures presented in this quote state “The statistics were released by the Commission of Population and Family Planning in 2004. Please see: <http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2004/Nov/694075.htm>” however the primary source for this data is in Chinese.

⁵⁹ Sources, for all years, for percent of Turkey’s population residing in Urban areas from: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)

⁶⁰ “The Kurds are a large and distinct ethnic minority in the Middle East, numbering some 25-30 million people. The area that they have inhabited--referred to on maps for centuries as “Kurdistan”--spans modern day Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Half of the Kurds reside in Turkey, where they comprise over 20 percent of the Turkish population.” - The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/turkey_background_kurds.htm)

⁶¹ India Population Medium variant 2025 Population: 1,395,496,000 Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>

⁶² Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, <http://esa.un.org/unpp>

⁶³ “Finally my friend the Minister mentioned polygamy. Designed for a pastoral way of life, polygamy continues to thrive in sub-Saharan Africa even though it is increasingly uncommon in Arab North Africa. Most youths I met on the road in West Africa told me that they were from ‘extended’ families, with a mother in one place and a father in another. Translated to an urban environment, loose family structures are largely responsible for the world’s highest birth rates and the explosion of the HIV virus on the continent.”

⁶⁴ “Taking the Aids battle forward” BBC News. September 16, 2005. Available at (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa/4242530.stm>)

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- ¹¹³ McNeil Jr., Donald G. "Millions of Lives on the Line in Malaria Battle" *The New York Times*. January 25, 2005
- ¹¹⁴ "Mathews and others who argued for a broad redefinition of security sought to place the physical health of the individual or the society, rather than just the territory of the state, at the center of what was to be secured. Beginning in the early 1990s, Homer-Dixon and other 'second wave' scholars and practitioners [like Kaplan]...narrowed the scope to focus on environmental stress that causes or triggers violence...During the second wave, researchers asked only how the environment might contribute to conflict, not why it might do so in some cases and not others." - Dabelko, Geoffrey D. "The Environmental Factor." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Autumn 1999): p 18.
- ¹¹⁵ "Mathews and others who argued for a broad redefinition of security sought to place the physical health of the individual or the society, rather than just the territory of the state, at the center of what was to be secured. Beginning in the early 1990s, Homer-Dixon and other 'second wave' scholars and practitioners [like Kaplan]...narrowed the scope to focus on environmental stress that causes or triggers violence...During the second wave, researchers asked only how the environment might contribute to conflict, not why it might do so in some cases and not others." - Dabelko, Geoffrey D. "The Environmental Factor." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Autumn 1999): p 18.

¹¹⁶ Liotta, P.H. "Future Talk: Building the Hybrid Security Community in the Euro-Mediterranean." Jerome E. Levy Occasional Paper; Economic Geography and World Order Number 3. February, 2002. (<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/levypapers/LevyPaper3.pdf>)

¹¹⁷ Certain liberties were tanked with regard to Kaplan's causal logic in the "Causes of Intrastate Conflict" subsection, specifically that "because the final result of the anarchy thesis is, in part, violent, criminal, stateless, anarchy, this refutation assumes that every statement Kaplan makes within "The Coming Anarchy" is being presented as a contributing factor to that end" (see "Causes of Intrastate Conflict" subsection, pages 70-72). Despite this interpretation that was adopted to address the intrastate conflict literature, it is true that Kaplan did make causal omission as this subsection demonstrates.

¹¹⁸ Despite the fact that in the preface of *The Coming Anarchy* Kaplan did state, "...Africa is not a bellwether for politics for the rest of the world," there are reasons (reasons presented in "Statement of the Problem" subsection, page 9. The issue is further discussed in the "Kaplan on Kaplan" subsection, page 136, where it is demonstrated that Kaplan changes his opinion of the anarchy thesis multiple times) why the causal omissions between his West Africa "evidence" and his conclusion are still worthy of being identified here.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

The reach of this thesis touched upon many different aspects of both “The Coming Anarchy” and on Robert D. Kaplan. As a result, portions of this work have discussed such diverse geographical areas as far as North America to the Asian Sub-Continent, and such subject areas as dissimilar as crude death rates and Kaplan’s peers’ opinions of him. Now, in conclusion of this large body of such diverse subjects, here will be presented a review of each sections’ content and relevant findings, followed by how this information contributed to the accomplishment of the specific objectives of this thesis.

The review of the relevant literature regarding “The Coming Anarchy,” and the anarchy thesis, contributed a great many things to this refutation. It showed that, as a prophecy, “The Coming Anarchy” was not alone in the immediate post-Cold War, but rather, it was accompanied with the works of such pundits as Francis Fukuyama, Benjamin Barber, and Samuel Huntington. By presenting the works of such authors as Marsh, Hardin, Carson, Meadows, Malthus, Osborn, Vogt, and Ehrlich, the literature review demonstrated that not only was Kaplan’s work not alone in its prophetic debut, but also, that it was not original in its content.

With reference to the “The Coming Anarchy” and the anarchy thesis, the literature review established that both the work and the notion have received support

not only from Kaplan's peers and the general public but from the political arena as well. All three groups have praised the work for such broad reasons as its accurate depiction of current events in Africa and elsewhere, its thought-provoking style, as well as the accurateness of the work's overall, and specific, conclusions. However, the review of the literature also demonstrated that both the work and the thesis received negative criticisms as well, some of which even from those quoted in the "acclaim" section of *The Coming Anarchy*. Criticisms about the work included its unprofessional and unscholarly presentation, including methodological errors, argumentative flaws, and even fault in Kaplan's interpretations of findings. The work was also criticized for containing contradiction, bias selectivity in data, and prejudice, all of which contributed to the overall criticisms against the conclusions of the anarchy thesis entirely, with some critics even labeling the article itself as a threat because of the impact of the errors it contained, or the sensationalism in which its facts were presented.

The review of the relevant literature also explored the environmental security and scarcity-caused conflict "roots" of the "The Coming Anarchy," demonstrating that not only is the causal link between scarce resources and violent conflict questioned by many, but also that military or interventionist remedies to environment-related problems may be an inappropriate response because, among other things, those who advocate such responses may be motivated by varying ulterior motives. In addition to addressing this relevant literature regarding environmental security and scarcity-caused conflict, the review also demonstrated that there were *numerous* challenges to Kaplan's other stated causes of intrastate, or "sub-national," conflict, such as race, culture, religion, and ethnicity.

Not only did the literature review demonstrate challenges to, and criticisms of, “The Coming Anarchy” and the anarchy thesis, but it also examined issues regarding Robert D. Kaplan himself. As a journalist and author, the review showed that a negative opinion of Kaplan is *not universal*. That, in addition to accusations that Kaplan is a clumsy, unscholarly, storyteller, with a poor knowledge of history, and poor knowledge in general, who is also an egotistical, self-serving, naïve, “party-pooper,” with distorted vision, biased opinions, and possible racist beliefs, who feels it is his duty to identify the realities of “dysfunctional cultures” so to address the problems that they breed, Kaplan is also complemented for his accomplishments in many different fields, being labeled as a master travel writer, historian, journalist, academic, visionary, U.S. foreign policy and international affairs specialist, and is also considered to be an authoritative advisor to the military.

Despite the many contributions that the literature review provided in refuting “The Coming Anarchy,” no critique of the anarchy thesis or of Kaplan himself provided more evidence against the work than Kaplan’s own words. Within the literature review it was demonstrated that Kaplan’s opinion of himself as a journalist and author was that he was permitted to contradict himself, be flexible beyond the regulations of journalism or academia, to revise his opinions at will regardless of past assertions and publications, and that none of his writings reinforce any particular idea.¹ With regard to his comments directed towards his anarchy thesis, the literature review showed that at different points between the publication of “The Coming Anarchy” and well after the release of the work’s second publishing, Kaplan presented the anarchy thesis’s content differently and even made such varying statements as directly contradicting it, “Africa is not a bellwether for politics of the rest of the world,”² to saying that it came to fruition, “I think in general the article has

been born out.”³ The review also showed that at different times Kaplan presented a contradictory opinion regarding not only the content but the classification of the work as well, calling the thesis “theoretical”⁴ at one point, and saying that it tracks well with the “analyses of the military and intelligence communities”⁵ at another. These shifting opinions are important to this refutation because, among other reasons, it demonstrates that Kaplan himself does not entirely support the content of his work.

However, the literature review also demonstrated that despite Kaplan’s own perceptions of himself and of his anarchy thesis, he is supported by many of his peers and readers, as mentioned above, and that his self proclaimed allowance for contradiction, revision, and flexibility as a travel writer is greatly mistaken. Mistaken because, as the review showed, not only has Kaplan not presented himself consistently and exclusively in his work as a travel writer, but even, within the preface to *The Coming Anarchy*, he omits any reference to travel writing and specifically states that the book’s content is reliable, that he is not considered to exclusively be a travel writer by his readers, that his own biographical blurb does not present him exclusively as a travel writer, and even if he was presented exclusively as a travel writer, and even if his readers did consider him as such, by definition a travel writer is not extended the liberties Kaplan implies, and lastly, that travel writers do have an affect on public opinion, and have even affected scientific thought, therefore must not only be accurate but also must be refuted when necessary. And refuting “The Coming Anarchy” was the primary goal of the subsections that followed the literature review: historical, quantitative, and point-by-point.

The findings of the subsection of this refutation discussing the history, status, and trend of non-nation state global conflict, demonstrated that according to the current comprehensive studies regarding the types of “sub-national” conflicts that Kaplan

focuses upon in “The Coming Anarchy” presented, all three studies concur that the trend of such conflict, whether it is expressed as “armed conflict,” “internal armed conflict,” “extrastate conflict,” “internationalized internal conflict,” “violent civil wars,” “violent conflict,” or “societal warfare,” is not only *not* increasing as the anarchy thesis predicted and predicts, rather, the trend is decreasing, and has decreased to a “much lower level than at the end of the Cold War,”⁶ as the UCDP study states, or to a level that “had already been reached by the mid 1980s,”⁷ as the Fearon and Laitin study states, or even a level that “by the end of 2004” has dropped “to its lowest level since the late 1950s,”⁸ as the Peace and Conflict 2005 study states. In short, not only did this subsection demonstrate that the historic trend of the types of conflict that Kaplan discusses in “The Coming Anarchy” is decreasing, but it also showed that the status of non-nation state conflict is, to adopt the words of one of the authors of the UCDP project, “more consistent with the optimistic assessments of world politics that emphasize the spread of liberal factors...than with realist, structural, or cultural interpretations that emphasize raising anarchy...”⁹ like Kaplan’s anarchy thesis.

The succeeding subsection on quantitative data for West Africa, found that the current status for nearly all of the issues presented in “The Coming Anarchy,” reviewed in this refutation, do appear to convey a Kaplan-esque picture of the region. The subsection found that the current statuses of deforestation, desertification and soil degradation, pollution, population doubling dates, urban growth and rural-to-urban population shifts, the HIV/AIDS virus, malaria, and tuberculosis, do not, by themselves, provide significant quantifiable evidence to counter Kaplan’s anarchy thesis. However, in addition to demonstrating that there were countertrends to Kaplan’s prophecy, such as decreasing trends in birth rates and net population growth,

data was also found that could be interpreted as evidence of Kaplan's critic's accusations of generalization in "The Coming Anarchy."

Numerous issues regarding the accuracy, context, and causation, of many of Kaplan's assertions and conclusion were discussed within the point-by-point subsection. The subsection demonstrated that support for Kaplan's environmental, population/demographic, and disease related assertions was abundant within newspaper and journal articles, international organizations' publications and data, as well as in policy and governmental papers. However, this subsection also demonstrated that when placed into their contexts' the subjects of these assertions, despite the fact that the assertions in themselves may be accurate, are part of much more complex issues drastically oversimplified by Kaplan's omission of their contexts. In other words, these contextual omissions present only one point of view regarding an assertion's subject matter that, however technically accurate that point-of-view may be, omits the larger reality of their status. Demonstrating such contextual omission, as this subsection does, undermines many of Kaplan's assertions, and even challenges the very basis of his resource scarcity argument.

The point-by-point subsection also addressed Kaplan's causal omissions in the anarchy thesis. What the critiques of the "third wave" of environmental security scholars demonstrated was that "The Coming Anarchy" omitted other causes for the conflict he was demonstrating as evidence of his prophecy, that environmental and demographic challenges do not universally cause conflict, and that Kaplan's thesis omits the fact that there are so many intervening variables between the environment and conflict that it is difficult to see the independent contribution of environmental and demographic challenges. The causal omissions presented in this subsection that were with regard to the salient result of the subject he addresses showed that, like the

contextual omissions, Kaplan's one-sided point of view omitted other potential causes of the subjects he was presenting as evidence of his anarchy thesis. And lastly, exemplified through his references to West Africa and the United States, this subsection demonstrated that Kaplan omitted the presentation of a causal link between his evidence and his conclusions.

While the above paragraphs presented the relevant findings of each section and subsection of this thesis, the remainder of this conclusion will present how these findings contributed to the accomplishment of the specific objectives of this refutation as they were identified in the introduction to this work.

Within the "Explanation of Methodology" subsection, three flaws in "The Coming Anarchy" were identified above the others, they were: 1) It is erroneous to extrapolate the events in West Africa onto the entire world; 2) Quantitative support for Kaplan's conclusions is inadequate and therefore his projections may be incorrect; and 3) Kaplan omits contextual and causal aspects regarding his "evidence" and thesis. It was also identified in the "Explanation of Methodology" subsection that the tool to be used to demonstrate each of these flaws was the Historical Comparison, Quantitative Corrections, and Point-by-Point, three-pronged methodology. The way in which each of these methodological tools accomplished, or did not accomplish, their set objectives are as follows.

In utilizing the findings of multiple conflict studies on the historic trend of intrastate conflict, defined in the many different ways presented above, the historic comparison method demonstrated that it is erroneous to extrapolate the events of West Africa onto the entire world because, among other reasons, while Kaplan may identify intrastate conflict within the region, the global status of intrastate conflict is, according to the most recent study presented, at the lowest level it has been since the

late 1950s. Similarly, where Kaplan projects that intrastate conflict is going to increase, these studies concur that the global trend for intrastate conflict is decreasing, implying as the UCDP project did, a trend “more consistent with the optimistic assessments of world politics”¹⁰ then Kaplan’s anarchic prophecy exemplified via West Africa.

However, the “Quantifiable Corrections” subsection of this refutation did *not* demonstrate the second flaw presented in the “Explanation of Methodology” subsection, that “quantitative support for Kaplan’s conclusions is inadequate and therefore his projections may be incorrect.” Indeed, as was stated above, the data did support that many of Kaplan’s figures depicting the state of environmental, demographic, and disease issues in West Africa are very similar to the region’s current reality.

Despite failing to demonstrate the second flaw, the third flaw identified in the “Explanation of Methodology” subsection, was demonstrated numerous in the Point-by-Point subsection. The flaw, that “Kaplan omits contextual and causal aspects regarding his ‘evidence’ and thesis,” was shown to exist not only by identifying contextual omissions regarding some of the specific assertions within “The Coming Anarchy,” but also, causal omissions were demonstrated through those identified by the “third wave” of the environmental security debate, as well as through identifying gaps, epitomized in Kaplan’s statements regarding West Africa and the United States, in the causality between the evidence of “The Coming Anarchy” and the conclusions presented therein.

Within the introduction, this refutation stated that Kaplan’s anarchy thesis created two threats, the first threat being that the “The Coming Anarchy” could instill fear in educators, students, voters, and policy makers, creating unjustified interventionist

reactions, possibly driven by ulterior motives, or, conversely, that such fear could generate isolationist reactions. The second threat being that all components of Kaplan's exaggerated thesis could be interpreted as absolute fiction, thus lessening the realities of the plight of individuals living in West Africa and creating unconscious apathy in those same educators, students, voters and policy makers. What this refutation has demonstrated is that Kaplan, and the anarchy thesis, have indeed had an impact on policy makers, educators, and general public opinion, that the use of the environmental security argument as a guise to accomplish ulterior motives is a risk, and that "The Coming Anarchy" has been interpreted as a work of pure fiction. What this refutation has accomplished is, by demonstrating that the historical and current status of global intrastate conflict shows a trend contrary to Kaplan's predicted increase of such conflict, that Kaplan's anarchy thesis is wrought with contextual and causal omissions, and that data regarding the current status of West Africa does indeed demonstrate the region to be struggling with numerous challenges to individuals' health and well being, is that, although it may be erroneous to extrapolate the events in West Africa as being an indicator of the future state of the world, the plight our fellow human beings in West Africa is a reality.

IV.A) IV. Footnotes

¹ “I’m a travel writer, and the genre of travel writing allows you to contradict yourself, to be flexible, to revise your opinions as you move along. Nobody expects a travel experience to reinforce any particular idea.” - Mirsky, Yehudah. Forward. “Following ‘The Revolution of Rising Expectations’” New York, N.Y.: Jun 14, 1996. Vol. C, Iss. 31,084; pg. 13

² Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.

³ Puplava, James J. Interview Robert D. Kaplan. February 23, 2002. Financial Sense Online. (<http://www.financialsense.com/transcriptions/Kaplan.htm>)

⁴ Mirsky, Yehudah. Forward. “Following ‘The Revolution of Rising Expectations’” New York, N.Y.: Jun 14, 1996. Vol. C, Iss. 31,084; pg. 13

⁵ Kaplan, Robert D. *The Coming Anarchy*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.

⁶ Gleditsch et al, 2002. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict, 1946–2001: A New Dataset.” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 615-637 (2002) Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

⁷ Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” *American Political Science Review* Vol. 97, No.1, 75-90. February 2003.

⁸ Marshall, Monty G., Ted Robert Gurr. “Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy” Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA (Publication Date: May 2005)

⁹ Gleditsch et al, 2002. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict, 1946–2001: A New Dataset.” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 615-637 (2002) Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

¹⁰ Gleditsch et al, 2002. Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Havard Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict, 1946–2001: A New Dataset.” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 5, 615-637 (2002) Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

CHAPTER 5

APPENDIX

V.A) Charts

- Chart 1: UNSD Main Environmental Indicators: Land Use: Forest Area;
Percent Change of Land Area Covered by Forest 1990-2000
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Millennium Indicators Database. United Nations Statistics Division.
Environmental Indicators; Land Use; "Forest area." 2005.
(<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/environment/forestarea.htm>)
- Chart 2: Soil Degradation Percent by Country; based on GLASOD
(UNEP/ISRIC)
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FAO
AGL. "National Soil Degradation Maps, based on GLASOD
(UNEP/ISRIC)." 2005.
([http://www.fao.org/landandwater/agll/glasod/glasodmaps.jsp?country=BE
&search=Display+map+%21](http://www.fao.org/landandwater/agll/glasod/glasodmaps.jsp?country=BE&search=Display+map+%21))
- Chart 3: Percent of Desertification for Select Countries, by Land Type
Source: Dregne, H. E., and N-T. Chou. "Global desertification dimensions
and costs. In Degradation and restoration of arid lands." Lubbock: Texas
Tech. University. 1992. ([http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/docs/002-186/002-
186.html](http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/docs/002-186/002-186.html))
- Chart 4a: Urban NO2 Concentration for West African Countries
Source: World Resources Institute, World Resources 1998-99; World Bank,
World Development Indicators 2000; WHO, Air Management Information
System-AMIS 2.0, 1998; and Global Urban Observatory, Citibase, 1999. via
ciesin.org As sourced by Nation Masters.
(<http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php>)
- Chart 4b: Urban SO2 Concentration for West African Countries
Source: World Resources Institute, World Resources 1998-99; World Bank,
World Development Indicators 2000; WHO, Air Management Information
System-AMIS 2.0, 1998; and Global Urban Observatory, Citibase, 1999. via
ciesin.org As sourced by Nation Masters.
(<http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php>)
- Chart 5: Urban NO2 Concentration for West African and Comparison Countries
Source: World Resources Institute, World Resources 1998-99; World Bank,
World Development Indicators 2000; WHO, Air Management Information
System-AMIS 2.0, 1998; and Global Urban Observatory, Citibase, 1999. via

ciesin.org As sourced by Nation Masters.
(<http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php>)

- Chart 6: Urban SO2 Concentration for West African and Comparison Countries
Source: World Resources Institute, World Resources 1998-99; World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000; WHO, Air Management Information System-AMIS 2.0, 1998; and Global Urban Observatory, Citibase, 1999. via ciesin.org As sourced by Nation Masters.
(<http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php>)
- Chart 7: Urban SO2 Concentration West African and Developed Countries
Source: World Resources Institute, World Resources 1998-99; World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000; WHO, Air Management Information System-AMIS 2.0, 1998; and Global Urban Observatory, Citibase, 1999. via ciesin.org As sourced by Nation Masters.
(<http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php>)
- Chart 8: Births Per 1000 Population by Region
Source: Population Reference Bureau. *World Population Data Sheet*. 2005.
(<http://www.prb.org/datafind/datafinder6.htm>)
- Chart 9: Population Doubling Time (years)
Source: Population Reference Bureau. *World Population Data Sheet*. 2005.
(<http://www.prb.org/datafind/datafinder6.htm>)
- Chart 10: Slum Population as Percentage of Urban (proportion of households with access to secure tenure)
Source: UN-HABITAT. United Nations Statistics Division; "Slum population as percentage of urban (proportion of households with access to secure tenure)." 2005.
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.asp?rowId=710)
- Chart 11: Adults and Children Living With HIV 2001 and 2003
Source: UNAIDS; "Table of country-specific HIV and AIDS estimates and data, end 2003." July 2004.
(http://www.unaids.org/bangkok2004/GAR2004_html/GAR2004_00_en.htm)
- Chart 12: Percent of Adult Population (15-49) Living With HIV for 2001 and 2003
Source: UNAIDS; "Table of country-specific HIV and AIDS estimates and data, end 2003." July 2004.
(http://www.unaids.org/bangkok2004/GAR2004_html/GAR2004_00_en.htm)
- Chart 13: Millennium Indicator, Malaria Prevention, Use of Insecticide-Treated Bed Nets in Population Under Five Years Old (%)
Source: United Nations Statistics Division. Millennium Indicator: "Malaria prevention, use of insecticide-treated bed nets in population <5, per cent (UNICEF)" February 24, 2005.
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.asp?rowID=645&fID=r15&cgID=)
- Chart 14: Millennium Indicator; Malaria Death Rate Per 100,000, Ages 0-4 for 2000

Source: United Nations Statistics Division. Millennium Indicator: “Malaria Death Rate Per 100,000, Ages 0-4 (WHO).” June 14, 2002.
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.asp?rowID=664&fID=r15&cgID=)

- Chart 15: Tuberculosis Prevalence Rate Per 100,000 (1990 and 2000)
Source: United Nations Statistics Division. Millennium Indicator: “Tuberculosis Prevalence Rate Per 100,000 (WHO).” March 1, 2005.
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.asp?rowID=617&fID=r15&cgID=)
- Chart 16: Tuberculosis Prevalence Rate Per 100,000 (2000 – 2003)
Source: United Nations Statistics Division. Millennium Indicator: “Tuberculosis Prevalence Rate Per 100,000 (WHO).” March 1, 2005.
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.asp?rowID=617&fID=r15&cgID=)
- Chart 17: Tuberculosis Death Rate Per 100,000 (1990 and 2000)
Source: United Nations Statistics Division. Millennium Indicator: “Tuberculosis Death Rate Per 100,000 (WHO).” March 1, 2005.
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.asp?rowID=647&fID=r15&cgID=)
- Chart 18: Tuberculosis Death Rate Per 100,000 (2000 – 2003)
Source: United Nations Statistics Division. Millennium Indicator: “Tuberculosis Death Rate Per 100,000 (WHO).” March 1, 2005.
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.asp?rowID=647&fID=r15&cgID=)
- Chart 19: Population Pyramids for West Africa
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, International Programs Center. “IDB Population Pyramids.” April 26, 2005.
(<http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbpyr.html>)
- Chart 20: Urban and Rural Population (thousands) for the Arab World
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision,
(<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)

Chart 1




Chart 2




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


Chart 4a




Chart4b




Chart 5

Urban NO₂ Concentration for West African and Comparison Countries




Chart 6




Chart 7




Chart 8

Births Per 1000 Population by Region




Chart 9




Chart 10




Chart 11




Chart 12




Chart 13




Chart 14




Chart 15




Chart 16




Chart 17




Chart 18





Chart 19
Population Pyramids for West Africa



(Continued on next page)

Chart 19
(continued)






Chart 20



(Continued on next page)

Chart 20
(continued)




V.B) Graphs

- Graph 1: **Crude Birth Rate (per 1000 population)**
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
- Graph 2: **Total Fertility Rate (children per woman)**
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
- Graph 3: **Net Reproduction Rate (per woman)**
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
- Graph 4: **Crude Death Rate (per 1000 population)**
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
- Graph 5: **Population Growth Rate (%)**
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
- Graph 6: **Percentage Urban, West Africa**
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
- Graph 7: **Percentage Urban and Rural, West Africa**
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
- Graph 8: **Number of Reported Clinical Malaria Cases**
World Health Organization; Regional Office for Africa. "Number of Clinical Malaria Cases Reported." March 30, 2004. (<http://www.afro.who.int/malaria/country-profile/index.html>)
- Graph 9: **Total Reported Admitted Malaria Cases (1998 – 2001 for available countries)**
World Health Organization; Regional Office for Africa. "Number of Clinical Malaria Cases Reported." March 30, 2004. (<http://www.afro.who.int/malaria/country-profile/index.html>)


Graph 10: Number of Malaria Deaths Reported (1998 – 2001 for available countries)

World Health Organization; Regional Office for Africa. "Number of Clinical Malaria Cases Reported." March 30, 2004.
(<http://www.afro.who.int/malaria/country-profile/index.html>)


Graph 1




Graph 2




Graph 3




Graph 4




Graph 5




Graph 6




Graph 7




Graph 8



Graph 9



Graph 10



V.C) Tables

- Table 1: 1995 Urban Populations for West African and Comparison Countries
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
- Table 2: Net Total Past, and Projected, Migration Shifts; West Africa, by Country
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
Computations done separately.
- Table 3: Tuberculosis Prevalence Rates Per 100,000 Population; 1990 & 2000 West Africa, by Country
Source: United Nations Statistical Division (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_indicator_xrxx.asp?ind_code=23)
Computations done separately.
- Table 4: Tuberculosis Prevalence Rates Per 100,000 Population; 2000 & 2003 West Africa, by Country
Source: United Nations Statistical Division (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_indicator_xrxx.asp?ind_code=23)
Computations done separately.
- Table 5: Tuberculosis Death Rates Per 100,000 Population; 1990 & 2000 West Africa, by Country
Source: United Nations Statistical Division (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_indicator_xrxx.asp?ind_code=23)
Computations done separately.
- Table 6: Tuberculosis Death Rates Per 100,000 Population; 2000 & 2003 West Africa, by Country
Source: United Nations Statistical Division (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_indicator_xrxx.asp?ind_code=23)
Computations done separately.
- Table 7: Comparison of North African and Sub-Saharan African Countries' Percentages of married women living in polygamy (1986-1992 for available countries)
United Nations, The World's Women 1995 - Trends and Statistics (United Nations publications, as sourced by *Focus International* available online at: <http://www.focusintl.com/statr1a1.htm#006>)
- Table 8: Urban Population for the Arab World 1950 – 2050
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)

- Table 9a: Arab World's Crude Birth Rates by Country (per 100,000) 1950 – 2050
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
- Table 9b: Arab World's Crude Birth Rates by Country (per 100,000) 1950 – 2050 (continued)
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
- Table 9c: Arab World's Crude Birth Rates by Time Period (1950 -2050)
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision (<http://esa.un.org/unpp>)
Computations done separately
- Table 10: Population Doubling Time (from 2005)
Source: Population Reference Bureau. *World Population Data Sheet*. 2005. (<http://www.prb.org/datafind/datafinder6.htm>)
Computations done separately.

Table 1

1995 Urban Populations for West African and Comparison Countries (The specific year, 1995, was dictated by the year that the urban NO ₂ and SO ₂ concentrations were collected)			
West African Country	Urban population (thousands) Medium variant 1995	Comparison Country	Urban population (thousands) Medium variant 1995
Liberia	899	Estonia	1011
Sierra Leone	1376	Albania	1221
Togo	1389	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1400
Guinea	2170	Armenia	2129
Benin	2379	Haiti	2409
Cote d'Ivoire	6156	Ecuador	6583
Ghana	7121	Belarus	6965
Nigeria	41046	Pakistan	40117
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp			

Table 2

Net Total Past, and Projected, Migration Shifts; West Africa, by Country			
Country	Year	Net migration, medium variant, per 5 years period (thousands)	Past and projected net migration total for 1995–2020 (thousands)
Benin	1995-2000	-30	
	2000-2005	100	
	2005-2010	50	
	2010-2015	-10	
	2015-2020	-10 -----	100
Côte d'Ivoire	1995-2000	150	
	2000-2005	-370	
	2005-2010	-145	
	2010-2015	10	
	2015-2020	30 -----	-325
Ghana	1995-2000	-50	
	2000-2005	10	
	2005-2010	-50	
	2010-2015	-20	
	2015-2020	-20 -----	-130
Guinea	1995-2000	-225	
	2000-2005	-300	
	2005-2010	-255	
	2010-2015	-10	
	2015-2020	-10 -----	-800
Liberia	1995-2000	555	
	2000-2005	-245	
	2005-2010	0	
	2010-2015	0	
	2015-2020	0 -----	310
Nigeria	1995-2000	-95	
	2000-2005	-170	
	2005-2010	-150	
	2010-2015	-150	
	2015-2020	-150 -----	-715
Sierra Leone	1995-2000	-110	
	2000-2005	440	
	2005-2010	-80	
	2010-2015	0	
	2015-2020	0 -----	250
Togo	1995-2000	130	
	2000-2005	-5	
	2005-2010	-5	
	2010-2015	0	
	2015-2020	0 -----	120
Total past and projected net migration for the region -----			-1190
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp . Computations done separately.			

Table 3

<u>Tuberculosis Prevalence Rates Per 100,000 Population</u> <u>1990 & 2000 West Africa, by Country</u>					
	1990	2000	Decreases	Increases	Percent +/-
Benin	171	128	-43		-25%
Cote d'Ivoire	266	552		+286	108%
Ghana	480	379	-101		-21%
Guinea	262	343		+81	31%
Liberia	420	387	-33		-8%
Nigeria	218	460		+242	111%
Sierra Leone	496	684		+188	38%
Togo	797	676	-121		-15%
		Totals	-298	+797	< Total Increases and Decreases
				+499	For a Total Regional Increase of 16%
Source: United Nations Statistical Division http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_indicator_xrxx.asp?ind_code=23 Computations done separately.					

Table 4

<u>Tuberculosis Prevalence Rates Per 100,000 Population</u> <u>2000 & 2003 West Africa, by Country</u>					
	2000	2003	Decreases	Increases	Percent +/-
Benin	128	141		13	10%
Cote d'Ivoire	552	618		66	12%
Ghana	379	369	-10		-3%
Guinea	343	394		51	15%
Liberia	387	484		97	25%
Nigeria	460	518		58	13%
Sierra Leone	684	794		110	16%
Togo	676	673	-3		-0.44%
		Totals	-13	+395	< Total Increases and Decreases
				+382	For a Total Regional Increase of 11%
Source: United Nations Statistical Division http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_indicator_xrxx.asp?ind_code=23 Computations done separately.					

Table 5

<u>Tuberculosis Death Rates Per 100,000 Population</u> <u>1990 & 2000 West Africa, by Country</u>					
	1990	2000	Decreases	Increases	Percent +/-
Benin	20	10	-10		-50%
Cote d'Ivoire	29	61		32	110%
Ghana	55	42	-13		-24%
Guinea	30	37		7	23%
Liberia	48	42	-6		-13%
Nigeria	24	51		27	113%
Sierra Leone	57	75		18	32%
Togo	92	74	-18		-20%
		Totals			< Total Increases and Decreases
			-47	+84	
				+37	For a Total Regional Increase of 10%
Source: United Nations Statistical Division http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_indicator_xrxx.asp?ind_code=23 Computations done separately.					

Table 6

<u>Tuberculosis Death Rates Per 100,000 Population</u> <u>2000 & 2003 West Africa, by Country</u>					
	2000	2003	Decreases	Increases	Percent +/-
Benin	10	12		2	20%
Cote d'Ivoire	61	68		7	11%
Ghana	42	41	-1		-2%
Guinea	37	43		6	16%
Liberia	42	53		11	26%
Nigeria	51	57		6	12%
Sierra Leone	75	88		13	17%
Togo	74	74	0		0%
		Totals			< Total Increases and Decreases
			-1	+45	
				+44	For a Total Regional Increase of 11%
Source: United Nations Statistical Division http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_indicator_xrxx.asp?ind_code=23 Computations done separately.					

Table 7

Comparison of North African and Sub-Saharan African Countries' Percentages of married women living in polygamy (1986-1992 for available countries)	
North Africa:	Percentage of married women living in polygamy
Morocco	5%
Sub-Saharan Africa:	
Burundi	12%
Cameroon	39%
Ghana	33%
Kenya	23%
Liberia	38%
Madagascar	4%
Mali	45%
Namibia	13%
Niger	36%
Nigeria	41%
Rwanda	14%
Senegal	46%
Sudan	20%
Tanzania	28%
Togo	52%
Uganda	34%
United Nations, The World's Women 1995 - Trends and Statistics (United Nations publications, as sourced by <i>Focus International</i> available online at: http://www.focusintl.com/statr1a1.htm#006)	

Table 8

Urban Population for An World 1950 - 2050																															
Height of urban population growth				Urban population has been decreasing since				Possible future mass migration?																							
Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change				
Algeria Urban				Bahrain Urban				Cameroon Urban				Uganda Urban				Egypt Urban				Iraq Urban				Jordan Urban				Kuwait Urban			
1950	1440			1950	74			1950	6			1950	35			1950	6971			1950	3978			1950	178			1950	80		
1960	2642	600	22%	1960	130	20	22%	1960	11	5	85%	1960	30	5	17%	1960	9602	9021	13%	1960	2367	461	30%	1960	208	130	41%	1960	112	42	32%
1980	3207	747	22%	1980	120	20	22%	1980	21	18	40%	1980	40	10	25%	1980	10541	1059	10%	1980	3148	788	25%	1980	458	185	37%	1980	281	80	34%
1990	4480	1199	27%	1990	180	28	18%	1990	38	18	40%	1990	58	18	32%	1990	12840	2299	19%	1990	4368	1205	20%	1990	608	144	24%	1990	386	85	48%
1970	6430	844	17%	1970	186	20	16%	1970	63	14	26%	1970	91	32	36%	1970	16882	2063	16%	1970	6678	1328	23%	1970	914	210	28%	1970	670	212	37%
1975	6480	1030	36%	1975	233	47	28%	1975	67	14	21%	1975	130	47	34%	1975	17075	2182	13%	1975	7348	1870	23%	1975	1128	210	19%	1975	644	265	31%
1980	8194	1751	21%	1980	381	88	23%	1980	80	23	26%	1980	226	80	38%	1980	19227	2152	11%	1980	8294	1896	20%	1980	1348	220	39%	1980	1249	404	32%
1986	9360	2059	20%	1986	362	61	17%	1986	116	26	22%	1986	206	80	21%	1986	21772	2648	12%	1986	11201	1967	16%	1986	1797	467	26%	1986	621	372	33%
1990	13800	2400	19%	1990	426	73	17%	1990	147	31	21%	1990	420	134	32%	1990	24170	2405	10%	1990	12908	1707	13%	1990	2368	583	24%	1990	2034	413	28%
1995	15340	2340	15%	1995	510	84	16%	1995	165	38	21%	1995	452	82	13%	1995	26182	2014	8%	1995	14807	1879	13%	1995	3368	636	30%	1995	1620	414	25%
2000	17400	2861	12%	2000	682	83	14%	2000	232	47	20%	2000	598	186	18%	2000	30549	2157	8%	2000	17015	2126	13%	2000	3913	550	14%	2000	2141	521	24%
2005	19896	2297	12%	2005	686	54	8%	2005	289	57	27%	2005	871	83	12%	2005	31291	2942	9%	2005	19258	2240	12%	2005	4524	611	14%	2005	2580	449	17%
2010	22200	2628	11%	2010	719	63	8%	2010	369	78	16%	2010	742	71	10%	2010	36336	3744	11%	2010	21625	2370	11%	2010	6388	566	11%	2010	2647	367	13%
2015	24870	2676	11%	2015	779	80	8%	2015	438	79	16%	2015	814	72	9%	2015	39584	4548	11%	2015	24347	2722	11%	2015	5640	583	10%	2015	3207	330	18%
2020	27980	2890	10%	2020	837	98	7%	2020	527	89	17%	2020	898	84	8%	2020	44880	5378	12%	2020	27428	3079	11%	2020	6212	589	9%	2020	3991	314	8%
2025	30128	2666	9%	2025	982	66	6%	2025	626	98	16%	2025	869	81	8%	2025	51282	6390	12%	2025	38938	2468	11%	2025	6707	676	9%	2025	3684	300	8%
2030	32488	2327	7%	2030	946	53	6%	2030	734	108	15%	2030	1181	32	3%	2030	53925	6930	11%	2030	34812	2852	11%	2030	7338	540	7%	2030	4187	203	7%
Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change
Lebanon Urban				Libya Urban				Morocco Urban				Mexico Urban				Pakistan Urban				Qatar Urban				Saudi Arabia Urban				Swaziland Urban			
1950	480			1950	191			1950	19			1950	2347			1950	375			1950	11			1950	580			1950	580		
1960	662	60	16%	1960	232	41	16%	1960	28	14	42%	1960	2806	460	16%	1960	422	48	11%	1960	16	5	21%	1960	636	556	23%	1960	636	236	32%
1980	747	86	25%	1980	387	75	24%	1980	58	28	43%	1980	3397	591	17%	1980	485	62	13%	1980	28	5	25%	1980	1231	395	32%	1980	1231	395	32%
1990	1070	323	30%	1990	444	137	31%	1990	104	46	43%	1990	4244	847	28%	1990	586	101	17%	1990	41	27	51%	1990	1585	627	34%	1990	1585	627	34%
1970	1419	349	26%	1970	580	446	57%	1970	173	73	42%	1970	5388	1044	20%	1970	586	5	2%	1970	56	44	62%	1970	90	36	30%	1970	2796	830	30%
1975	1704	275	21%	1975	1489	589	40%	1975	289	116	40%	1975	6547	1249	19%	1975	748	152	20%	1975	98	36	32%	1975	146	53	37%	1975	4201	1435	34%
1980	1880	164	10%	1980	2189	830	29%	1980	446	157	35%	1980	8880	1515	18%	1980	912	164	19%	1980	374	194	52%	1980	198	53	27%	1980	6325	2894	37%
1986	2010	230	10%	1986	2682	774	27%	1986	652	206	32%	1986	9442	1662	19%	1986	1140	228	20%	1986	718	236	47%	1986	387	119	30%	1986	6637	3820	32%
1990	2280	62	3%	1990	3487	584	17%	1990	894	240	27%	1990	11851	2085	17%	1990	1402	250	20%	1990	1148	435	38%	1990	417	180	24%	1990	1011	3454	27%
1995	2700	420	16%	1995	3989	522	12%	1995	1171	277	24%	1995	14841	3080	16%	1995	1776	364	27%	1995	894	439	30%	1995	478	85	12%	1995	6479	2880	17%
2000	2844	244	9%	2000	4522	630	12%	2000	1627	364	23%	2000	16212	2171	12%	2000	2286	429	19%	2000	1665	271	16%	2000	666	80	14%	2000	16610	3820	16%
2005	3148	304	6%	2005	5387	865	11%	2005	1873	446	23%	2005	19497	2285	12%	2005	2682	457	17%	2005	2013	154	6%	2005	351	186	20%	2005	21744	3232	15%
2010	3363	215	6%	2010	6074	687	10%	2010	2452	479	20%	2010	20832	2495	12%	2010	3194	532	17%	2010	2314	296	13%	2010	632	81	10%	2010	24920	3176	17%
2015	3671	308	6%	2015	6244	670	8%	2015	2846	493	17%	2015	23419	2686	11%	2015	3074	688	16%	2015	3623	308	12%	2015	918	70	9%	2015	28084	2176	11%
2020	3960	289	5%	2020	6787	523	8%	2020	3447	602	16%	2020	25880	2442	9%	2020	4480	628	14%	2020	2927	306	10%	2020	975	85	7%	2020	31220	3126	18%
2025	3829	308	4%	2025	7219	492	8%	2025	3949	502	13%	2025	28219	2399	8%	2025	5089	609	13%	2025	3219	292	9%	2025	1037	62	6%	2025	34375	3895	9%
2030	4074	146	4%	2030	7612	360	6%	2030	4446	496	11%	2030	30400	2261	7%	2030	6272	704	12%	2030	3468	280	9%	2030	1068	61	6%	2030	37281	2846	8%
Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change	Year	Value	Change	% Change
Guatemala Urban				South Urban				Syria Urban				Tanzania Urban				UDM Urban				Yemen Urban											
1950	288			1950	579			1950	1071	1071		1950	1102	1102	100%	1950	36	36		1950	258	258	100%								
1960	375	87	22%	1960	826	249	38%	1960	1344	273	20%	1960	1270	168	13%	1960	48	13	27%	1960	348	86	20%								
1980	480	113	22%	1980	1186	360	38%	1980	1680	264	21%	1980	1621	261	17%	1980	66	16	26%	1980	476	120	27%								
1985	833	145	22%	1985	1681	505	38%	1985	2162	464	21%	1985	1629	380	17%	1985	110	46	41%	1985	638	164	26%								
1970	817	194	22%	1970	2489	717	38%	1970	2766	603	22%	1970	2220	484	20%	1970	180	78	39%	1970	642	328	24%								
1975	1854	237	22%	1975	2031	820	26%	1975	3397	620	16%	19																			

Table 9a

Arab World's Crude Birth Rates by Country (per 100,000)											
Peak Birth Rate in Bold											
Period	Algeria	Bahrain	Comoros	Djibouti	Egypt	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Mauritania
1950-1955	51	45.1	46.5	50	48.6	52.6	46.7	45.2	41	48	44.4
1955-1960	50.8	45.5	48.4	50.7	44.8	49.4	46.7	44.3	39.7	48.5	46.7
1960-1965	50.4	47	50.2	51.2	45.4	46.9	52.5	44.5	37.9	49	46.8
1965-1970	48.9	43.4	50.4	50.2	41.5	45.8	52.5	49.7	34.4	49.5	46.3
1970-1975	48	36	49.3	47.7	39.8	45.4	50	44.4	31.3	49	45.4
1975-1980	45.4	34.4	48.7	45.2	39.6	42.7	45	40.1	30.4	47.3	44.8
1980-1985	41.2	32.8	48.7	44	38.4	39.8	42.3	34.6	30	45.6	43.2
1985-1990	34.8	31.2	42.5	43.2	34.7	39.6	38.8	28.1	27	31.9	42.6
1990-1995	28.8	26.4	39.3	41.7	28.9	39	34.4	20.7	24.7	24.8	42.4
1995-2000	21.6	21.6	38.5	39	26.9	38.3	32.6	20.9	22.3	23.3	42.6
2000-2005	20.8	18.8	36.5	36.2	26.3	35.7	27.8	19.5	19	23.3	41.8
2005-2010	20.8	16.5	33.3	32.8	25	32.2	25.1	18.7	18	22.8	39.6
2010-2015	20.2	15	29.8	29.9	23.1	29	22.5	16.7	17.1	21.1	36.3
2015-2020	18.6	13.9	26.8	27.6	20.8	26.5	20.5	14.9	16.2	18.4	33.2
2020-2025	16.4	13.4	24.7	25.7	19.1	24.5	18.9	13.8	15.1	15.8	30.4
2025-2030	14.3	13.2	23.2	23.9	18	22.6	17.3	13.2	13.9	14	27.9
2030-2035	13.2	12.6	21.7	22.1	17	20.9	15.6	12.8	12.9	13.4	25.6
2035-2040	12.8	12	20	20.5	16	19.3	14.2	12.5	12.5	13.5	23.6
2040-2045	12.8	11.5	18.4	19.1	14.8	18	13.5	12.1	12.1	13.2	21.8
2045-2050	12.5	11.2	17	17.9	13.8	16.8	13	11.6	11.8	12.5	20.1
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp											

(Continued on next page)

Table 9b
(Continued)

Arab World's Crude Birth Rates by Country (per 100,000)											
Peak Birth Rate in Bold											
Period	Morocco	Oman	Palestine	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	Somalia	Sudan	Syria	Tunisia	UAE	Yemen
1950-1955	50.4	51.4	46.7	46.3	49	53.4	47.2	48.1	46.4	47.8	54.8
1955-1960	50.4	50.9	46.7	43.7	48.8	52.1	47.5	47.9	46.7	47.5	54.6
1960-1965	50.1	50.4	52.5	40.8	48.9	51	47.6	48.5	46.5	43.6	54.6
1965-1970	48.2	50	52.5	37	48.1	50.8	47.5	47.5	41.8	38.6	54.1
1970-1975	45.6	49.5	46.6	31.3	47.6	51.3	47	46.8	37.1	33	54.5
1975-1980	39.4	48.1	47.8	29.9	45.9	51.7	45.2	46.9	36.5	30.5	55.2
1980-1985	36.9	46	44.6	28.7	41	46.4	43.2	46.2	33.8	29.5	56.7
1985-1990	31.6	41.5	45.1	25.6	38.2	46.4	39.8	40.4	30.3	29.8	53.4
1990-1995	27.3	34.4	45.6	21.2	34.6	45.7	37.8	32.7	24.1	23.4	48.2
1995-2000	24.2	29.5	41.8	21.2	31.2	47.7	35.9	30.3	18.6	18.9	43.8
2000-2005	23.3	25.6	38.8	19.1	28.5	45.8	33.5	28.7	16.8	16.3	41
2005-2010	22.1	24.2	35.4	17.3	26.2	42.9	30.5	26.9	16.2	15.5	39.4
2010-2015	20.6	23.2	32.3	15.3	24.2	39.7	27.7	24.4	15.2	14.6	37.2
2015-2020	18.7	21.4	29.6	14	22.5	36.8	25.4	21.3	14.3	13.7	34
2020-2025	17	19.5	27.4	13.3	20.6	34.4	23.7	18.8	13.6	12.7	30.5
2025-2030	15.8	17.8	25.4	13.1	18.7	32	22.2	17	12.7	11.8	27.5
2030-2035	15	16.6	23.4	12.8	16.9	29.4	20.7	15.6	11.8	11.1	25.4
2035-2040	14.2	15.7	21.5	12.2	15.3	26.9	19.2	14.5	11.3	10.5	23.7
2040-2045	13.3	14.8	19.8	11.4	14.1	24.6	17.8	13.9	11	10.3	22.2
2045-2050	12.6	13.9	18.3	10.8	13.7	22.8	16.6	13.1	10.9	10.1	20.5
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp											

Table 9c

Arab World's Crude Birth Rates by Time Period (1950 -2050)		
“The Coming Anarchy” Time Period in Bold		
Period	Entire Region (per thousand)	Entire Region (per hundred)
1950-1955	48.2	4.8
1955-1960	47.8	4.8
1960-1965	48.0	4.8
1965-1970	46.8	4.7
1970-1975	44.4	4.4
1975-1980	42.8	4.3
1980-1985	40.6	4.1
1985-1990	37.1	3.7
1990-1995	33.0	3.3
1995-2000	30.5	3.0
2000-2005	28.3	2.8
2005-2010	26.4	2.6
2010-2015	24.3	2.4
2015-2020	22.2	2.2
2020-2025	20.4	2.0
2025-2030	18.9	1.9
2030-2035	17.6	1.8
2035-2040	16.5	1.6
2040-2045	15.5	1.5
2045-2050	14.6	1.5
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp . Computations done separately		

Table 10

Population Doubling Time (from 2005)		
Country	Doubling Time (years)	
Algeria	45	>20
Bahrain	38	>20
Comoros	23	>20
Djibouti	37	>20
Egypt	35	>20
Iraq	26	>20
Jordan	29	>20
Kuwait	40	>20
Lebanon	44	>20
Libya	29	>20
Mauritania	25	>20
Morocco	45	>20
Oman	38	>20
Palestinian Territory	20	= 20
Qatar	39	>20
Saudi Arabia	25	>20
Somalia	24	>20
Sudan	25	>20
Syria	26	>20
Tunisia	63	>20
United Arab Emirates	51	>20
Yemen	21	>20
Regional Average:	34	
Source: PRB 2005 World Population Data Sheet. Computations done separately.		

V.D) Point-by-Point Spreadsheets:

Spreadsheet 1: Environment-Related Assertion

Spreadsheet 2: Demographic/Population-Related Assertions

Spreadsheet 3: Disease-Related Assertion

Environment-Related Assertions Within "The Coming Anarchy"		
<u>Country / Area</u>	<u>Assertion / Quote From "The Coming Anarchy"</u>	<u>Addressed / Not Addressed; Section, Page</u>
West Africa	"...desertification and deforestation--also linked to overpopulation--drive more and more African peasants out of the countryside."	III.B.i.a) Deforestation; Page 177
Sierra Leone, Ghana Ivory Coast, Guinea	"...most of the rain forest and secondary bush is being destroyed at an alarming rate."	III.B.i.a) Deforestation; Page 177
Sierra Leone	"Sierra Leone...in 1961...60 percent of the country was primary rain forest. Now six percent is."	III.B.i.a) Deforestation; Page 177
Ivory Coast	"In the Ivory Coast the proportion [of rain forest] has fallen from 38 percent to eight percent."	III.B.i.a) Deforestation; Page 177
West Africa	"...deforestation has led to soil erosion..."	III.B.i.b) Desertification and Soil Degradation; Page 177
Nigeria, Lagos	"...pollution..."	III.B.i.c) Pollution; Page 179
Guinea	"Hardwood logging continues at a madcap speed."	III.B.i.a) Deforestation; Page 177
Nile Delta/Bangladesh	"rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh..."	III.C.i.a) Environment-Related Assertions; Page 204
Saudi Arabia, Central Asia, SW U.S.	"...water will be in dangerously short supply in such diverse areas as..."	III.C.i.a) Environment-Related Assertions; Page 205
Hungary, Slovakia	"...Even in Europe tensions have arisen between...over the damming of the Danube..."	III.C.i.a) Environment-Related Assertions; Page 208
Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria	"Though each of these nations has exhibited democratizing tendencies of late...such tendencies are likely to be superficial...shrinking raw materials..."	Not Addressed; Unqualified - "raw materials"
China	"...per capita availability of arable land in interior China has rapidly declined..."	III.C.i.a) Environment-Related Assertions; Page 209
India	"...shrinking natural resource base..."	Not Addressed; Unqualified
India	"...including dramatically declining water levels."	III.C.i.a) Environment-Related Assertions; Page 206
India	"...Green Revolution has been...overworking its croplands and depleting its watershed"	III.C.i.a) Environment-Related Assertions; Page 209
Pakistan	"...65% of its land dependent on intensive irrigation..."	III.C.i.a) Environment-Related Assertions; Page 210
Pakistan	"...with wide scale deforestation..."	III.C.i.a) Environment-Related Assertions; Page 211
India	"...India...receives 70% of its precipitation from the monsoon cycle, which planetary warming could disrupt."	III.C.i.a) Environment-Related Assertions; Page 205
World	"National Academy of Sciences reports that 'as many as 1 billion people, or 20% of the world's population, live on lands likely to be inundated or dramatically changed by rising waters..."	III.C.i.a) Environment-Related Assertions; Page 204
World	"...Matthews, warns that many of us underestimate the extent to which political systems...depend on the underpinning of natural systems..."	Not Addressed; Subjective - "many of us"

Demographic/Population-Related Assertions Within "The Coming Anarchy"		
Country / Area	Assertion / Quote From "The Coming Anarchy"	Addressed / Not Addressed; Section, Page
West Africa	"In cities in six West African countries I saw similar young men everywhere--hordes..."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 212
West Africa	polygamy continues to thrive in Sub-Saharan Africa even though it is increasingly uncommon in Arab North Africa...largely responsible for the worlds highest birth rates..."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population - Related Assertions; Page 213
West Africa	"...overpopulation..."	III.B.ii.b) Population; Page 182
West Africa	"...refugee migrations..."	III.B.ii.b) Net population growth; Page 183
Sierra Leone	"...400,000 Sierra Leonians are internally displaced..."	III.B.ii.b) Net population growth; Page 183
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Guinea	"the borders dividing these four countries have become largely meaningless."	Not Addressed; Unqualified - "meaningless"
Ivory Coast	"between a third and a half of the country's population is now non-Ivorian, and the figure could be as high as 75 percent in Abidjan."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 217
Ivory Coast	"Perhaps 15% of Abidjan's population population...live in shantytowns..."	III.B.ii.d) Internal Migration and Urbanization; Page 186
Ivory Coast	"55% of the...population is urban and the proportion is supposed to reach 62% by 2000"	III.B.ii.d) Internal Migration and Urbanization; Page 186
Ivory Coast	"The yearly net population growth is 3.6 percent."	III.B.ii.b) Net population growth; Page 183
Nigeria	"...Nigeria's population...set to double during the next 25 years..."	III.B.ii.c) Doubling dates; Page 184
Nigeria, Lagos	"...overcrowding..."	III.B.ii.d) Internal Migration and Urbanization; Page 185
West Africa	"...population belts are horizontal...vertical borders..."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 212
Sub-Saharan Africa	"...and the cities keep growing..."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 213
Guinea	"In 28 yrs Guinea's population will double if growth goes on at current rates."	III.b.2.C) Doubling dates Page 173
Guinea, Conakry	"...people flee the Guinean countryside for Conakry."	III.b.2.D) Internal Migration and Urbanization Page 174
Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria	"Though each of these nations has exhibited democratizing tendencies of late...such tendencies are likely to be superficial...soaring populations"	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 217
World population	"over the next fifty years...5.5 billion to more than nine billion."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 211
World population	"...95% of the population increase will be in the poorest regions of the world..."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 211
China	"...a population of 1.54 billion by the year 2025..."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 217
China	"...large scale population movements are underway, from inland...to coastal..."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 217
Turkey	"...1980, 44%...lived in cities...1990...61%...by 2000...expected to be 67%. Villages are emptying out..."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 218
Egypt	"...Egypt, parts of whose capital city, Cairo, evince worse crowding than...in Calcutta..."	Not Addressed; Subjective
Turkey	"About half of the world's 20 million Kurds live in 'Turkey'"	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 218
Turkey	"...people have migrated and settled in patterns that obliterate borders..."	Not Addressed; Unqualified - "obliterate"
Arab world	"Much of the Arab world, however, will undergo alteration...fueled by mass migrations into the cities and a soaring birth rate of more than 3.2%...in the next 20 yrs, at current growth rates, the population of many Arab countries will double."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Pages 214-16
India	"...given that in 2025 India's population could be close to 1.5 billion..."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 219
Pakistan	"...population growth of 2.7%..."	III.C.i.b) Demographic/Population-Related Assertions; Page 219

Disease-Related Assertions Within "The Coming Anarchy"		
<u>Country/Area</u>	<u>Assertion / Quote From "The Coming Anarchy"</u>	<u>Addressed / Not Addressed: Section, Page</u>
West Africa	"Translated to an urban environment, loose family structures are largely responsible for the world's highest birth rates and the explosion of the HIV virus on the continent."	III.C.i.c) Disease-Related Assertions; Page 219
West Africa	"Disease..."	III.B.iii) Disease; Page 186
West Africa	"Virtually everyone in West African interior has some form of Malaria."	III.B.iii.b) Malaria; Page 189
Sierra Leone / West Africa	"...unchecked spread of disease..."	III.B.iii) Disease; Page 186
West Africa	"Of the approximately 12 million people worldwide whose blood is HIV positive, 8 million are in Africa."	III.B.iii.a) HIV/AIDS; Page 187
Ivory Coast	"Ivory Coast...10% of the population is HIV positive."	III.B.iii) Disease; Page 186
Africa	"...representative of the CDC in Abidjan explains that...HIV...and tuberculosis are now fast forwarding each other'	III.C.i.c) Disease-Related Assertions; Page 223
Africa	"...experts worry that viral mutations and hybridizations might...result in a form of AIDS that is easier to catch than the current strain."	III.C.i.c) Disease-Related Assertions; Page 220
Sub-Saharan Africa	"...malaria...is mutating into increasingly deadly forms..."	III.C.i.c) Disease-Related Assertions; Page 221

V.E) Terms

Population Terminology

(Unless otherwise noted, all definitions for the population terminology are from the United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospectus: The 2004 Revision, Population Database. Available online at <http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=7>)

Crude birth rate: Number of births over a given period divided by the person-years lived by the population over that period. It is expressed as number of births per 1,000 population.

Net migration rate: The number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants over a period, divided by the person-years lived by the population of the receiving country over that period. It is expressed as net number of migrants per 1,000 population.

Net migration: Net number of migrants, that is, the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants. It is expressed as thousands.

Net reproduction rate: The average number of daughters a hypothetical cohort of women would have at the end of their reproductive period if they were subject during their whole lives to the fertility rates and the mortality rates of a given period. It is expressed as number of daughters per woman.

Percentage rural: Rural population as a percentage of the total population.

Percentage urban: Urban population as a percentage of the total population.

Population change: Population increment over a period, that is, the difference between the population at the end of the period and that at the beginning of the period. Refers to five-year periods running from 1 July to 30 June of the initial and final years. Data are presented in thousands.

Population growth rate: Average exponential rate of growth of the population over a given period. It is calculated as $\ln(P_t/P_0)/t$ where t is the length of the period. It is expressed as a percentage.

Projected Population 2025 and 2050: Projected populations based upon reasonable assumptions on the future course of fertility, mortality, and migration. Projections are based upon official country projections, series issued by the UN or the U.S. Census Bureau, or PRB projections.

Definition from “Notes” of the 2004 World Population Data Sheet, available online at: http://www.prb.org/Content/NavigationMenu/PRB/DataFinder/DataFinder_Sources/Data_Sources.htm

Rate of natural increase: Crude birth rate minus the crude death rate. Represents the portion of population growth (or decline) determined exclusively by births and deaths.

Slums: The proportion of households with access to secure tenure is one minus the percentage of the urban population that lives in slums. A slum is a contiguous settlement where the inhabitants are characterized as having inadequate housing and basic services. (Reference: UN-HABITAT: Guide to Improving Target 11: Improving the lives of

100 million slum dwellers, 2003, and United Nations, Indicators for Monitoring the Millennium Development Goals, Definitions, Rationale, Concepts and Sources, 2003)

Total fertility: The average number of children a hypothetical cohort of women would have at the end of their reproductive period if they were subject during their whole lives to the fertility rates of a given period and if they were not subject to mortality. It is expressed as children per woman.

Urban population: De facto population living in areas classified as urban according to the criteria used by each area or country. Data refer to 1 July of the year indicated and are presented in thousands.

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