Peter Singer (1946 - )
Famine, Affluence and Morality (1971)Synopsis:
Assumption 1: suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.
Second point: If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.
"marginal utility" The point where by giving more one would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal.
Singer: a Strong and Moderate version of the principle
Strong version: requires us to prevent bad things from happening unless in doing so we would be sacrificing something of comparable moral significance.
Moderate version: we should prevent bad occurrences unless, to do so, we should sacrifice something morally significant.
Peter Singer
Formerly a professor at Monash University in Australia
Now, controversially, at Princeton.
Singer is a utilitarian: differs from Mill and Bentham-primary consideration is not the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but serving the best interests of all concerned in a moral dilemma: a recognition and protection of the widest range of interests among equal beings.
1971 article
Singer opens 420
People are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter and medical care.
Singer says-this suffering in not inevitable or unavoidable
The causes: constant poverty, a cyclone (hurricane), and a civil war.
Nine million people are now destitute refugees.
People have not responded as individuals to the crisis is any big way.
Governments have tried to help:
But Britain has given only a fraction of what they've paid to develop the Concorde SST.
Australia has given money, about one twelfth the cost of the new Sydney Opera House.
India couldn't give much help and in fact went to war to enable refugees to return to their lands.
Question how important is it that we help the hungry ?
420 c2 Singer
What are the moral implications of a situation like this? In what follows, I shall argue that the way people in relatively affluent countries react to a situation like that in Bengal cannot be justified; indeed, the whole way we look at moral issues-our moral conceptual scheme-needs to be altered, and with it, the way of life that has come to be taken for granted in our society.
Question what is a moral conceptual scheme ?
Singer asks you to accept certain assumptions: if you follow him, he thinks you'll accept his conclusion
Assumption 1: suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.
Doesn't think this point needs to be argued
Second point: 421c1
If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.
Question what do you think this means ?
"without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance" =
"Without causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent.
Question what does this mean ?
Question can you accept this second principle ?
If everyone accepted this principle, our society would be very different.
Singer contends that we should not take proximity or distance into consideration.
No moral difference if I help a neighbor's child or someone halfway around the world whose name I will never know.
Question: is this true, can you help someone around the world as easily as you help a drowning child?
Singer wants you to give money, if you give money and some "warlord" in the region pockets it, have you fulfilled your obligation?
Is what you did still worthwhile?
Justification for this: more likely that we can or will assist someone physically near us.
But that doesn't mean we ought to help that person, rather than someone further away.
Question why not ?
The emerging Global village supports this moral point of view.
Question: what is a global village-do we really have a global village?
2. Principle makes no distinction between cases where I am the only one who could do anything, or whether I am one among millions in the same position.
Defense of this one more difficult.
422 The fact that millions of other people are in the same situation doesn't make any difference for my moral obligation
422 c1 Singer uses an argument by analogy:
Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if on looking around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child but are doing nothing?
Singer pointing to the absurdity of this view.
Appropriate use of an argument by analogy--to illustrate a point, add support for the point, but not be the main argument.
422 c1 Singer says
unfortunately most of the major evils-poverty, overpopulation, pollution-are problems in which everyone is almost equally involved.
Singer's example-if everyone gave £5 we'd solve the problem.
But everyone isn't going to give £5, so that obligates us to give more.
By giving more than £5 I will eliminate more suffering than I would if I just gave £5.
422 c2: Singer discusses the possibility of giving up to the point of "marginal utility"
The point where by giving more one would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal.
If everyone did that, there would be more than could be used and some of the sacrifice would have been unnecessary.
Singer doesn't think that would be a serious problem
People could all not give simultaneously
The relief fund could be well organized.
Point: How much others give is a relevant circumstance
However
422 c2 The result of everyone doing what he really ought to do cannot be worse than the result of everyone doing less than he ought to do, although the result of everyone doing what he reasonably believes he ought to do could be.
422-423 Singer gives a restatement of his main principle:
If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.
Question what do you think of this principle ?
Singer looks at supererogation: "acts which it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do-going beyond the call of duty, heroic action.
Singer says his principle upsets the distinction between duty and charity.
He doesn't rule out "charitable considerations" His claim is that they don't apply here.
Question what is that distinction: between charity and duty ?
Someone who is charitable is praised, while someone who is uncharitable isn't condemned.
Singer's contention 423 c1
When we buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look "well-dressed" we are not providing for any important need. We would not be sacrificing anything significant if we were to continue to wear old clothes, and give the money to famine relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person from starving. It follows from what I have said earlier that we ought to give money away, rather than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep us warm.
Singer says this is not a matter of charity or supererogation.
423 On the contrary, we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so.
Question what do you think of Singer's contention here ?
Singer says that this limited revision of our "moral conceptual scheme" would have radical implications
In response, He takes up objections.
First objection: His proposal demands a too drastic change of our moral scheme.
People morally condemn those who do things like taking away someone else's property.
The don't condemn those who indulge in luxury instead of giving to famine relief.
Singer claims, in so many words, that he's doing normative ethics, not descriptive ethics
It doesn't matter what people do, it's what they ought to do.
Where does the other view come from: J. O. Urmson-some type of social utility in moral rules-keep us from killing each other.
Helping people outside our own society goes beyond these needs.
424: Singer claims that the moral point of view requires us to look beyond the interests of our own society-something that is today feasible.
424 c1 From the moral point of view, the prevention of the starvation of millions of people outside our society must be considered at least as pressing as the upholding of property norms within our society.
Possible Logical Problem here: begging the question: why must we do it, because the moral point of view says so.
Where does the moral point of view come from?
Despite evidence to the contrary (Urmson, Nietzsche perhaps) it comes from the requirements of what is moral.]
Another objection: Urmson, Sidgwick (19th Century Utilitarian) we need to have a basic moral code which is not too far beyond the capacities of the ordinary man.
Otherwise there will be a breakdown of compliance with the moral code.
Question is this a viable objection to Singer's view.
We simply can't give away 50% of our income or more
--what are we obligated to do?
Singer's response to this objection is that it doesn't take into account the effect that moral standards can have on the decisions we make.
He says 424 c1
Given a society in which a wealthy man who gives five percent of his income to famine relief is regarded as most generous, it is not surprising that a proposal that we all ought to give away half our incomes will be thought to be absurdly unrealistic.
Singer doesn't think their will be a general breakdown of moral behavior caused that by spreading around the idea that we ought to be doing much more than we do.
Another main objection: one made against utilitarianism.
According to some forms of utilitarianism: morally we ought to be working full time to increase the balance of happiness over misery.
Singer says that his position would not lead to that state in all circumstances.
If there were no bad occurrences that we could prevent without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, the argument would have no application.
However, he does believe that it follows from his argument that we ought, morally, to be working full time to relieve great suffering from things like famine.
We ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance.
Objection 4: Singer's conclusion is wildly out of line with what anyone else thinks.
Response-quoting "way-out radical" Thomas Aquinas who claims that we should share those material goods we have in superabundance.
Singer doesn't know this, apparently: Medieval Catholic view:
425 c1 The bread which you withhold belongs to the hungry; the clothing you shut away, to the naked; and the money you bury in the earth is the redemption and freedom of the penniless.
No lending money at interest either!
Objection 5: this is a matter for the government to deal with.
Singer thinks that the governments of affluent nations should give to famine relief.
And giving privately is not enough.
But: not a sufficient reason for individuals not to give.
Objection 6: concerns effective population control.
Singer supports this, but
A view about the future.
But population control doesn't relieve from the responsibility of famine relief.
425: Comes back to the idea of how much we should give away.
1. Marginal Utility-point where we begin to cause suffering to ourselves equal to that of the people we're trying to help.
Singer: a Strong and Moderate version of the principle
Typical move in a philosophical paper: Offer a strong and weak version of the point you're trying to prove.
Even if the reader can't except the strong version, can they deny the weak version?
And the weak version still has important consequences.
Strong version: requires us to prevent bad things from happening unless in doing so we would be sacrificing something of comparable moral significance.
Singer says he thinks this is the correct version and it does seem to require we reduce ourselves to the level of marginal utility.
Moderate version: we should prevent bad occurrences unless, to do so, we should sacrifice something morally significant.
Question what is the difference between the strong and moderate versions?
Here we're not required to reduce ourselves to the level of marginal utility.
Then shifts to a discussion of Philosophers playing a role in public affairs.
Here the facts about the existence of suffering are beyond dispute.
425 c2 The issue is one which faces everyone who has more money than he needs to support himself and his dependents, or who is in a position to take some sort of political action. These categories must include practically every teacher and student of philosophy in the universities of the Western world. If philosophy is to deal with matters that are relevant to both teachers and students, this is an issue that philosophers should discuss.
And discussion is not enough.
Singer calls on us to act here.
At least make a start
conclusion 425 c2
The philosopher who does so will have to sacrifice some of the benefits of the consumer society, but he can find compensation in the satisfaction of a way of life in which theory and practice, if not yet in harmony, are at least coming together.
Question do you think we are obligated as Singer claims ?
Question: could we have an even weaker version of Singer's claim: we ought to give up some things that are frivolous or of otherwise no moral significance?
Botox injections $500 a pop: would the money be better spent on famine relief?
Problem: Garret Hardin-a biologist-discusses notion of the "Carrying capacity"
If we help the starving, their population will just increase, and make more starving people.
Is helping people then a bad thing.
Does famine relief do more harm than good?
Question what would Singer reply?
