San Diego Politics Online
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1999-00 REGULAR SESSION
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 4
Introduced by Assembly Members Baldwin and Kaloogian
(Coauthors: Assembly Members Aanestad, Bates, Cunneen,
Leonard, Margett, Pescetti, and Strickland)
December 7, 1998
An act to amend Section 190.2 of the Penal Code, relating
to murder.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST
AB 4, as introduced, Baldwin. Murder: special
circumstances.
Existing law, as amended by initiative statute, provides that
the penalty for a defendant guilty of murder in the first degree
shall be death or imprisonment in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole where one or more special
circumstances have been charged and found to be true.
This bill would include within the enumeration of special
circumstances a murder where the defendant intentionally
killed the victim, who was under 14 years of age, and knew or
reasonably should have known that the victim was under 14
years of age.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes.
State-mandated local program: no.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited
as ''Matthew's Law.''
SEC. 2. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code, as amended
by Chapter 478 of the Statutes of 1995, is amended to read:
190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found
guilty of murder in the first degree is death or
imprisonment in the state prison for life without the
possibility of parole if one or more of the following special
circumstances has been found under Section 190.4 to be
true:
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for
financial gain.
(2) The defendant was convicted previously of
murder in the first or second degree. For the purpose of
this paragraph, an offense committed in another
jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be
punishable as first or second degree murder, shall be
deemed murder in the first or second degree.
(3) The defendant, in this proceeding, has been
convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first
or second degree.
(4) The murder was committed by means of a
destructive device, bomb, or explosive planted, hidden,
or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or
structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should
have known, that his or her act or acts would create a
great risk of death to one or more human beings.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or perfecting or
attempting to perfect, an escape from lawful custody.
(6) The murder was committed by means of a
destructive device, bomb, or explosive that the defendant
mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or
caused to be mailed or delivered, and the defendant
knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her
act or acts would create a great risk of death to one or
more human beings.
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in
Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34,
830.35, 830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or
830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the
performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed,
and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have
known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace
officer, as defined in the above-enumerated sections, or
a former peace officer under any of those sections, and
was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance
of his or her official duties.
(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer
or agent who, while engaged in the course of the
performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed,
and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have
known, that the victim was a federal law enforcement
officer or agent engaged in the performance of his or her
duties; or the victim was a federal law enforcement
officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation
for the performance of his or her official duties.
(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section
245.1, who, while engaged in the course of the
performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed,
and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have
known, that the victim was a firefighter engaged in the
performance of his or her duties.
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was
intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his or
her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding, and
the killing was not committed during the commission or
attempted commission, of the crime to which he or she
was a witness; or the victim was a witness to a crime and
was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her
testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used
in this paragraph, ''juvenile proceeding'' means a
proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant
prosecutor or a former prosecutor or assistant prosecutor
of any local or state prosecutor's office in this or any other
state, or of a federal prosecutor's office, and the murder
was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to
prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any
court of record in the local, state, or federal system in this
or any other state, and the murder was intentionally
carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the
performance of, the victim's official duties.
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or
former official of the federal government, or of any local
or state government of this or any other state, and the
killing was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or
to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity. As used in this
section, the phrase ''especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity'' means a
conscienceless or pitiless crime that is unnecessarily
torturous to the victim.
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim
while lying in wait.
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his
or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of
origin.
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant
was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission
of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight
after committing, or attempting to commit, the following
felonies:
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.
(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207, 209, or
209.5.
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon
the person of a child under the age of 14 years in violation
of Section 288.
(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation
of Section 460.
(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section
451.
(I) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.
(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.
(L) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the
infliction of torture.
(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by
the administration of poison.
(20) The victim was a juror in any court of record in
the local, state, or federal system in this or any other state,
and the murder was intentionally carried out in
retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the
victim's official duties.
(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by
means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,
intentionally at another person or persons outside the
vehicle with the intent to inflict death. For purposes of
this paragraph, ''motor vehicle'' means any vehicle as
defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.
(22) The defendant intentionally killed the victim,
who was under 14 years of age, and knew or reasonably
should have known that the victim was under 14 years of
age.
(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required
under subdivision (a) for a special circumstance
enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom the
special circumstance has been found to be true under
Section 190.4, need not have had any intent to kill at the
time of the commission of the offense which is the basis
of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or
confinement in the state prison for life without the
possibility of parole.
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the
intent to kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces,
solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the commission of
murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or
imprisonment in the state prison for life without the
possibility of parole if one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) has been
found to be true under Section 190.4.
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person,
not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to
human life and as a major participant, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists
in the commission of a felony enumerated in paragraph
(17) of subdivision (a) which results in the death of some
person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in
the first degree therefor, shall be punished by death or
imprisonment in the state prison for life without the
possibility of parole if a special circumstance enumerated
in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has been found to be
true under Section 190.4.
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this
section and Sections 190.1, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.
SEC. 3. This act affects an initiative statute and shall
become effective only when submitted to, and approved
by, the voters pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 10 of
Article II of the California Constitution.
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