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ANGOLA. American involvement in Angola initially began in April 1974 after a leftist coup ended hundreds of years of Portuguese domination. Early the next year, the Portuguese government negotiated with three tribal rebel groups -- the Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The groups agreed to form a coalition government and to work towards setting up free elections. All three tribal groups were left of center and somewhat socialistic, and all had received some weapons and aid from communist countries.

The FNLA was founded in 1954 by Holden Roberto, and the group consisted of about 700,000 Bakongo tribal members. Ten years later, Roberto's top lieutenant, Jonas Savimbi, broke away and formed UNITA which consisted of two million members of the Ovimbundo tribe. Just prior to the 1974 coup, the CIA supported both UNITA and the FNLA. The agency provided intelligence reports to the FNLA while selling older bombers to UNITA. In addition the CIA permitted UNITA to recruit Cuban pilots.

After the Portuguese departed in 1974, the National Security Council "40 Committee" agreed to appropriate more funds in the amount of $300,000 to the FNLA while refusing to approve $100,000 for Savimbi's UNITA. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union decided to provide weapons to the MPLA which also had ties to Cuba and China.

The following year, the 40 Committee approved Operation Feature, a projected $100 million covert effort to place the FNLA in power. First, in July 1974 President Ford approved $14 million in weapons which were flown to the FNLA in Angola on Air Force transports. Then a shipload of personnel carriers and rifles was sent to both FNLA and UNITA troops at the end of August. Meanwhile, the South African government initiated its clandestine "Zulu" operation, providing arms and military personnel to UNITA forces.

Threatened by the FNLA and UNITA, the MPLA turned to the Soviet Union and Cuba. Castro provided 5,000 soldiers by the end of 1975, while the Soviets provided weapons which were valued at $100 million by the end of the year.

After the Hughes-Ryan Amendment became law, the American intelligence community was forced to notify various congressional committees about its covert war in Angola. Democratic Senator Dick Clark, chairman of the African Affairs subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, was critical of the role of the United States in Angola and with the South African regime. During 1975 and 1976, the intelligence committees were briefed 35 times by the CIA. Director Colby continued to deny that American weapons were sent to Angolan rebels, and he also maintained that no Americans were in Angola.

Articles in the New York Times and the Washington Post first broke in September 1975, and they revealed American complicity in Angola. Three months later, CIA official William Nelson admitted the truth about the agency's involvement. This lie led to the termination of further American aid to the guerrillas.

Known as the Clark Amendment, all aid to Angola was terminated. The legislation passed the Senate by 54-22 in December 1975, and it passed in the House the following month. Despite the fact that he probably opposed the amendment, Ford signed it into law on January 9, 1976. For the first time, a covert operation carried out by the intelligence community was stopped by Congress. But when George Bush was appointed DCI, he refused to confirm whether American aid had been terminated.

AFGHANISTAN. Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the CIA moved quickly to aid the rebel Mujahaddin rebels and to shore up relations with Pakistan's General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. Zia set up the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) to oversee intelligence on the Afghan-Pakistani border as well as allying itself with the CIA.

In May 1979, seven months before the Soviets moved into Kabul, the first CIA shipment of arms began to flow to Pakistan and on to Mujaheddin camps. The hub of CIA activity center in Islamabad. The operation began with $30 million in weapons a year in the early stages. It then grew slowly and eventually reached $700 million in 1988. Within ten years the United States had funneled in $3 billion in aid to the Mujaheddin, and the CIA had provided the rebels with $2 billion in covert aid. This was the largest covert shipment of arms, next to that which was delivered to Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, in the CIA's history.

However, much of those funds and arms earmarked for the Mujaheddin was funneled to other sources. First, Pakistani forces took a chunk off the top. Then Mujaheddin leader stole hundreds of millions of dollars of anti-aircraft guns, missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47 rifles, ammunition, and mines. Some of these weapons were sold to criminal gangs, drug kingpins, and the Iranian military. Other weapons were stockpiled by guerrilla leaders, waiting for the time when the Soviets would depart and when they could expand their territory. Estimates of the thefts and diversions of the CIA weapons ranged from $600 million to over $1 billion. State Department officials even acknowledged that the losses may have been as high as 50 percent or more of all the arms destined to reach the Mujaheddin. The department's estimate of losses was only $350 million.

The Mujaheddin also needed funds with which to purchase more arms, to bribe mule drivers, and to for oil from neighboring Arab countries. So the CIA counterfeited over $20 million in cash. Yet they still needed more CIA aid. CIA Director Casey then turned to areas where dollars could be hidden from Congress. The CIA formed partnerships with Saudi Arabia and surprisingly with China and its newest archrival, Iran, after the Shah had fallen from power. These countries contributed more than $750 million in weapons and money to the Mujaheddin cause.

In 1981, the CIA sold AWACs reconnaissance planes to Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and netted $8.5 billion from the sales. Then Casey began to urge the royal family to work with the CIA in order to finance the Afghan war. The CIA set up a secret bank account in Switzerland, and the Saudis contributed sums equal to the CIA's legal allotment to finance the Mujaheedin. In addition, the royal family also poured in millions of dollars to finance the Contras in Central America. In addition President Reagan used emergency war powers and arranged 400 Stinger missile sales to Saudi Arabia in 1984 and 1985 for over one-half billion dollars which was then channeled into secret accounts in Switzerland and the Cayman Islands. Between $500 million and $525 million was set aside specifically for the Afghan guerrillas, while $32 million was earmarked for the Contras.

In 1980, Chinese Defense Minister Geng Biao agreed to help the Afghan cause and allowed the CIAto coordinate shipments of Chinese-made weapons to the guerrillas. For two years the CIA paid China to ship arms by land through Pakistan and on to the resistance fighters in Afghanistan. Between 1983 and 1985, the shipment of weapons accelerated, and the CIA began purchasing anti-aircraft guns, rocket launchers, and surface-to-air missiles from China. The Chinese were willing to sell their outdated stockpiles of Soviet-made weapons and were eager to replace them with modern weaponry. In addition, Israel hoped to sell its modern weapons' components to China. So the CIA arranged for Israel to receive millions of dollars in credit toward the purchase of sophisticated American weapons systems. This allowed China to export numerous weapons to a dummy corporation set up by the CIA.

In 1987, more than $600 million in weapons poured into the Mujaheddin pipeline. The next year, the amount reached $700 million. In 1989, newly elected President Bush convened a meeting with the NSC and decided to continue with $700-per-year funding even though there were concrete signs that the Soviets were beginning to withdraw from Afghanistan. After nearly 10 years in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union packed up and departed. The war had promised nothing more than death and destruction. This was the cost of the CIA's involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

LIBYA. Since the 1980s Libya has repeatedly been charged with terrorism. In 1981 the Reagan administration chose to conduct military maneuvers approximately 100 miles off the coast of Libya, an obvious act of provocation. Libya had declared these to be national waters in the Gulf of Sidra. The White House declared that their waters did not extend more than 12 miles off their coast. When two Libyan jets approached the American warships, they were promptly shot down.

In the late 1980s, terrorist attacks in Europe were blamed on the Gadaffi regime. The Reagan administration claimed that Libya was responsible for the bombing of the German LaBelle nightclub which killed an American soldier. As a result, in 1986, Reagan directed the air force to strike civilian targets in Tripoli. Reagan stated that his goal was "contributing to an international environment of peace, freedom, and progress within which our democracy - and other fee nations - can flourish." Nine F-111 bombers from German bases carried 36 laser-guided 2,000 bombs. Not only were there extensive damage and casualties, but Gadaffi's home was bombed and two of his sons were maimed and his daughter was killed. In addition, a hundred residents were killed. Reagan stated that this was a mere coincidence, and that their home was not targeted by American bombers.

In the 1990s, the White House charged Libya with being behind the downing of Pan American Flight 103 which crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people. There was no evidence that the perpetrators had any links to Syria or Libya. A year later the Bush administration paid the Syrian government one billion dollars to be part of the coalition to support the war against Iraq.