When detained, pre-trial, for the underlying conviction in the instant case (and, too, held on excessive bail and denied “O.R.,”per the usual modus operandi of the “Own Recognizance Project,” all members thus involved hereby listed as “respondents/defendants” for “color of law,” 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983 and 18 U.S.C. 242 purposes of further complaint; said members attempting further abuse of process through a “mental health” interview prior to his court apperarance in the “hopes” that the defendant might seem “erratic” enough to require further evaluation while held in custody- -perhaps even “get lucky” and have him civilly committed, as per efforts over the past decade of his Uncle James Hunter McNenny, 1126 Hilltop Drive, Newark, Ohio 43055, previously listed as “defendant/respondent” for his RICO involvement in disbursing monies due legally to the defendant, fraudulently claiming to be his “conservator” or “legal guardian” and “other” estate monies disputed by the defendant, in a timely and proper manner,and per efforts of his “Uncle” Al and his ”Aunt” Margaret English, 25 Cleo St., Novato, CA 94947, similarly listed as a “co-conspirator” for the fraud--well in excess of any federal or “other” jurisdiction requirement--and for her self-admitted bouts of “temporary insanity” in claiming, most erroneously, to be the defendant’s “business agent” or ”legal representative” with regards for his Intellectual Property (at one point, almost a decade ago, Margaret apparently “sold” rights to the defendant’s newly-recognized Tibetan Buddhist “tulku” history of “Padmasambhava the Buddha” ( see Argument at 51) with the explanation that the defendant’s “family” were all “Christian” and “[the defendant] had been exorcised of the devil so he didn’t need that work of Satan anymore”). While in custody, after explaining to the Alameda County Public Defender that he was innocent of the P.C. 602(N) charge (underlying the instant case’s alleged probation requirement), and that he had purposively decided to challenge his “keenly felt stigmatization” of what he’d heard termed “Operation 86” (the slang term for barring one from a tavern or pub) through “civil disobedience.” Though defendant’s memory on the exact words of the Public Defender is hazy due to the “anti-psychotic” medication illegally per se introduced into his body through the tampered box of jail food specifically given to him through the “role call” handout--which put him soundly to sleep and drastically impaired his thought processes, as he’s made federal complaint regarding the impossibility of doing any creative work when so severely impacted--the defendant believes that the Public Defender told him a “conviction” was necessary to said challenge (per Bouie v. City of Columbia, South Carolina, supra , et al) and that if he pleaded “no contest” that Judge Greenberg would not impose any further “court probation” (from Case #143473, whose legality the defendant has also challenged in federal pleadings). Defendant, who’d been physically threatened the evening before at Santa Rita County Jail--as happens every single time he is takeninto custody and “shipped out”--and told, too, that “the guards gonna let us beat the shit outta ya, old man,” did indeed plead “no contest” without admitting any issues of fact or law to preserve, as best he could, given the “Hobson’s Choice” nature of involuntariness, the entire matter for appellate review. “This error may well have impaired the constitutionally [***18] protected trial rights Riggins invokes. At the hearing to consider terminating medication, Dr. O'Gorman suggested that the dosage administered to Riggins was within the [*137] toxic range, id., at 483, and could make him "uptight," id., at 484. Dr. Master testified that a patient taking 800 milligrams of Mellaril each day might suffer from drowsiness or confusion. Id., at 416.[Dr. Jurasky noted, too, that one could “tranquilize an elephant” at that dosage level. Record, at 752] Cf. Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae 10-11 ("In extreme cases, the sedationlike effect [of antipsychotic medication] may be severe enough (akinesia) to affect thought processes"). It is clearly possible that such side effects had an impact upon not just Riggins' outward appearance, but also the content of his testimony on direct or cross examination, his ability to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his communication with counsel. “Efforts to prove or disprove actual prejudice from the record before us would be futile, and guesses whether the outcome of the trial might have been different if Riggins' motion had been granted would be purely speculative. We accordingly reject the dissent's suggestion that Riggins should be required to demonstrate how the trial would have proceeded [***19] differently if he had not been given Mellaril. See post, at 149-150. Like the consequences of compelling a defendant to wear prison clothing, see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-505, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976), or of binding and gagging an accused during trial, see Allen, supra, at 344, the precise consequences of forcing antipsychotic medication upon Riggins cannot be shown from a trial transcript. What the testimony of doctors who examined Riggins establishes, and what we will not ignore, is a strong possibility that [*137] Riggins' defense was impaired due to the administration of Mellaril... “To be sure, trial prejudice can sometimes [***20] be justified by an essential state interest. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-569, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525, 106 S. Ct. 1340 (1986); Allen, supra, at 344 (binding and gagging the accused permissible only in extreme situations [**1817] where it is the "fairest and most reasonable way" to control a disruptive defendant); see also Williams, supra, at 505 (compelling defendants to wear prison clothing at trial furthers no essential state policy). Because the record contains no finding that might support a conclusion that administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state policy, however, we have no basis for saying that the substantial probability of trial prejudice in this case was justified.” Riggins v. Nevada (1992) 504 U.S. 127, *138; 112 S. Ct. 1810, **1817; LEXSEE 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2701, ***20; 118 L. Ed. 2d 479 ; opinion of the Court delivered by Justice O’Connor --”CONCUR: JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment. The medical and pharmacological data in the amicus briefs and other sources indicate that involuntary medication with antipsychotic drugs poses a serious threat to a defendant's right to a fair trial. In the case before us, there was no hearing or well-developed [***21] record on the point, and the whole subject of treating incompetence to stand trial by drug medication is somewhat new to the law, if not to medicine. On the sparse record before us, we cannot give full consideration to the issue. I file this separate opinion, however, to express [*139] my view that absent an extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause prohibits prosecuting officials from administering involuntary doses of antipsychotic medicines for purposes of rendering the accused competent for trial, and to express doubt that the showing can be made in most cases, given our present understanding of the properties of these drugs.” Riggins, supra, 504 U.S. 127, *139; 112 S. Ct. 1810, **1817 --”Since the 1950’s we have used medication to alter brain chemistry, which in turn changes behaviors and feeling. Thorazine, a medication from the 50’s, affected dopamine levels, which helped clear up the symptons of schizophrenia. However, the side effects of lethargy, unclear thinking, and unresponsiveness to emotions were less than optimal. In the 60’s and 70’s, drugs such as Valium and anti-depressants, such as Elavil and Tridvil, became available. Again, their side effects of drowsiness and unclear thinking encouraged researchers to search for new anti-depressants...[that] are more selective than older ones in affecting serotonin levels. However, serotonin affects not only moods but also many other things, such as vision, functioning of the gastrointestinal tract, perception and memory. So even these newer drugs have side-effects [which] may seem minor, but when something like our perception is change, that can affect our relationships, our understanding of ourselves, and even our spiritual life. To avoid these side-effects, we need to alter our brain chemistry naturally when at all possible. I believe this should be the goal of even those who benefit from anti-depressants [as] many depressed people are expected to stay on anti-depressants for the rest of their lives.” Dr. Joel Robertson, with Tom Monte, Natural Prozac (Harper Collins, 1997) p. 1-2 (authors of Peak Performance Living, consultants to pro sports) Defendant has made complaint and argument regarding his “place of public accomodation” civil rights in his “Long Term Alumni Membership” at the Recreational Sports Facility of U.C. Berkeley, where he has worked out since the Facility’s opening and at the old Harmon Gym prior, when he was a student; as opposed to many of his opposition completely out of touch with the physical form known as one’s “body,” the defendant has an extremely “aware” and “refined” mind-body continuum, in the phrase of his spiritual tradition, his harmony thus generated by his daily workouts most vitally important to his spiritual and emotional well-being. Defendant argues that his revival of William Shakespeare’s term “fustilug” to describe the dowdy, clunky, affective-schizophrenic “bubbas and bubbesses” neo- Victorianly plaguing his life, civil rights and associations, in no way qualifies him for the cultural genocide these federal operatives bureaucratically insist is “a necessary evil” not only for himself but too “other” of his Tibetan Buddhist reincarnated “tulkus,” all without any Due Process, Right to Evidence or respect for his religious association’s legitimately- recognized “ecclesiastical authority.” What is “substituted” and “palmed off” through psycho-babble of a “secondary dilution” (as in“cock a leg and pee on like a dawg”) deliberate, willful misuse of the legitimacy of his 10,000 year-old religious association’s opinions and advice as to “finding one’s way” --whether, midlife, lost in the thick of woods, as the poet Dante found himself one day, or other wise--is something woefully mis-termed a “vajra lesson of compassion,” a matter causing such legitimate authorities as His Holiness the Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso and “other” Rinpoches previously cited by the defendant as “expert witnesses” in his legally-filed pleadings to “scratch one’s head” in “astoundance at the abysmal ignorance on display,” projected from the dim Neanderthal/Cro-Magnum throwback recesses of one’s own warped ill-lit quagmire of an inner landscape, and proclaim, loud and proud!: “As our Guru Je Rinpoche, Padmasambhava the Buddha, informed the superstitious hill- people of Tibet, early 740’s A. D., similarly devolving as you Americans are into mere parodies of former greatness, seduced as you are and they were by sorcerers’ nonsense and egotistical claims to power of a most pallid and misshapen nature, No such thing you ding-a-ling!” “Well aware ...that all attempts to influence [the “free mind”] by temporal punishments, or burdens, or by civil incapacitations tend only to beget habits or hypocrisy and meanness and are a departure from the plan of the holy Author of our religion, who being Lord both of the body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coiercions on either, as was in His almighty power to do, but to extend it by its influence on reason alone...” --”The venerable Chogyam Trungpa gave two seminars on crazy wisdom in december, 1972...Though they had been planned in response to a request for teaching on the eight aspects of Padmasambhava, Trungpa Rinpoche had slightly shifted the emphasis and given the headline to crazy wisdom...The exotic iconography of the eight aspects of Padmasambhava, if presented too definitely, would have been bloody meat in the water for spiritually materialistic sharks. This may explain why a tidy hagiography of the eight aspoects, with complete and consistent detail, was avoided, and the raw, ungarnished insight of crazy wisdom was delivered instead...Here we have the mighty roaring of a great lion of dharma. May it put to flight the heretics and bandits of hope and fear.” Chogyam Trungpa, Crazy Wisdom (Shambhala, 1991), ed.’s fwd --”I suppose the best way to characterize Padmasambhava for people with a Western or Christian cultural outlook is to say that he was a saint. We are going to discuss the depth of his wisdom and his lifestyle, his skillful way of realting wiht students. The students he had to deal with were Tibetan, who were extraordinary savage and uncultured...In some ways, Padmasambhava’s situation was very similar to our situation here. Americans are hospitable, but on the other hand there is a very savage and rugged side to American culture. Spiritually, American culture is not conducive to just bringing out the brilliant light and expecting it to be accepted.” The Trungpa, Ibid, p. 4 --”In Space Time and Medicine, (Shambhala, 1985) Larry Dossey, M.D., attributes the “profound crisis in health car” to being an aspect “of one and the same crisis, which derives from the fact that we are trying to apply the concepts of an outdated world view-- the mechanistic worldview of Cartersian-Newtonian science--to a reality that can no longer be understood in terms of these concepts. We live today in a globally interconnected world in which biological, psychological, social and environmental phenomena are all interdependent.” (Foreword to Mr. Dossey’s book is by Fritjof Capra, whom the defendant interviewed for an article in 1978, when he lived around the corner from Mr. Capra at 2424 Russell St., Berkeley; over tea, Mr. Capra explained to the defendant how the work of Neils Bohr and the “Bell Theorum,” from quantum physics, scientifically approach the philosophical descriptions Buddha Shakyamuni wrote 2500 years ago about “the nature of reality.“) --”Achieving the realization of the universal monarch...is the fruition of developing what is called the warrior’s ‘authentic presence.’ In Tibetan, ‘authentic presence’ is wangthang, which literally means a ‘field of power.’...The cause of authentic presence is the merit you accumulate, and the effect is the authentic presence itself...When you meet a person who has authentic inner presence, you find he has an overwhelming genuineness, which might be somewhat frightening because it is so true and honest and real. You experience a sense of command radiating from the person of inner authentic presence...On the one hand, authentic presence is the result of a gradual, developmental process of letting go of ego fixation. On the other hand, it is also the result of an instantaneous, magical process of letting go of fixed mind...that brings authentic presence [,known as] raising windhorse, or lungta, which is basically rousing the energy of basic goodness into a wind of delight and power...[Yet] [i]n order to sustain that glimpse [of authentic presence thus raised] and manifest that presence fully, there is a need for discipline...This [developmental] process is called the warrior’s path of the four dignities...meek, perky, outrageous, and inscrutable. All human beings experience the four dignities in some form. Meekness is basically experiencing a humble and gentle state of being, while perkiness is connected with uplifted and youthful energy. Outrageousness is being daring and entering into situations without hope and fear, and inscrutability is the experience of fulfillment and uncontrived, spontaneous achievement. Chogyam Trungpa, Shambhala, The Sacred Path of the Warrior, (Shambhala, 1988), p.159-61 --”Mind transmission of the Buddhas (rGyal Ba dGongs brGyud) is the unique transmission that exists between the Buddhas. Just by the realization of the meaning of the tantras by the teacher (the Buddha), the retinue of disciples (the Buddhas who are representations of himself) also has the same realization. This is the transmission of the nature of the mind of teacher and disciples. There is also a secondary or similar type of mind transmission in which the disciples who are not one with the teacher become inseparable in mind from the teacher by means of the teacher’s blessing.” Tulku Thondup, Masters of Meditation and Miracles (Shambhala, 1996) p. 18 --”There is timing in everything...You win battles with the timing in the Void bornof the timing of cunning by knowing the enemies’ timing, and thus using a timing which the enemy does not expect.” Musashi from A Book of Five Rings, quoted by Forrest E. Morgan, Maj. USAF, Living the Martial Way (Barricade, 1992), p. 93; Mr. Morgan also describes, briefly, the art of happo zanshin, the 8-directional awareness of the samurai as a survival tool--Tibetan Buddhism makes use of this metaphor with the “Buddhas of the directions” metaphor, in which the four cardinal directions, at 45-degree angles up and down, are used to expand a pupil’s three-dimensional awareness of shunyata, the emptiness pervading the space around one and, from the seed of awareness in the tantien, several inches below the navel, considered the Heavenly umbilical cord psychic link, forming the suchness then spherically expanding in concentric rings grounding one in the Clear Light Bardo of here and now forming the reality of “that which is”... --”Aiki is the art of defeating your opponent with a single glance.” Takeda Sogaku, turn of the century headmaster of Daito Ryu Aikijujutsu, Japan. --Kokuru (heart) as defined by a samurai war banner: “Fast as the wind, quiet as the forest, aggressive as fire, and immovable as mountain.” PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Dalai Lama (Mr. Gyatso is the legitimately recognized incarnation of the Third Dalai Lama, given that title and independent ecclesiastical jurisdiction by a Mongol warlord, centuries ago, see the aforementioned “Exhibit His Holiness’s Parliamentary Material,” has been manifestly disregarded as a “charlatan involved in politically divisive racial separatist and supremacist activites,” as aforementioned, by such Federal Gov’t. Employees as Attorney General Janet Reno and her nepotistic companion Jamie Gorelich (hereby listed as “respondent/defendant”)-- strangely espousing the Chinese Communist Party’s exact “line” rather than paying attention to the “force of stare decisis” holding forth “[a] fervent view of individual liberty” in this country, pursuant to our Consitution and republican form of government ( quotes from Planned Parenthood of SE Pa v. Casey (1992) 505 US 833 at 923), causing one to conclude, as did the Justices in Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378, 390, that surely, where a “policymaker” has “failed to act” or take some action to control agents of the Government committing wrongdoing “is so obvious, and the inadequacy [of existing practice] so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymake[r]...can reasonably be said to have deliberately indifferent to the need.” PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that in search of a “remedy” for this harmful “custom or policy” the defendant has requested his attorney, Mr. Patrick Hallinan , to list His Holiness Tenzin Gyatso the Dalai Lama as his sole co-plaintiff in his federal “claim for relief,” a matter hereby referenced as well; defendant, too, lists the U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno as a “respondent/defendant” for not only her “deliberate indifference” as a dictatorial “chief law enforcement officer,” as she’s mis-described herself, but too her willful, malicious “crusade” in an official and individual capacity against the defendant and his religious association(s)--he’s an ordained Scotch Presbyterian lay “Minister of the Word” from a two-year “Advanced Communicants” course taken from his pastor in Owego, N.Y., while in junior high school and a weekly tithing member of his “United Presbyterian Church,” see “Exhibit Presbyterian,” entered into previous, pendent lower-court pleadings; he’s considered an expert on Hebrew culture and history,too, another of Ms. Reno’s no-no religions experiencing her official “custom or policy” disfavor--for not only federal statutes on “color of law” infringment of federally-protected rights and guarantees, but too those statutes international in scope--such as the Torture Victims Prevention Act. --” The court must determine whether state action is required to state a claim in violation of the law of nations. On this point, the Second Circuit's decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), is instructive. In Kadic, two [*20] groups of victims, Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia Herzegovina, filed suit against Radovan Karadzic, the self-proclaimed President of Bosnian-Serb Republic within Bosnia Herzegovina. The plaintiffs complained that they were the victims of various human rights violations, including rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, summary execution, genocide, other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, assault and battery, sex and ethnic inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death. The victims sought relief under the Alien Tort Statute, The Torture Victim Protection Act, and federal question jurisdiction. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 237. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, *20 In Kadic, the Second Circuit held that state action is not required for all international torts. Id. at 239. Certain conduct violates the law of nations whether committed by a state or private actor, whereas other conduct only violates the law of nations if committed by a state actor. This court, as guided by the analysis in Kadic, reaches the same conclusion. Genocide, for example, violates international law, whether undertaken by a state or non-state actor. Id. The Restatement provides that a state has jurisdiction "to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern," such as piracy, hijacking, genocide, war crimes, and certain acts of terrorism. Restatement @ 404. So-called "universal 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, *21 jurisdiction" exists over the specified offenses, as a matter of customary law, "as a result of universal-condemnation of those activities and general interest in cooperation to suppress them, as reflected in widely accepted international agreements and resolutions of international organizations." Id., comment a. Where a state has universal jurisdiction, it may punish conduct although the state has no links of [*22] territoriality or nationality with the offender or victim. Id. Universal jurisdiction includes civil tort actions. Id., comment b. Though the list of offenses specified in section 404 is not static, n4 genocide is the only relevant offense for which universal jurisdiction exists and no state action must be proven. "‘International law is not static, but an evolving body of directives which courts must interpret in a contemporaneous fashion.’ Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 180. “A broader range of conduct is actionable as violative of the law of nations only when committed by a state actor. Restatement section 702 provides: A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide; (b) slavery or slave trade; (c) the murder or causing the disappearance [*23] of individuals; (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (e) prolonged arbitrary detention; (f) systematic racial discrimination; or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognized human rights. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, *23 Genocide is an international tort. The crime of genocide was clearly recognized in the aftermath of the Second World War by the United Nations, international conventions, United States law and case law. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (citations omitted). Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S 277, ("Convention on Genocide"), defines the crime of genocide [*26] as: 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, *26 Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births with the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. This definition is generally accepted for purposes of customary law. Restatement @ 702, comment d. The Convention on Genocide unambiguously applies to all: "persons committing genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals." Convention on Genocide, art. IV. This language squares with the Convention Implementation Act of 1987, <=55> 18 U.S.C. @ 1091 (1988), n6 and the Restatement, Restatement @ 702, note d.: both non-state actors and state actors may be held liable for genocide. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, *26 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - n7 Genocide is a specific intent offense. Cf. <=58> Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244. To prove genocide Beanal must demonstrate that certain acts were "committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part" an ethnic group. Intent may be averred generally. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 9(b). - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4767, *28 In determining whether an act was within the authority of an official or an official body, or was done under color of such authority, (clause (c)), one must consider all the circumstances, including whether the affected parties reasonably considered the action to be official, whether the action was for public purpose or for private gain, and whether the persons acting wore official uniforms or used official equipment." Restatement @ 207, comment d. [*33] Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges rights created by the Constitution and the law of the United States. Federal Jurisdiction @ 8.1. Section 1983 grants a remedy for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which [*37] provides, "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." In deciding whether the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated, courts distinguish between private and governmentalconduct. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349, 95S. Ct. 449, 452-53, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1974), quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 842, 92 L. Ed. 1161 (1948) (describing the "essential dichotomy" between governmental action, which is subject to constitutional scrutiny, and private conduct, which is not). By condemning only certain official conduct, these laws exclude a vast range of conduct visited upon victims at the hands of private actors. This dichotomy between private and official conduct is mirrored in international law. See Restatement @ 207, comment c (A state is responsible under international law only for official acts, but not for acts by private actors.) A private actor can be found liable under @ 1983 for engaging in conduct which constitutes state action. The proper defendants in a @ 1983 claim are those who represent the state in some capacity. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, [*38] 49 F.3d 1442, 1446 (10th Cir. 1995). National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191, 109 S. Ct. 454, 462, 102 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1988) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172, 81 S. Ct. 473, 476, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961). Similarly, in customary international law, a state is liable for official conduct committed by state officials. Restatement @ 207, comment c, and @ 702. The court understands the term "state" as it is used in the Restatement to be consistent with that term under @ 1983 jurisprudence, i.e., "those who represent the state." “Corporations can represent the state. Both private individuals and private entities can be state actors and can be held liable under @ 1983. Sims v. Jefferson Downs Racing Ass'n, 778 F.2d 1068, 1076 (5th Cir. 1985). Section 1983 does not require that the defendant be an officer of the State. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S. Ct. 183, 186, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1980). "Private persons jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, [*39] are acting under color of law for purposes of @ 1983 purposes." Id. at 28, citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1605, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). Section 1983 applies to all persons, including corporations. “ “The Supreme Court has recognized several circumstances in which a private actor can be held to have acted under color of law within the meaning of @ 1983. In Gallagher, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal summarized the relevant tests: ‘The Court has taken a flexible approach to the state action doctrine, applying a variety of tests to the facts of each case. [1] In some instances, the Court has considered whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. n9 [2] The Court has also inquired whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private party, that there is a symbiotic [*41] relationship between them. n10 [3] In addition the court has held that if a private party is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents then state action is present. n11 [4] Finally the court has rules that a private entitle that exercises powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State is engaged in state action. n12 49 F.3d at 1447 (quotations omitted). The court refers to these four tests as (1) the nexus test, (2) the symbiotic relationship test, (3) the joint action test, and (4) the public function test. The Torture Victim Protection provides [*58] an explicit cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1350, note, @ 2. The TVPA provides: (a) Liability -- An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation-- (1) Subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or (2) Subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death. (b) Exhaustion of remedies--A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred. Id. The terms "torture" and "extrajudicial killing" are defined by the statute. To state a claim under the TVPA, plaintiff must allege (1) that the individual defendant acted under color of law, (2) that defendant subjected an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing, and (3) that plaintiff has exhausted "adequate and available remedies" where the violative conduct occurred. As defendant argues,he’s being subjected to torture through the bizarrely “disproportionate” punishment he is being “administered” by confinement to a “paper gulag” of “another’s” error--pristinely innocent of any crimes, scurrilous allegations or slanderous accusations bandied about as if gospel by complete wingnuts and their “handlers” is an ipso facto “death sentence” by “Thallium” and other “heart-attack drugs”/poisons, “military disease-warfare viruses” (“friendly fire”)/eugenical sterilization/ against a civilian and citizen, for alleged political “crimes” of which he’s never been given the slightest “notice,” right of appearance to defend and impeach, to confront [_________Supreme Court Justice quote frowning brow to brow_____] or other guarantees of a “public trial” (like any indictments or serious consideration as a “perpetrator”) or, as in the case of the convicted murderer in Riggins, v. Nevada, supra, right of appeal--a matter which, given the reversal in that case due to error construed to be not merely “harmless,” must be seen as a grave threat to this country’s very existence: as Justice O’Connor stated in Planned Parenthood of SE Pa v. Casey, supra, “[t]he analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute operates; it begins there.” (Emphasis added). --This country’s unwillingness to scrutinize the negative consequences of “poor public policy” can best be seen by what a New York district court in 1984, In Re Agent OrangeProduct Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 749 termed “a possiblity of an ultimate finding of liability with claims totalling billions of dollars.” What becomes even more jackass-headed is terming said potential liability the “justification” for denial of justice. --The Court, in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984), “recognized that violation of the guarantee of a public trial required reversal without any showing of prejudice and even though the values of a public trial may be intangible and unprovable in any particular case. The search for truth is indeed central to our system of justice, but ‘certain constitutional rights are not, and should not be, subject to the harmless-error analysis because those rights protect important values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial.’ Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring)(1986).” (1990) Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 294-295 (White, J., dissenting) --“‘This law [a California“chemical castration” statute] is reminiscent of the eugenics period [of National Socialist “revisionism”],’ said Margaret Crosby, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union...’Both the state and federal constitutional rights to privacy protect bodily integrity,’ Crosby said...The ACLU, in a news release responsing to the governor’s signature, deemed chmical castration ‘barbaric, unconstitutional and ultimately ineffective’...” “The San Francisco Daily Journal,” 9/18/96, page one --”LITTLE ROCK, Ark.--...While awaiting trial, Dumond [the subsequently convicted defendant], 47, was castrated by two men in stocking masks who broke into his home. A St. Francis County sheriff involved in the investigation had Dumond’s testicles preserved in formaldehyde and displayed on his desk for about two weeks. Dumond won a $110,000 lawsuit over the display. The sheriff died while serving a prison term on a racketeering conviction...Recent DNA evidence indicates the sperm found on the victim’s pants was not Dumond’s [who nonetheless has spent the last dozen years behind bars...]” “San Francisco Daily Journal,” Sept. 25, 1996 --State must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that complained of error did not contribute to the conviction for the matter to be “harmless.” Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,24 --Some errors can never be treated as harmless: see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 (right to counsel petitioned to the Court on jailhouse paper and pencil and upheld); Payne v. Arkansas (1958) 356 U.S. 560 (coerced confession); Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510 (impartial judge) --Courts after Chapman have said that in making the harmless error determination the reviewing court is to consider the record as a whole. See Carella v. California (1989), 109 S. Ct. 2419, 2421, “In the usual case the harmlessness determination requires consideration of the ‘trial record as a whole,’[]in order to decide whether the fact supported by improperly admitted evidence was in any event overwhelmingly established by other evidence.”; Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 579, “Where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied.” However, “misdescription of an element of the offense,” like a conclusive presumption, also takes fact-finding away from the jury and must be similarly analyzed. Carella , at p. 2423. --”In Snyder v. Massachusetts, Justice Cardozo established that a state court cannot violate any constitutional right ‘ranked as fundamental’ by ‘the traditions and conscience of our people.’ 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)... --”[A] procedural default based on an ambiguous order that does not clearly rest on independent and adequate state grounds is not sufficient to preclude federal collateral review.’ Morales, 85 F. 3d at 1392 (citing Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F. 3d 1308, 1317- 18(9th Cir., 1994)[] The district court properly declined to dismiss these claims.” Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11963, 11965 (9th Cir.,Oct. 1, 1996) --”Anyone can become angry--that is easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way--this is not easy.” Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics Our understanding of the purposes and effects of the Fourth Amendment has been an evolving one. From the outset, the Amendment has been understood to protect the people from the unlimited authority of law enforcement officials to search almost anywhere and seize almost anything which characterized the despised general warrants and writs of assistance. Over time, however, the Amendment has been construed to serve other purposes. One such purpose is to accord to each individual a measure of autonomy and privacy, which are vital to human dignity. As Justice Louis Brandeis stated it in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, in the Fourth Amendment the Founders "conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. " Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). the Fourth Amendment reflects a special concern with intrusions when the purpose is to obtain [**57] evidence to incriminate the victim of a search. Id. This concern for self-incrimination is reflected in the Supreme Court's test which limits standing to invoke the exclusionary rule to situations where the Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful search. United [*1286] States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974). The Fourth Amendment also reflects a particular concern for protecting freedom of thought, speech, and religion. As Justice Lewis Powell wrote, "Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs." United Sates v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314, 32 L. 771 F. Supp. 1266, *1286; 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16081, **57 Ed. 2d 752, 92 S. Ct. 2125 (1972). U.S. v. Ferrara, 771 F. Supp. 1266; 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16081 (1991) --”OPINION: [*970] WEINSTEIN, District Judge. In each of these three cases consolidated for trial the plaintiff complains that first-class mail was intercepted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), opened without warrant and copied. Birnbaum and Mac-Millen each sent a letter abroad; Avery received one here. All the letters were resealed after copying and promptly returned to the mails. Plaintiffs, individually and as a class, seek to recover damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. @ 1346(b) (the Act). 436 F. Supp. 967, *970; 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 In this country we do not pay lip service to the value of human rights and individual dignity -- we mean to live by our ideals. A primary role of the courts is to translate these noble sentiments into palpable reality. [*971] I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND From approximately 1953 until 1973, in violation of federal statutes and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Central Intelligence Agency conducted an extensive program of opening first-class mail passing in and out of the country through Hawaii, San Francisco, New Orleans, and New York. Most of the correspondence opened, photographed and circulated within the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was intercepted by the New York project, known within the CIA by either of the two code names HTLINGUAL or SRPOINTER. Various ... ... [*975] One such raid generated a civil suit in which the Supreme Court -- barred by section 2680(h), as it was then written, from holding the government itself liable -- granted plaintiff the right to recover damages 436 F. Supp. 967, *975; 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 from the individual agents. <=27> Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971). Congress altered section 2680(h) so that, from the date of amendment forward, such Fourth Amendment violations would be actionable against the government, providing aggrieved persons actual relief, rather than worthless awards against "judgment-proof" individual agents. S.Rep. No. 83-588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3, reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code & Cong.Ad. News 2789, 2790-91. As the court in Cruikshank v. United States, 76- <=32> C-362, 431 F. Supp. 1355 (D.Haw., May 9, 1977), put it when faced with a case similar to those of Birnbaum, Avery and MacMillen: [We] are dealing with the commission of a series of illegal acts by agents of the Government. Justice would certainly not countenance a court straining the language of a statute in order to deny the victim of such illegality at least some measure of compensation. <=33> 431 F. Supp. at 1361. 436 F. Supp. 967, *975; 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 In at least one unrelated case, <=34> Black v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 529 (D.C.D.C. 1975), a plaintiff did recover for an invasion of common law and constitutional rights of privacy, through illegal electronic surveillance, which occurred in 1963, eleven years before the subsection was revised to take Bivens and similar cases into account. The court never suggested that an implied exclusion of such claims might exist. It noted that its judgment rested "on theories of trespass, invasion of privacy by intrusion, invasion of privacy by publication, and violation [*976] of Constitutional rights", characterized by the court as "intentional torts." <=35> 389 F. Supp. at 531. The straightforward reading of the statute in Black is consistent with the general treatment of intentional torts by federal courts in suits against the government. The principle is well-established that parties may sue under the Act for intentional wrongs. The Supreme Court in <=36> Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 92 S. Ct. 1899, 32 L. Ed. 2d 499 (1972), for example, stated that: The legislative history [of the Federal Tort Claims Act] indicates that Congress intended to permit liability essentially based on the intentionally wrongful . . . conduct of Government employees . . . . <=37> 406 U.S. at 801, 92 S. Ct. at 1901 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., <=38> Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 76 S. Ct. 745, 100 L. Ed. 436 F. Supp. 967, *976; 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 1065 (1956) (trespass and conversion); <=39> Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975) (denial of due process and interference with business opportunity through blacklisting); <=40> Aleutco Corp. v. United States, 244 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1957) (conversion); <=41> Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y.1967), aff'd, <=42> 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968) (trespass); <=43> Palomo v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D.Guam 1960) (waste); <=44> United States v. Ein Chemical Corp., 161 F. Supp. 238, 246-47 (S.D.N.Y.1958) (conversion by duress). The government's suggestion that suits for invasions of constitutional rights of privacy are exempt by implication must be rejected. 1. Common Law Right To Privacy. Most states recognize invasions of privacy as actionable torts. W. Prosser, Law of Torts @ 117 at 804 (4th ed. 1971); 1 F. V. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts @ 9.6 at 682 (1956). In this context, the general rubric " right of privacy" encompasses four concepts. As described by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, they are: (a) Intrusion upon the seclusion of another . . ., or 436 F. Supp. 967, *976; 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 (b) Appropriation of the other's name or likeness, . . . or (c) Publicity given to the other's private life [of a sort which is offensive and not of legitimate public concern], . . . or (d) Publicity which places the other in a false light before the public [*977] 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts, @ 625A (1977). Intrusion upon the seclusion of these plaintiffs is the branch of privacy involved in these cases. Comments to the Restatement make it plain that the tort is committed whenever an intrusive act is committed, even if the tortfeasor never reveals either the fact of the invasion or any information about the plaintiff to third persons. The form of invasion of privacy covered by this Section does not depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded, or to his 436 F. Supp. 967, *977; 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 affairs. It consists solely of an intentional interference with his interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable man. 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts, @ 652B, Comment a at 378 (1977) (emphasis added). This common law right extends beyond the plaintiff's immediate physical environment and is infringed by examinations of bank accounts or of personal records under false pretenses, or by opening of mail. Common law copyright reserves to authors the right to control the time and circumstances of the first publication of their works. The right has been important [*979] to artists, professional writers, scholars and others whose intellectual productions have some commercial value. But the doctrine also has been utilized to shield writers of ordinary, nonliterary letters against the misappropriation and nonconsensual publication of their correspondence. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193, 198-206 (1890); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 Colum.L.Rev. 1205, 1293 n. 416 (1976). In drafting the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub.L.No.94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, Congress explicitly recognized that common law copyright was relied upon by the states to protect a broad range of interests beyond those of the individual in the marketplace value of his work product. Federal law did not preempt state law in those other areas, but acknowledged its continued vitality and capacity for growth. As a relevant congressional report indicated: 436 F. Supp. 967, *979; 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 The evolving common law rights of "privacy, " "publicity," and trade secrets, and the general laws of defamation and fraud, would remain unaffected [by the codification of common law copyright] as long as the causes of action contain elements, such as invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringement. H.R.Rep.No.94-1476, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 132, reprinted in [1976] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, pp. 5659, 5748. No one is quite sure when or where the concept of copyright originated. That some legally recognized right to control the publication of books and to protect them from piracy pre-dated the invention of the printing press is suggested by rumors of an Irish case decided in 567 A.D. R. Bowker, Copyright, Its History and Its Law 9 (1912); A. Birrell, The Law and History of Copyright in Books 42 (1899). Justice Story in <=64> Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed.Cas. 342 (1st Cir. 1841) -- one of the earliest and fullest discussions in American case law of the rights of the author in personal correspondence. No meaningful distinction, Story felt, could be drawn between 436 F. Supp. 967, *980; 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 personal letters and literary works; common law copyright, therefore, must be said to protect both. Story expounded further on this theme in his treatise on equity jurisprudence, where he eloquently ... ... [*982] accomplished by the act of writing words on paper. Rather, it is effected only when the letter is read by the addressee. Both parties to the correspondence have an interest in securing that result, and censorship of the communication between them necessarily impinges on the interest of each. Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend on whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter, for the addressee as well as the sender of direct personal correspondence derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended communication. The illicit mail openings in these cases directly contravene the letter and spirit of the Bill of Rights. The Constitution and the first ten amendments to it created a central government whose powers to encroach upon the personal and 436 F. Supp. 967, *983; 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 political lives of its citizens were carefully limited. Of particular concern to the drafters was protection of ideas -- including their tangible embodiment in books and private papers -- from interference by public officials. In England and the Colonies, citizens had been aggrieved by such abusive practices as the use of general warrants to search homes and businesses of British subjects for politically suspect documents. W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions @ 2 at 2-3 (1972). In 1765, one English court The lack of objective harm is, however, no bar to recovery. The law generally recognizes that where a person suffers an invasion of the right to privacy, awards are appropriate for general damages covering the injury of invasion itself, as well as for the resulting mental distress. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, @ 652H, summarizes the rule in privacy cases: One who has established a cause of action for unreasonable invasion of his privacy is entitled to recover damages for (a) the harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion; (b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind which normally results from such an invasion; and (c) special damage of which the invasion is a legal cause. 3 Restatement (Second), Section 652H at 401 (1977). V. CONCLUSION The American people have already paid a considerable price for the CIA's illegal mail search activities. In addition to the large out-of-pocket 436 F. Supp. 967, *989; 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 487 expenditures in operating the program, there has been a perceptible widespread loss of confidence in the integrity of the mails and in the right of individuals to be free from surreptitious intrusions into their privacy by government officials. Adding to the taxpayers' burdens by awarding damages in these cases may seem like a regrettable additional disbursement for this ill-starred program. But the law requires that plaintiffs be compensated for their special loss. Moreover, knowledge by [*990] government officials that individuals have effective legal remedies to enforce their rights may deter future illegality. The existence of a court system capable of protecting the right to privacy by granting money damages and other relief against the government and its agents makes our Constitution and laws consequential to our citizens rather than pretentious, empty promises. The court finds that the United States government, through its agents, committed torts against plaintiffs, causing compensable injury. ..” Birnbaum v. U.S. (1977) 436 F. Supp. 967 Besides having violated the defendant’s Right to Privacy under state and federal “color of law,” U.C. Berkeley Vice-Chancellor Carol Christ, using a variety of fabricated, non-justiciable reasons, has, along with her fellow “lesbian Klan CIA,” declared, regarding the defendant, “There’s no way we’re going to let [so and so] marry ya!”...Resulting, of course, in further illegal “seizures” --”Section 51.5 of the California Civil Code reads in relevant part’No business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against, boycott or blacklist, refuse to buy from, sell to, or trade with any person ion this state because of the race, creed, religion, color, national origin, sex, or disability of the person...’ Few California cases have construed this p[rovision, originally passed in 1976. On its face, Sec. 51.5, like Sec. 51 [the Unruh Act] appears to be aimed only at discrimination in relationships similar to the proprieter/customer relationship...Indeed at least one California Court has noted that Sec. 51.5 is an expansion upon Sec. 51. See Roth v. Rhodes, 25 Cal. App. 4th 530, 537 (1994).” Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F. 3d 859, 875 (9th Cir., 1996) Defendant argues that he has amply and fully stated the substantial “nature of his complaints” to such people as the aforementioned FBI Director (whom defendant has asked to investigate the substantial basis of complaints made to the Governmental Task Force on Wrongdoing, established by former CIA Director Robert Michael Gates, 1991- 92, to investigate precisely the type of governmental actors abuse of authority currently making headlines--his use of the proper forum in no way making him a “paid FBI informant,” like say, “Rev.” Al Sharpton or Judi Bari and Sequoia of “Earth First,” members, too, of what defendant calls the “Lez-bEE-Eye” wicca “covens” operating under IRS “color of law” as “spiritual initiators” merely “doing the right thing” by teaching these infernally ignorant and bizarrely mis-named “vajra lessons of compassion” authored by “Executive Branch personnel” as “secret extra-legal judicial proceedings” enforced by corrupt “Municipal Court Judges” having seized power across the country in many “small towns” like Berkeley, CA, (like the non-elected “Mayor” Jeffrey Shattuck Leiter, who exercised political racketeering power through something billing itself as the “Gay Klan CIA,” corrupting the sporting arena(s) of this country as well, who was hand- picked by his crony, Loni Hancock, listed as “respondent/defendant,” along with “any and all” City Attorneys for Berkeley, for having personally led a “boycott” violating the civil rights of the defendant under federal “color of law”) through this horrifyingly evil per se abuse of authority completely identical to the National Socialistic Third Reich’s subversion of the Weimar Constitution in the 1930’s in Germany and replacement of civil courts and forums once available to Jews, Celts and other “Semitic” peoples with “internal affairs proceedings” overseen by the “Minister of the Interior” making any and all decisions regarding property, civil rights, liberty and even life without any judicial safeguards or proceedures to those victimized (see, e.g., Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State (Oxford U. Press, 1941)--being “taught a lesson of respect for Hitler’s authority,” as Holocaust survivors and descendants have recounted to such curators of oral history as Dreamworks-SKG’s Steven Spielberg, with whom--among “others”-- the defendant’s business agent (sole person so legally empowered) Ms. Maxine Hong Kingston, has been “attempting to negotiate a done deal” in terms of the defendant’s Intellectual Property. The result of such people being “commandeered” through Federal Gov’t. “Social engineering” bizarrely “experimental” alleged “public policy” type of “orders” to violate the defendant’s civil rights can be seen in the case of Judge Brosnahan, who was thus pressured into ruling against the defendant’s well-pleaded demurrer before her if he made issue of the matter--which he did not, preserving all issues of law for appellate review-- and, in a previous hearing over which she presided, suffering similar strong-arm behind- the-scenes manipulation to disregard CCP Sec. 1179 in the defendant’s illegal eviction in 1994 from 2750 Dwight Way #8, Berkeley, CA, i.e., his profferment of full payment of rent due through his business agent, Ms. Kingston, who made the Court fully aware of the monies available as a “purchase” due the defendant for his literary work--a matter since greatly reduced in monetary value, see Argument at 90, post. PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 6, 1996, at “Black Oak Books,” northside Shattuck, Berkeley, CA, Ms. Kingston read a selection from “China Men” for an anthology on Central Valley (Cal.) writers (Ms. Kingston grew up in Stockton, Cal., where the defendant worked as an independent contractor/private civilian for a collegiate summer job program surveying architecture for the Dept. of Defense, 1974), her choice, ironically enough, was about an old Chinese grandfather who, though having enough cash, was unable to purchase a house (as a “Chinaman,” see, e.g., People v. Ah Ye (1866) 31 C. 451, in which the defendant had a conviction for theft overturned when the court noted that the original charging instrument had listed “Ty Chin, A Chinaman,” ala the maxim “close enough for government work”) for his family--even when using an Anglo as a “front,” overcoming his “difficulties” eventually, but with sorrow... --When the judgment declares a forfeiture of the lease, the tenant my obtain relief from the forfeiture and restoration of the tenancy under CCP Sec. 1179. Relief from forfeiture may be granted only under the condition that the tenant make full payment of rent due or fully perform other breached covenants of the lease. Defendant argues that, as described in a variety of published books and articles of a “mainstream” nature about the FBI’s COINTELPRO operation begun in the Sixties as disinformation to stifle “free speech”( see, e.g., Agents of Repression: the FBI’s secret wars against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement, by Ward Churchill, (South End Press, 1990); Alien Ink: the FBI’s war on freedom of expression, by Natalie Robins (William Morrow, 1992); Break-ins, death threats and the FBI: the covert war against the Central American movement, (South End Press, 1991) by Ross Gelbspan ) and disrupt the personal life of people like, say, the defendant’s attorney, Patrick Hallinan or his friend, David Harris (the Vietnam War conscientious objecter formerly married to the folk singer Joan Baez), the same type of “snitch-jacketing” has destroyed the defendant’s Life, Liberty and Pursuit of Happiness to such a thorough “degree” that, quite frankly, he does not see how any “compensation” will ever suffice... As properly complained of and pleaded, the defendant argues that these “common nucleus of operative facts” as governmental “actors” denying his civil rights continue, year after year, to “plague” him and not only “get away wid it” but too “merit” promotions within the Federal Government--an “avenue of opportunity” denied to the defendant, who, over the years, has been subtly “recruited” and suddenly “rejected” over a dozen times by Federal “intelligence,” as he’s made Freedom of Information Act requests regarding--all these years of having false friend after false friend--the only type of person allowed any where near the defendant (proclaimed with proper “we’ll shoot ta kill” flourishes as a “heavenly mandate”)--manages to “leapfrog” over the defendant who, of course, is not allowed to get “upset” over the abuse. --”Evidence of threats to a witness is generally admissible on either or both of two theories. First, it is relevant on the questionof the witness’ credibility. )Evid. Code, Sec. 780; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 1, 20; People v. Brooks (19790 88 Cal. App. 3d 180, 187; People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 145.) Second, it may be admissable as tending to show a defendant’s consciousness of guilt if the threats are linked sufficiently to the defendant (People v. Brooks,supra, 88 Cal. App. 3d at p. 187, fn. 4.)” People v. Lybrand, 115 Cal. App. 3d 1, 11 (1981) --”Defamation consists of false and unprivileged written, oral or recorded publications which expose the defamed person to hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy or cause the person to be shunned or avoided or injured in his or her occupation (Sec. 45, defining libel), or which charge the person with crime, suggest that the person has an infectious or loathsome disease or is impotent or unchaste, tend to injure the person in his or her business or profession, or otherwise cause actual damage (Sec. 46, defining slander).” Rothman v. Michael Jackson et al, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12054, 12055 (Cal. C.A. Second District, Division Three, 10/3/1996) “Misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows...” One such paid Fed. Govt. informant who, to “compensate” his “inferiority complex,” has wreaked all “kinds” of damage with regards to the defendant and his “females” is this “Monk,” a.k.a. “Hank Deadwood” or “George Petty,” who begged the defendant to be allowed use of his living room at 2750 Dwight Way #8, which was granted--as this “Monk” a heroin and methamphetamine “hype” addict, was attempting to “kick the habit” and the defendant--unlike this Monk, is and has always been “highly heterosexual,” i.e. “straight” and “clean,” a non-substance abuser nevertheless most knowledgeable about “addictive behavior and patterns.” As such an expert defendant thus thought this idea good, too--only to have to ask this Monk to leave and in return for the kindness he’d shown have this Monk smash the car window of his neighbors in #7, two young Cal students, one of whom was on the Women’s Swim Team, both of whom “good neighbors” to the defendant, who expressed concern when told of the incident by them, and, upon further investigation, found this Monk had indeed done the “dirty deed” and cut his hand on the window (a couple of dollars were on the dash; this Monk further told his “internal affairs” investigation that he was a “bit jealous” of how fast the woman can swim, better than his own High School times, before he’d ruined his body through drug abuse, the “several hundred dollar a day” habit he claimed to the investigators that he was supporting by “ripping off CD’s from record stores” and as a male prostitute in the Castro District of San Francisco for those customers who liked “it rough,” his sadomasochism a matter previously noted as “troublesome” ); this incident did indeed “upset” the defendant as the matter became a “contributing factor” to the landlord’s (“Edgewood Properties”) decision to seek eviction against the defendant--about whom they were told so many “packs of lies” that competed and conflicted so badly as to “boggle the mind” and “shock the conscience” that any person could be so awful--a matter causing not only the defendant a great bit of “grief” but too his agent, Ms. Kingston and “others” like his spiritual colleague, the Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, known as “His Holiness” for “good cause” and for whom the defendant--as previously stated, with the reminder that “any and all” U.S. Dept. Of State personnel continue to be kept currently appraised of said internationally-protected matter-- serves as his and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile’s Sakya Lama, i.e., a “public minister” accomplishing “consular functions.” --California Evidence Code Sec. 1101(a): “Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102 and 1103, evidence of a person’s character or trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” --”[A] generic threat [i.e., “I’ll waste any mother fucker that screws with me,” said while pointing a handgun] is admissable to show a defendant’s homicidal intent where the other evidence brings the actual victim within the scope of the threat...In People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 730, we rejected a similar contention regarding admissibility of the defendant’s statements that he would kill any police officer who tried to arrest him...A defendant’s statements that ‘he would kill anyone who got in the way of his plan’ were likewise found to have been properly received in evidence for prosecution for capital murder. (People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal. 3d 86, 109-110.)” People v. Lang, 49 Cal. 3d 991, 1014 (1989) --”Therefore, if [previous threats] would ‘induce a well founded belief in the mind of a reasonable person that his adversary was on the eve of executing the threat’ and that immediate defense against the impending danger was the only means of escape from freat bodily injury or death, the law of self-defense justifies use of whatever force is necessary to ‘avert the threatened peril.’ (People v. Scoggins (1869) 37 Cal. 676, 683-684; People v. Aris (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1186-1189)...Today we hold that ‘evidence of battered women’s syndrome is generally relevant to the reasonableness, as well as the subjective existence, of defendant’s belief in the need to defend...” People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1092-95, J. Brown’s concurring opinion (9/3/96) “To be so pestered by a popinjay!...” --In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court outlined the factors to be considered in determining whether a statute implies a private cause of action for damages: [one that can never be “denied” one as “punishment”] 1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for the whose ‘especial benefit’ the statute was enacted; that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? 2) Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? 3) Is it consisitent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? 4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? (Id., at 78) --A cause of action is implied in the language of 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1982, whichguarantees “all citizens of the United States shall have the same right...to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property.” Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.(1969) 396 U.S. 229,238; see too,California v. Sierra Club,451 U.S.287 (1981) --A report by the house Education and Labor Committee expalined that the two new subsections of 42 USCA Sec. 1981 (the Civil Rights Act of 1991) “confirms section 1981’s coverage of both public and private sector employment” and cited Runyon, H. Rep. No. 102-40(i), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 92, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630. See too, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Fed. of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11482, 11486 (9/20/96) --”The mighty King of the English...perpetrated injuries...plunderings, burnings...sparing no age or sex [by] the most savage tribes...people however barbarous [committing] these evils innumerable...[thus] in most unfriendly wise harassed our Kingdom... to Him, as the Supreme King and Judge we commit the defence of our cause...[through] Divine Providence firmly trusting that He will bring our enemies to nought.” PLEASE TAKE NOTICE of USCA Title 18, Sec. 112, assaulting “public ministers” and Sec. 1116, an “attempt to kill” an “internationally protected person,” i.e., a representative of an “international organization” pursuant to the International Organizations Act (22 U.S.C. 288), as well as Sec. 1117, regarding “conspiracies,” reading in relevant part: [against “any person,” pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause] “entitled pursuant to international law special protection against attack upon his person, freedom or dignity,and any member of his family then forming part of his household”; the Declatory Relief Act, 28 USCA Sec. 2201. See too, U.S. v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 272 (1981); U.S. v. Sampel, 636 F. 2d 621 (1980); U.S. v. Liddle (C.C. Pa. 1808) Fed Cas#15,598; U.S. v. Ortega(C.C. Pa. 1825) Fed Cas#15,971, 24 U.S. 467 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the defendant has been the “target” of several “hate-crime” attempts recently(early 1997)--including as has happened to him in the past, a “fall wingnut” sneaking around with a pistola one October, 1996 morning as the defendant was around the corner, about to have his “gulag breakfast” provided by the Dorothy Day Catholic Workers. Defendant, as was well-witnessed directly in front of the staff-serving volunteers one morning in People’s Park several years ago, was “sucker- punched” assaulted through a “set-up” incident arranged by his former acting teacher, Herr Lissa Tyler Renaud, who paid (with monies stolen from the defendant, as he has made proper complaint regarding) for “muscle” throught the DEA’s”Lou” of “King’s Gym,” East Oakland, CA. This past October, 1996, the police were summoned by a resident from within one of the neighboring houses and, as opposed to past calls for assistance made by the defendant and his friends, actually showed up “in force,” the suspected target was believed to be the defendant, according to witnesses and investigative reports by U.C.P.D. and B.P.D. PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a previous complaint filed as a result of a felonious assault against the defendant by a self-avowed “gay rights”and “Nation of Islam” activist, occuring several months prior--in which the defendant did nothing but request one of the breakfast attendees to “cease and desist” after having hot coffee, thrown at “another,” scorch him instead, as well-witnessed by one of the Catholic Workers service providers and manager, Shurra, needs to be investigated in a “different light,” as the defendant somehow wound up being “tarred and feathered” by unsubstantiated hearsay entered well after the “actual facts, ma’am” and subsquently, per the modus operandi of this infernal “conspiracy” operating under “color of law” against him, used as “evidence of violent psychopathic insanity against people of color especially gays and lesbians, this rage stemming from his inferiority complex as a manifest failure,” whom the perpetrators of this “internal affairs” report (res gestae available through the defendant’s attorneys the Hallinan’s) greatly insult as “the Great White Dope” or “King Stupid,” etc. PLEASE TAKE NOTICE of a preceding incident at “Larry Blake’s,” another Telegraph Ave. area bar that the defendant was a welcome regular at years back, in which the defendant was telling another old friend, “Ponytail Jim,” about yet another incident of his nearly being shot that morning at “People’s Park” by a man who pulled a gun and threatened to shoot another man, the defendant conveniently in the crossfire, when the bar manager asked the defendant to leave, claiming that one of the customers in the dinner section had heard him say that he “had a gun and was going to shoot someone,” upon hearing the misunderstanding the defendant indeed smiled broadly and retold the incident about himself almost being shot that morning--the “kicker” being that the police only ticketed the man for an unlicensed or registered handgun, as the bearer admitted he did not have to the officer, who did not even bother to take him into custody despite his well- witnessed threat to shoot a man with whom he was arguing; the bar manager, who, unbeknownst to the defendant, had been told by former Cal Basketball Coach Todd[ler] Bozeman, (see “Exhibit Sen. Feinstein,” further res gestae),an admitted “pathological liar” by his own “temporarily insane” pleas in legal forums and proceedings, (again available through defendant’s attorneyas federal plaintiff, Mr. Hallinan) that the defendant had allegedly said that he “had a gun and was gonna shoot hisself a bunch of [n-words],” insisted that the defendant leave or he would “call the cops,” to which the defendant said, “Go ahead.” The bar manager returned and said they’s told him to go ahead and “kick the shit out of you” in the meantime,” the defendant, by then admittedly annoyed, told him, “Well, give it a try,” and proceeded to walk towards the bar’s exit, at which point two off- duty police, one U.C.P.D. and the other B.P.D., jumped the defendant in the bar from behind. Defendant shook off these two paid “slackers” and went outside, at which point U.C.P.D. Off. “Nancy,” a sometimes bicycle cop, and now “detective,” who’s not only slandered the defendant’s reputation with a great number of U.C. Berkeley females--thus made wary and “afraid” of what’s been said--but too this Nancy was involved with the defendant’s allegedly illegal arrest inside the new Main Library at U.C. Berkeley, arrested the defendant outside “Larry Blake’s” after his calm discussion of the issues with her, claiming he had “too much history in his file.” The complaint, heard before Judge Brosnahan in open court while the defendant was forced to present his case from in custody “yet again,” was dismissed. Most peculiarly and particularly related is the abuse of police power in allegedly “enforcing” something illegal per se called”Jesse Jackson’s vajra lesson of compassion,” a fatwah-style Islamic edict used to abuse civil authority in this country and worldwide at this late point in time, ( about this “Jackson,” termed “Langdarma the Jackass-Wrong- Headed One, ” the “secret” name the defendant’s religious association uses to describe a historical persecuter of Buddhism, circa 800 A.D., and “Jackson’s” obsession with Misappropriating the defendant’s Intellectual Property and Rights of Publicity and then, as in the “case” of Jose Canseco, Spike Lee, Dale Schmidt, Lissa Tyler Renaud et al, refuse to abide by the “law of the land” Due Process for adjudicating said matter--the defendant having enlisted the aid of his deceased grandfather Harold Francis McNenny’s copyright and patent law firm, “Pearne, Gordon, McCoy and Granger,” 1200 Leader Building (formerly the Tower) in Cleveland, Ohio, approximately six to seven years ago, to assist with infringement violating the defendant’s civil rights --and those, too, of any female near and dear to him--especially his absent mother--see the FBI complaints and investigations)- -with the “wickedly great” result of denying the defendant any and all civil and contractual rights as well as basic, human decency rights and treatment--access to available services, public library typewriters, etc., as “stage incident” after fabricated “undercover poh-leece report,” literally one right after another, accumulate against the defendent by agent provacateurs like “Bear,” a crack cocoine selling DEA operative who has a “mean and nasty habit” of “beating da bitch like a ‘ho,” to many women in this town, some of whom make complaint, and the defendant is thereupon blamed and “set up” with a phony incident like the one that got him taken into custody, yet again, one night after one of Bear’s snitch buddies told the defendant “we ain’t gonna let you play pool cause we thinks yous a homosexual,” a false accusation that admittedly upset the defendant a bit. Most tired, as well, is the defendant of hate crimes, assaults, email threats and obscene phone calls made to any of his colleagues and associates (and often, too, blamed most erroneously and patently ridiculously on the defendant) who “lifts a finger” to assist him; his friend Bruce Slayman, sitting in Ho Chi Minh Park one early evening reading a book, recently lost the teeth in the right side of his mouth from a “wandering wingnut” suddenly and calculatedly psychotic--the defendant’s information and belief is that the assaulter (behind bars now) was sent and “set up” by not only the aforementioned “Monk,” a.k.a. “George Petty,” “Hank Deadwood,” “Da Bear,” etc., but his fellow “snitch-jackets” and paid informants locally (out of “People’s Park”) for the D.E.A.’s “Fort Reno Task Force,” deploying a supposedly convicted, sentenced and “behind bars” Ciro Mancusco out of Mexico “these days” with a “pipeline” of illegal aliens recruited to do “dirty tricks” in the States before being cut a “contingency fee” and shipped out elsewhere--as well as the usual “dynamic duo” of this alleged narcotics “Task Force,” Hosie Canseco (the Martinez-look-alike-double family as well) and his “lil buddy” Dalie Schmidt (so pathetically unbalanced mentally as to “schmirk” about the “damage” he’s wreaking against the defendant and others everywhere he goes--even showing “training films” of the pornographic variety (showing the “endless” possibilities of what can be done to a thoroughly “doped-up” woman “without a clue” to incite the proper “motiviation” in his new minions)--as he has done under Federal “color of law” as “wargames” dirty political tricks to destroy the electoral process of candidate selection, as he has done through former Berkeley Emergency Food Project employee James Thomas, who had a habit of showing Nation of Islam recruitment propaganda videos along with pornography in the City of Berkeley and U.C. Berkeley -financed Veteran’s Building Homeless Shelter, where “other” B.E.F.P. employees and Fed.Gov’t. policy-managed “Andre House” manager John Fitzgerald had “the whole East Bay” entertained by women, tied down with silks onto the floor of four vans one night over seven years ago, as a”Vajra lesson of compassion,”as this Schmidt had a “habit” of doing--drugs, alcohol and pornos--with U.C.P.D. members on “slow nights” at Moffit Library, several years ago (reported in the “Daily Cal,” without the “suspects,” as “Sex, Drugs and Videotapes”). Defendant argues that this “burgeoning crisis,” evidenced by a statistical increase of campus and vicinity rapes (finally being reported again after threats to the victims of mutilation with switchblades, shivs, etc., kept matters “out of the paper” as our Congressional representatives like Ron Dellums have been constantly pressuring) stems directly by a shameful “failure to act properly on a claim before” the proper forums, as, most “topsy-turvily,” he has had to endure the “slings and arrows of [an] outrageous [boycott]” for voicing his indignation over completely indefensible incidents--the brief details of one of which will suffice: circa 1991, when “Spike Lee Productions” was filming “Malcolm X” on the U.C. Berkeley campus, the defendant, on his way to the Graduate Theological Union Library where he was doing his ecclesiastical research as “Sakiya Lama” for the Dalai Lama, passed by the film crews production vans and was greeted briefly by an attractive, blonde-haired white woman who, unbeknownst to the defendant, was playing “Sophia” in this movie. Defendant returned her flirtatious greeting, in a subdued and proper, courtier manner, only to learn the next day that this actress had been gang-raped by Denzel Washington and the crew (police in uniform getting in on it when summoned, etc.), the “tip of the iceberg” occuring when ole Spikie Lee hisself pummelled the woman’s face into the equivalent of raw hamburger, his (ala the aforementioned “Monk’s,”) so-called “trademark.” Just another “vajra lesson of compassion,” so they say. --”One must not disparage women... One should speak with pleasant words And give a woman what she wants. Having worshipped with one’s belongings, Accordingly one should not despise her. Never abandon woment! Heed the Buddha’s words! If you do otherwise, That transgression will land you in hell!” Candamaharosana-tantra, sDe-dge, 319a.1-2 “Clatterings fools...who disparage women out of hostility, Will by that evil action remain constatnly tortured For three eons in fathomless Raudra hell, Wailing as their bodies burn in many fires.” Ibid, translated by Christopher George (New Haven, 1974), p. 70 “One should not strike a woman, Even with a flower, Even if she commits one hundred misdeeds.” Kaulavalinirnaya sutra, 10.69 “[Women a tantric adept] should serve in the proper way without making any distincition. If he makes a distinction, Candamaharosana will be provided and slay the practicioner, throw him into Avici Hell, and threaten him with sword and noose. Nor will he obtain Success in this world or the next.” George, supra, p. 66 [In this Tibetan Buddhist text, Candamaharosana, as Mahakala the Protector, has dharmic duties involving the subduing of evildoers of this world by siddhis, or supranormal abilities bestowed by Grace of Heaven; in particular, as the fierce dakini Vajrayogini’s chosen consort, he is entrusted with singling out, for Heavenly judgement, miscreants who transgress against women. As Protector of the Gentle Wisdom, he assures Vajrayogini that for failure to pay homage and due respect to women, he will slash the scoundrels to pieces, lightning-quick. As Miranda Shaw states in Passionate Enlightenment, Women in Tantric Buddhism (Princeton Press, 1994): “Anyone who reads a Tantric text or enters a Tantric temple encounters a dazzling array of striking female imagery. one discovers a pantheon of female Buddhas and a host of female enlighteners known as dakinis. The dakinis leap and fly, unfettered by clothing, encircled by billowing hair, their bodies curved in sinuous dance poses. Their eyes blaze with passion, ecstasy, and ferocious intensity. One can almost hear the soft clacking of their intricate bone jewelry and feel the wind stirred by their rainbow scarves as they soar through the Tibetan Buddhist landscape (p.3).] --”And will she yet abase her eyes on me, That cropped the golden prime of this sweet prince... On me, that halts and am misshapen thus? My dukedom to a beggarly denier, I do mistake my person all this while. Upon my life she finds, although I cannot, Myself to be a marv’lous proper man. I’ll be at charges for a looking-glass And entertain a score or two of tailors To study fashions to adorn my body. Since I am crept in favor with myself...” William Shakespeare, Richard III, Act 1, Sc. 2, 233-45 “But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariable the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism...” --”The principle that government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice is so well understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions. Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953)...Our [certiorari] review confirms that the laws in question [in this instant case] were enacted by officials who did not understand, failed to perceive, or chose to ignore the fact that their official actions violated the Nation’s essential commitment to religious freedom...The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has been applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), provides that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...’ (Emphasis added)...In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice, Employment Div., Dept. Of Human Resources of Ore. V. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied...In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or religion in general. See, e.g.,, Board of Ed. Of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality opinion); School Dist. Of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1968); School Dist. Of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Everson v. Board of Ed. Of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15- 16 (1947)...Indeed it was ‘historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.’ Bowen v. Ray, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986)(opinion of Burger, C. J.). See J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States Sec’s. 991-992 (abridged ed. 1833) (reprint 1987).” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah (1993) 508 U.S. 520, 523-524, 531-532, in passim --”When a law discriminates against religion as such, as do the ordinances in this case, it automatically will fail strict scrutiny under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-403, 407 (1963)...In my view, regulation that targets religion in this way, ipso facto, fails strict scrutiny.” Ibid, at 579, J. Blackmun and J. O’Connor, concurring “[W]hen a statute or regulation by its vagueness or overbreadth threatens to deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, we require of it greater precision and specificity than would be necessary to fulfill Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements,” Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F. 2d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 1975), cited in Cohen v. San Bernadino Valley College, [96 DAR 10092 (9th Cir. 8/21/96)], upholding a teacher’s rights to “assert controversial viewpoints,” See, too, Bull frog Films v. Wick, 847 F. 2d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1988); NAACP v. Button, 371 US 415, 433 (1963) --”I consider the government of the United States as interdicted by the Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises...Certainly, no power to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in religious discipline has been delegated to the General Government...Every religious society has a right to determine for itself the time for these exercises, and the objects proper for them, according to their own particular tenets; and this right can never be safer than in their own hands, where the Constitution has deposited it.” Thomas Jefferson, 1808 letter to Rev. Samuel Miller, 11 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 428-429 (A. Lipscomb, ed. 1904). --The Balfour Declaration of 1917, by Arthur James Balfour, head of the British Foreign Office and a native Scot, was the document that enabled the creation of Israel in Palestine. As Duncan A. Bruce notes, in The Mark of the Scots, (Birch Lane Press, 1996), “...Germany in the Middles Ages was teeming with prosperous Scottish (and Jewish) peddlers...But the hard-working and clannish Scots were as envied and disliked in Germany as they had been and were to be elsewhere...And, of course, their great sin was that they made money...The Scottish and Jewish peddlers in Germany had to endure near- Russian winters, wolves, many recorded murders at the hands of peasantry, anti- discrimination laws, confiscation of merchandise, jail terms , and the strong and continuous opposition of the guilds [who late 1600’s] prayed in a successful petition ‘the Scots skim the cream off the milk of our country.’(p. 175)” --”Since they were usually barred from the colonies before the Union of 1707, it was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that Scots became a significant minority in America, and it was at precisely this time that the colonies began to move toward revolution. The coincidence cannot be ignored...We have seen, too, that these immigrants were thought of as foreign, a condition which led to discrimination against them, something a new democratic government would not allow...One of the most significant events leading toward revolution occurred in 1735, when Andrew Hamilton, a Scottish lawyer from Philadelphia, went to New York to defend a German immigrant printer who was being held in jail on charges of ‘seditious reflections’ and libel against the King...’ Thirty years later, when most Americans still considered thoughts of independence to be seditious, a persuasive and powerful radical in Virginia delivered a speech which became one of the landmarks in influencing the American people towards revolution. Patrick Henry was the son of a Scottish-born judge...On March 23, 1775, Patrick Henry, who [fellow Scot, a descendant of a sister of King Robert I, the Bruce, President-to-be Thomas] Jefferson said was ‘before us all in maintaining the spirit of the Revolution,’ gave his most memorable speech [‘...give me liberty or give me death!’] Duncan, supra, at p. 35-38 (Note, too, that the jacket blurb comments that 75% of all American Presidents had Scottish ancestors, 11% of all Nobel Prize awardees, too, though Scots are but 5% in America and .5% worldwide; “Scots have been significant in most of the major inventions of the past three centuries, including the steam engine, the telegraph, the telephone, radio, television, the computer, the transistor, and the motion picture”; 21 of the 56 signers of the Declaration of Independence, including James Madison, primary author of the Bill of Rights, were Scottish; Edinburgh, seat of the Scottish Enlightenment (David Hume et al), was called the “Athens of the North.” (P.35) Kenneth Clark, in Civilization (1969, New York), p. 302-304, notes that the James MacPherson (1736-1796) translation of 3rd century Gaelic poems by “Ossian” (legended to be the son of Finn Mac Chumaill, founder of the “Fenians” in Ireland), moved Thomas Jefferson so much that he attempted to learn Gaelic and said, “I am not ashamed to own that I think this rude bard of the north the greatest poet that has ever existed,” (p 201, noting that Ossian’s other admirers included Goethe, Coleridge, Scott and Byron). See too, Andrew Hook, Scotland and America (Glasgow, 1975), p. 67. --”While it is evident that the AFLA does not pass muster under Lemon's "effects" prong, the unconstitutionality of the statute becomes even more apparent when we consider the unprecedented degree of entanglement between Church and State required to prevent subsidizing the advancement of religion with AFLA funds. The majority's brief discussion [***98] of Lemon's " entanglement" prong is limited to (a) criticizing it as a "Catch-22," and (b) concluding that because there is "no reason to assume that the religious organizations which may receive grants are 'pervasively sectarian' in the same sense as the Court has held parochial schools to be," there is no need to be concerned about the degree of monitoring which will be necessary to ensure compliance with the AFLA and the Establishment Clause. Ante, at 615-616. As to the former, although the majority is certainly correct that the Court's entanglement analysis has been criticized in the separate writings of some Members of the Court, the question whether a government program leads to "'an excessive government entanglement with religion'" nevertheless is and remains a part of the applicable constitutional inquiry. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 613, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). I accept the majority's conclusion that "[t]here is no doubt that the monitoring of AFLA grants is necessary . . . to ensure that public money is to be spent . . . in a way that comports with the Establishment Clause," ante, at 615, but disagree with its easy [***99] characterization of entanglement analysis as a "Catch-22." To the extent any metaphor is helpful, I would be more inclined to characterize the Court's excessive entanglement decisions as concluding that to implement the required monitoring, we would have to kill the patient to cure what ailed him. See, e. g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 614-615; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S., at 370; Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S., at 413-414. Bowen v. Kendrick (1988) 487 U.S. 589, *649; 108 S. Ct. 2562, **2595; 988 U.S. LEXIS 3027, ***98; 101 L. Ed. 2d 520; Justice O’Connor’s dissent (emp. Add.) PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, as referenced in his cross-complaints to the FBI (attached),the defendant has been subjected to an extra-judicial proceeding--emanating, primarily, from Executive Branch alleged authority--in which every item of his food and drink is adulterated with a variety of “substances,” ranging from the quasi-legal use of “medications”--i.e., “Thorazine” et al--to such legally “doubtful” practices as eugenic “sterilization” chemicals even more severely impacting one’s body and health, with permanent, irreversible damages, than the “chemical castration” recently legislated in California, to such horrifyingly evil per se “acts of war” internationally outlawed as “biological warfare” viruses and biochemical “psychic channelling” microbe/substances. “Jurisdiction” for said “civil interdiction” type of fascistic “re-education” of defendant comes from such “functionally-confused” quasi-mystical “law-givers” as the U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno--somehow allowed to keep her job despite manifesting, during too numerous to cite “press conferences,” an abysmal--and defendant has argued and does now--complete non-comprehension of her “job description”: in no way is Janet Reno “the nation’s top law-enforcer.” To draw an analogy from a U.S. District Court opinion about a challenged practice a decade or so ago also allegedly predicated upon rule of law, "it is impossible to comprehend entanglement more extensive and continuous than that necessitated by [our nation’s chief prosecuter ]." ( Bowen, supra, LEXIS at [*600]; 657 F. Supp., at 1568.n7) --” The court also found that the AFLA's funding of religious organizations is likely to incite political divisiveness. See Bowen v. Kendrick, (District Court opinion), 657 F. Supp._____ at 1569 (citing, e. g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J.,concurring)).” Bowen, supra, n. 7, at 1568 Not only does our U.S. Attorney General. Janet Reno, concertedly “refuse to deal” with the defendant’s attorney-of-record as a plaintiff, Mr. Patrick Hallinan, but too dogmatically and imperiously commandeers any and all to do the same: both within the U.S. Dept. Of Justice (especially a member of the International Committee of Lawyers for Tibet, Mr. Andrew M. Scoble, an Assistant Attorney General at 450 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco, CA, to whom defendant made complaint, as “proper forum,” and failing any response, then listed the Attorney General, Janet Reno, as “respondent/defendant” and served--in person--”courtesy copies” of briefs legally filed raising federal jurisdiction and questions) and, too, within the FBI--issuing “direct orders” to the chief fact-finding law enforcement officer, the Director Mr. Freeh--and so-called “without,” through her fellow “fishie-witchie” (as Rome’s publicans and off-spring were termed) legacies of the Internal Revenue Service, whose “fink division” may have claimed the foster-families of the defendant but never him or his person. These quasi-mystical (with use of misappropriated mudra’s from the defendant’s Tibetan Buddhist religious association that, as jarringly ill-practiced, flash faster than a “Three Card Monty” street-scam card-player,i.e., a lot of “sound and fury signifying nothing”) extra-judicial “justifications” in perversely misguided attempts at “teaching a lesson” to defendant have been practiced non-stop the past twenty years by his “color of law” relatives, as defendant has complained both properly and timely--despite the absence of any notice or Due Process entitling him to “tolling” of time limits consideration. To thus have our nation’s Attorney General et al those “dogmatically”-affiliated “run[] afoul of the Lemon effects test” (however “religiously inspired” the “substantial purpose” replacing, cult-like within our Federal bureaucracy, the “rule of Law”) indeed leaves one-- not thus “inculcated,” thus forced to bear witness to the horrifyingly “pervasively sectarian” mechanical-as-a-steamroller obliteration of an admittedly delicate process termed "to tread an extremely narrow line" by our Supreme Court in Roemer, 426 U.S., at 768-769 (WHITE, J., citicizing the interaction of entanglement and effects tests, concurring in judgment)--or even those allegedly “adherents of the denomination"( 473 U.S., at 409-410, cited in Bowen, supra, 487 U.S. 589, *616), suddenly awakened or aware of the affective-schizophrenic clunk-a-bout way these operatives flail pasty arms and squiggly hands made soulless through and laden with biochemical gasses whose forerunners were similarly deployed at the Warsaw ghetto’s pogrom, at Auschwitz and other “re-education” gulags, noting the strangely-determined way these new minions, ala the “of the blood and soil’ German masses hypnotized and seduced into “with the program” affirmations of “all HAIL!,” grimly repeat “no GAME!”; why, one and all indeed may be left, sans “remedy,” permanently “speechless”... “...in hot digestion of this cormorant war...” Defendant argues that he is being subjected to these “cop/schlop” gulag forced meals system for the same reasons as intellectual dissidents as Hongda HarryWu, who spent nineteen years in a Chinese Communist prison, members of Mrs. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s democracy movement in Burma, most Buddhists, force to be “porters” or “comfort women” for the scum of the earth carrying out this “re-education,” or his fellow Rinpoches as His Holiness Kusum Lingpa, a recognized reincarnation of Palgyi Dorje, one of Padmasambhava’s favorite students. This class-based, invidious discrimination for being “too talented” and hard-working, thereby in-cur-ring the “inferiority complexes” of “others” as “compensation” of a most mish-taken nature (as he’s argued the revanche! cry of Bismark’s Teutons as they razed Paris, 1880’s was, or as has happened to related Semites, the Hebrews and Vedic Indians, from holocaust to holocaust, has been) in which any and all are openly encouraged to heap abuse upon him, based upon ignorant, superstitious pre-conceptions about him having no basis in reality...The “battle-axe” cry of these bureaucratic fustilugs as the defendant is destroyed is “[he has to be] diseased [or disseised] until dead!” --”We hold that, after Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant [party] that furthers the underlying purposes of the Copyright Act [of 1976] is reposed in the sound discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion is not cabined by a requirement of culpability on the part of the losing party.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, (9th Cir. 8/26/96) 96 Daily Journal D.A. R. 10385, a dispute from a 1988 copyright infringement action brought against the musician/composer, John Fogerty of “Creedence Clearwater Revival’ for creating a “Swamp Rock” genre song similar to one of his other songs to which Fantasy now owned the copyright, Fogerty, however, vindicated in his right to “future original compositions” of that genre. --To commemorate Nov. 6, 1996--a day on which at the aforementioned Berkeley Emergency Food Project the defendant was refused a few measly “french fried” potatoes, dry and unedible as they were, by the Afrcican-American cook who called the defendant “white trash” who “eats too much anyway”--as the anniversary of the Irish Great Hunger, in which one million of Ireland’s 1840’s six million starved to death and another two million were forced to emigrate, penniless, to places like the United States--packed, like the recent wave of Asian “slave and sexual chattel” pirates of the Indonesian Seas, in what became known as “Coffin Ships” for “obvious” reasons--the American Ireland PEC of New York published the following (excerpts, obtained from the Internet) in the October, 1996 newsletter: 1837--Gustave de beaumont, French writer, noting Ireland’s condition, said, “I have seen the Indian in his forest, and the negro in his chains, and I thought I had beheld the lowest form of human misery, but I did not then know the lot of Ireland...” 1838--The Duke of Wellington declared that never was there a land in which poverty existed to such a degree as in Ireland. 1842--Provision riots. Many outrages. 1843--Thackery, the English travel writer, in IRISH SKETCH BOOK: “Men are suffering and starving by millions.” 1844--Thackery, TRAVELS IN IRELAND: “I doubt in the whole world a nation can be found subjected to physical privations of the peasantry as in some parts of Ireland.” 1845--”London Times,” June 26: “The people have not enough to eat. They are suffering a real, though artificial, famine.” 1846--Lord John Russell: “We have made Ireland--I speak it deliberately--the most degraded and most miserable country in the world.” 1847--Mr. Bingham, House of Commons: “We are driving six millions of people to despair and madness. The people of England have most culpably and foolishly connived at a national iniquity. The landlords exercise their rights with a hand of iron...” --”It might, of course, have been argued that a broader objective is apparent: that the ultimate point of forbidding acts of discrimination toward certain classes is to produce a society free of the corresponding biases. Requiring access to a speaker’s message would thus be not an end in itself, but a means to produce speakers free of the biases...But if this indeed is the point of applying state law to expressive conduct, it is a decidedly fatal objective...[as] the [defendant] Council is engaged in a use of the streets that has ‘from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens.’ Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 US 496, 515 (1939)(opinion of Roberts, J.).” Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995) 115 S. Ct. 2338 --Edmund Pearson, after writing on sensational murders for Vanity Fair magazine, put a collection of said recountings together for Charles Scribner’s Sons in 1930 called, “instigation by the Devil,” with the preface from “an old indictment”: “Not having the Fear of God before his Eyes, but being Moved and Seduced by the Instigation of the Devil...” --”The adolescent liar flourishes at about that time [14 to 18], although it is hard to fix the limits. Ann Putnam was only twelve when she led the little band of hell-cats who caused nineteen persons to be hanged, and one to be pressed to death, in Salem in 1692. She and her friends began by dabbling in spiritualism and the divination of dreams: today their amusement would be thought intelligent and even fashionable; it would be called psychic research and Freudian interpretation. It is impossible to say how far they lost control of themselves, and were helpless hysterics; and to what extent they knew they were swearing away the lives of innocent persons...” Ibid, at p. 286-6, “Accomplished Female Liars” --”Absent compelling justification, government may not exercise its taxing power to single out the press.” Leathers v. Wedlock (U.S. Ark., 1991) 499 US 439 ; see too, Arkansas Writers Project, Inc., v. Raglan, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (U.S. Ark., 1987) --”[L]aws that single out press or certain of its elements for special treatment pose particular danger of abuse by government , and so always are subject to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.” Turner Broadcasting Systems v. F.C.C. (1994) 114 S. Ct. 2445 --”Prior restraints of reporting of news by media are particularly disfavored. CBS, Inc. v. Davis (1994) 114 S. S Ct 912, per J., Blackmun, Cir. Jus. --”The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Art. I, Sec. 9, of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), authored by George Mason. He in turn, had adopted verbatim the language of the English bill of Rights. As Mason himself had explained: ’We claim Nothing but the Liberties & Privileges of Englishmen, in the same Degree, as if we had still continued among our brethren in Great Britain...We have received [these rights] from our Ancestors, and, with God’s Leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired, to our Posterity.“ Solem v. Helm, 463 US, 277, 285-6, fn.10 (1982) --The standard for “reckless disregard” for the truth in a defamation action by a public figure is a “subjective one,” requiring that “the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts ...or...had a high degree of awareness of...probable falsity.” Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton (1989) 491 US 657,688; see too, 18 USC Sec. 242, which sets criminal penalties for deprivation of rights under color of law. --”Our decision that the Eighth Amendment liability requires consciousness of a risk is thus based on the Constitution and our cases, not merely on a parsing of the phrase ‘deliberate indifference’...In Canton [v. Harris, 489 US 378 (1989)], interpreting 42 USC Sec. 1983, we held that a municipality can be liable for failure to train its employees when the municipality’s failure shows ‘a deliberate indifference to the rights of the inhabitants.’ 489 US, at 389...Justice O’Connor’s separate opinion for three Justices agreed with the Court’s ‘obvious[ness]’ test and observed that liability is appropriate when policymaker’s are ‘on actual or constructive notice’ of the need to train, id., at 396 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).” Farmer v. Brennan (1994) 128 L Ed 2d 811, 827-8; see too Collins v. Harker Heights (1992) 117 L Ed 2d 261 re: “...the threshold for holding a city responsible for the constitutional torts committed by its inadequately trained agents.” --”The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether [ ] officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a [petitioner] to a sufficiently substantial ‘risk of serious damage to his future health,’ Helling [v. McKinney ] (1993) 125 L Ed 2d 22, and it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a [petitioner] prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all [persons] in his situation face such a risk...If, for example, prison officials were aware that inmate ‘rape was so common and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not sleep [but] instead...would leave their beds and spend the night clinging to the bars nearest the guard’s station,’ Hutto v. Finney, 437 US 678, 681-682 n. 3 (1978), it would obviously be irrelevant to liability that the officials could not guess beforehand precisely who would attack whom. (Cf. Helling, supra, 125 L Ed 2d 22 (observing that the Eighth Amendment requires a remedy for exposure of inmates to ‘infectious maladies’...).” Farmer, supra, at 829 “[M]any inmates discover that their punishment, even for nonviolent offenses...degenerates into a reign of terror unmitigated by the protection supposedly afforded by prison officials...’Such brutality is the equivalent of torture, and is offensive to any modern standard of human dignity.’ United States v. Bailey (1980) 444 US 394 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).” Farmer, supra, at 835 (fn” citing 10 federal cases that “document the pervasive violence” in prisons). --”[C]onditions of confinement” are often brought as 42 USC Section 1983 actions. Rhodes v. Chapman (1981) 452 US 337, 340, cited in Fierrro v. Gomez (9th Cir., 1996), 77 F. 3d 301, at 304. --”As to what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, it has long ago decided that the standard set was not by what was the prevailing norm in 1789, but rather by an evolving adaptation to new evils. Weems v. United States, 217 US 349, 373, 54 L. Ed. 793 (1910). The standard Weems approved has been repeatedly invoked to permit the application of ‘evolving standards of decency,’ e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 US 361, 369[] (1989), quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86, 101[] (1958)(plurality opinion).” Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 972, 978 (N.D. Cal., 1992), J. Noonan’s dissent --In 1909, Paul A. Weems, a U.S. Governmental official stationed in the Philippines, was sentenced under Penal Code of Spain provisions including cadena temporal, Arts. 105,106 providing that those so sentenced “shall labor for the benefit of the state. They shall always carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrists; they shall be employed at hard and painful labor, and shall receive no assistance whatsoever from without the institution.” Plus he had “civil interdiction” imposed: “Art. 42. Civil interdiction shall deprive the person punished, as long as he suffers it, of the rights of parental authority, guardianship of person and property,and the right to dispose of his own property by acts inter vivos...” As Justice McKenna, delivering the opinion of the Court, observed, “It must be confessed that they [these provisions], and the sentence in this case, excite wonder in minds accustomed to a more considerate adaptation of punishment to the degree of crime. In a sense the law in controversy seems to be independent of degrees. One may be an offender against it, as we have seen, though he gain nothing and injure nobody.” [One such jurisdictional offense was “perverting the truth”] Weems v. United States, 217 US 349, 364,368 (1910) --”Other cases [citing “cruel and unusual punishment”] have selected certain tyrannical acts of the English monarchs as illustrating the meaning of the clause and the extent of its prohibition. [Story, in his work on the Constitution, vol. 2, 5th ed. Sec. 1903,] expressed the view that the provision [against cruel and unusual punishment] ‘would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible that any department of such a government should authorize or justify such atrocious conduct.’ He, however, observed that is was ‘adapted as an admonition to all departments of the national government , to warn them against such violent proceedings as had taken place in the arbitrary reigns of some of the Stuarts.’ [citing Elliot’s Debates, and the remarks of Patrick Henry at the Virginia Convention.] Henry and those who believed as he did would take no chances. Their predominant political impulse was distrust of power, and they insisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse...They were men of action, practical and sagacious, not beset with vain imagining, and it must have come to them that...[w]ith power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to give criminal character to the actions of men...what more potent instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power...We cannot think that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised through other forms of punishment was overlooked. We say ‘coercive cruelty,’ because there was more to be considered than the ordinary criminal laws. Cruelty might become an instrument of tyranny; of zeal for a purpose, either honest or sinister.” Ibid, at 368-373. --”During the reigns of the Stuarts the King’s judges had imposed heavy fines on the King’s enemies, much as the Star Chamber had done before its abolition in 1641. L. Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689, p. 91 (1981). In the 1680’s the use of fines ‘became even more excessive and partisan,’ and some opponents of the King were forced to remain in prison because they could not pay the huge monetary penalties that had been assessed. Ibid [fn. citing the 1683 Trial of Thomas Pilkington, and others, for a Riot, 9 State Tr. 187, and the 1684 Trial of Sir Samuel Barnardiston, 9 State Tr. 1333.] The group which drew up the 1689 Bill of Rights had firsthand experience; several had been subjected to heavy fines by the King’s bench. Id., at 91-92.” Browning Ferris Ind. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 US 257, 267 (1988) --”Accounting for the constitutional magnitude of the error is, of course, appropriate. See Weems v. United States, 217 US 349, 362 (1910) (court less reluctant to find plain error ‘when rights asserted which are of such high character as to find expression and sanction in the Constitution or Bill of Rights’). Under the Court of Appeals analysis, constitutional error, whether or not objected to at trial, would always be subject to more sensitive prejudice standard set out in Chapman.” U.S. v. Robinson (1987) 485 US 25, 36, J. Blackmun’s opin. --”There can be no doubt at this point in our constitutional history that the Eighth Amendment forbids punishment that is wholly disproportionate to the blameworthiness of the offender.” Stanford v. Kentucky (1988) 492 US 361, 393, J. Brennan’s dissent --”[T]here remains a constitutional obligation imposed upon this Court to judge whether the ‘nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant’s blameworthiness ‘ is proportional. Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 US 815, 853, quoting Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 US 782, 825 (O’CONNOR,J., dissenting).” Ibid, at 382, Justice O’Connor’s opinion “Minding true things be what their mock’ries be...” Shakespeare described the deformed-for-artistic-metaphor-machievellian Richard of Gloucester in Richard III as “not shaped for sportive tricks...Cheated of feature by dissembling nature...since I cannto prove a lover...I am determined to prove a villian.” (1.1.1-31, passim). The real-life personage upon whom he based this character was one Robert Cecil, who, having been trained by Lord Burghley, Queen Elizabeth’s legal adviser, to “run the secret machinery of the state” after him (rumor has it that Cecil was an illegitimate son of Elizabeth and Burghley), which he did for King James. Cecil built on the infiltration of the “poets and players” circle accomplished by Burghley, the thug operatives of the Earl of Oxford, and other notorious thieves of Shakespeare, Ben Jonson et al , who enforced the “iron-fist-beneath- the-velvet-glove” religious edicts as civil interdiction of Queen Elizabeth--especially her “matchmaker” pronouncements and “teaching a lesson of respect” to “ladies of the Court” who violated her dicta (such as Mary, Countess of Pembroke and her “circle”) by associating with the “upstart crow” Shakespeare,i.e., the”devil himself”...”you can catch the very plague from his eyes alone!”... etc.etc. etc. The matter was “not difficult” for these henchmen of the Queen; as historians have noted, Cecil’s, his relative Francis Bacon’s, and Burhgley’s taste ran to “little boys,” women were creatures for whom each had “no use...” This often cruel misogyny was carried over into Cecil’s infiltration of the “ecclesiastical authorities” of the time. As Antonia Fraser, the historical novelist,notes: “At some point in this [diplomatic] trip, Fawkes’ name was entered into the intelligence files of Robert Cecil [by then made the first “Earl os Salisbury”]. The King’s [James] chief minister had of course an energetic networkof spies everywhere, not only in Flanders but in Spain, Italy, Denmark, and Ireland. Further more, Salisbury was able to build on the famous Elizabethan network of Sir Francis Walsingham. The number of ‘false priest’ abroad--treacherous intriguers who either were or pretended to be priests--constituted a specially rich source of information, as Salisbury admitted to Sir Thomas Parry, the Ambassador in Paris. They were all too eager to ingratiate themselves with such a powerful patron. (Faith and Treason (Nan A. Talese, Doubleday, 1996), at 123). In Fraser’s analysis of the infamous “Guunpowder Plot,” one might note an eerily similar “hidden agenda” in what the defendant argues is color-of-law disinformation (e.g., “he’s [the defendant] the real UnaBomber” or “Just a disgruntled queer likes to take it up his rear” or “ a sick pervert poses as poor Hosie Canseco and rapes women as a lascivious devil then beats them up to keep ‘em quiet,” the defendant’s attorney-as-plaintiff, Mr. Hallinan, has a nauseatingly lengthy list of similar quotes re: the defendant of a just as wrongful, malicious, deliberate-infliction-of-pain-and-suffering ill-nature) that has been “police or penological purpose” misused as “justification” or “probable cause” for stops, detentions, arrests, and other “actions and proceedings” against him--especially in the instant case. For example: “Was the [Gunpowder] Plot really ‘Satan’s policy’--that is, the work of Satan carried out by the Catholics? Or was some other agency responsible, rather closer to the King? The first rumours that the mastermind was in fact Salisbury, not Satan, occurred in Novemeber 1605. [She cites reports from that time of]: ‘this plot must have roots high up’ and ‘a flash of some foolish fellow’s brain’...”(Ibid, at 284). In what must be yet another classic “case” of what the defendant, questioning the motives of his accusers in his pleadings, has termed “pointing that bony pinkie,” with a ghoulish grin stretching marbled, lifeless flesh, at a scapegoated “other” to divert suspicion from oneself, Ms. Fraser describes the “deliberate campaign to blacken the reputation of Father Garnet,’ a “middle-aged priest,” who, upon his arrest as the “mastermind” of the conspiracy, sends a letter to an elderly female patron familiar with the Court’s inner circle, protesting his innocence, only to have this Cecil et al confiscate the missive--questionable if not illegal procedure even at that time--and misuse the letter at a public appearance by caliming it to be a “juicy love letter,” waved before the leering, lowest-common-demominater crowd, eager for a hanging, by this despicable Cecil with a flourish and triumphant, “What, you senex fornicarius!” (Ibid, at 237). “As the well-known dictum of Justice Holmes has put it, great cases generate hydraulic pressures.” --”It would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life- threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them.” Helling, supra, 125 L Ed 2d 22 --”One does not have to await the consumption of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.” Pennsylvania v. West Virginia (1923) 262 US 553, 593 --”Purpose of preliminary injunction is to preserve relative positions of parties until trial on merits can be held, and thus party is not required to prove his case in full at preliminary injunction hearing, and findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the court granting preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the merits. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 65(a)(2), 28 USCA.” University of Texas v. Camenisch, 101 S. Ct. 1830 (1981) --”Injunction against picketing and other boycott activities engaged in by those seeking to secure racial equality had to be limited so as to restrain only unlawful conduct and only the persons responsible for the conduct of that character.” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 US 886 (1982) --”Injunctive relief is to be molded to the necessities of a particular case.” Ronduau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 US 49 (1975) --”Injunctive order is extraordinary writ, enforceable by power of contempt.” Gunn v. Univ. Comm. to End War in Vietnam (1970) 399 US 383 --”Basic fairness requires that persons enjoined receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is outlawed. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., rule 65(d), 28 USCA.” Schmidt v. Lessard, (1974) 414 US 473 --”In exercising their powers of perspective injunctive relief, federal courts are not reduced to issuing injunctions against state officers and hoping for compliance; once issued, an injunction may be enforced...Civil contempt proceedings may yield a conditional jail term or fine, or a remedial fine which compensates the party who won injunction for the effects of his opponent’s noncompliance.” Hutto v. Finney (1978) 437 US 678 --”Persons subject to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if they have proper grounds to object to the order.” GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S. (1980) 100 S. Ct. 1194 “...Each word..contributes like a bit of mosaic...” --In United States v. One Book Entitled ‘Ulysses,’( 5 F. Supp. 182 (1933) S.D.N.Y.) Judge Woolsey (colleague to Judge Learned Hand), on “the government’s motion for a decree of forfeiture on the ground that the book is obscene within the Tariff Act 1930 (19 USCA Sec. 1305), and, therefore, is not importable into the United States, but is subject to seizure, forfeiture and confiscation and destruction...,” denied the government’s motion. --Noting that “[e]ach word of the book contributes like a bit of mosiac to the detail of the picture which Joyce is seeking to construct for his readers,” Judge Woolsey confere’s “the leer of the sensualist” with “what the French would call l’homme moyen sensuel.” Ibid at 183, 184. --”’Ulysses’ is not an easy book to read or to understand...In writing ‘Ulysses,’ Joyce sought to make a serious experiment in a new, if not wholly novel, literary genre...Joyce has attempted--it seems to me, with astounding success --to show how the screen of consciousness with its ever-shifting kaleidoscopic impressions carries, as it were on a plastic palimpset , not only what is in the focus of each man’s observation of the actual things about him, but in a penumbral zone residua of past impressions, some recent and some drawn up by association from the domain of the subconscious. He shows how each of these impressions affects the life and behavior of the character which he is describing. What he seeks to get is not unlike the result of a double, or, if that is possible, a multiple exposure on a cinema film, which would give a clear foreground with a background visible but somewhat blurred and out of focus in varying degrees. To convey be words an effect which obviously lends itself more appropriately to a graphic technique, accounts, it seems to me, for much of the obscurity which meets a reader of ‘Ulysses’...It is because Joyce has been loyal to his technique and has not flunked its necessary implications...that he has been the subject of so many attacks and that his purpose has been so misunderstood and misrepresented.” Ibid, at 133 --”In respect of the recurrent emergence of the theme of sex in the minds of his characters, it must always be remembered that his locale was Celtic and his season spring. Whether of not one enjoys such a technique as Joyce uses is a matter of taste on which disagreement or argument is futile, but to subject that technique to the standards of some other technique seems to me a little short of absurd...[as] ‘Ulysses’ is an amazing tour de force...” Ibid at 184 --Given how the Judge was “quite aware that owing to some of its scenes ‘Ulysses’ is a rather strong draught to ask some sensitive, though normal, persons to take,” he asked two separate “literary assessors” to evaluate for offensiveness, both reporting “that its net effect on them was only that of a somewhat tragic and very powerful commentary on the inner lives of men and women.” Ibid, at 185 --”James Joyce, the author of Ulysses, may be regarded as a pioneer among those writers who have adopted the ‘stream of consciousness’ method of presenting fiction, which has attracted considerable attention in academic and literary circles. In this field Ulysses is rated as a book of considerable power by persons whose opinions are entitled to weight. Indeed, it has become a sort of contemporary classic, dealing with a new subject matter. It attempts to depict the thoughts and lay bare the souls of a number of people, some of them intellectuals and some social outcasts and nothing more, with a literalism that leaves nothing unsaid. Certain of its passages are of beauty and undoubted distinction, while others are of a vulgarity that is extreme and the book as a whole has a realism characteristic of the present age... We may discount the laudation of Ulysses by some of its admirers and reject the view that it will permanently stand among the great works of literature, but it is fair to say that it is a sincere portrayal with skillful artistry of the ‘streams of consciousness’ of its characters. Though the depiction happily is not of the ‘stream of consciousness’ of all men and perhaps of only those of a morbid type, it seems to be sincere, truthful, relevant to the subject, and executed with real art. Joyce, in the words of Paradise Lost, has dealt with ‘things unattempted yet in prose or rime’--with things that very likely might better have remained ‘unattempted’--but his book shows originality and is a work of symmetry and excellent craftsmanship of a sort.... The net effect even of portions most open to attack, such as the closing monologue of the wife of Leopold Bloom, is pitiful and tragic, rather than lustful. The book depicts the souls of men and women that are by turns bewildered and keenly apprehensive, sordid and aspiring, ugly and beautiful, hateful and loving. In the end one feels, more than anything else, pity and sorrow for the confusion, misery, and degradation of humanity. Page after page of the book is, or seems to be, incomprehensible. But many passages show the trained hand of an artist, who can at one moment adapt to perfection the style of an ancient chronicler, and at another become a veritable personification of Thomas Carlyle. In numerous places there are found originality, beauty, and distinction...If [ the erotic passages] are to make the book subject to confiscation, by the same test Venus and Adonis, Hamlet, Romeo and Juliet, and the story told in the Eight Book of the Odyssey by the bard Demodocus of how Ares and Aphrodite were entrapped in a net spread by the outraged Hephaestus amid the laughter of the immortal gods, as well as many other classics, would have to be suppressed... In Halsey v. New York Society for Suppression of Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 136 N.E. 219, 220, the New York Court of Appeals dealt with Mademoiselle de Maupin, by Theophile Gautier, for the sale of which the plaintiff had been prosecuted under a New York statute forbidding the sale of obscene books, upon complaint of the defendant. After acquittal, the plaintiff sued for malicious prosecution, and a jury rendered a verdict in his favor...[As] Judge Andrews [remarked]: ‘No work may be judged from a selection of such paragraphs alone. Printed by themselves they might, as a matter of law, come within the prohibition of the statute. So might a similar selection from Aristophanes or Chaucer or Boccaccio, or even from the Bible...’ In the New York Supreme Court, Judge Morgan J. O’Brien declined to prohibit a receiver from selling Arabian Nights, Rabelais, Ovid’s Art of Love, the Decameron of Boccaccio, the Heptameron of Queen Margaret of Navarre, or the Confessions of Rousseau. He remarked that a rule which would exclude them would bar ‘a very large proportion of the works of fiction of the most famous writers of the English language.’ In re Worthington Co. (sup.) 30 N.Y.S. 361, 362... The foolish judgments of Lord Eldon about one hundred years ago, proscribing the works of Byron and Southey, and the finding by a jury under a charge by Lord Dennan that the publication of Shelley’s ‘Queen Mab’ was an indictable offense are a warning to us all who have to determine the limits of the field within which authors may exercise themselves...Ulysses is a book of originality [, not criminal in nature], even though it justly may offend many.” U.S. v. One Book Entitled Ulysses (1934) 72 F. 2d 705, 706-709, in passim --”Where book is written with honesty and seriousness of purpose, and portions which might be considered obscene are relevant to the theme, it is not condemned by statute barring obscene materials from the mails, even though the book may justly offend many...The text of this edition of ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’ was written by Lawrence toward the close of his life and was his third version of the novel, originally called ‘Tenderness.’ The book is almost as much a polemic as a novel. In it Lawrence was expressing his deep and bitter dissatisfaction with what he believed were the stultifying effects of advancing industrialization and his own somewhat obscure philosophic remedy of a return to ‘naturalness.’...One result, as he saw it, was the corrosion of both the emotional and physical sides of man as expressed in his sexual relationships which had become increasingly artificial and wholesome...” Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry (1959) 175 F. Supp. 488, 489, 500 (fn: 23. “As Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Kingsley Int. Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 79 S. Ct. 1362, 1369, “Lawrence knew there was such a thing as pornography, dirt for dirt’s sake, or, to be more accurate, dirt for money’s sake. This is what D. H. Lawrence wrote: ‘But even I would censor genuine pornography, rigorously...Pornography is the attempt to insult sex, to do dirt on it. This is unpardonable. Take the very lowest instance, the picture post-card sold underhand, by the underworld, in most cities. What I have seen of them have been of an ugliness to make you cry. The insult to the human body, the insult to a vital human relationship! Ugly and cheap they make the human nudity, ugly and degraded they make the sexual act, trivial and cheap and nasty.’ (D.H. Lawrence, Pornography and Obscenity, p. 13)’ Collected in Lawrence ‘Sex Literature and Censorship,’ supra, p. 69 (Ibid, at 1367).”) --”...[T]he Postmaster General’s [defendant’s] finding that the book is non-mailable because it offends contemporary community standards bears some discussion. I am unable to ascertain upon what [grounds] the Postmaster based this conclusion [ noting, too, that] editorial comment by leading journals of opinion [in support of Lawrence’s work] was excluded by the Judicial Officer at the [internal affairs Post Office] hearing.” Grove, supra, at 502. --”What New York has done, therefore, is to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture [‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’] because that picture advocates an idea--that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior. Yet the First Amendment’s basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas. The State, quite simply, has thus struck at the very heart of constitutionally protected liberty.” Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York State (1958) 360 US 684, 688 --”We have to thread our way, Term after Term, through the particular circumstances of a particular case in relation to a particular defendant in order to ascertain whether due process was denied in the unique situation before us...This was recognized in the first full- dress discussion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, when the Court defined the nature of the problem as a ‘general process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require, with the reasons on which such decision may be founded.’ Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 US 97, 104.” Ibid, at 697. --”...I hope it is not improper for me to say that the rule as laid down, however consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals, does not seem to me to answer to the understanding and morality of the present time, as conveyed by the words, ‘obscene, lewd, or lascivious.’ I question whether in the end men will regard that as obscene which is honestly relevant to the adequate expression of innocent ideas, and whether they will believe that truth and beauty are too precious to society at large to be mutilated in the interests of those most likely to pervert them to base uses. Indeed, it seems hardly likely that we are even to-day so lukewarm in our interest in letters or serious discussion as to be content to reduce our treatment of sex to the standard of a child’s library in the supposed interest of a salacious few, or that shame will for long prevent us from adequate portrayal of some of the most serious and beautiful sides of human nature. That such latitude gives opportunity for its abuse is true enough; there will be, as there are, plenty who will misuse the privilege as a cover for lewdness and a stalking horse from which to strike at purity, but that is true to- day and only involves us in the same question of fact which we hope that we have the power to answer. Yet, if the time is not yet when men think innocent all that which is honestly germane to a pure subject, however little it may mince its words, still I scarcely think that they would forbid all which might corrupt the most corruptible, or that they would forbid all which might corrupt the most corruptible, or that society is prepared to accept for its own limitations those which may perhaps be necessary to the weakest of its members...If letters must, like other kinds of conduct, be subject to the social sense of what is right, it would seem that a jury should in each case establish the standard much as they do in cases of negligence. To put thought in leash to the average conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least capable seems a fatal policy.” U.S. v. Kennerley (1913) 209 Fed. 119, 120-121, J. Hand’s opinion --”In error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas to review a judgment convicting Dan k. Swearingen under the provisions of U.S Rev. Stat. Sec. 3893, for depositing in the postoffice, to be conveyed by mail and delivered to certain persons, a certain publication or newspaper containing a certain article of an obscene, lewd, and lascivious character. Reversed, with instructions to award a new trail. (fn: “The article was in the following language: ‘About the meanest and most universally hated and detested thing in human shape that ever cursed this community is the red-headed mental and physical bastard that flings filth under another man’s name down on Neosho street. He has slandered and maligned every Populist in the state...This black hearted coward is known to every decent man, woman and child in the community as a liar, perjurer and slanderer, who would sell a mother’s honour with less hesitancy and for much less silver than Judas betrayed the Saviour...’) The offense aimed at, in that portion of the statute we are now considering, was the use of tthe mails to circulate or deliver matter to corrupt the morals of the people...As the statute is highly penal, it should not be held to embrace language unless it is fairly within its letter and spirit.” Swearingen v. United States (1895) 161 US 447, 450-451 --C.f., for a definition of “indecent” as grounds of exclusion from the mails as matterof a character tending to incite “murder or assasination,’ see Magon v. United States (1918, 9th Cir.) 248 Fed. 201 --When a statute operates as an overhanging threat to free discussion by sweeping within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of speech or of the press, this misapplication is void ab initio. See: Thornton v. Alabama, 310 US 88; Bridges v. California, 314 US 252; Stromberg v. California, 283 US 359; Carlson v. California, 310 US 106; and Roth v. United States (1957) 1 L Ed 2d 1498, at 2204, “Briefs of Counsel,” (Stanley Fleishman, Hollywood), “Words like ‘obscene,’ ‘indecent,’ ‘lascivious,’ and ‘lust’ in a statute dealing soley with thoughts and desires cannot be defined other than in tautological abstractions because the primary words are themselves abstractions , humors, emotions, and moods. In the ultimate analysis ‘obscenity’ exists only in the mind that condemns...” --Noting that all 14 States which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution had made ‘blasphemy,” among other matters, a statutory crime (fn: citing, e.g., “Act Against Drunkenness, Blasphemy,” 1737 Georgia penal code), our Supreme Court said, “The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. This objective was made explicit as early as 1774 in a letter of the Continental Congress to the inhabitants of Quebec: ‘ [Thomas Jefferson citing the importance of] ready communication of thoughts...whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.’...All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance--unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion--have the full protection of the guaranties...” Roth, supra, at 484 --”...he who destroys a good Booke, kills reason itselfe, kills the Image of God...We should be wary therefore what persecution we reaise against the living labours of publick men, how we spill that season’d life of man preserved and stored in Books; since we see a kind of homicide may be thus committed...” John Milton, from Areopagitica (1644) --”But we have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasonings of some, if others are left free to demonstrate their errors. And especially when the law stands ready to punish the first criminal act produced by the false reasoning. These are safer correctives than the conscience of a judge.” Thomas Jefferson, letter to Elijah Boardman, July 3, 1801, Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, Vol. 115, folio 19761. As Jefferson noted in his 1801 Inaugural Address, he preferred seeking the “...principles form[ing] the bright constellation of that which has gone before us, and guided our steps...” CONCLUSION: WHEREFOR PETITIONER, HAVING NO PLAIN SPEEDY OR ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW, PRAYS FOR RELIEF IN THE FORMS PREVIOSULY PLEADED: (see, e.g., “conclusion” from pendent case #388242, Oakland Municipal Court Dept’s 8 and 16, post) Thomas Francis Noonan, defendant pro per/ plaintiff pro se Counsel of record: Mr. Patrick Hallinan and Associates, Esquires Law Offices 819 Eddy Street San Francisco, CA 94109 (415)-433-1950 From the ACLU amici curae brief, Heller v. Doe,#92-351, filed before the U.S. Supreme Court Jan. 8, 1993, and one of several briefs the Court has had opportunity to review the past few years addressing the abuse of anti-psychotic medication for what is mis-diagnosed as “overactive behavior” among those classified as “mentally retarded”; in the same ACLU brief was noted: “Laws for the commitment of people with mental retardation were enacted at the same time that large institutions were developed to accomplish the lifelong segregation of a greatly feared population.” Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom as Drafted by Thomas Jefferson William Shakespeare, The Tempest, II, ii, 40. Shakespeare, I Henry IV, 1.3.49. “Arbroath Declaration,” see footnote three. “Declaration of Independence,” Thomas Jefferson, 1775. William Shakespeare, Love’s Labour Lost, 1.1.4 William Shakespeare, Henry V, Prologue to Act Four An ancestor of de Vere, Charles Vere, has been on a publicity tour with the “cult” claim of fellow Oxfordians that “there’s no way that Shaxspere the illiterate poacher ever wrote anything”; as for de Vere having been “Shakespeare” as a nom de plume the U. C. Berkeley professor Alan H. Nelson, at work on a book about the controversy, has said: “Not in a million years.” Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F.Supp. 972, 975 (N.D. Cal. 1992), J. Noonan’s dissent. United States v. One Book Entitled ‘Ulysses’ (1933) 5 F. Supp. 182.