SUPPORTING RIGHT-WING PAKISTAN

CONTENTS

1. HOW BUSH WAS DUPED BY MUSHARRAF

2. LINKS TO AL QAEDA

3. MUSHARRAF’S AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

4. WASTING UNITED STATES FUNDS

5. EXPORTING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

1. HOW BUSH WAS DUPED BY MUSHARRAF. After Bush became president, he soon was duped by several world leaders. The two most important were Russian President Putin and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. When Bush was running for office in 2000, he did not even know Musharraf’s name. Bush could not identify the leader of Pakistan for a reporter’s pop quiz during an interview that was widely replayed on late-night television. (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

Relations between the United States and Pakistan were always tense over Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions even before Bush took office. American aid to Pakistan had been all but cut off. But 9/11 changed their relations. Bush demanded Musharraf’s allegiance in pursuing al Qaeda-- and got it at least verbally. Musharraf demanded military aid from Bush so he could maintain power -- and got it. (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

Musharraf played the union masterfully by convincing Bush that he alone could keep Pakistan stable. Kamran Bokhari, an analyst for Stratfor, a private intelligence company, who met with General Musharraf in January, said the general views Mr. Bush with some condescension. (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

Bokhari added, “Musharraf thinks that Bush has certain weaknesses that can be manipulated. I would say that President Musharraf doesn’t think highly of President Bush, but his interests force him to do business with the U.S. president.” (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

In his autobiography, In the Line of Fire, General Musharraf writes glowingly of the trust Bush placed in him. But he passed up a chance to praise Bush on “The Daily Show with Jon Stewart” where he was promoting the book. Stewart asked who would win a hypothetical contest for mayor of Karachi, Bush, or bin Laden. (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

Bush repeatedly called Musharraf “a friend.” In 2003, Bush invited the Pakistani dictator to Camp David, a place reserved for the closest of allies. In 2006, at Musharraf’s insistence, Bush risked a trip to Pakistan, despite security risks. (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

In the fall of 2007, Musharraf defied Bush by suspending Pakistan’s Constitution and imposing martial law. That led to the rekindling of old tensions. (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

Bush always claimed he was an ardent believer in personal diplomacy. He once remarked that he had looked into the eyes of Putin and had “a sense of his soul.” Bush was taken by Musharraf’s fluent English and duped by his promises to hold elections and relinquish military power. Bush looked at Musharraf and saw a democratic reformer when he should have seen a dictator instead. (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

Bush presumably was incompetent to ask the hard questions. Neither did high-level administration officials. The White House viewed Musharraf as the reasonable general. Bush bought the line -- hook, line and sinker.” (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

2. LINKS TO AL QAEDA. As Bush cozied up to Musharraf and his authoritarian regime after the 9/11 attacks, the Pakistani president accused the Bush administration of threatening to bomb Pakistan “back to the Stone Age” after 9/11 if he did not help America’s war on terror.

No other country on earth was more dangerous than Pakistan. It had all that bin Laden needed:

1. Political instability, a nuclear weapons program, a trusted network of radical Islamists.

2. An abundance of angry young anti-Western recruits.

3. Secluded training areas.

4. Access to modern electronic technology.

5. Regular airline service to the West.

6. Security services that were unreliable. (Newsweek, October 29, 2007)

After 9/11, Musharraf promised the Bush administration that he would cut off support for anti-American groups, including the Taliban. Early on, he authorized the arrests of several top al Qaeda leaders in Pakistani cities, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and Abu Zubaydah, a top al Qaeda organizer. (Newsweek, October 29, 2007)

But Musharraf never made a concerted effort to fulfill his pledge. He was constrained by the deep sympathies that many of his countrymen had for Jihadists. For decades, Pakistanis were taught that the guerrillas were Muslim heroes, fighting for national honor and security. Such loyalties could not be contained or eliminated. Many militants, both inside and outside the government, maintained links with anti-United States groups. Pakistan’s security services would pursue certain figures -- particularly foreign al Qaeda fighters -- but ignored others. (Newsweek, October 29, 2007)

Many of Pakistan’s ordinary citizens believed Jihadists should be preserved for future use as a strategic weapon, especially against India. A vast majority – over 80 percent – looked to bin Laden as a hero, while fewer than 20 percent perceived Bush as their enemy. (Newsweek, October 29, 2007)

The Pakistan government provided a safe haven for Taliban fighters next door in Afghanistan. The Taliban could enter and leave Pakistan at will. Their sick and injured could safely enter private hospitals in Pakistan. Guns and supplies were readily available to them. During the winter, when fighting traditionally diminished in Afghanistan, thousands of Taliban could travel to Pakistan’s thriving madrassas to study the Koran. Others studied computer technology, video production, and even English. Many attended local mosques where they solicited donations to support the war against the West. (Newsweek, October 29, 2007)

Taliban insurgents had no centralized supply system. Instead, each senior provincial commander operated his own network. With cash from Afghanistan and from fund-raising efforts, commanders could acquire shoes and warm clothes for Taliban fighters, walkie-talkies, satellite phones, weapons, explosives, and remote-control devices. Many items were hidden in shipments of clothes and food or under the baggage of Afghan refugees on their way home. Some Taliban chiefs preferred to shop for themselves. (Newsweek, October 29, 2007)

While the Pakistani Army halted some offensive operations and dismantled some checkpoints, militants helped the Taliban and al Qaeda regroup and infiltrated back into Afghanistan. Those forces, all working together, brought the Afghan Jihad home to Pakistan. Within the tribes’ safely controlled territory, they ran training courses for insurgent recruits and suicide bombers. Some eventually traveled to Afghanistan to fight beside the Taliban. Others stayed in the tribal area to fight the Pakistani Army, while others were sent out to hit targets in places like Karachi. Several terrorist plots in Britain were traced back to the tribal areas. (Newsweek, October 29, 2007)

By launching a war in Afghanistan in 2001, Bush alienated a large majority of Muslims, opening the floodgates for the recruitment of a large number of al Qaeda recruits. Bush was not the liberator he had hoped to be. An extremely high 87 percent of Pakistanis viewed Bin Laden as a freedom fighter, and most believed Bush to be the enemy. (CNN, October 24, 2003)

Despite acquiescing to the Bush administration, Musharraf warned that an American attack would cause more turmoil in the Muslim world. He said in an interview on British Broadcasting Corporation, “We are on their side with whatever is happening. But that doesn’t mean that we can start operating or participating in activities all around the world. Let’s deal with what is happening around our country. We have got too much on our hands here in this region to get involved in anything else, especially when one is very conscious that this shall have very negative repercussions in the Islamic world.”(New York Times, August 29, 2002)

With massive American bombing strikes in Afghanistan and with thousands of American ground troops chasing al Qaeda forces, Musharraf found himself in a quandary. Pakistan had been home to high-level Al Qaeda officials as well as numerous terrorist training camps, particularly near the Afghanistan border in northwestern Pakistan and in Kasmir.

According to Seymour Hirsch of The New Yorker, the American Special Forces had an ideal opportunity to kill and capture thousands of al Qaeda forces in late 2001. American forces had cornered as many as 8,000 al Qaeda soldiers and ISI (Pakistan Intelligence Agency) officials in northeast Afghanistan at Kunduz, 150 miles from the Pakistan border. Musharraf had been under intense pressure to protect himself from Islamic fundamentalists at home to protect the ISI and Pakastani forces in the field.

With political pressure from the Islamic community mounting against him, Musharraf was compelled to protect the 8,000-plus forces and negotiated with the Defense Department to lift the corridor which American Special Forces had sealed. The Defense Department called for a cease fire for several days, in order for terrorist forces to escape and in order for Musharraf to save face. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld denied having knowledge of this deal.

About 12 Pakistani planes flew between 2,500 and 5,000 ISI and al Qaeda soldiers from the combat zone to safety in Pakistan. Those included at least two Pakistani generals and possibly members of Osama bin Laden’s family. Pakistan continued to have close ties to Saudi Arabia, which continued to funnel in funds to al Qaeda and other fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups.

During the summer of 2003, hostilities increased between al Qaeda and American troops along the Pakistan border. The Al Qaeda forces, who were not captured or killed, were pushed to the southeast into Pakistani territory with the hope that Musharraf’s army would capture them. But after three days of tribal protests, Musharraf called off the search, and not one Taliban soldier was arrested.

It became increasingly evident that the Pakistani army was opposed to cooperating with the United States in hunting down al Qaeda forces. Musharraf also failed to crack down extremist groups that had attacked Americans in Kashmir. In January 2002, he banned such groups, but they surfaced under new names. (Time, September 29, 2003)

The anti-American fever was not only fueled by fundamentalist Muslims in Pakistan, but Musharraf himself felt he was shunned by the Bush administration. Musharraf felt that the Bush White House failed to compensate Pakistan for joining the United States – at least to some extent – in its war on terrorism. In addition, Islamabad had lobbied the Bush administration for the sale of F-16 fighter jets, for the opening of American markets to Pakistan’s textile industry, and for failing India to settle the Kashmir dispute. (Time, September 29, 2003)

During the summer of 2003, hostilities increased between al Qaeda and American troops along the Pakistan border. The al Qaeda forces, who were not captured or killed, were pushed to the southeast into Pakistani territory with the hope that Musharraf’s army would capture them. But after three days of tribal protests, Musharraf called off the search, and not one Taliban soldier was arrested.

In the spring of 2004, the Pakistani army under General Safdar Hussain signed a truce with Nek Mohammed, a former Taliban leader and the tribal leader with al Qaeda fighters. For nearly two months, they eluded capture while killing approximately 80 of the general’s men. The truce was a severe setback for the Bush Administration that was devoted to capturing al Qaeda and the Taliban from the tribal territory. (Time, May 3, 2004)

The Pakistani army agreed to halt its operation against Mohammed’s al Qaeda soldiers, and they repaid Wazir tribesmen for war damages. Most of the 160 suspected al Qaeda captured supporters were freed. The tribesmen were also allowed to keep their weapons. In exchange, Mohammed and his clan promised to refrain from attacks on Pakistani forces and the United States troops in nearby Afghanistan. (Time, May 3, 2004)

During Bush’s first term as president, Musharraf said the CIA paid Pakistan millions of dollars for handing over more than 350 suspected al Qaeda terrorists to the United States. (President Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire)

By 2006, Musharraf was weary. His power was diminishing as tribal units gained more territory. In September 2006, Musharraf decided to sign a pact – using his local governor – with tribal militants. Even al Qaeda jihadists began parading through Waziristan as they dragged “criminals” through the streets.

Later that year and in 2007, Cheney and Secretary of Defense Gates traveled to Islamabad to convince Musharraf to renew his military operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Musharraf was in dilemma. He risked support if he would refuse or not refuse to take a stronger stance against jihadists. He decided to send 20,000 Pakistani troops into territories to reinforce the 80,000 already stationed there.

In 2006, Musharraf claimed the threat was delivered to by Pakistan’s intelligence director. Musharraf said in a 60 Minutes interview, “The intelligence director told me that (Armitage) said, ‘Be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age.’“ Armitage said he denied telling Pakistan’s intelligence director that he threatened to bomb Pakistan. (New York Times, September 22, 2006; CBS’ 60 Minutes, September 24, 2006)

As the American president continued to praise Musharraf, Pakistan played a double game. On the one hand, Islamabad half-heartedly pursued al Qaeda operatives. The Pakistani government arrested more than 600 suspects and handed most of them over to the United States. Thousands of Pakistani troops were sent into the tribal areas to drive out al Qaeda fighters hiding in the mountains along its Afghan border. (Time, November 29, 2004)

Afghan officials and Taliban fighters and sympathizers in the frontier Pakistani cities of Quetta contended that Musharraf did little to capture the many Taliban commanders who had fled into his country. Other Taliban leaders continued to live openly in Pakistani cities, according to Afghan intelligence officials and several jailed jihadis. (Time, November 29, 2004)

Islamabad’s reluctance to crack down allowed Afghan fundamentalists to use Pakistan as a refuge from which to recruit fresh militants and launch cross-border ambushes against United States and Afghan troops. Some ex-Taliban fighters even alleged that several colonels in Pakistan’s security agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), funded former Taliban proteges through madrasahs, or religious schools, and mosques in border villages. (Time, November 29, 2004)

Afghan and Western intelligence officials contended that, more than a dozen times in 2003 and 2004, they alerted Pakistani authorities to the locations of specific Taliban hideouts. In every case, the extremists had slipped away before the raids started. In response, Pakistani officials claimed the information was too sketchy. (Time, November 29, 2004)

In January 2006, tensions increased as a result of widespread suspicions of United States involvement in the attack by a Predator. The pilotless plane struck at a house just two miles from the Bajaur madrasa, killing 18 people. (The Guardian, November 1, 2006; The Guardian, November 1, 2006)In September 2006, Bush said that Musharraf had looked him “in the eye” and said, “There won’t be a Taliban and won’t be al Qaeda.” Subsequently, the war continued with more American and allied casualties, and al Qaeda and the Taliban gained ground in Pakistan. (New York Times, February 26, 2007)

Five months later -- in February 2007 -- Cheney lashed out against the Pakistan regime. The vice president castigated Islamabad for making inadequate efforts by Pakistan in combating al Qaeda and the Taliban. Musharraf responded immediately, saying, “Pakistan does not accept dictation from any side or any source.” (New York Times, February 26, 2007)

In November, Musharraf, declared a state of emergency despite warnings from Bush and other world leaders. All members of the Supreme Court were required to sign a new provisional constitutional order mandating the state of emergency, but 8 of the 11 justices signed an order calling the state of emergency illegal and gathered at the Supreme Court building. (New York Times, November 3, 2007)

About 1,000 additional police were deployed in Islamabad, the capital. Prominent Pakistani journalists and opposition politicians were be detained.

In 2007, the United States Special Operations Command proposed enlisting tribal leaders in the frontier areas of Pakistan to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban, as part of a broader effort to bolster Pakistani forces against an expanding militancy. (New York Times, November 12, 2007)

The proposal consisted of a shift in strategy that would also be likely to expand the presence of American military trainers in Pakistan. The cost was estimated at $350 million over several years to help train and equip the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force with about 85,000 members who were recruited from border tribes. (New York Times, November 18, 2007)

The plan directly financed a separate tribal paramilitary force that was proved largely ineffective and paid militias that agreed to fight al Qaeda and foreign extremists. (New York Times, November 18, 2007)

The program was modeled in part on a similar effort by American forces in Anbar Province in Iraq that the Bush administration hailed as a great success in fighting foreign insurgents there. But it raised the question of whether such partnerships could succeed without a significant American military presence on the ground in Pakistan. Also, it was unclear whether enough support can be found among the tribes. (New York Times, November 18, 2007)

Altogether, the broader strategic move toward more local support is being accelerated because of concern about instability in Pakistan and the weakness of the Pakistani government, as well as fears that extremists with havens in the tribal areas could escalate their attacks on allied troops in Afghanistan. (New York Times, November 18, 2007)

In late 2007, Islamic militants sympathetic to al Qaeda and the Taliban extended their reach beyond the frontier areas into more settled areas, most notably the mountainous region of Swat. (New York Times, November 18, 2007)

BENAZIR BHUTTO’S ASSASSINATION. Pakistan and most of the Middle East and the West were dealt a tremendous blow on December 27, 2007 when Benazir Bhutto, whose father had been the country’s democratic leader two decades earlier, was assassinated. Some believed that Musharraf was behind the assassination. At the very least, he was not unhappy with her death. The al Qaeda network accused by Pakistan’s government of killing Bhutto is increasingly made up not of foreign fighters but of homegrown militants. (Agence France Presse, January 6, 2008)

After the assassination, Bush planned to further meddle in the internal affairs of Pakistan. The Pakistani military reacted angrily to Bush’s plan to carry out covert military operations in the country’s volatile tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

CIA operatives based in Afghanistan would be able to call on direct military support for counter-terrorism operations in neighboring Pakistan. The proposal called for giving CIA agents broader powers to strike targets in Pakistan. The plan was reportedly discussed by Cheney, Rice, and national security aides after the assassination of Bhutto. Musharraf was not consulted. (New York Times, January 6, 2008)

Major General Waheed Arshad said, “It is not up to the U.S. administration, it is Pakistan’s government who is responsible for this country.” (Agence France Presse, January 6, 2008)

3. WASTING UNITED STATES FUNDS. Oxfam, a leading British charity, concluded that too much aid to Afghanistan was wasted. Billions of dollars was tossed away in contractors’ profits, expensive expatriate consultants, or small-scale, quick-fix projects. (Reuters, November 20, 2007)

Between 2001 and 2007, more than $15 billion was funneled to Afghanistan. The United States was the largest donor. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated close to half its funds to the five largest American contractors in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the United States military spent $65,000 a minute in Afghanistan. (Reuters, November 20, 2007)

The Oxfam report called for the 25 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) run by the armies of 13 different nations across the country to withdraw where the security situation was stable enough and carry out relief work only where there was a critical need. Oxfam also called on the 50,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan to take greater care not to hurt civilians, particularly in air strikes. (Reuters, November 20, 2007)

The Center for Public Integrity reported in November 2007 that United States contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan more than doubled from 2004 to 2006 to over 25 billion dollars. However, during this time span, government oversight of the firms involved slackened. (Agence France Presses, November 20, 2007)

The top United States contracts went to:

1. KBR with more than $16 billion from 2004 to 2006.

2. DynCorp International, a provider of private security services to State Department personnel with $1.8 billion.

3. Washington Group International, a rival to KBR in building and engineering, with just over $1 billion.

4. First Kuwaiti General Trading and Contracting ranked eleventh. The firm was accused of holding foreign laborers against their will to help build the new United States embassy in Baghdad.

5. Blackwater ranked 12th with $485 million. (Agence France Presses, November 20, 2007)

4. EXPORTING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY.

Bush secretly funds Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan was one of the world’s leading suppliers of illicit nuclear technology. In 1993 and 1994, Pakistan offered to supply Iraq with an entire nuclear-weapons program. Americans investigators suspected that A. Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s “Islamic bomb” program. (Newsweek, May 17, 2004)

In 2002, American satellites detected a Pakistani plane picking up missile components in North Korea, apparently as part of a barter deal for nuclear weapons technology. In November 2003, Iran told nuclear inspectors that its uranium enrichment programs had gotten crucial help from people in various nations who were probably linked to Pakistanis. In December 2003, Libya indicated that its nuclear programs benefited from intermediaries in Dubai who might have been working with Pakistanis. (New York Times, January 31, 2004)

Over his first six years as president, Bush handed over $100 million on a highly classified program to help Musharraf secure his country’s nuclear weapons. Shortly after 9/11, the Bush administration began to secretly funnel funds to Pakistan, hiding the aid in secret portions of the federal budget. (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

The funds paid for the training of Pakistani personnel in the United States and the construction of a nuclear security training center in Pakistan. United States officials said the facility was nowhere near completion, even though it was supposed to be in operation in 2007. (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

The United States aid included a raft of equipment -- from helicopters to night-vision goggles to nuclear detection equipment -- to help secure its nuclear material, its warheads, and the laboratories that were the site of the worst known case of nuclear proliferation in the atomic age. (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

Even though Islamabad claimed the equipment improved its nuclear program, Pakistani officials refused to show American officials how or where the gear was actually used. Pakistan did not want to reveal the locations of their weapons or the amount or type of new bomb-grade fuel the country was producing. (New York Times, November 17, 2007)

A.Q. Khan and Pakistan’s nuclear program. Besides terrorist connections between the Musharraf regime and Islamic militants, Pakistan posed another major threat to the global community. Islamabad possessed as many as 40 nuclear warheads after presumably acquiring enriched uranium over the previous decade from Europe. In addition, Pakistan was one

In late 2003, Musharraf backed off from insisting that Pakistan was never involved in nuclear technology exports. He then claimed that whatever problems existed came from rogue scientists who sold technology. Musharraf claimed Khan had sold nuclear secrets abroad “for personal financial gain” but reiterated his government’s position that there had been no official involvement. He added, “There is no such evidence that any government personality or military personality was involved in this at all.” (New York Times, January 25, 2004)

of the world’s leading suppliers of illicit nuclear technology.

In 2004, Abdul Qadeer Khan , the father of Pakistan’s “Islamic bomb” program, admitted that he had exported nuclear material and blueprints to several rogue nations. Another scientist, Mohammed Farooq, a high-ranking manager at Pakistan’s premier nuclear weapons laboratory, was also suspected of passing on nuclear technology to other regimes. (New York Times, January 25, 2004) (Newsweek, May 17, 2004)

Pakistan’s bomb program took years to mature. As a result of Khan’s work, Pakistan finally detonated five underground nuclear bombs in 1998. At a time of high tensions with India over the disputed region of Kashmir, this event turned Khan into a national hero. (Time, February 14, 2005)

Khan owned dozens of properties in Pakistan and Dubai and invested in a Timbuktu hotel, which he named after his wife. He donated $30 million to various Pakistani charities and had enough money left over to buy his staff members cars and pay for the university education of their children. After paying to restore the tomb of Sultan Shahabuddin Ghauri, an Afghan who conquered Delhi, Khan put up a portrait of himself next to the tomb. (Time, February 14, 2005)

Pakistan asked the Bush administration to set up nuclear power plants in the country but failed to get a favorable response. Instead, Bush chose to reward Pakistan’s archrival, India, with a deal to supply nuclear fuel and technology.

Then Pakistan turned to China to help expand its sector and to become a competitive nuclear power industry. In 2006, China completed a 300 megawatt nuclear power plant in Chashma in Pakistan. Months later, Musharraf lobbied for more Chinese input in the nuclear sector, requesting a series of new plants to help Pakistan boost its nuclear power capacity and signing a deal whereby China helped build six nuclear power plants with an installed capacity of 300 megawatts each. (Inter Press Service, September 4, 2006)

Aiding Iran’s nuclear program. Besides working for the Pakistani regime, Khan also operated clandestinely. He offered centrifuges -- known as P-1 and P-2 -- to countries interested in building nuclear weapons. In the early 1990s, Khan began meeting with representatives from Iran. He was offered about $8 billion for nuclear technology, but he turned down the offer. (Time, February 14, 2005)

Three years later, the IAEA claimed Khan sold Iran centrifuges as well as blueprints to manufacture P-1 and P-2 centrifuges. The Iranians said they wanted the centrifuges for civilian purposes. (Time, February 14, 2005)

In November 2003, United Nations nuclear inspectors uncovered outlines of a secret nuclear procurement network whereby Iran acquired thousands of sensitive parts and tools from numerous countries over a 17-year period. Much of the equipment was routed through the Persian Gulf port city of Dubai to conceal the actual destination. (Washington Post, December 21, 2003)

Pakistan was a major source of Iran’s key blueprints, technical guidance, and equipment for a pilot uranium-enrichment plant. The blueprints depicted a type of centrifuge that was nearly identical to a machine used by Pakistan in the early years of its nuclear program. The plans and components, which were acquired over several installments from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, allowed Iran to circumvent several major technological hurdles to make its own enriched uranium. (Washington Post, December 21, 2003)

In addition, Iran obtained sensitive equipment from European, Asian, and North American companies. China and Russia made significant contributions to the Iranian program. IAEA inspectors detected traces of Soviet-made highly enriched uranium at Iran’s Kalaye nuclear facility that was a former testing center for uranium-enrichment equipment. (Washington Post, December 21, 2003)

The most valuable assistance to Iran came from anonymous individuals who provided top-secret designs and key components for uranium-processing machines known as gas centrifuges. Centrifuges were technologically complex machines that, at supersonic speeds, extracted the small amounts of fissile material present in natural uranium. (Washington Post, December 21, 2003)

In January 2004, Pakistani investigators concluded that at least two of the country’s top nuclear scientists provided unauthorized technical assistance to Iran’s nuclear weapons program in the late 1980s. The scientists allegedly provided the help under a secret agreement between Pakistan and Iran that was supposed to be limited to the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology. (New York Times, January 25, 2004)

In early 2005, the Bush administration told its Asian allies that Pyongyang exported uranium hexafluroide -- which could be enriched to weapons-grade uranium -- to Libya, after the shipment first went to Pakistan. But United States intelligence reported, according to two officials with detailed knowledge of the transaction, that it was North Korea that sold the nuclear material to Pakistan. In return, Pakistan sold the uranium to Libya. The Bush administration no evidence, the officials said, that North Korea knew of the second transaction. (Washington Post, March 20, 2005)

Helping Libya’s nuclear program. In the 1980s, Libya’s Colonel Muammar Gaddafi tried to build his own nuclear program by importing German technology and engineers. The effort failed. Libya needed to enrich uranium rather than produce plutonium in a reactor. Khan gave the Libyans technical instructions for how to build a nuclear warhead. The material was wrapped in plastic sheeting. (Time, February 14, 2005)

In 1997, Khan’s Libyan contacts told him they wanted P-1 and P-2 centrifuges and the equipment to build hundreds more. The deal was worth $100 million. Khan turned to old contacts in Western Europe and South Africa, in some instances using the same people he had done business with in the 1980s. Among the shadowy middlemen involved over the years were South African Johan Meyer and German South African Gerhard Wisser. Wisser allegedly helped set up a processing facility that could be shipped whole to Libya. (Time, February 14, 2005)

Khan's crew tapped furnace-makers in Italy, lathe-makers in Spain, and Swiss middlemen who helped design parts for construction in Southeast Asia. The network began sending Libya crate-loads of equipment on ships through Europe and the Persian Gulf city of Dubai – and on to Tripoli. Khan’s base of operations became Dubai, with its easy transit connections by air. A key member of Khan’s network said Iranian contacts once dropped off in Khan’s apartment two suitcases containing $3 million in cash as a payment. After 1999, Khan traveled to Dubai 41 times. (Time, February 14, 2005)

On October 4, 2003, the Italian Coast Guard seized the BBC China, a German-flagged cargo ship that was headed for Libya. Coordinated by the CIA and the British MI6, the seizure yielded five large containers, each carefully packed with precision machine tools, tubes, and other bomb-making equipment. The containers amounted to part of a uranium-enrichment facility manufactured in Malaysia by Buhary Sayed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan whom Khan first met in Dubai in the 1990s. Tahir was arrested in Kuala Lumpur in May 2004. (Time, February 14, 2005)

Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman, said Khan shipped components to Libya and Iran for their nuclear weapons programs and received two briefcases with a $3 million payment from Iran. Khan shipped containers of used centrifuges -- sophisticated equipment for enriching uranium -- to Iran from Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates. He transported the materials on a merchant vessel owned by an Iranian company. (Washington Post, February 21, 2004)

Khan told Tahir that he had also flown hexafluoride to Libya on a Pakistani airliner as part of a secret program he had worked out with the Libyans between 1999 and 2003 at meetings in Istanbul; Casablanca, Morocco; and Dubai. (Washington Post, February 21, 2004)

When experts from the United States and the IAEA scoured Libya for nuclear data for blueprints for a 10-kiloton atomic bomb, they discovered that Khan had provided $100 million in nuclear machinery for enriching uranium to make fuel for warheads. (New York Times, December 26, 2004)

The North Korea connection. According to high-level Bush administration leaks to the New York Times (October 18, 2002), Pakistan had been colluding with North Korea to the mutual benefit of their respective nuclear weapons programs.

Khan made contact with the North Korean government in 1993. In the late 1990s, he began shipping centrifuges and instructions to Pyongyang, sometimes aboard Pakistani military cargo planes. Khan also traveled to Saudi Arabia and Egypt and to such African countries as Sudan, Ivory Coast, and Niger. (Time, February 14, 2005)

Pakistan sold missiles to North Korea around 1997 in order to counter India’s nuclear arsenal. As part of the apparent quid pro quo, Pakistan provided information to Pyongyang to help in the production of nuclear technology. The equipment presumably included gas centrifuges used to create weapons-grade uranium, warhead prototypes, nuclear designs, and test data. If Pakistan delivered nuclear data to North Korea, it would be likely that it also passed on similar data to the Third World. (New York Times, October 18, 2002)

The Pakistani government maintained that it was “absolutely incorrect” to accuse Pakistan of providing nuclear weapons technology to North Korea. Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States said, “We have never had an accident or leak or any export of fissile material or nuclear technology or knowledge.” (New York Times, October 18, 2002)

As part of the apparent quid pro quo, Pakistan provided information to Pyongyang to help in the production of nuclear technology. The equipment presumably included gas centrifuges used to create weapons-grade uranium, warhead prototypes, nuclear designs, and test data. If Pakistan delivered nuclear data to North Korea, it would be likely that it also passed on similar data to the Third World. (New York Times, October 18, 2002)

Since the 1990s, Pakistan flirted with nuclear war with India, another member of the nuclear community.

The Pakistan-Iran nuclear connection. In November 2003, United Nations nuclear inspectors uncovered outlines of a secret nuclear procurement network whereby Iran acquired thousands of sensitive parts and tools from numerous countries over a 17-year period. Much of the equipment was routed through the Persian Gulf port city of Dubai to conceal the actual destination. (Washington Post, December 21, 2003)

In addition, Iran obtained sensitive equipment from European, Asian, and North American companies. China and Russia made significant contributions to the Iranian program. IAEA inspectors detected traces of Soviet-made highly enriched uranium at Iran’s Kalaye nuclear facility which was a former testing center for uranium-enrichment equipment. (Washington Post, December 21, 2003)

One scientist was Abdul Qadeer Khan, considered the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb. The other was Mohammed Farooq, a high-ranking manager at Pakistan’s premier nuclear weapons laboratory. (New York Times, January 25, 2004)

Even Musharraf acknowledged that it appeared Pakistani scientists had sold nuclear secrets abroad “for personal financial gain” but reiterated his government’s position that there had been no official involvement. He added, “There is no such evidence that any government personality or military personality was involved in this at all.” (New York Times, January 25, 2004)

Pakistan acknowledges it exported technology. In late 2003, Musharraf backed off from insisting that Pakistan was never involved in nuclear technology exports. He then claimed that whatever problems existed came from rogue scientists who sold technology.

In February 2004, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist, acknowledged that he had leaked nuclear secrets to other nations. He admitted that he and his associates spread the designs and technology to produce nuclear weapons fuel to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

International inspectors found blueprints linking Khan to Iran and Libya and entire centrifuge assemblies in Libya that appeared to have been shipped directly from Pakistan. (Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2004)

Khan told Tahir that he had also flown uranium hexafluoride to Libya on a Pakistani airliner as part of a secret program he had worked out with the Libyans between 1999 and 2003 at meetings in Istanbul; Casablanca, Morocco; and Dubai. (Washington Post, February 21, 2004)

The gas, uranium hexafluoride, was used in the process of enriching uranium. Highly enriched uranium was required needed to build a nuclear weapon. At lower levels, it was used to fuel nuclear power plants. (Washington Post, February 21, 2004)