CHAPTER 16
BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA
BRAZIL. Joal Goulart became Brazil's the first democratically elected president in 1961. Once a strong supporter of the United States, he turned his attention to domestic policy. The reform-minded Goulart proposed numerous social and economic reforms. He announced plans to distribute millions of acres of land to the poor and to nationalize seven United States oil companies. As an example, he pushed for legislation to nationalize some multinational corporations as well as to limit the amount of profits that others could earn in Brazil. A subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph was nationalized, and the American multinational was to be compensated. However, since Goulart had inherited a dismal economy, compensation was slow in coming.
Goulart sought to continue trading with the United States. However, when he requested to purchase military hardware, the United States refused. Goulart was forced to turn to Eastern Europe and purchased helicopters from Poland. At this point, the CIA set out to overthrow this new democracy. The agency spent up to $20 million in a campaign to support other candidates in the 1962 election. The CIA gained access to right wing newspapers and printed anticommunist articles. 50,000 textbooks were printed by the CIA and distributed to high schools and colleges. The agency organized women's groups which circulated rumors that the Goulart government was communist.
In 1963, the CIA was able to infiltrate the right wing element of the army and bought the support of Castelo Branco. The CIA provided him with weapons and the equipment with which to destroy oil refineries. The United States Navy deployed ships off the coast of Brazil and made available military personnel who would aid Branco when fighting was to erupt.
In March 1964, Branco and leading army officers carried out the coup in Rio de Janiero. Troops and tanks advanced through the capital city and thousands of enlisted men gave their support to the right wing. The city's largest military base was seized. Goulart refused to call upon his reliable officers and fled to Uruguay. The United States placed in power a repressive and murderous regime which kept the great mass of the population in conditions of severe poverty. The social and economic reforms of Goulart were terminated, and Brazil's standard of living quickly declined.
The new regime immediately created a very inviting climate for business investment. Labor unions were tightly restricted. Strikes were outlawed. Generous tax rebates and tax-exempt export earnings were granted to foreign investors. Within the next ten years the "Brazilian miracle" -- as it was referred to in the American media -- emerged. The gross national product tripled, growing faster than any in the world including Japan's. However, the growth reached only a small segment of the population. The real income of the poorest 80 percent declined by over half in the decade after Goulart. One-third of the population had tuberculosis; one-half of the children had no schools; and the infant mortality rate climbed to the second highest in the hemisphere. Hunger and starvation increased as they converted vast acreage of farmland to export crops.
Meanwhile, $12 billion a year was spent on the Brazilian army, the most powerful in Latin America. Thousands of trade unionists, students, clergy, peasants, and intellectuals were arrested, tortured, and murdered. Today, two multinational corporations control 80 percent of Brazil's electronics industry, since Brazilian firms were driven out of business. American and other foreign companies control 60 percent of heavy industry, 90 percent of pharmaceuticals, and 95 percent of automobile production. All these new investments were of no benefit to Brazilian workers. Under the military dictatorship the twelve-hour day was instituted; the unemployment rate climbed; and Brazilian workers had the highest industrial accident rate in the world.
ARGENTINA. In the summer of 2002, the State Department released thousands of classified documents today that shed more light on Argentina’s violent military junta in its campaign against leftist opponents. The documents explained some of the systematic kidnapping, torture, and killings of leftists by the military dictatorship that ruled Argentina from 1976 until 1983. Over 9,000 people were killed or missing. 4,677 documents -- including dispatches, interview transcripts, and intelligence reports held at the American embassy in Buenos Aires -- were declassified. (Washington Post and New York Times, August 21, 2002)
A string of messages to the State Department from the Buenos Aires embassy reported that the leaders of Argentina’s military regime returned from meetings with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Vice President Nelson Rockefeller with the conviction that the United States “understood” the junta’s tactics and would not directly oppose them. (Washington Post, August 22, 2002)
In an October 1976 cable, American Ambassador Robert Hill told his superiors that the Argentine foreign minister, Admiral Carlos Guzzetti, had expected members of the Ford administration to deliver a firm warning about Argentina’s human rights violations. Instead, Hill reported, Guzzetti returned “in a state of jubilation, convinced that there is no real problem with the USG (U.S. government) over this issue.” (Washington Post, August 22, 2002)
One embassy dispatch cited an Argentine source who said that captured leftist fighters, known as Montoneros, were all dealt with in the same way, through “torture and summary execution. The security forces neither trust nor know how to use legal solutions. The present methods are easier and more familiar.” (Washington Post and New York Times, August 21, 2002)
The documents assisted in the prosecution of former military officers accused of atrocities during the dirty war. A month before the documents were declassified, several leading military officers from the regime were arrested and charged with human rights abuses. They included General Leopoldo Galtieri, Argentine’s former military dictator, and more than 30 other officers.
Additionally, officials in Spain and Italy requested the release of the documents, because they considered opening cases on behalf of families of those who were killed or tortured who came from their countries.
Argentine officials also expressed hope that the documents might help several hundred Argentines who were kidnapped, some at birth, to identify their parents. Many were adopted by military officers after their parents were killed.
The documents suggested that the Ford administration did little to deter the junta and its death squads, even as the American embassy was complaining to the Argentine government about the disappearance. Although the embassy was a source of information about the military junta’s excesses, its recommendations for reducing the repression were not always heeded in Washington. (Washington Post and New York Times, August 21, 2002)