Second Edition
By William Thomas Sherman
1604 NW 70th St.
Seattle, WA 98117
206-784-1132
gunjones@netscape.net
http://www.angelfire.com/d20/htfh
-----------------------------------------------------
Copyright William Thomas Sherman 2005, TXu1-268-419,
10/10/2005.
This book may be printed for free, but it is not to be
sold for profit, nor may the text be altered beyond its surface appearance
(i.e. for example, say, the type of font or font size used), without my
author’s consent. ~~ WTS, 2004, 2005.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~Contents~.
Introduction...2
a. Lord…12
b. Maker…18
c. Source…21
d. Path…22
e. Goal..23
2. Summary and Conclusions
Pertaining to the
Previous…25
a. Questions Relating to God and the Divine
Attributes…26
b. God and the Question of Evil…31
Part II.
1. God Subjectively…39
2. The Bible…40
3. The
Character of Deity in the Old Testament…48
4. New
Testament Antecedents…50
5. The New
Testament…58
6. Christ
Historically…60
7. The Cross…62
8 Implications
of the Cross…64
9. The
Resurrection, Ascension, and the Success of the early Church…65
10. Love and Truth…66
11. Christian Belief…71
12. Christ as God…74
Appendix.
a.
Questions for and
Arguments against Christianity…77
b.
An Overview of Sects,
Schisms, and Heresies of the Early Church…82
c.
An Overview of Early
Church Councils…84
“Arise, my soul on wings enraptur’d, rise
To praise the monarch of the earth and skies,
Whose goodness and beneficence appear
As round its center moves the rolling year,
Or when the morning glows with rosy charms,
Or the sun slumbers in the ocean’s arms:
Of light divine be a rich portion lent
To guide my soul, and favour my intent.
Celestial muse, my arduous light sustain,
And raise my mind to a seraphic strain!”
~~~ Phillis
Wheatley, “Thoughts on the Works of Providence”
Introduction
For over the past two millennia, “Christianity,” in its
various forms and denominations, has been the pre-dominant (at least openly)
orthodox religious faith in Western societies and cultures. After the passage
of these twenty centuries, it seems not inappropriate time to ask once again
whether Christian faith is still relevant, and really possesses and makes
possible the higher truth, strength, peace, hope, well-being (both heavenly and
practical) it has always taught or implied. Should “Jesus Christ” be seen as
the actual manifestation of God almighty, and consequently all that is both truly
good and all powerful?[1] If so, what evidence and argument are legitimately
available to establish such (and similar) claims and propositions rationally,
and where possible, scientifically? It is then with a mind to attempt to answer
these questions and explore possible answers that the work before you has been
written.
Rather than being a mere personal testimony or
“apologia,” my interest here is to show Christianity as a faith and belief that
is epistemologically sound, consistent, and in most of its basic tenets, more
than plausible, while bearing in mind
that it is, after all, a faith. To say that Christ defeats Hell, death and the
grave, but not the disputations of honest and polite philosophers and
scientists, seems, after all, inherently contradictory and self-refuting. What
then I have endeavored to do in this work is critically examine, and, if
possible, justify and account for objective[2] belief in the essential principles and wisdom of
Christianity, while supplementing this with more subjective, yet nevertheless
(or so they seem to me) fair and reasonable, arguments and “proofs.”
In undertaking this, I have tried as much as possible
to be unflinching, unbiased, and thorough
in my presentation and analysis. If one believes in God, if one says “Christ
is God,” these are clearly very momentous choices for one to make. If they are
correct beliefs then it only makes sense that such beliefs be able to withstand
(or at minimum, be not too inconsistent with) the very strictest scrutiny and
standards of truth verification of which we are capable. The too abrupt and
casual use of unexamined assumptions (sometimes of a categorical nature), often
based on subjective judgments, has been a traditional failing of much religious
argumentation, and this kind of thing I have tried to avoid here as much as
possible. Though raised a Catholic, there was time during my undergraduate
years when, even if I didn’t actually not believe in God, I thought him
un-provable or irrelevant. Swept away as I was by the persuasive and beguiling
vision of the atomists (both ancient and modern), the underling unity in things
was atoms and their arrangement. I could not see how the order of things could
really be better explained, analyzed, or broken down otherwise. I mention this
to show that I am very much familiar with and how it feels to be materialistic
and skeptical toward traditional religion, though still retaining my respect
and appreciation for the “atomists.” I have therefore tried to frame questions
and arguments about God, Christ, and Truth, in such a manner as would (I
believe) have suited myself in those “modernist” years of my intellectual
development.
It is probably assumed on all sides that one cannot
expect to debate another into adopting real Christian, or any deeply held
religious faith or love. Refined and thoughtful arguments can suitably
contribute to persuasion, but such faith is ultimately a movement of the heart
prompted (as believed) by the Spirit. One cannot then legitimately tell another
why they must believe in God or why they must be a Christian, any
more than they could properly insist that one must not believe in God or must
not be a Christian. For, in the final analysis, these are choices we can only
make as unique and separate individuals. Yet what it seems one can with
justification do is provide convincing and credible facts and reasons why it is
a good idea that one should believe, while, at the same time,
conscientiously respecting, indeed painstakingly defending, others right not to
believe. Though myself a professed Christian, I have endeavored here to be as
impartial as I thought was possible. Moreover, I have tried as much as I could
to deprive Christianity the benefit of the doubt on certain points it is often
commonly granted – even such points granted by non-Christians.
The French
mathematician and inventor Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) wrote: “The infinite
distance between body and mind symbolizes the infinitely more infinite distance
between mind and charity, for charity is supernatural.”[3]
If what Pascal says of charity is true, how much more
so must be the distance between mind and a devoted love of God? One cannot
rationally or scientifically prove why someone or something should be loved and
revered higher than all other persons or things. Deepest love comes from
within, and yet at the same time be validated by conscious choice. Reason and
science do not tell us what deepest desire is. At best they can attempt to
explain what and why we desire or love the way they do. They themselves, after
all, are things a person values (i.e. loves) or doesn’t value, since they will
not be accepted as valid unless they are valued (even if embraced by convention
to be correct or predictable methods otherwise.)
How then might reason and science we brought to bear
with respect to one’s decision to love or not love “God?”
Reason and science, at minimum, provide that
objectivity which brings us closer to intellectual harmony. Without them there
is only chance, chaos or some indeterminate force and external intelligence
left governing people’s relationships and joint actions, and to which they may
be said to be in bondage to. What we will want to do then is attempt to find in
reason and science a way of enhancing greater mutual appreciation and
understanding of who and what God means (or might mean) to us collectively and
communally, the possible meanings and significance of devotion to him, and
perhaps also, acquire a better understanding of the nature of love and valuing
to begin with, and which are fundamental to both our intellectual and active
lives.
A general rule I will be observing in what follows that
judgments as to what is most valuable (for we mortals at any rate) are
ultimately subjective. Yet this said,
if a certain “good” (or “goods”) are agreed upon at the outset, it is
nonetheless possible to objectively justify (or better objectively
justify) why other “goods” are to the advantage or benefit of the assumed “good.”
For example, if we value our garden as a highest good,
it naturally follows that we will value water as a good necessary to its
well-being. On this sort of basis, I believe one can make a properly rational
and convincing case for why belief in Christ can be said to be both conducive
and beneficial to what people (most people at least) are generally understood
to love or value most. While, again, one cannot prove why something should be
one’s ultimate love or ultimate good (such choices being subjective), as a
practical matter, one can, still yet inquire and discern what factors best work
to the advantage of those “goods” which are commonly accepted: such as
truth, reason, wisdom (understanding), moral virtue, purity, beauty, liberty,
health, wealth, justice, strength, compassion, and peace. In what follows,
these as assumed highest or higher goods we will allow ourselves to take for
granted, though understandably in specific circumstances we might well want or
need to adjust which is of most value to us at a given moment (for example, if
they conflict, is “liberty” better than “justice?”)
We all believe
differently. This, after all, is what most makes us what we are as individuals
in the first place. “Goods” will differ
in value among us, and we all accept this as a matter of fact given. Where then
we line up our own individual ideas of highest good with ideas of highest good
held by others is understandably bound to be a source of certain
disagreement. Nonetheless, as long as
we caution and qualify ourselves in this manner, it seems not unreasonable to
go ahead and designate “truth, reason, wisdom, moral virtue, purity, etc.” as
highest goods.
While sharing with them
most (if not all) basic beliefs, there are many Christians whom I personally
admire or adore as people, yet whose theological views or emphasis I deplore or
find unacceptable. Yet it would genuinely pain me very much to think to ever
somehow offend their heart felt ideas and principles of faith. But it would
obviously be too much to attempt to reconcile all the different “Christian”
explanations and viewpoints. Though Christians are a community of
believers, they are also believers as individuals also, just as the
apostles were together in their faith in Christ, yet very much distinct in
their personalities, perspectives, and attitudes.
If then what I express in
this work possibly offends the views of brother and sister believers, I
respectfully request that if they question my judgment or understanding, they
will not question my good intention or sincerity as a fellow. For those who
agree with my basic points but feel that I somehow fail to grasp the robustness
of the basic Christian perspective, I hope they will at least receive Christ
and Truth as well-meaning, if, even so, poor man’s Christianity. All in
all, I admit I have tried to speak in this work more as a person who doesn’t
claim to know, and less a person who does. Others will have treated these same
questions and issues far more comprehensively and meticulously than myself, so
that I continue to welcome improvement, suggestions and correction from others
on the various topics considered. The actual or potential scope of this study
is, after all, extraordinarily immense – to say the least. If someone says that
on a given point I speak in error, far better that than my unconsciously
wronging the truth or insult a wiser and more sensible person’s intelligence.
While fully acknowledging then my capacity to possibly err, my great devotion
to the principle that it is the truth above all things which “set us free,” will, I hope, be borne out as
much as anything else I have to say.
In forming my own somewhat unusual perspective here
(or, more specifically, the perspective I prefer) I have drawn from, and, as
suited me, distilled arguments from traditional philosophers and theologians
like the pre-Socratics, Aristotle, Pyrrho of Ellis, Philo of Alexandria, the
many Church Fathers, Boethius, Moses Maimonides, St. Thomas Aquinas, Samuel
Clarke, John Locke, Kant, F. H. Bradley, Josiah Royce, and others, including
Asian sources. My focus and selection then are diverse, eclectic and derived
from thinkers and texts who, as a general rule, seem to me to have a
relatively more correct idea than others who might also have been cited or
quoted.
In asking whether philosophy or theology should,
properly speaking, come first as a criteria or method for highest truth, my
assumption is that philosophy takes precedence. Theology, as a form of
advanced rational discourse, is
philosophy’s child. It not uncommonly permits the acceptance of revelations and
dogmas which philosophy (and scientific and scholarly analysis) must usually
forbear from accepting too casually. Yet very interestingly philosophy can be
said to have had its origins in religion, pointing out in support of this the
Memphite Theology of 700 B.C. (with origins perhaps going as far back as two
thousand years earlier.)[4] Their historical beginnings and chronological
connection then between the two branches of study, seems to support the view
that God (or if you prefer the Absolute), whether as reality or a mere
practical conception, lies at the necessary center of rationally coherent and
consistent knowledge.
It would seem a both reasonable, and a scripture
supported assumption also, that God desires us to ourselves desire wisdom, and
to become more wise in our thinking and how we live. But both human experience
(internationally) and an inner sense (which some say itself comes from God)
tells us that our own desire for wisdom must be in accordance with Truth, Love,
Logic, Morals, Justice, and Beauty, and it is by means of these we can come to
acquire wisdom, and a higher understanding and meaning of life. In the interest
of improving and clarifying our understandings then we should not be afraid to
ask meaningful questions which might otherwise seem too offensive or
potentially blasphemous. In fact, we are actually to be blamed for indifference
and loving wisdom less, while promoting irrational fear, to do otherwise. It
seems only right to say that that any theological question or historical
questions concerning religion may be asked and answer attempted if we are not
frivolous in our inquiry, and keep an eye to objectivity, facts, fairness,
logic, and rudimentary morals.
St. Clement of Alexandria (150?-220? A.D.),
a rather eclectic Church Father well versed in classical philosophy and
culture, expresses the crucial significance of Reason with respect to
man’s relationship to God this way:
“(T)hat man in whom reason (logos[5]) dwells is not shifty, not pretentious, but has the
form dictated by reason (logos) and is like God. He is beautiful and does not
feign beauty. That which is true is beautiful; for it too, is God. Such a man
becomes God because God wills it. Rightly, indeed did Heraclitus say ‘Men are
gods, and gods are men: for the same reason is in both.’ That this is a mystery
is clear. God is in man and a man is God, the mediator fulfilling the will of
the Father. The mediator is the Word (logos) who is common to both, being the
Son of God and the Savior of men.”[6]
On grounds such as this, we can affirm and announce
then at the outset that the pursuit of right, purer, and cogent Reason needs to
be seen as lying actively at the heart of this inquiry and study before you. If
God is anything he is the ultimate mind, and we cannot trust our own minds, how
can we begin to know his? The validity of scriptural revelation, on the other
hand, we endeavor as much as possible to avoid having to assume, while
simultaneously qualifying its value as a source of historical knowledge.
I have covered some points and not others in this work
simply out of personal predilection and a desire to emphasize what seems to me
of special significance. Naturally, this does not necessarily imply that points
not covered are not significant. A topic such as the meaning of Baptism or the
Eucharist for example, are of utmost importance to many Christians. Yet here I
speak little, if at all, on these topics. Part of my reason for this is the
Eucharist, etc. has been already so well considered by others, that there is
little (at the time of composing this work at any rate) I feel I need add. At
the same time, also needless to say, the omission or briefly passing over of
many and sundry topics has made a rather ambitious undertaking such as this
more manageable. Yet I think this, under the circumstances, has been
accomplished without seriously detracting from an otherwise adequate and fair
consideration of most of the fundamental questions and concerns relating to
Christian belief.
Last to be mentioned, I use “Christ” rather than
“Messiah” or “Maschiach” as the designation more common, and perhaps one more
appropriate to the largely Greek founded sort of analysis I will so often be
using. Yet I do so not without some real regret, given the more euphonious and
poetical beauty of the Jewish title.[7]
Part I
“The aim of
‘Science’ is to attain conceptions so adequate and exact that we shall never
need to change them.”
~~ William James[8]
“For one to attempt to speak of God in terms more
precise than He Himself has used: -- to undertake such a thing is to embark
upon the boundless, to dare the incomprehensible. He fixed the names of His
nature: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Whatever is sought over and above this is
beyond the meaning of words, beyond the limits of perception, beyond the
embrace of understanding. It cannot be expressed, cannot be reached, cannot be
grasped. The nature of the subject itself is such that it exhausts the meaning
of words, its impenetrable light obscures our mental perception: -- whatever is
without limits exceeds the capacity of our understanding. But in the necessity
of doing this, we beg the indulgence of Him who is all these things: and we
shall venture, we shall seek, and we shall speak.”
~~ St. Hilary of Poitiers,[9]
Though probably not something many bear in mind or even
consider, the term “God” is one far from agreed upon in essence and meaning.
Exactly what it refers to, its basis, its rationale will to some extent differ
and diverge according to a given religion, philosophy or culture -- sometimes
so radically as to mean its opposite. Indeed, it is so charged with numerous
and diverse associations that the word may be unsuitable for who and what I
will be discussing. In what follows, on more than a few occasions the word
“Absolute” (drawing from G. W. F. Hegel and others) would be a more desirable
term because it carries less historical and associative baggage with it, and in
that way is more objective, more value neutral. Even so, I will use “God”
rather than “Absolute,” for the purpose of this work’s larger plan, while in
the meantime requesting readers to understand that in many respects the latter
term is often much more appropriate and precise -- particularly from a
philosophical and objective stand-point.
Although the matter is far from clear, it would seem
historically that the intellectual concept of a “god” or “gods,” preceded the
monotheistic one of “God”: the Old Testament’s record being the notable
exception. But even in the Old Testament, somewhat curiously, God has two
names, “Eloheim” (i.e. God or Chief) and “Ya-he-vey” (Lord), which represent
two apparently distinct manifestations of Him. The two names are understood to
represents originally separate religious traditions which later merged. Perhaps
part of the reason also for two different names is to suggests God’s
indescribability and un-nameability, with a distinction being made between God
as He is versus how we know him in our interaction with him.
Pharaoh Akhenaten’s (or Ikhenaton, 1375-1358 B.C.) one
God, Aten, who antedates the Bible, was both supreme ruler and
the sun.
Ahura Mazda,
introduced by Zarathustra (c. 6th century B.C.), was the one God for
the ancient Persians.
It has been traditional for many Native Americans to
speak of “the Great Spirit.” Otherwise the more pronounced and cultivated forms
of monotheism in western culture do not seem to have come about till the
theologies of Judaism, neo-Platonism, Christianity and later Islam were more
fully developed. It ought to be pointed out, however, that the teachings
regarding Brahman, (not much later than the earliest Bible) of the earlier
Hindus (800-500 B.C.), taken apart from the other Vedas, contain some of the
most well thought and devised doctrines of monotheism ever enunciated.
Most are in some way familiar with how the gods of the
various well known pagan religions acted, in say Egyptian, Babylonian,
Egyptian, Hindu and Greek societies, as handed down in stories and myths.
Sometimes they act as a force for justice and benevolence, at others they are
simply more powerful, yet nevertheless flawed beings, compared to us.[10] Zoroastrianism saw them, that is the “devas,” as
devils. The early Christian church was quick to point out that people serving
different gods in the Roman Empire was a source of disunity among peoples. If
nothing else, monotheism seems to have been a logical development towards the
means of resolving this problem, and what were before thought of as gods were
relegated to the status of (usually) demons. Although there were good, powerful
angels they were not to be confused with what had been known as the gods,
unless perhaps the fallen angels were meant. Otherwise the gods’ other fate was
to become characters in common story telling and folklore.
Yet whatever the actual history, the monotheistic, as
opposed to polytheistic, view seems originally to have been the exception, and
for most societies the universe was ruled and created by gods, rather than God.
Certainly in pagan religions some gods were viewed as greater than others.
Nonetheless, even the greatest of the gods was invariably an individual
dependant on the assistance of some other god or gods to carry out his or her
reign. The reason for this (assuming the premise) apparently would be that it
is was intellectually easier and more practical for people (certainly as objective
thinkers and communicators) to conceptualize an “important” god or gods, than
an absolute, unchallengeable, and completely independent God. The concept of a
single God by contrast, seems to suggest a higher level of culture and
intelligence that took mankind time to develop. [11]
A noun or pronoun is a name or label for someone or
something that we believe to exist (or believe possibly to exist) and is in
some way or other traceable to a physical or intuitive cause. So to define
something we simply join and frame our who or whatever it is by means of a
predicate to whatever name or label we start with. Definitions of God can be
brought about by connotation as when someone says God is [i.e. connotes]
“One” (or e.g. God is or implies omniscience), or by denotation, if we
say One is [i.e. denotes] God (or e.g. omniscience denotes God.) Whether or not
a connotation can serve as a valid means of describing God, or whether
denotation can serve as a means of “proving” God (i.e. proving Him to be
whatever is predicated) is simply up to the person making the decision to
believe or not. God cannot be known by reason, says Boethius (480?-524? A.D.)
because he is a simple.[12] Deduction (and reason itself) assumes and begins with
simples (out of which predicates are formed), consequently reason cannot prove
what it already assumes. Therefore we are in a sense left to establish our
primary intellectual knowledge and understanding of God based on these
connotative or denotative predicates, which we can then assume (in earnest or
for theory’s sake) and then reason on the basis of them to secondary and or
speculative predications. The value we then place on these secondary
predications can be used to either bolster, clarify or enhance our primary
descriptions or proofs, or else it can be denied (given God's most pure
simplicity) that either are permissible or even worthwhile. The upshot of all
this seems to be that God, understood noetically and objectively, is a
problematical concept.
Consider the following statements and inferences:
Note. Before
going further, for simplicity’s we will assume that the initial or first given
predicate (as listed here “A.”) is true, though, of course, arguments could be
made for its opposite. On the surface, a predicate like [Omniscience connotes
God] would seem to be false. Yet because the term “God” is contingent, this
could be said to make the predicate contingent, hence theoretically
[Omniscience connotes God] could be true. If such a predicate statement based
on “term uncertainty” is possibly true it presumably is possibly false also.
“Term uncertainty” refers not to absolute uncertainty but to human, objective
uncertainty.[13] As used here, “God” refers to actual God, and
“Omniscience” refers to actual omniscience, not their mere concepts.
If we say, as in our first example here, [Omniscience
connotes God] and if we assume this True[14] (and the same for all the initial predicates which
follow) then:
A.[Omniscience connotes God] (theoretically could but)[15]does not imply B. [God connotes Omniscience]
and
A. [Omniscience connotes God] does not imply B. [God
denotes Omniscience]
A. [Omniscience denotes God] does not imply B. [God
connotes Omniscience]
A. [Omniscience denotes God] does not imply B. [God
denotes Omniscience]
A. [God connotes Omniscience] does not imply B.
[Omniscience connotes God]
A. [God connotes Omniscience] implies B. [Omniscience
denotes God]
A. [God denotes Omniscience] does not imply B.
[Omniscience connotes God]
A. [God denotes Omniscience] does not imply B.
[Existence connotes God]
Now even if God cannot adequately be known through mere
predication and inferences arising from them, it still remains that God may
still possibly be known based on
a)
assumed values (which are
heart-soul felt in origin), and secondary cognitive inferences (which may be
practical ones) following from those values;
b)
the Spirit; or
c)
all or some combination
of all three, heart,[16] intellect, and Spirit. It is interesting to observe
how in our seeking knowledge of God we try to label, describe, instantiate, and
prove him, consistent with what? With the same methods for knowing truth by
which we know truth otherwise. This is to say the concept of God, like every
other concepts we know is contingent for it’s understanding on other concepts.
For many who have tried to predicate him, God is like
light. We know him based on his effects and cannot be said to know him by his
true essence. Further we only know these effects through his invisible and
mysterious presence in us. We therefore cannot see him any more than we can
actually see seeing. We can think of ourselves seeing, and see others seeing
but these are representations of one sort or another, the act and nature of
seeing alone and by itself we cannot see. Until we could see “seeing”
therefore, how could we see God who is presumably the source and greater than
seeing?
If God is infinite, eternal, omnipotent, and
omniscient, as, for example, he[17] is ordinarily assumed to be, then it would seem simply
impossible for we who are finite to sufficiently define him, and therefore
speak of him objectively. Moreover, it
would seem also we cannot properly use predicates with God in an assured,
objective sense, but only as practical constructs, which must be qualified, or
else as explicitly acknowledged
subjective belief. Plotinus, for instance, might say: God cannot
properly speaking be called "I am" because then he would then have a
quality, i.e. existence. All properties and qualities derive from God, but God
himself, being the source of them, transcends all properties and qualities. We
don’t know whether we are in a position to ascribe predicates, which are both
comprehensible and accurate, with respect to God. One argument goes thusly:
speech implies subject predicate, predicates are compounds, God is not a
compound, therefore God cannot be spoken of.
If God cannot be spoken of then he cannot be known objectively except in
theory.
We will assert then here a fundamental objection to
attempting to define God objectively, or at least attempting to define him in a
way that is not based on speculation or assumed givens.
“Dionysus’ Mystical Teaching” (also called
“Pseudo-Dionysus”), written by an anonymous author, (possibly a Syrian monk of
the late 5th or early 6th century), is a very slim tract,
being hardly more than a common chapter in length. Yet it had a decisive
influence on the development of scholastic philosophy and theology.[18] In this work the author divides our knowledge of God
into two kinds: affirmative theology where we construct our knowledge of
God based on things most like him (the sun or a great mountain for example);
and negative theology where we start with things least like God (a
created object for example) and begin, one at a time, of removing them from our
definition of him. The negative
approach the author believes, and many who came after him, is the preferred of
the two. He states:
“So first of all we remove from God everything that has
no substance, and everything that has no existence, beginning with the most
remote; for such a ‘thing’ is more remote than those things which exist but do
not live. And then we take away these existing but not living things, for they
are further off than something that exists and lives. After that we eliminate
the existing, living things which have no feeling, for they are further off
than those that can feel. Next go feeling things that have no reason or
understanding, for they are more remote than those which possess both. And
together we remove from God everything that is physical, and all that has to do
with bodily matters like shape, form quality, size, weight, position,
visibility, sensitivity, action, and suffering; the disorderly, fleshly greed;
the complications of material passions; the weakness controlled by haphazard
senses; the necessity of light; all breeding and corrupting and dividing and
suffering; and all the passing moments of time. For he is none of these things,
nor has he any of those things, nor any other thing that we know by our
senses.”[19]
When we have done this we will find that God is above
every other kind of description. “For the perfect and unique cause of all is
necessity beyond compare with the highest of all imaginable heights, whether by
affirmation or denial.”
Yet even earlier St. Gregory of Nyssa (335?-394? A.D.)
had written: “Human thought, busying itself with solicitous inquiry through
such reasoning as is invaluable to it, reaches out and touches His inaccessible
and sublime nature; for its discernment is neither so sharp nor so clear that
it can see the invisible, nor is it yet so remote of approach that it is unable
to catch a glimpse of what it is seeking. Not that the human mind is able to
see precisely what that nature is, about which it is reasoning, but from the
knowledge of the properties which that nature has and the properties which it
has not, it sees as much only as can be seen…From the negation of properties
not inherent in that nature, and from the confusion of what may piously be
inferred about that nature, the human mind grasps something of what is.”[20]
Similarly, Novatian (?-258 A.D.): "Whatever you
would state in regard to God, you would really only be shedding some light upon
some condition or His power, and not upon Himself. What could you fittingly
either say or think of Him who is greater that all words or thought?…“We must
think of Him as being that which cannot be understood either in quality or in
quantity, and of which we cannot possibly conceive.”[21]
Philosophers like Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), Avicenna
(Ibn Sina, 980-1037), Averroës (Ibn Rushd, 1126-1198), and St. Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274 ) say we can speak of God rationally with precision in a sense that
is at least useful to us, yet must do so with qualification and rational circumspection. But when we they assert with something more
than probabilistic certitude they fail to make a distinction between subjective
and objective knowledge, so that while what they assert may be subjectively
true, and objectively plausible, their arguments are not objectively
irrefutable. Further they do grant that there are things about God that are
necessarily unknowable, and cannot avoid predicating God, which is to say fit
God into human terms, language, and representation when it is arguably a matter
of opinion whether such are adequate, and if so how much.[22] From the perspective of fairest rational objectivity,
and with the most minimal assumptions, what then we conceptualize and
rationally arrive at as adequate conceptions of God, would seem, are bound to
fall decisively short of our intellect’s capacity for truth compared to what
else we might know. At least the potential risk of error is such that a more
cautious approach is warranted.
While in one sense this might seem disappointing we
cannot (except perhaps on a practical level)
adequately comprehend God, it can be argued that, in this very special
instance, and for necessary moral reasons, our inability to fully comprehend
something intellectually (in this case God) provides us with a life-saving
humility, and were we otherwise able to rationally comprehend the almighty it
would puff up our pride and undermine our understanding of the nature of our
relationship to him. To use a loose
analogy, better it is that one of our limbs know its own function and
relationship to ourselves rather than have a full grasp of who we are. Were it
even capable of doing so, it is not necessary or desirable that my finger fully
know who I am since its capacity to live and function are entirely subservient
to myself, and would have no true being or purpose outside its role as a
physiological appendage. If my finger rejected this conclusion, and it were
possible for it to quit my person and start a life on its own somewhere else,
it would lose its greater power and purpose, thereby becoming less than it
otherwise would be. While this example of a sentient limb is conjectural and
assumes a lot, nevertheless, it offers what seems a plausible theory for
explaining the dependency of our knowing upon God, and consequently our
inability to know or prove him with objective necessity, at least in our
fallen state.[23]
Yet though we here take the position that God, due to
his profound nature and our limited one, is objectively unknowable (except as a
mere theory), we will go ahead and assume that it must be possible for us to
have a hypothetical understanding of him and that it is possible to
prove him a true notion. Otherwise, by definition, we will have to dismiss the
notion of God entirely. Some of course do this, though not necessarily for good
epistemological reasons. Consequently, we will want to argue the existence and
reality of God for us based on 1) what seem to be his effects, 2) the need and
incomparable value for God as a concept to explain what is otherwise inexplicable,
3) both 1 and 2, bolstered and circumscribed by coherent and consistent
reasoning and plausibility. Part then of understanding the notion of God
involves explaining what otherwise cannot be explained, while at the same time
making such characterizations (i.e. 1 and 2) consistent both with each other
and with what other facts we do know. This will still leave God as merely a
theory – again, and I emphasize, intellectually speaking. But Christian
faith is not dependant on the refinements of the intellect. And though we say
God is only a theory intellectually, we can, despite this, say God is not any
less plausible than other cosmological and epistemological theories. At the
same time there are strong practical arguments in support of the notion of God.
Moreover, the argument for God explains and accounts for much else, while
accepting the converse argument (i.e. that there is no God), makes our
explanations of the universe more strained – though this, of itself, still
doesn’t overcome the arguments of the rational atheist.
St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.) argues we must first
believe in God, that is assume God, and then reason. Yet he adds: “Far be it
from God to hate in us that faculty by which He made us so much more excellent
than other living creatures. Far be it, I say, that we should so believe that
we would neither accept nor seek a reason for our belief; for if we had not
rational souls we could not believe at all. In some points, then that pertain
to salvific doctrine, which we cannot grasp by reason, -- though someday we
shall,-- let reason be preceded by faith, which cleanses the heart, so that the
heart may receive and retain the light of great reason; and this too is
reasonable. Therefore, it is reasonable for the Prophet to say: ‘Unless you
believe you shall not understand.’ In this passage the Prophet undoubtedly
makes a distinction between believing and understanding and advised us to
believe first so that we might afterwards understand what we believe. Hence it
is reasonably demanded that faith precede reason.” [24] Once we have faith then we are free to use our
rational faculties with which God has blessed us, and indeed it is right that
we do so. It only makes sense to say God allows us to question who He is if we
do so rationally, humbly, respectfully, fairly, impartially – because we love
wisdom which can only be a good thing. Even so, reason is not always so
encouraging to faith, and in this way faith can be (though not necessarily so)
a cross to reason, just as abstinence or mortification are crosses to the flesh
(or can be.)
If God cannot be intellectually conceived or believed
except by faith and speculation, there are what we might call epistemological
roles and cognitive manifestations (if not attributes) of God which seem to
strongly imply, if not actually necessitate, his reality and existence. Again,
the idea here is that we can somehow both prove and know him by these roles
(denotations earlier) and manifestations (connotations), i.e. describe what he
is or might be, and infer his reality from these apparent effects and epistemic
principles. Or if we cannot prove him by these roles and manifestations they do
at least give both worthwhile and encouraging grounds for supporting our belief
in him. In this sense, God can be said to exist because we need him. Voltaire’s
adage that if there were no God it would be necessary to invent him, while
usually interpreted as a piece of sarcasm, if, looked at differently, is an
epistemologically sound argument. If we don’t allow for the existence of God, the
basis of rational and scientific knowledge becomes a great deal more
convoluted, if not flat out insoluble.
Yet again if “God” is desirable as an intellectual
construct, does that make it a necessary one?
St. Anselm (1022-1190) and Renée Descartes’ (1596-1650)
answer to this is yes, and they offered the following ontological arguments:
(Anselm) If there is someone or something greater than
all else (say the universe) than that someone or something is God.
For such as Kant such reasoning is unpersuasive in
establishing God’s necessity. But such a reaction to theology is not so strange when we realize that cognitive and
apodictic necessity eludes us everywhere else. As Arcesilaus (c.315-242
B.C.), Pyrrho of Ellis (c.365-c.270 B.C.), and their followers, and at a later
date (unintentionally) Hegel, and then Bradley, showed, all our
knowledge is contingent and that there is really nothing which we can
demonstrate or assert such as possesses indisputable necessity. The kind of
necessity, metaphysical and otherwise, historically insisted on in pre-modern
theological arguments simply will not do.[25]
Yet if God is problematical as a necessary and
objective notion, what then might we as mere mortals say for and about God?
The following are further theistic conceptions of note which we might at least
consider as hypotheses.
To Zeno of Citium (334-262 B.C.), the founder of Stoicism and a
materialist, God is a fiery ether which passes through the universe like a
honeycomb. He is known and exists to us by means of reason confirmed by
experience. His essence is one, but is differentiated in a variety of things.
He may be called, Nature, aforethought, or Fate. In Chrysippus’ (c.280-c.206
B.C.) view (also a Stoic and a materialist) God is known through reason. Reason
itself is a physical (if rarefied) power (pneuma) which cuts through and
moves all things, but with the understanding that God’s (or True Reason)
supercedes all other reason. This said the heart’s logic is as important as the
mind’s in all this. Even Chrysippus himself makes the former the seat of
intelligence rather than the latter.
Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), from Cordoba, Spain, and
successor to a long tradition of Jewish sages versed in Western rationalism, as
well as someone who benefited from the Aristotelian revival and Islamic
enlightenment of the early Middle Ages, asserts that no definition can be given
of God, nor can any attribute be predicated of him except loosely and for
purposes of moral instruction. All persons and things which can be expressed
are composites. God is not a composite therefore God cannot be adequately
expressed by us. God can, in what we might think of as a practical sense, be
known only his actions as attributes, otherwise His essence is unknowable.
Maimonides does however allow of saying that God is a incorporeal pure unity.
If God were corporeal, he would be finite. What are spoken of as God’s
attributes (such as Justice, Power, Wisdom, etc.) are really all one and the
same thing namely Himself. God is known by his actions, or, again as we might
say today as pragmatists, his effects. Yet we know God better by what he is not
rather than what he is. Because God
(and his angels, though differently) are incorporeal they are seen only through
intellectual perception.
For Aquinas, although Reason is not of itself
sufficient, certain necessary truths can be brought to man’s understanding by
means of it. Theology is a sacred science which accepts principles revealed by
God, all other sciences are the handmaiden. It more than any other branches of
study is devoted to a final end then other sciences. Its end is eternal
beatitude, and those who possess true charity will be the most beatified. He
states: “If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no
longer any means of proving the articles of faith by argument, but only of
answering his objections – if he has any –against faith. Since faith rests upon
infallible truth, and since the contrary of truth ca never be demonstrated, it
is clear that he proofs brought against faith are not demonstrations, but
arguments that can be answered.” [26]
We can know God from his effects, and from his effects
we can know his essence. God is the reducing of all things to one principle,
just as Nature is the reducing of all nature (in its various manifestations) to
one principle. His divine essence is Being itself. Being in thought then stems
from the divine essence. Although one in reality, God is many in idea. God can
be seen only by the intellect, but not by senses and imagination. To see the
essence of God via the intellect is made possible by grace, not nature. God, by
his grace, must literally unite himself to a persons’ intellect for them to
know him. Our thoughts, when rational, are manifestations of his own thought,
which, when applied to him, participate in his own contemplation of himself.
John Duns Scotus (1265?- 1308?) held that the human
intellect in this life has no immediate or intuitive knowledge of God.[27] Further God cannot be known by this or that essence.
He is the essence of all essences (to which we might also infer that he is the
will of all wills.) If our knowledge of God is merely negative, it is no
knowledge at all or else inadequate. Being as we know it does not apply to God
because all being as we know it derives from him. The most perfect concept of
God we are capable of is that which we obtain by conceiving of all the
perfections in their highest degree. Yet this most perfect conception will
ultimately fall short of his being given his infinite nature and the
restrictions and limitations of our own means of knowing and expressing
ourselves. This said natural reason can, nonetheless, demonstrate the
existence, unity, and infinite perfection of God. God is the necessary basis of
all contingent truths. As the source of all possibility, God is the implied and
necessary basis of all contingent truths. All possibilities have their
existence because of him, and consequently he himself could hardly be only
probable.[28]
Boethius, whom we cited earlier, is a pivotal and
ironic figure in the history of philosophy, representing the tail end of Greek
and Roman classical culture, and yet who (for his locality) lived in a
predominantly Christian era. Though scholars are inclined to see him as a Christian
in sentiment, his most well known theological writing, the Consolations of
Philosophy, contains no overt reference to Christ. This I take to be the
result of his desire for consummate objectivity and purest clarity in his
thinking. As Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) said “the mind is pagan,” and on
this premise Boethius (in the thought he expresses) seems be creating both an
image and intellectual vision that doesn’t see mind as capable of anything
beyond the “pagan” view, yet an image and vision which, nonetheless, is fully
compatible and supportive of Christian belief.
He speaks of God as
“lord, maker, source, path, goal.”[29] These assumed characterizations (or roles and
manifestations) I will use to construct a basic, working conception of God here.
For one thing, these offer us appropriate means to establish God as an
objectively legitimate and desirable, if not absolutely necessary concept.
Using these somewhat religious terms as the basis for
epistemological-theological constructs also seems fitting given the Christian
premise of this work. While Boethius’ exact and intended meaning of “lord,
maker, source, path, goal” might be somewhat different than my usage, they will
despite this serve as a very suitable terminology on which to establish a
better understanding of “God” as a sound, reasonable and objective concept, if
not an absolutely necessary one. In addition these proposed primary definitions
provide us with an elementary, yet useful preliminary understanding of what,
for many, a philosopher’s God is.[30]
a. LORD
“It is not mind
we should want to know: We Should Know The Thinker.”
~~~Kaushitaki Upanishad[31]
“No man has existed, nor will exist, who has plain
knowledge about the gods and the questions I discuss. For even if someone
happened by chance to say what is true, he still would not know that he did so.
Yet everybody thinks he knows.”
~~~ Xenophanes of Colophon, as contained in Hippolytus’
Refutation of all Heresies. I.1
Before we can determine whether the assertion “God” (in
one sense or other) exists, or is that this statement is “true,” it is only
mete to ask what we mean when we say an assertion or belief is true or not to
begin with, and what is referred to when we speak of “truth” (i.e. contingent truth), versus, say, “Truth” (absolute
truth.)
Judgment, on one level or
other, is necessary for us to assert there is reality, and to describe anything
as being real without both judgment and someone to make and assert that
judgment is to make reference to something that, in our experience at any rate,
is not possible. One could, naturally,
have a sense of reality or what is real without having to make a formal
assertion about what they know or realize. But such haphazard states of consciousness
need not concern us.
An assertion is said to be “true” (i.e. contingent)
inasmuch as it is deemed to be in accordance with reality, experience, logic,
reason, morals, the opinions of others, or whatever criteria of knowledge we
deem most correct. A “truth” may be subjective, objective in character or both.
Inasmuch as all “truths” (as we know them) come from fallible mortals, they are
merely opinion, though, among more rational and scientifically minded people
objective truths are, communally speaking, almost always thought to be
superior or more true than subjective truths.
“Truth,” (with upper case “T”), by contrast, refers to
a statement or belief that is absolutely true and more than mere
opinion. As a belief, a “Truth,” in theory could be either subjective,
objective or both. Yet the more important question here is whether we are
capable of knowing “Truth” in the first place. My own response to this offhand,
with some qualification, is no – at least not objectively. It is possible we
may know absolute truth subjectively. But, if so, we are incapable of
adequately establishing such knowledge objectively. Without someone or
something “divine” to somehow validate it as such, we have no way of knowing
that a subjective belief is absolutely true, at least objectively speaking,
since if we could it would require invoking thoughts and language that are
contingent in order to know and describe them.
The vast majority of people no doubt do not consider
all that they believe to be mere opinion. Some of what they believe they assume
to be true in a sense that is more than mere opinion. For example, most people
assume Vietnam and the planet Venus exist, and would not think to question the
fact. This belief would be considered “a truth,” and if it wasn’t true in an
apodictic sense, it would be seen as “true enough” to make it something more
than mere opinion. Yet while they might not care about the nice distinctions of
philosophers, close examination will reveal that they are wrongly assuming that
certain criteria confers on certain judgments (which they make) the quality of
necessity, or at minimum a very high degree of probability. Assertions such as that there is Australia,
or there is a moon should, it would seem, be spoken of as practical truths, but
not as practical or absolute truths which are strictly necessary. Absolute
necessary truths are beyond our pronouncing, objectively speaking.
Practical truths which are necessary would be analytical statements, such as a
square has four sides, and perhaps also mathematical statements like 7 + 5 = 12.
A “truth”, or a supposed “fact” is something both
asserted to and asserted by at least one person. There is no assertion or
decision (and hence no truth) without someone to make them. A non-asserted or
non-adjudged truth is like an unknown or undetermined fact, which is to say
either a contradiction, a mere potentiality, or else something useless.[32] This applies to both judgment/assertions of fact and
value. A truth connotes a judgment, and a judgment connotes a person. The
person then who makes a judgment (i.e. holds a belief), or makes an assertion,
and thereby has selected the criteria for validity, is what we can here call an
arbiter.
If we know something as “true” (as in a practical
truth), and or if we can know “Truth” (i.e. absolute knowledge or belief
somehow greater than mere opinion), who (or what) says what a “truth” or
a “Truth” is, or whether something is or is not true? If we can establish or
know a fact or correct conclusion, how does one know what criterion (or
criteria) is or are the correct ones? Who (or what) will tell us?
If 7 + 5 = 12, this assertion is only true if someone
validates it as such. It will not do to say 7
+ 5 = 12 is true and no one believes or asserts it is true, or that it
can be true without there being an authority who is a person, and therefore an
arbiter. The assertion is true, as a statement which has meaning for more than
one person, only if someone says it has. It may well be that 7 + 5
= 12 is true in some sense without
anybody saying so. Just the same, it has no truth value for us unless
(somewhere along the line) there is someone to both assert and validate
it as a truth. “7 + 5 = 12” as a fact which is not asserted, is a fact which,
although it may well be true, is not known by anyone, and therefore has no
value or meaning. In cases where we say
logic or calculation tells us something is true, this takes place only because
we have admitted logic and calculation based on others and or ourselves
concluding at the outset that these are valid criteria or rules for truth
determination. Logic and calculations are not what we think of as persons,
yet they can only be believed if a person assumes and to that extent adjudges
and accepts their being valid tools for truth determination. Logic then is not
a valid truth determination tool and has no meaning unless someone judges it to
be appropriate for such. But unless and until that validity and meaning were
assumed and accepted, logic could not be said actually possess them. Truth as
we know it then must involve a person.
Allowing that there is Truth beyond mere opinion, and
if then there is such a thing as final and incontrovertible Truth (or a Truth),
there must be someone to both to assert and adjudge it to be such. If it is
possible to speak of a final and absolute Truth there must be a someone
who states and decides this very special sort of claim or pronouncement. Such a
person we can call an ultimate arbiter.
In brief, we might say:
Does someone decide whether something is True?
If no, there is no Truth beyond opinion.
If someone does decide whether something is True, does
that someone answer to someone else?
If no, then that someone is an ultimate arbiter.
If yes, then there is an ultimate arbiter that person
must answer to.
As a practical matter we (as individuals) who think
that there is such a thing as Truth will choose who we believe to be an
ultimate arbiter. Our choice of ultimate arbiter, whether made newly or else
implied by past choices, might be ourselves, someone else, or God. In turn, a
given person might invoke any one or all of these as arbiter depending on
circumstances and or the claim asserted or made.
Clearly the reason why the ultimate arbiter (in its
highest and purest sense) must be God (and or the Absolute) is that we need
someone most knowing and most understanding to make right (or the most right)
judgments. At the same time, it is not unreasonable to define God, for
conjectural purposes at least, as what such a being or person is. Of course,
anyone we choose as ultimate arbiter we will be inclined to characterize as
most knowing and most understanding. By the notion of God we mean someone who
is more knowing and more understanding than all others. We might identify God
as this or that one, but according to our otherwise common understanding God is
the single individual or entity who is all wise and omniscient. Why can’t we
ourselves or anyone else other than God be the ultimate arbiter? Because if we
assume that all reality can somehow be known, the one person who could be
omniscient (by definition) must be God.[33] If there is no God to decide all of reality, all
ultimate and final questions of true and not true, all such questions of fact
and not fact, all such questions of good versus bad, then there is no absolute
truth, no ultimate reality, and arguably as well no reality (beyond opinion) at
all.
This at least is the argument and point of view I wish
to propose and explore here
Perhaps someone will say we can know objective truth in
a way that is more than mere opinion, and without the need of “God.” If we take
this view, what criterion do we use to determine such truth?
a) We could believe there is truth (whether trivial or
profound), as for example when we speak of a fact, conviction, or judgment),
but deny our ability to know it (either because we are deceived, skeptical, or
suspend our judgment about it.)
b) We could believe there is truth, and there may be a
way of knowing it.
If we have an assertion (whether held by a single
individual or more than one person) that something is true, then there must be
someone who by some standard or rule determines that the assertion in question
is true or false (or partly true, or partly false, etc.)
So let's say "Alfred" or else a community
which we can call “experts,” is this person. Who then designates this person(s)
as being the one who determines the truth of the assertion? Themselves or
someone else? If themselves they would be the ultimate arbiter. If “someone else” we might well ask the same
question about this “someone else.” Who designated this someone else as
arbiter? Upon these questions we follow a chain of authority until we arrive at
our ultimate designator (of arbiters.)
We are, of course, assuming that any of these assertion are actually
true or false. If we say all assertions these people are decide are merely a
matter of opinion, then an ultimate arbiter isn’t necessary. An ultimate
arbiter is, however, necessary if we assume mutually understood
truth, and that assertions which do not conflict with reality are possible. Not
only a purportedly absolute truth, but a purportedly objective
"truth" without there accompanying it someone to validate it as being
such cannot be anything more than opinion or a mere subjective truth. [34]
How else does one distinguish between practical truth
(i.e. more desirable opinion), and real truth? I defy anyone to do it ~~ you cannot make the distinction
successfully unless and until we bring in someone as an ultimate arbiter. If an
assertion is true, and (as an assertion) needs someone to assert it,
then if they are not an ultimate arbiter, then they are merely expressing
opinion. If we choose to abandon reason, how else will we be able to know or
distinguish between whether a claim is actually true or merely opinion and
conjecture?
The ordinary difference between an opinion and a truth
is that a truth is something that fulfills certain objective criteria. However,
our choice of criteria, including reason, are themselves opinion. Who ever
chooses the criteria and then decides whether an opinion rises to the status of
truth is an arbiter. If there is no truth, then what I say about an arbiter or
ultimate arbiter can be ignored. But if there is an opinion that is true, that
is if there is a belief that is consistent or not inconsistent with reality
(assuming there is such a thing as "reality") such belief requires an
arbiter. Now an arbiter may use reason to arrive at his choice (that is arrive
at his judgment), but who then will say then that reason is an ultimate
criterion? This would presumably have to be an ultimate arbiter.
As one of the foremost criterions of judgment, reason
(roughly speaking “an intelligent person’s understanding of how to apply logic
to experience, and including their actually doing so”), doesn't just “happen.”
Reason requires someone who reasons. Even the logical calculations of a
computer have no bearing in beliefs (or true/false assertions) unless a
“someone’s” judgment is involved. Reason is generally accepted among more
thinking people to be a proper standard or method by which to resolve
differences of opinion. Yet reason itself cannot rid us of the need of an
arbiter. Someone must finally decide and tells us that reason is a proper
standard, now matter how useful and reliable experience and intuition tells us
it is. Whether or not the arbiter concurs with reason or experience, we
ultimately will not believe something is true (beyond opinion) an arbiter says
or asserts that it is so.
A person could claim themselves as ultimate arbiter,
but this would only have meaning as more than opinion if another person agreed
with them, which if that took place, would render the judgment as objective between
themselves. Granted a given person could think they themselves were the
ultimate arbiter, perhaps even be correct. But unless someone else agreed with
them, anyone else would assume such a view to be merely subjective opinion and
probably not true beyond that.
As people who express ourselves, and by this means make
judgments we are like a painter's assistant, say working on the painter’s
project when he is not in the studio. We can speculate on how he wants
something depicted, but will not really know unless and until he returns to the
studio to see the work we have done for him in his absence. For one reason or other, we have faith that
we are painting what he wants painted, and doing this painting in a way he
wants it done. Yet we will not really know whether our faith is
justified until he sees what we have done and judges it.[35] One odd
implication of this view is that it in effect says we do not really know
that 2 + 2 = 4, and indeed perhaps never did.
What we have done is believed it to be true, and in effect had a certain
faith that someone or something will justify both our arithmetical assertion
and our faith in it, all the while assuming certain steps and method as
consistent and reflective of true judgment.
The definition of an ultimate arbiter people can
formulate and perhaps to some extent agree upon. Yet whether their
characterization or definition of arbiter is correct, whether it is true or
not, we, paradoxically, would not know unless our arbiter pronounced it such.
In which case the truth of the matter would be pronounced in a manner that no
one could refute it. How pronunciation of absolute truth (or falsehood) by an ultimate arbiter might
take place would depend on the ultimate arbiter. Even so, it is not
unreasonable to say we can form a legitimate or plausible opinion or practical
idea of how the ultimate arbiter does this, though understandably we can expect
people’s views would or might differ on this point. This understood, unless and
until such "arbiter" is somehow made manifest and acceptable to all
concerned, all assertions are opinions which may or may not be true. Otherwise,
common assertions of truth and falsehood are accepted on the basis of pragmatic
criteria, unless and until our ultimate arbiter can be established and
pronounce on their validity as something more than this.
If say "we” all agree that logic or reason is the
highest criteria of truth," then this “we” in effect becomes the ultimate
arbiter. However, reason itself might object that this “we” cannot be the
ultimate arbiter because this “we” is a group made up of fallible individuals.
It could be argued that there might be “gods” (or if you like “experts”) who
together act as ultimate arbiter. Yet even so, only in their united agreement
and judgment as one would they arrive at truth determination, such as in the
case of a committee of judges.[36] If God is two
(or more) who or what holds them together? Then who or whatever that something
is would be God. In the case of a committee of judges we might say what rules
is the laws of procedure (or such), but laws cannot function until an arbiter
appoints them. No committee then could have come together by rational or
natural principle unless someone had
the authority or power to be the ultimate arbiter to begin with, and by that
power authorize rational or natural principle as true. Rational or natural
principle, as we know them, need someone to pronounce their validity and
supremacy. At the same time they must be stated. This someone who states is the
ultimate arbiter, and it would seem to follow that if there is no advanced,
pre-ordained rule of, say, rational or natural principle, than there must be an
ultimate arbiter which precedes and validates all rational and natural
principle. One is inclined to think of this arbiter as one God,[37] but, at present, we need not insist on this.
If there is more than one
reality (or let’s say universe) there may or may not be someone who knows those
realities (universes) in his one person. Now if there is such a person he might
know them in a way consistent with true reality or might know those realities
merely as a matter of his personal perspective and opinion of them. If he knew
these multiple realities as or in their true reality, and if he knew all true
realities (which there might be), that person would be God (i.e. “our
omniscience connotes God” again.)
If we deny there is God who can act as the ultimate
arbiter, and say instead that ourselves are the standard for final truth, we
can do this, except how would we know we were right except arbitrarily? To say
we, of and by ourselves, can validate our own judgment as being absolutely true
(as some most certainly do) is objectively speaking meaningless. We can say we
believe such and such, but we cannot say that our belief is true,
because by invoking the notion of truth we are invoking a common standard or
arbiter who proclaims the validity and soundness (or invalidity and or
unsoundness) of whatever is asserted.
The key term in addressing questions as to the identity
of the ultimate arbiter is “justified.” What standard(s) is invoked to justify
a belief is invariably a matter of someone's choice. That there is one truth
potentially knowable and agreeable to all has been used as a connotative
argument for God, since only God would be that someone to decide what the
standard or criteria of truth is. Otherwise, standards of true versus false
belief are decided by given communities or ourselves as individuals. Hence, the
necessity of God, as many philosophers have argued since there would be
otherwise be no absolute independent authority of truth for the any and all of
the universe, and the criteria of truth and falsehood would be decided by
someone less than God, and hence imply criteria less than Truth qualified.
Without God there is no objective knowledge that can truly be characterized as
necessary truth, and instead would leave us only with objective truth that is,
at best, only relatively or pragmatically necessary. This would include even
analytical and tautological propositions. Again criteria that are chosen by
anyone less than God are ultimately subjective or at best of only practical,
and non-absolute validity, including even the most elementary assertions (such
as the belief that a given belief can be true or false.)
Truth and justice without
God then makes truth and justice subjective; objectivity being merely (as
generally understood and accepted) a superior form of subjectivity. With God,
it is at least hypothecated that truth and justice are pure objective notions,
or at least notions superior to human deficiency and limitations. Only if we
presuppose God can we say there is absolute truth, whether that truth can be
understood subjectively, objectively or both. But notice, we must pre-suppose,
and this pre-supposition is a faith, not itself irrefutably confirmed
knowledge. As Aristotle, in Posterior Analytics, says, unless we already
know something to begin with we cannot learn or determine anything.[38] For those who believe in
God this pre-supposition is no problem, yet they must respect the logical
objections of opponents who might say that such pre-supposition is a subjective
belief, and cannot be used to validate itself, at least if the unbeliever
chooses to see it that way.
If we believe in God, we can believe God will justify
our belief. If not we can say any and all beliefs are subjective. In this sense
the justification, as a practical matter for us between humans, is ultimately
formed by people’s assent, except for those who choose to believe in God, in
which case, the justification, for them is already established. But they cannot
characterize such “God” belief to a non-believer as anything more than
subjective, which objection a reasonable believer will (if he is fair) concede
as being (objectively) just. [39]
Until God (somehow and this is possible) shows up to
say “this is Truth,” we decide what is Truth or truth, and any such
decisions between people are ultimately subjective, that is, certainly, if we
desire to be consistent. Subjective belief does not imply a given such belief
is not absolutely true, only that it requires God or the Absolute's validation
to make it so. Subjective belief may then be demonstrated as absolutely true if
God “somehow” manifests Himself and validates to the acceptance of all
concerned that it is absolutely true. Until then it is just a subjective
belief. Whether such manifestation (or, if you like revelation) is forthcoming,
has already taken place, or is even possible, is open to question. But
apparently only such manifestation could establish a belief as both objectively
and apodictically true, in a truly absolute and more than subjective sense.[40]
Looking at all this from a different perspective, let's
assume there is an all powerful God. If it were possible that he would have the
veto power, so to speak, over any other sentient beings assertions of potential
truth (including the most matter of fact kinds of belief such as “I exist,” or
“I am presently at such and such a location.”), this might be one sense in
which he could assert his authority as ultimate arbiter. It would not follow,
however, that because one person could somehow change the thoughts of another
that he would necessarily be the ultimate arbiter. With someone who brainwashes
another he merely changes the persons opinion, by means of manipulating their
information source or affect the person’s thought processes. An ultimate
arbiter would be able to actually change the truth status of a person’s belief,
without needing to manipulate our personal or psychological thought processes.
Despite these arguments, God as arbiter must be
something chosen for the simple reason that in theory we could choose to
believe whatever we like, including choosing to believe that God is not the
ultimate arbiter, even if it were otherwise affirmed by both God and
everyone else that he was. We could, of course, be wrong in our choice of
belief. Yet there is nothing in theory or potentially we could choose not to
believe. We therefore choose or, at very least, have the potential to choose,
our arbiter. Regardless of whether this is how it must or should be, the fact
is that is, as best we know, how it is and always has been. If we have no
choice in who we believe or not believe to be arbiter than we will have lost
all intelligence because intelligence requires belief, which, by definition,
implies choice.
Though God’s judgment (as ultimate arbiter) is
presumably fixed and unchangeable, yet our own judgment, and our own idea of
His judgment are, based on past experience, liable to error. In order to
correct such possible errors we have recourse to sociability, benevolence,
morals, logic, the dialectic, and science (which are, in turn, fostered by
culture and institutions.) It is by these means, at least traditionally, that
we can most correctly determine whether our judgments are in conformity with
God’s. These then become our guides to who he is objectively.
As to why sociability, morals, benevolence, morals,
justice, the dialectic, aesthetics, analytical and empirical sciences, based in
altruistic love, are our guides to knowing God, I will address to bring out in
the greater course of this work, while remarking that established wisdom of the
ages and around the world have generally seen these as most necessary for
achieving higher Good, either personally or communally. Otherwise I will take
it for granted that God must be known through sociability, morals, benevolence,
morals, justice, the dialectic, aesthetics, analytical and empirical science
since, as I understand the matter, these are most consistent with the highest
truth we are capable of knowing it.
If we accept the idea of God as the ultimate arbiter,
one cannot disagree with God and be right, since God is more moral, rational
and just than we are. So does this mean
that God must answer to our own idea of right reason? The answer is, of course,
no. If God is ultimate arbiter it would seem he could (at least in theory)
overrule our ideas of right reason and morals as he “sees fit.” Meanwhile,
because experience has shown rationality and morals (at least in the form of
sociability and basic honesty) are necessary for the best estimation and
evaluation of what is true (and what is false, real and not real), we have good
grounds for believing, if not insisting, that God can best be determined and
known through these as basic criteria. As well, it has been many times
attempted to be shown by theologians like Aquinas that God himself, by his
grace, gives and bestows on us epistemologically justifiable grounds for us to
assume him, and that, (as a practical if not an apodictic matter) our knowing
of and relationship to him is rational and moral in character.
Now of course we
can choose to believe otherwise. As I have already said, our potential power of
choosing belief is phenomenally great, and includes our choosing who we see as
the ultimate arbiter despite his own rebuttal of us otherwise. That is, we
might reasonable posit that despite the ultimate arbiter’s own formal
pronouncement, we could even then still deny his authority as ultimate truth
arbiter. What is the limit of choice of belief? Can a person or power (even the
ultimate arbiter) authoritatively revoke our trust in Right Reason,[41] Love, Morals and Beauty? No doubt people will feel
differently about whether this would be possible. But what is wonderful to
remember is that unless and until such revocation took place (and is possible)
we have a choice, a choice which is confirmed and supported by reason, and
which we see in the very nature of Reason (itself), Love, Beauty and Morals.
For what are Reason, Love, Beauty, and Morals without choice? Now a clever
skeptic might argue that choice or no choice, and he does not value or care for
them. Whether or not the skeptic is himself consistent between what he says and
what he actually believes, his very posing of a point of view demonstrates that
he has a choice, or at the very least, we can say there are persuasive grounds
for demonstrating that he has choice or potential choice. The very existence of
choice, so essential to Reason, Love, Morals and Beauty, itself strongly
supports a case for their high importance, else why do we have these available
to us, and why have they been recognized by wise and intelligent persons from
time immemorial as the penultimate standards? To say they are meaningless
accidents of chance, while perhaps plausible, certainly sounds very strange.
If we say God does not measure up to right, we
contradict ourselves, since whatever standard we go by to know whether
something is right is God’s standard according to my definition here.[42] For instance, someone might say “I see people
starving, therefore God, who is all powerful, is to blame.” Yet it is God, as
the higher moral principle you appeal to, who tells them that people starving
is something wrong. How then can he be blamed for the starvation? If it is not
he who validates and justifies our belief that starving is wrong than who or
what does? If we say he is acting illogically (i.e. by telling us starvation is
bad and then somehow bringing it about), then who do we say authorized moral
and logical inference? If God, then he would not do such a thing. If not God,
where ultimately is the strength of reason on which the moral and factual
judgment are based?
A rational person who sees God as ultimate arbiter will
understandably believe that if they seek the truth, honestly, sincerely,
rationally and morally they can always say they are in agreement, or sufficient
agreement, with God. One of the practical advantages of this outlook,
especially for a sensitive and conscientious believer, is that it helps them to
avoid thinking that they are at odds with God when deep down they don’t want or
wish to be. What they can say is: this is how I see such and such to be. God
knows whether I am right or wrong and I will always defer to his judgment. Yet
until I know that this or that is God’s view of the matter I will hold the view
reason, morals and justice tell me to, and I assume because he is (at least in
his relationship to me and my relationship to him) rational, moral and just
then he will not only condone my doing so, but would strongly bless and
encourage it.
The question might again be asked: if we choose our
arbiter, does this mean that an ultimate arbiter can never be forced on
us? If truth and reality to begin with are forced on us, then either choice in
thought and judgment is only temporary to this human state of things, or else
we could conclude the ultimate arbiter will always grant us a choice, but that
unless and until such divine validation we will never be sure of his final
judgment. We cannot dismiss or defy the ultimate arbiter if we choose to assume
that absolute truth can be known. But in another sense it would seem the
ultimate arbiter cannot force belief on us. For him to be able to do so would
be to say we have no intelligence, since (transposing Samuel Clarke’s dictum)
intelligence without liberty is no intelligence. While beliefs are, in day to
day life forced on us, nonetheless, we could, at least in theory, reject all
of them: though (as a practical matter, viz. in our mortal state) rejecting
some beliefs, needless to say, is not always so easy as rejecting others. Yet
because we could reject any judgment or belief, that neither does nor does not
imply that our judgment or belief is absolutely correct. Only an ultimate
arbiter, properly speaking, could do this. We could have what we consider to be
good ideas of the ultimate arbiter’s judgment is. But we ourselves could never
pronounce our own judgments of and by ourselves as being ultimate or absolute.
There are invariably some beliefs which are compelled, such as that a belief
may be true or false, that knowledge is possible, or that our own well-being
matters. But just because a belief is compelled or is inborn in us, does not
(at least it seems to me) automatically qualify that belief as absolute and
objective truth.
In Peithology, I take the position that what
matters more is not so much what we know but what we love.
What we are concerned to
know and what matters to us to know is invariably connected to what we love or
desire. Knowledge which does, or does not offer potentially to, further “our”
interests or desires is, as a practical matter, meaningless. In this sense,
love precedes “knowledge,” yet it cannot be emphasized too much as well that
love without a known "object" or person (and therefore some kind of
knowing of that object or person) is meaningless as well. Therefore there is
some kind of knowledge that is innate, since before we can truly know, there
must be something we already both know and desire, and for us to desire
something, we must have at least an inkling of it, if not actual or true
knowledge of it as such. This knowledge
is an opinion, a hope that we desire to be at some point fully realized. We
might for example, desire love itself, yet, in our full consciousness, not have
true knowledge of it. Yet starting from a shadow, trace, or image of
love, we seek love in its true reality. That there is a true reality of love is
an opinion, which we (or some people at least) have faith will or can be
realized as ultimate, universally irrefutable truth. Again, just because an
assertion by us that falls short of (the alleged) confirmation by the (alleged)
Absolute can never rise higher, among ourselves, than an opinion, it does not
necessarily follow that such an opinion cannot be in harmony with Absolute
truth. All that is being claimed is that we would not know the opinion was
Absolute truth unless we presuppose the Absolute (i.e. God), and, in addition,
that such Absolute can or will at some "time" (or other juncture of
sequence) validate that opinion as being absolutely true.
The question might be asked could God will another or
something to be absolute? Possibly. Could God will another or something to be
absolute and then himself not be the absolute? Our own logic would seem to
imply not. But if we posit God as unfathomable to our finite intellects, and
assuming a sequence,[43] he might, in theory at any rate, be able to do
such.
In conclusion here, a quite different sort of argument
for God as “Lord” is this:
There is no object or event which is not potentially
under the control of some will (whether that control is immanent or occurs over
time), and there is no will proper without some mind to guide it. To speak
otherwise of an object or event being controlled without will or mind has no
meaning. Temperature may be loosely said to "control" whether water
is sold, liquid, or gas, but then the question can be asked, is it impossible
that someone could or does control the temperature?
It would seem from this you could never prove
materialism, because if the above is true it does not seem we could ascertain
that a given object or event was not brought about by conscious will and mind
since the control in question could conceivably have originated with a mind
cleverer than our own, and which could thus conceal itself from us. This sounds
rather strange I admit, but let the materialist, if he is rational, refute it.
But let's try. A Stoic might say God, or the most
rarefied fire-ether is a material object. If he accepts that no object is not
potentially under the control of some will and mind, and God is an object, then
the Stoic might conclude that God himself is controlled by more rarefied God
who is controlled by an even more rarefied God, ad infinitum (since
divisibility of what is material is infinite, or such is how it appears in
Chrysippus' view.)
b. MAKER
“Whence this creation has arisen – perhaps it formed
itself, or perhaps it did not – the one who looks down on it, in the highest
heaven, only he knows or perhaps he does not know.”
~~~ Rig Veda,
Creation Hymn
Belief in God has not
always entailed that he was the creator, or that the universe was ever created.
Among primitive cultures,
creation would seem to be the more commonly held belief and understanding. In
cosmologies, such as ancient Near Eastern, Egyptian, and Greek (Hesiod), in
which God or some god(s) forms the universe, they do it out of chaos, material
and forms somehow already existing. In Genesis there is an abyss prior
to creation. Whether this implies chaos is somehow either real or eternal by
itself and exactly what God’s relationship to it is or would be is not entirely
clear.[44]
In typical Hindu thought
the universe has always existed but it is being regularly born destroyed,
reborn, in a continuous, never ending cycle.
Plato, in his dialogue Timaeus, drawing
evidently to some measure from Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c. 500-428 B.C.), has
it that the universe was created out of indistinguishable matter already
existing, which came into being after God (in Plato actually “the Demiurge”)
conferred form on it: the four elements earth, air, fire and water, in the
shape of various triangles, being the most elemental forms. This view was later
expanded upon and developed by many thinkers, perhaps most notably Plotinus
(204-270 A.D.)
Democritus of Abdera (c.
460-c.370 B.C.), the atomist, spoke of the universe as being infinite and
uncreated.
In Aristotle the universe
emanates as a necessary extension of God who is supreme over it. But it was
never actually created. Rather, like and along with him, the universe always
existed. Aristotle further maintains that the will of God is necessary for
world’s existence, and the world is not necessary of itself (except that God
makes it so.)
Skeptics, thinking especially of Pyrrho of Ellis, and those we were
before or came shortly after him, did not think we could know whether the
universe was created or not.
Kant, in his Critique
of Pure Reason, in the tradition of the ancient skeptics, convincingly
demonstrates that we cannot prove the universe was created – or that it wasn’t.
The question of whether it was created or not, according to this view (which
serves as one of Kant’s metaphysical antinomies), simply cannot be shown
conclusively one way or another. As I think most philosophical and scientific
minded people would probably agree, neither the Big Bang of modern science,
Darwinian spawned evolutionists, or the argument of religion-based creationists
has been able to refute his argument.
This said, Kant’s view does not forbid us from
speculating and theorizing whether the universe was created. It simply says,
given the limitations of human cognition that nothing conclusive can come of
it. One who attempted a rational justification of the pro-creation perspective
was Samuel Clarke (1675-1729.) As presented in his A Demonstration of the
Being and Attributes of God, his argument goes something like this (though
here somewhat roughly and with some interpolation of my own):
1. The universe is either caused or self-existent. If
it is caused, certain philosophers will posit that cause as God and God is
self-existent. If self-existent then the universe itself is God.[45] God, as the only self-existent, whether as Himself and
or along with the universe therefore precedes everyone and everything. [46]
2. Intelligence implies willful volition capable of
bringing about motion
With respect to 2., It is not sufficient that we can
choose a thought, but can move absolutely nothing. Granted one can speak of
someone being paralyzed so that all action arising upon their choice could (at
least in theory) be somehow frozen or suspended, and assuming also by paralyzed
we mean they could move nothing within their person or body except their own
thoughts. But sooner or later, they are going to have to be able to move
something of their own free-thought choice (including their own person),
otherwise to speak of them having intelligence has very trivial or no meaning.
If one individual’s intelligence is pre-determined by another, we would simply
then say that that other has intelligence, while the former has none(really.)
If we say no one has intelligence, we may well do this. But then we are
naturally left to ask why do we speak of intelligence then to begin with?
If we must choose, it intuitively makes more sense to
us that matter would spring from mind rather than mind from matter, since mind
as intelligence (or power) implies volition; volition implies effecting someone
or something else. A mind, as we know it, is potentially a pure unity. Some
assume that it is. All matter (and energy) as we empirically know it is
composite. It has no real being (other than perhaps brute existence), and is a
mere “blob,” without the mind to identify, label and categorize it. Mind
arising from deaf, dumb, blind and thoughtless composites is more difficult to
conceive. How could a blind dumb universe (assuming this is what matter is[47]) create a being which could comprehend itself? From
whence do imperfect being (like ourselves) derive the idea of perfection (God)
and the desire to become more perfect? How can we describe ourselves as
evolving (i.e. in a progressive and positives sense), to something that is
better than we are, and yet which isn’t ever yet known, which has not to
our knowledge ever existed and yet which is somehow better? What can this
“better” (or if you prefer “worse”) be? Better (or worse) compared to and based
on what?
How though might unintelligent motion be possible, and
how, given its dominance, might it precede intelligence either in sequence,
importance, or both? If one will say,
like some materialists, that intelligence is itself just a mechanical cycle of
images and or objects, then again one intelligence is no more valid than
another. If all intelligences are equally valid or correct then one
intelligence is no more superior than any other intelligence, and that
therefore there is no true or false, and there is no reality, except as a
matter of convention. Some of, of course, such as the Greek sophists,
maintained this. Can there be unintelligent motion? At best, and taken all in
all, we can say perhaps unintelligent motion is possible.
What thing then is not
potentially an agent of some mind? If anyone or anything can exist and act as
an agent of some mind, then naturally we will want to know who and what this
mind is. So if a puppet (matter) attacks us we look to the puppeteer, not so
much the puppet. The question then becomes what process do we use to identify
the puppeteer because everything lies in this, for it is from this
identification that we next go if we are to seriously deal with the puppet. One
could never then prove that there are any physical actions which did not arise,
nor were capable of arising, due to someone’s will, and hence someone’s
intelligence. To say something arises out of chance or fate tells us nothing.
Such words are simply labels for “unknown,” about which little definite can be
said except with relation to certainty, and it is simply impossible to prove
purposeless motion, given the infinite, or practically infinite, variety of
causal connections in the universe. If all or any motion has a purpose, an a
priori mind or order would seem to precede it.
The possessor of such mind which rises in intelligence and understanding
over all others would be God, whether or not we see God as One, Many, or both.
If then motion ultimately requires intelligence, and
there was an initial motion of all things, that intelligence arose from God,
i.e. a Prime Mover connotes God. If not then
a)
intelligence is ruled by
non-intelligence, or
b)
b) intelligence is
meaningless. If we say the universe possesses motion, but not intelligence,
then we fail to account for why there is intelligence, and of what significance
it is.
If we say more than one intelligence causes original
(or else is the source of all) motion, we are left to ask what intelligence is
it that unites their intelligences? True, they might disagree on important
points but the very fact that they possessed intelligence in some form or other
(such that the same term could be applied to different persons) still implies a
basic unity and identity.
Intelligence implies motion, therefore there is motion
which is intelligent. If there is a source or highest intelligence, that
intelligence is God. God therefore is the source of greatest motion, and
therefore either created the knowable universe, or else the knowable universe
in some manner is contingent on him.
There are other
arguments for creation based on design, which bring to our attention the
incomprehensible complexity of different aspects of the physical cosmos, and
how they are all interrelated according to patterns that intelligence can
comprehend suggests design. We often – at least so it seems -- very vividly see
love in creation, yet how could there be love with no intelligence?
These arguments are no irrefutable proof of the
creation vs. non-creation question. Again, when it comes down to it, such a
question is simply beyond scientific knowing. Yet the above briefly enumerated
points do add weight to the creation view, and, if human thought has any say in
the matter, certainly render it a credible and important scientific theory.
Whether to
believe or not in the theory of evolution has been a major bone of contention
between the religionists and modern materialists. Often this is simply a result
of misunderstanding on either side of the possible truth in the other’s view.
Yet there seems no reason to assume that evolutionary theory (that is that man
evolved from “lower”[48] life forms, including primates) is somehow necessarily
incompatible with the creation viewpoint. And while evolutionary theory (which
incidentally originated with ancient Greek thinkers Anaximander of Miletus
(c.612-545 B.C.) and Empedocles of Acragas (c.495-c.435 B.C.), and later
Anaxagoras and Democritus) may perhaps be incompatible with certain
interpretations of the Bible, this does not mean that it is necessarily
incompatible with a creation theory itself. Nor should the religionist, in my
opinion, need feel so uncomfortable about accepting such a theory. After all we
come into life from being cells, then grow and develop into fish-like looking
beings in the womb. So why then should the idea that, biologically speaking,
we derive from lower species be thought so threatening to religious belief?
Personally, I see so reason why believers should feel imperiled by a biological
theory. For even if our physicality in some way derived or develop from
animals, this does mean our souls or spiritual nature did.
The rejection of biological evolution comes from the
sense that we are born spiritually, that our true beings are spiritual. Yet there
doesn’t seem to be any strong reason we can’t properly respect our
spirituality, without ignoring or distorting our physical origins. Perhaps both
“evolution” and “Bible” are true, but in a way that would perhaps amaze and
startle us. Thoughtful believers certainly should at least be willing to
entertain this possibility. Evolution, it could be argued, does not do away
with Adam and Eve, it would merely suggest that either a) Adam and Eve were
individuals created from the existing proto-human species, or that b) the
“creation” of Adam and Eve took place outside of, which is to say after, what
would have been the regular course of evolution.
Would Christianity make sense if there were no
creation? Leaving aside scriptural mandate, it does not, on the surface, seem
that Christianity could not make sense if there was no creation. Even if we say
that humanity needed a starting point (as in the persons of Adam and Eve) this
does not necessarily imply the universe itself had to be created. What the
creation viewpoint brings to rationality and morality is perhaps a greater
consistency of explanation, using the arguments mentioned above. Nonetheless,
if only the point of God’s supremacy is insisted upon and not scripture and
tradition (at least on this particular point), there does not seem a necessary
and compelling reason why, from a Christian stand-point, we could not say that
the universe itself always existed, and was therefore not created as such
(while allowing for the possibility of birth, death and re-birth of the
otherwise always existing universe.). It is unlikely such a viewpoint would
change some Christian’s creation beliefs, yet it is, even so, one worth
mentioning.
Finally, though without in any way asserting their
validity or invalidity, it is worthwhile to list (albeit briefly) some of the
gamut of possibilities on this subject.
One could theoretically say:
* God (unchanging, self-sufficient) created the
universe.
* God (unchanging, self-sufficient) created gods who
created the universe.
* God (unchanging, self-sufficient) created God, who
created God, who created God, who created the universe.
* God (unchanging, self-sufficient) created god, who
created God, who created God, who created gods, who created the universe.
* god (unchanging, self-sufficient) created gods who
created the universe.
* gods (unchanging, self-sufficient) created god who
created the universe.
*gods (unchanging, self-sufficient) created god who
created gods who created the universe.
Etc. and perhaps their converse.[49]
c. SOURCE
“There the sun shines not, nor the moon, nor the stars;
lightnings shine not there and much less earthly fire. From his light all these
give light, and his radiance illumines all creation.”
~~~ Katha Upanishad
As all things we otherwise know of are contingent, who
or whatever is self-existence and absolute self-sufficiency is understood to
connote God. Yet even if God is self-existent (or self-existence) and
self-sufficient (or self-sufficiency), there doesn’t seem reason to necessarily
assume that there are no beings (of some sort or other) who are not also
self-existent, yet who are not necessarily God. This admitted, it would not
appear to make much sense to speak of there being self-existing and
self-sufficient beings separate from God who are “self-existence” and
“self-sufficiency.”
The way our mind, and its ability to understand the
world, functions is on the basis of objects and classes (or concepts) of
objects. All classes are subclasses of greater classes, except for the universe
itself (unless it is considered sub-classed under God). Is the universe a
sub-class of the concept (i.e. class) God? Or is God a sub-class of the
universe? Or is God a class/concept exclusive of the class universe? Or should
God be seen as existing “separate” from spatio-temporal reality? If universals
don’t originally come from or originate with God, where do they come from? Even
if we cannot actually prove him, will we not wish there was God to give our
mind’s the ultimate unity, harmony, and peace? For some it is simply a matter
of if there is ultimate unity, harmony, and peace then that is God, or there is
God.
Of all the great thinkers of ancient Greece, Diogenes
Laertius (3rd century A.D.) in his Lives of the Philosophers
mentions Musaeus (chronologically) first, and says Musaeus,[50] “maintained that all things proceed from unity and are
resolved again into unity.”
A much later, but still very early figure in Greek thought was
Anaximander of Miletus who is recorded as saying “There is a unity from which springs
all qualities.” What emanates, literally, from this Unity are all things as
qualities and contraries, which then return to the Unity, ad infinitum in a
cycle. There is a sense in which this unity, the [qualitatively] unlimited,[51] or indeterminate (this
“something” which precedes all conceptions and which all conceptions presume),
and the source of all qualities and contraries, is by definition Fate or
Destiny. But this isn’t clear. By the
time of Pericles, i.e. the early 5th Century, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae
came to state it was Nous or Mind, which is infinite, and sorts, distributes,
and matches everything. In Musaeus, Anaximander, and Anaxagoras is an attempt
to identify the greatest unity by immaterial abstraction, as opposed to some
physical element such as fire, earth, air and water, Though the views of Thales
of Miletus (c. 6th century B.C.), Anaximenes of Miletus (c. 546
B.C.), and Heraclitus could in a sense be called materialistic, theirs were
also, in their various ways, attempts at identifying ultimate unity. Note again
how in the case of the first group an abstract name is used: unity, the
unlimited, or Mind, as opposed to speaking of Water, Air, Fire and Earth as the
ultimate unity.
Cognitively speaking, it would appear self-evident that
everyone and everything (i.e. the All and everyone and everything it contains)
partakes of unity and existence,[52] and that unity and existence are the categories under
which everything are subsumed, and, as well, everything has its source. They
are, in effect fundamental and essential qualities or attributes if anyone or
anything is to be known or spoken of. If unity and existence are somehow real
or based in something real, the one necessarily implies the other. Both, in
some form or other are encountered in everything we know, whether we speak of a
person, an object or an event. Though I
suppose it isn’t entirely clear, it would seem we possess these notions both
innately and from experience. But as we grow our sense and understanding of
these takes on a more clear and defined form, depending on the individual.
To say that here is something which has no unity and
which exists doesn’t make sense. [53] When we speak of say hippogriff as not existing, we
mean that a literal hippogriff does not exist, but as an imagined notion,
hippogriffs certainly do exist. Therefore there is a way in which all things
that can be spoken of or referred to do exist in some way, even if only as
fictitious notions. It might be argued that unity and existence are
intellectual constructs and abstractions, and not real things. Here, however,
we will take it for granted that unity and existence are real things, and or
practical abstractions of real things.
Unity and existence are qualities. Qualities we assume
to be effects, i.e. the effects of someone or something. Our perception
followed by thought proper identifies the quality, and attribute the quality to
the person or thing we are perceiving or thinking about. Unity and existence as
qualities are notions which it seems we best know and recognize intuitively and
also by degree. “By degree” I mean we can recognize (at least in a rough way)
something that possesses “more” existence and “more” unity. A new and expertly
built skyscraper would seem (at least on the face of it and from a common point
of view) to have more existence and more unity than a small, broken down shed.
In these examples, existence is seen in the form of a physical presence and
unity in the solidity and cohesiveness of a physical structure.
Unity and existence are finite, contingent terms and
imply their opposite, i.e. chaos and non-existence. If unity and existence did
not by implication refer to chaos and non-existence there would be no need to
mention them. We could then be said to know unity and existence by their
contrary or opposite, as well as each other, all in relation to each other,
each in relation to the whole, each in relation to the whole in relation to
each other, etc.
Now when we ask what unifies unity and existence,
seeing as neither is real to us in isolation, that higher “unity” and
“existence,” if there is such, is God. We could also perhaps express this by
saying that God is the essence and source of unity and existence. Though these
somehow derive from him, there is no clear way of knowing whether we can speak
of his requiring these, or that he himself somehow possesses these as
qualities.
Someone could argue, even admitting there is somehow an underlying basis or
substratum to unity, and existence, why must it be characterized as God?
Technically, it need not. We could speak of the Absolute or use some other
name. Yet the peculiar uniqueness of this notion does lend itself to being
interpreted as God. For Descartes this very tempting explanation became his
proof of God’s existence. We don’t need
to go so far here. Rather we’ll be satisfied with observing what an
extraordinary and awesome concept and idea this is, whether it is or isn’t God,
or whether it reflects or doesn’t reflect God as he is normally conceived.
Lastly, we might also remark, experience shows that if
we are attacked by a powerful unity, we need a more powerful unity to resist
and defeat it. Life itself is a unity, and can only persist as a unity. What
greater unity could there be to protect us than he who is the source of all
unity?
d. PATH
“By the path of the good lead us to final bliss, oh
fire divine thou god who knowest all ways. Deliver us from wandering evil.
Prayers and adoration we offer thee.”
~~~ Isa Upanishad
There is a right or correct way or method to get to
where we want to go, or achieve what we want to achieve. This is what is meant
by “path.” Yet must we say God is necessary to secure a correct way or method
to attain some destination or goal? The answer, strictly speaking, is no, of
course, since we can think of innumerable instances where someone can get to
where they want to go or achieve what they want to achieve without God as such.
True, one can argue that nothing can be attained or achieved without God, but
this is only possibly true if we assume God’s existence to begin with, and
therefore is no proof.
Faith and devotion to Christ in its earliest form was
known not as Christianity, but rather
(as given in Acts of the Apostles) “the Way,” clearly implying that
belief in Christ and His teachings provides us with a way or path to reach God
(who is both good itself and the highest of all goods.)[54] Other religions, and philosophies as well, of course,
have a “way” of their own to reach or become nearer to the supreme good. Taoism
not only has its own “Way,” more than this, it, in effect, sees “the Way” (the
Tao or Dao) as God and God as “the Way.”
When Boethius speaks of (or implies that) God is the
necessary path to good he has a certain good in mind: in particular, ultimate
or divine goodness. Yet only if we accept the idea that God is, or else the
source of our highest good, it makes sense to speak of Him as “path.” We must therefore first ask what it means
for God to be the “goal,” or ultimate good.
“Progress” is the realization of some higher state. It
may be the return to an ideal state of goodness, the moving forward to an
entirely new, never before realized ideal/state of goodness, or a combination
of both of these. Which ever it is, or all of them, the highest or ultimate end
of progress could be defined as God, or else requiring God.
On a related, but lesser point, it could be contended
that progress could not attain to something entirely new because if new it
would be something God previously was without, and if God was previously
without it he would somehow be imperfect and therefore not God. We might get
around this by saying progress realized can be something entirely new to the
universe, if not to God.
e. GOAL
“Where there is
the Infinite there is joy. There is no joy in the finite. Only in the infinite
is there joy: Know the nature of the Infinite.”
~~~ Candogya
Upanishad
By “Goal,” is meant
ultimate end or greatest good to be attained. An end achieved or greatest good
attained can also, for purposes of what follows, be also term happiness, with
the caution that there are those who would disagree that the ultimate end or
greatest good should be defined or characterized this way.[55]
God as either ultimate
happiness or greatest good is not a notion that is readily obvious to most of us.
If we were rather to speak of peace, love, hope, beauty, virtue, wisdom,
liberty, health, or friendship, these would make more immediate sense to us as
true ends or true happiness. And even these would only be realized say through
love of family friends, loved ones, pets, and nature, before we would even
conceive, let alone , love the abstraction “God.” It might be said then that
unless we know God somehow instinctively, our idea of his goodness is
constructed out of accumulated instances in day to day life of “goodness,”
which then are brought together intellectually under the category “God” or
God’s goodness.
For most people, ultimate good rarely comes
up as an issue in their lives. By comparison, practical goods and pleasures are
by far more our regular concern. Despite this if there is to be a coherence and
consistency to the pursuit of happiness, accumulated, or the sum of all
justified pleasure in our lives, it makes sense to speak of an ultimate end or
good. If then there is an ultimate good, either collectively, or for ourselves
as individuals, we could denote it God. And if God isn’t actually the final
goal of our happiness, we could think of him as being the creator or source of
whatever is our ultimate good or happiness.[56]
To use our examples, peace,
love, hope, beauty, virtue, wisdom, liberty, health, or friendship are
contingent. Allowing that we would more likely know these as goods before or
prior to our ever knowing God as Good, we, nonetheless, cannot experience or
have any of these things without a someone or something else. And when we go to
that someone or something else, we find they also are contingent (i.e.. they
depend on another or others to both be realized and or to function). This
continues ad infinitum, unless and until we bring in God as the non-contingent,
final goal or happiness. Or at least, for ultimate end or happiness to be
attained there must be someone or something who is not dependant, and
non-contingent. If there is someone, or something, who is non-contingent, and on
which all contingent happiness is based, that person or something is God. We
can put this another way by saying that God is what necessarily underlies the
strength of any and all happiness, otherwise happiness is finite and limited,
and therefore mere pleasure and not true happiness. St. Augustine further than
this say, “There is no other good which can make any rational or intellectual
creature happy except God.”[57]
This argument is, of
course, very similar, if not identical, to the St. Anselm-like argument we have
already been using with respect to “Lord” and “Source.” Now it does not necessarily follow that God
is final end or happiness. All the argument as applied to Goal says is that if
there is an ultimate happiness it depends of God, i.e. what is non-contingent,
if it is to have greatest strength, reality, and lasting power.
Elsewhere, Augustine also states: “Though shalt see
God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good.”[58] According to Aquinas, everything is good according to
divine goodness, and those most like the divine are more good than those less
like him. Apparently influenced by such as Augustine, Pascal has it: “Happiness is neither outside nor inside us:
it is in God, both outside and inside us.” [59]
We can say an end or good
that changes in value has relative value, and, further, that there is no
necessary reason that one’s ultimate good, as something we desire, cannot be
something that changes value. On the other hand, it could be maintained that if
the value of a good is relative and subject to change, it cannot be an ultimate
good because it could then just be a matter of time before it is supplanted in
importance by something else, and therefore cannot be good in a final or
ultimate sense. But whether we accept the first or second view, more consistent
thinking suggest that if there is a value which is always fixed and absolute,
by which all other values are measured, that value, by this definition, can be
titled “God.”
The vast majority of people it would seem do not think
or guide their conduct in terms of (the abstraction) ultimate Happiness as
such, but rather particular pleasures they have in mind of obtaining or
achieving. Even for someone who greatly
loves virtue, the pursuit and realization of virtue could be considered a
particular pleasure. The immediate heirs of Aristippus of Cyrene (c.435-350
B.C.), a student of Plato, the Cyrenaics taught, “…there is a difference
between ‘end’ and ‘happiness.’ Our end is a particular pleasure, whereas
happiness is the sum of all particular pleasures, in which are included both
past and future pleasures.”[60] If we accept this position, “ the sum of all
pleasures” or “ultimate good” must be a hope or a theory, because, of course,
it is not anything we can atheistically point to. Despite this, it is a viable
hope and theory, made all the more plausible by the argument that all good or
goods are derivative from someone (as when we spoke earlier about God being
ultimate “Source.”) Perhaps also it can be maintained that if we don’t have an
ultimate good, or God is not our ultimate good, someone else will intervene in
our lives (say the devil) and create a false ultimate good for us, or else
manipulate our pursuit of smaller goods, such that out of these an ultimate
(yet really inferior) good will be created for us by another. Put differently,
if we don’t make God our ultimate good, then we are susceptible of having
others create or foisting on us their (perhaps immoral or otherwise harmful)
ultimate good, which might be something less then wise, healthy, and duly
moral.
In speaking of pleasure and happiness,
there is an interesting and related issue of whether we can speak of Value
somehow preceding Existence or whether Existence precedes Value. The sequence
could be viewed temporally (with respect to creation), or as a priority which
either God has pronounced, or which we otherwise have decided for ourselves, or
somehow both.
Although he understandably sees Being as prior to value
as a logical matter, Aquinas notes that among the names signifying divine
causality goodness precedes being. Otherwise he holds that Goodness and Being
are really the same, but only differ in idea. Goodness expresses the aspect of
desirableness, which Being does not express. Although Being extends only to
Being and Goodness, Goodness extends to Being and Non-Being also.
On the other hand, to say Being (or
Existence) precedes value seems to imply that being isn’t valued, or else is
somehow valued only after the “appearance” (in some sequence) of value.
Therefore Value must precede or be prior to Existence. To go along with this
approach, we might in a sense think of Value as having supra-existence which
precedes Existence.
Conversely, someone could contend that
Existence precedes Value. This view says you can't have Value unless it exists
first, and is for many a common sense view.
Either of these perspectives recognizes
that all that has value (or are valued) exist as something necessary to
them (even if it is else somehow assumed that not all existence is of value.)
There is no thing that is valued that does not exist, while there may be things
that exist that are not valued (at least in theory.)
A case could be made that valueless
Existence comes first, Value second, and then ordinary Existence has Value
conferred on it. This would ordinarily seem to us a rather strange viewpoint.
Nevertheless, there does not seem anything to single-handedly rebut it.
In addition to these, we could argue (if
also somewhat awkwardly like the last) there is no Value, or else no true Value
we know of, and assessments of value are, when all is said and done, some kind
of illusion or futility. Further “Value” may perhaps, in some sense, be spoken
of but which yet is somehow not something existing or else which “exists” in a
manner that is somehow a separate existence from what we normally think of as
persons, things and events existing. Similarly we might say Value and Existence
appeared simultaneously (neither one precedes the other), or else that a
sequence with respect to value and existence, either in reference to time or
any order of sequence (including hierarchy) cannot be spoken of.
Assuming the question is a legitimate one
in the first place, the issue of whether Value precedes Existence, or Existence
precedes Value, or whether both “appeared” simultaneously, is then one of those
metaphysical issues for which there is no easy and obvious (perhaps not any)
answer. It would seem that if we say Existence precedes Value that all values
are somehow less than they are. At the same time if Value precedes Existence
then this would suggest that Value is more “important”[61] or more necessary than existence, or would at least
imply that Existence does not exceed Value in either “importance” and
necessity.
In sum, all this I would suggest matters
because (in its basic form) if Value precedes Existence then Value is more
“important” than Existence. Oppositely, we would be saying Existence is more
important than Value. The first is a Heraclitean viewpoint (i.e. Value somehow
both is and isn’t), and by its mysterious preceding of Value to Existence
offers hope that no matter what Existence is quantitatively, Value always
exceeds it either in “importance” or necessity. The second view is Parmenidean
in character (Value is not real, only Existence is) and suggests stasis and
limit, and happiness which is limited is not true happiness, but only pleasure.
This second may then be said to lend itself to certain kinds of Buddhist belief
and other asceticisms which seek non-Existence as a solution to there being no
real happiness. Of course, it could and has been maintained that we needn’t say
Value or Existence comes first, and instead simply say they arise or arise
simultaneously. Yet if we do pose that a demarcation be made, the practical,
daily-life implications are very striking and worth serious consideration.
2. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION S PERTAINING TO THE PREVIOUS
Lord, Maker, Path, Source, Goal
What we have attempted to do prior to this juncture is
to provide a working epistemological and objective idea(s) of what thoughtful
and intelligent people could expect God to be, or entail. We have not proven
that God is absolutely necessary, nor did we set out to do so. Again, the main
reason for this is that we don’t think we are capable of proving anything with
absolute necessity, at least objectively, because to do so we must first assume
God. And since we know nothing that possesses absolute necessity (so I have
previously argued) then who or whatever is necessary and or can confer
necessity is God. Yet God is what we seek to prove to begin with and therefore
cannot assume him. What then we have rather tried to do is show or support the
view that if we initially grant certain beliefs and conclusions then God, as a
practical matter, is objectively necessary, or at least a good case can be made
for such.
The initially assumed
beliefs are:
a) Logic, in the form of
Reason, is a valid criterion for establishing objective truth.
b) Language is adequate
to discuss theological questions and issues of this kind.
c) We have choice in most
beliefs we hold and in the judgments we make.
c) There is truth and
reality beyond mere opinion or beyond mere “phantasms.”
d) Existence, in some
form or other, is a quality all things must possess in order to be
known.
e) There is someone or
something that doesn’t change.
f) There is such a thing
as Happiness, beyond mere individual pleasures.
g) There is a value that
is fixed, unchanging, above all other values, and which is the ultimate
standard of worth.
So….
If there is truth beyond mere opinion, then there must
be God to ultimately (and at least potentially) proclaim it such.
If the universe or all existence was created or
“emanates” (as, for example, per Aristotle), then the one who created it or who
is its source can be denoted God.
If the universe or all existence has a source or center
then we can denote it as God.
If there is true, unchanging existence that is not
contingent that existence must be and or derive from what we can denote as
God. The idea that existence changes
otherwise seems a contradiction. Even if a given something changes, the notion
that existence itself could or does change strikes one as incomprehensible.
If there is a fixed and unchanging value, he or it can
be denoted God. Otherwise all values change, and there is no fixed value. If
there is no fixed value, there may be pleasures, but no happiness.
True Happiness, that is the end or sum of mere
pleasure, is or derives from God.
If the above conclusions
are accepted, then if we reject God we reject:
That there is truth
beyond opinion (even this conclusion itself then is questionable, ad
infinitum.)
That the universe was
created or is emanating
That the universe has a
center or source.
That there is real
existence (except as a matter of opinion and even this much is questionable, ad
infinitum.)
That there is such a
thing as Happiness
It is very important to note that “Lord” (as we have
used it here as drawn from Boethius) does not of itself imply “Maker,”
“Source,” “Goal;” nor do any of the other divine “attributes” (Maker, Source,
Goal) imply one or more of the others. They are compatible and complimentary,
but not logically necessary for each other as such. It is not strictly
necessary then, for example, that Source be Goal, or that Maker imply Lord,
etc., though, with the understanding, there are sound and legitimate
theoretical arguments for claiming that they are so.
a. Questions Relating to God and the Divine Attributes
In order to expand our possible understanding of God
the following are questions about God and his, attributes or qualities that
have been or could be raised. One of the interesting things worth noting in
addition to their variety, is that the larger majority of these questions we
would not think to ask about Man, but only God. Yet if God is a fictional
notion (or else only a practical principle) consider the numerous and
consequential implications questions about God have raised with respect to any
number of issues vital to our lives, including issues relating to truth,
happiness, and morals.
Another intriguing aspect of these questions is that
the answers (in the way of alternative explanations) can be simple and neat, or
else complex, and can tangent off into all kinds of sub-questions with further
implications for other assumptions or as yet undetermined qualities. Theology
then it would seem, despite proofs such as those of Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677)
propounds, does not seem (on the surface anyway) to line up into so uniformly a
consistent geometrical pattern of argument as we might think. Because of their
large number, we will not attempt something like a full exploration of these
key theological questions, but only a few which seem of special significance to
a basic understanding of the concept of God.
This list of questions does not pretend to be complete,
and the main idea posed in one may easily overlap that contained in another
question. One thing to be borne in mind also is that we might catalog our
answers to these questions according to what we can know absolutely,
conditionally, actually practically, what purported angels can know, and
what God(s) himself can know. Our main concern here then has been with
what we humans can posit and or know based on commonly accepted standards of
empirical objectivity.
1. Questions of Primary Importance
* Can God be known cognitively?
* Can God can be known emotionally?
If the answer is yes to either of the above, the next
question would be could such knowledge of God be known objectively and
communicated to another as objective knowledge? If yes to this second question
we could ask what are the limits and rules for such objective validation and
(language) description? That is, even given how much can be known, how much of
theological knowledge can still be put into adequately objective and cognizable
terms?
* Does God have attributes (or qualities)?
Now it can be objected that we must assume God exists
(or is existence) before we can ask if he has any qualities, and that therefore
the first question should be whether God exists. While not categorically
rejecting this view, it makes more sense to me personally to take the position
that existence, while the most unique kind and fundamental quality of anyone or
anything, is still nonetheless a quality. If existence is something more than a
quality than it is a something mortals cannot know or comprehend except
speculatively.
* If God has qualities (or attributes) can these be
expressed in human language, and predicated of him?
As mentioned, if God has qualities, and which can
adequately be spoken of, it is possible they could be characterized as
absolute, conditional, actual, practical (for man) -- that is to say one, a
few, or all of these. For example, one person might say that what another
person would call God’s absolute attributes (or qualities) are not actual
attributes but merely practical constructs devised to help our
understanding (while denying we know anything absolutely, or else that anything
exists absolutely.)
2. Questions of Secondary Importance
* Does God exist?
* Is God existence itself or else highest existence?
* Does existence have its origin in God?
* Is God Goodness or the highest good?
* Can God be quantified (e.g. is he one or many)?
* Is God infinite?
* Can God be quantified?
* Is God a person?
* Is God is Spirit (i.e. immaterial power) or is he
physical?
* Does God occupy space and time?
* Is God self-existent?
* Does God have a free will?
* Does God think and have ideas?
* Does God have desire (s) and or emotions?
* Is God all powerful, or conditionally powerful?
* Is God omniscient?
* Can God contradict or act in real conflict with his
own principles (such as those contained in divine Reason), or contradict or act
in real conflict with his own actions? Subsumed under this might be questions
like “can God create another like himself?;”
“can God destroy himself?;” and “could God create a universe in which
accidents preceded essences?”
From these kinds of questions we can educe, build and
create categories (such as Being, Unity, First Cause and other such supreme
universals.) Of course, a good case could be made that the philosophical notion
of God itself arose out of a need to create a source or explanation for Being,
Unity, Causation, etc. Be this as it may, with these sort of theologically
created or established categories it became more possible to refine questions
and concepts in various areas of philosophy and science, as they pertained not
only to God but to humanity as well. We might for example have found ourselves
asking does Man exist? Does Man have free will? But who would it occurred to
have asked “is Man self-existent, infinite, Highest good, etc?” Most
fascinatingly then, in asking these questions about God, humanity has been
dramatically able to increase our knowledge and understanding of ourselves.
Questions like is man in time and space are also such we would not normally
think to ask. Kant who did end up doing so was, in a very palpable way, merely
building upon the reasoning of the ancients and scholastics, except that in
Kant’s case he took the questions originally about God and related them to
humanity and cognition.
We certainly
wouldn’t ordinarily think to ask “is man all knowing or all powerful”
literally. It is questionable we could even ask questions whether there is a
highest good, or whether man is good without at least hypothecating the notion
of God. And in the case of goodness, if we say there is a highest goodness it
could not unreasonably be claimed that this is, by definition, God, as per Anselm’s
reasoning.
Below is a brief examination pertaining to the question
of whether God can be quantified.
3. Is God One, Many, both, neither, or something else?
The initial answer to this seems to be that given the
limitations of human cognition we simply have no way, objectively speaking, of
knowing whether God can be rightly spoken of quantitatively. Religious
viewpoints will, of course, describe God as One and or Many. But they know or
believe this on the basis of revelation, or a desire for logical consistency,
and otherwise have no irrefutable reasons for asserting God as one or a
multiplicity, except as a matter of consistency based on other assumptions,
plausibility, subjective preference, faith, or opinion. In addition, it could
be argued that being numbered is a quality. God is the source of all qualities,
and is therefore above possessing qualities. Therefore, God cannot be spoken of
in numerical terms.
In asking questions of this kind relating to God’s (for
us) potential numericity it must be recognized that there are preliminary
questions which one would probably do well to address before hand. For example,
does the one exist in (physical) nature? In thought? If there is a one in
nature and a one in thought what makes a correlation of the two (i.e. the one
and nature and the one in thought) possible? Does one apply only to nature,
only to thought, or both nature and thought? Is there a true and pure one
anywhere? These preliminary questions having been posed, however, it is
sufficient for our purpose here to have merely mentioned them.
* Arguments for God as One[62]
Our minds naturally conceive best by means of
singularities. But does this disposition of our minds imply that God must be
singular? The mind after all functions on the basis of images or
representations which we call concepts and ideas. So must God (as Lord, etc.)
be answerable to the capacity of our representations? Perhaps needless
to say, there is no known compelling necessity for such a belief, that is,
unless certain assumptions are stipulated.
This having been said, and assuming God could be known
and spoken of in some quantified way to begin with, there are things about
oneness which suggest it as inherent to God.
For one thing, any given something, is a one of this a
one of that. So that if you can speak
of “a one of this,” or “a on e of
that,” you could, based on inductive and linguistic inference, say “everything
is one.” At least as nominalists we could accept this, since they might
otherwise object that the abstraction “everything” is not a concept of
something actually real, and is not the same as “each individual thing
examined” (i.e. is one.)
Unity, on which all love, harmony, and peace, refers to
the one of an aggregate, so that in this sense One can mean the uniting
and coming together of all ones. As the greatest strength of anything is so
many ones joined as one (in some fashion of another), one then implies
power, and presumably therefore the greatest power must possess the greatest
oneness.
“One” could be said to imply no change, while Two does
imply change – i.e. due to the possibility of movement, perspective. God is
more likely One than Two since, based on other reasoning, we would not expect
him to be subject to any substantial change (if change at all.)
The infinite, non-existence (or non being) chaos, and
chance, inasmuch as they can be spoken of, are ostensibly one. Certainly they
are not known of without the concept of one, and in this sense could not exist
or be real without one (or the one.) [63]
By the same token, it makes logical and conceptual
sense to think that there is a One, from which all ones either derive, stem
from or have their reality. While there is, at least conceivably, a One without
multiplicity, as say Parmenides of Elea (c.515.-? B.C.) believes, there is no
multiplicity conceivable without one. Similarly, a multiplicity is divisible,
but one is not except in the form of fractions or decimals. This suggests that
One takes precedence and is more important than multiplicity.
Yet a non-composite, pure One evidently does not exist
in Nature. Our thoughts can speculate on there being a pure and true one, but
as soon as we grant that such a One exists we grant God. Otherwise, because our
thoughts are contingent, there is no “one” that we know of naturally or
cognitively which we can speak of which is not a composite in some measure.
Name any single someone or thing you like and we will easily find an attribute
for them or it, thus making them a composite. Either then there is no real One,
or else if there is, he or it could reasonably be denoted God. Inasmuch as
power implies, unity, and unity implies one, and the notion of greatest unity
and power suggest that it is one, and if there is no real One other than God,
then God must be both One and consequently the greatest power and unity.
In ordinary experience, when we
make a mistake we fix on some one thing and or other. Yet truly the error is in
the thing or things, not in the one. No error is in truly one thing. It
consists of multiple factors which are inconsistent with the One, and are what
make it a mistake.
* Arguments against God
as One
There is in experience no one we can know or speak of
without multiplicity. There may be such a one in theory and as a practical,
mathematical label, but from experience we know of no thing that can be spoken
of which cannot in some way be described as a composite. Granted we can assume
there is a One who is non-contingent and call them God, but that already
decides the question and can hardly be considered proof.
Observe also that historically there has been no pure
monotheism which does not invoke some contingent or ancillary who is needed to
explain or denote the presumably One God. One may be everywhere, but everywhere
is not one, or at least doesn’t seem to be except in a highly theoretical way.
Moreover, is not also the principle of One at the basis
of false pride and selfishness? Are not there times when One is bad, as in say
a situation where one individual unduly dominates a group of others in some
way. If then God is seen as One does this not make him seem selfish, and seem
to conflict with ideas that he is benevolent? Also, One suggests isolation. If
we say God is One does this mean that God suffers from isolation and even
possibly loneliness? How then could the One be God?[64]
As Aristotle observed, isolated notions cannot express
truth or falsehood. Therefore if we say God exists is “True,” he cannot then be
One since Truth requires a composite, typically at minimum, a predicate (and
therefore multiple) statement of some kind. God then either is not one or else,
if he is One, he cannot be spoken of in a way that conforms with Truth as we
know and can express it.
* Arguments for God as Many
Since there is no true One that we know of (i.e. all
things are composites to some degree) this would suggest that if there is a
God, as “totality,” “He” is many. In order to avoid the logical implication
that if God is Many this makes him also One, it could be argued that God’s
multiple nature is mysterious, and otherwise beyond our finite human knowing or
numerical categorizing as to be merely one number. For this reason, it could be
said that while we are correct to speak of God as Many (i.e. this is his
ultimate reality – as best we might know it), this does not, nor should it
mean, he is One or necessarily One also. To speak of Many being One in
conceptual terms, while permissible, the interpretation may due to the nature
of our knowing, and have nothing to do with God.
All of life moves and acts because of opposites and
contraries, as in male-female, hot-cold, true-false being-not being, wet-dry,
above-below, life-death, health-disease, too much-too little, earth-sky,
beginning-end, short-long, peace-strife, love-strife, sweet-bitter, sweet-sour,
acids-bases, right-left, straight-curved, odd-even, loud-quiet. All these,
combined with the fact that we find no pure one in experience, suggest that if
there is God he must be more than one.
* Arguments against God as Many
In theory at least, there may be oneness without
multiplicity. But there may not, so far as we know, be multiplicity without
oneness.
If there is more than one
God they are either united or not-united.
If united what is it that
holds them together or unites them?
What ever it is must be
God or exclusively of God.
If not united, then none
of them is God, and there is no God.
If there are only gods,
but no God then:
Nothing unites them that
is decisively superior to any of them. And any one at his or her greatest power
is never more or greater in overall power than another. Should the power of one outweigh the power
of all others, say on a particular occasion, that person might (if one chose
to) be said to be God -- but for that
occasion only. If we say one god is supreme strength at one thing, one at
another, and another god the supreme strength in his/her own specialty or
expertise, this would not fit our earlier intended definition of God, and
consequently none of these gods could be said to be God properly speaking.
Now if someone or
something united all gods or else members of the universe, and was therefore
presumably superior to them, that person would be God.
If all gods or all
members of the universe exist co-equally in powers then in some sense their
co-equality could be said to be God or derived from God.
If something unites them
that is equal or (merely) marginally superior to any of them, then it would
seem as a practical matter there is chaos, because law that does not rule and
govern is not properly law but amendable custom. In this sense chaos could be
said to be God, and chaos being one kind of something, this could still mean
that God is one.
This said one imagines
that those who think God is chaos (or else chaos is God) would be probably few,
since they could embrace chaos as the ultimate power or “order” without having
to invoke its being conceptualized as God. On the other hand, it might be part
of their idea of chaos to do otherwise.
* Arguments for God as both One and Many
Both the arguments for God as one (above), and for God
as many (also above) together speak to the support of this argument, though, of
course, with the assumption that the two assertions are compatible and not an
insuperable contradiction, which viewpoint we are free to chose or its opposite
depending on the truth criteria we use. Though God being One and Many might
seem to be a contradiction to us, God, nevertheless, being who “he,” is not
subject to the restriction imposed by this contradiction (assuming it is one),
nor perhaps not answerable or subject to any contradiction.
* Arguments against God as both One and Many
It seems illogical to think that God can be both One
and Many since the two conceptualizations conflict, and if accepted would seem
to imply that God is a contradictory or incoherent being. Granted in theory the
idea that God can be One and Many may somehow be possible, but even if so, this
does not seem to be anything we are in a position to know. Taken a certain way
one might interpret the Nirvana of the Buddhist’s as God, though God which
cannot be ascribed number and which is devoid of personality, such a thing
being superfluous to “it.”
* Arguments against God being described as either One,
Many or both
Since all of the suggested designations have their
arguments, no single one has sufficiently compelling reasons to assert its
necessary superiority over one of the others. Therefore none of these
designations are true, insofar as we can know, except perhaps as a matter of
convention.
~~~*~~~
In conclusion, the argument that God, if he can be
ascribed a number at all, is One seems, in this writer’s opinion, overall the
most persuasive of the choices available. At the same time acceptance of God as
One leaves open the possibility that he is also Many, both One and Many, or
neither One or Many. In any case, whatever version of God one decides. it will
still be necessary for us to conceive of God as One, if only for reasons of
cognitive, linguistic, and practical comprehension.
4. Is God necessary for our Knowing Reality?[65]
This question is related to the ultimate arbiter issue
considered earlier, and what follows here should be considered in conjunction
with what was said there.
If the world can be realized there must be something in
us or something else which gives us the potential to realize it. Our very
ability to see, and accompanying or following this, the ability to think,
arguably stem from what we can denote as God. If all of reality is known, God,
by one definition, is the one who most knows it. If this is true, it would then
seem to follow if God does not actually confer on us the ability to know
reality, we nonetheless must at least look to him to have our judgment of
reality approved.
Malebranche, in the
tradition of Aristotle, Augustine, and the scholastics, maintained that we need
God to think if we are to assume that knowledge is true, true for all, and true
beyond any individual’s opinion (not counting God’s, of course, though properly
speaking we don’t speak of Him as having an opinion.)[66] He remarks:
“God is the intelligible world or the place of minds,
as the material world is the place of bodies, that from His power minds receive
their impressions; that in His wisdom they find all their ideas, that through
His love they receive their orderly impulses, and because His power and love
are but Himself, let us believe with St. Paul that He is not far from any of
us, and that in Him we are, move and have our being.”[67]
Put another way, if there is a common currency by which reality can
be known, either it is or comes from God. Else how could we expect all or any
parts of reality be known as connected or in connection with another?
Aquinas, harking back to Plato, argued that we know
things and everything through ideas or forms. These ideas or forms come about
through natural reason or divine reason, both of which come from God. If you
don’t know God, you cannot better know ideas or forms and hence cannot know
things.
It could be argued that
if God is the basis of absolute morals[68] (or absolute excellence
if we like a more Aristotelian viewpoint), and morals are necessary for higher
truth and our understanding of (beyond opinion), then there is no real,
non-subjective truth, nor can we speak of knowing reality, if we do not assume
God. This all takes for granted that morals are necessary for truth and that
God is necessary for morals. While I refrain from addressing this claim here,
it is taken up at considerable length in my study, Peithology.
5. Must God be a person?
Even if God is a necessary or desirable
epistemological, logical or heuristic principle, does this imply that he is a
being(s) or person(s)? Could not he be simply a useful idea like chance or
empty space whose necessity is more practical than either scientific, let alone
apodictic?
Whether God is a mere a
mental or verbal construction, a heuristic principle, an ideal representation
of person, object, or “something else” will ever be (in this life it would
seem) incomprehensible to us. Objectively and scientifically speaking,
we evidently do not know.
There then simply does not seem to be any compelling
argument to say that God must be a person. At the same time, there is no argument to say that he either
cannot be or must not be a person. Yet to say God is not a person, such as we
know a person to be, does not imply he is merely a thing, material object or
process either, as some might mistakenly infer. At the same time, to go ahead
and assume God is merely a necessary idea or principle, would as a practical
matter be rather rash, since after all we could be wrong on a point with
potentially serious implications for our better understanding of “God.”
b. God and the Question of Evil
“Ah Love! Could you and I with Him conspire
To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,
Would not we shatter it to bits – and then
Re-mould it nearer to the Heart’s Desire!”
~~ Omar Khayyám, Rubáiyát
If we allow that God exists, and is both “Lord”
(arbiter), “Maker” (creator), “Goal” (goodness), etc. then why is there evil in
the world? Hardship, inconvenience, and disappointment most of us can normally
understand, and it’s not hard to see that a certain amount and kind of
destruction is both natural and necessary to life, certainly life as we know
it.
There is dearth that is beneficial and
compatible with natural harmony (as in the occurrence of winter.) There is destruction
that is beneficial, as when food is gathered, processed, and consumed. Pain
serves the purpose of assisting our self-preservation. There is also natural conflict,
strife, or tension, as in competition, as that which brings about ecological
equilibrium, and which can work to help the quality of living for all affected.
Yet there is a point where when these things are taken
to excess, or else a state of unnaturalness, that they are seen as evil.
Certainly, we might think so if we had to endure them.
In the ordinary sense then, we see evil in experience
when destruction becomes something more than what would be “natural.” It
implies more than discomfort, strain, or inconvenience. It implies unhappiness
or a serious threat to happiness, rather then the mere denial or frustration of
pleasure, though the accumulated frustration of pleasure might constitute
genuine unhappiness, and therefore evil, depending on the circumstances. Evil
then might be seen in the taking of what is natural and distorting or taking it
to excess.