HENRY FREDERICK RAMEY, JR.

5647 Clara St.

Bell Gardens, CA., 90201

TEL.: (562) 531-4439

In Propria Persona.

TO THE HONORABLE BONNIE LEGGAT, DISTRICT JUDGE:

I, Henry Frederick Ramey, Jr., Defendant and Applicant, in propria persona, file this Application for a preconviction Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking a dismissal of his felony prosecution for depriving him of 1) a right to a speedy trial, 2) a legal arrest with warrant and probable cause, 3) legal searches and seizures with warrant and probable cause, and 4) being released after the driver was given the citation as required by law, and in support, shows the following:

The Applicant has been released on bail, pending the extremely slow process of indictment. He was confined at the Harrison County Jail in Marshall, Texas, between June 15, and June 25, 1999, and until he was admitted to bond on June 25, 1999.

As a consequence of the previously stated events, Applicant was arrested on June 15, 1999. The final date of the next full term of which the Applicant was to be indicted fell on September 4, 1999, pursuant to Article 32.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since September 4, 1999, the Applicant has still not been indicted. As a result, the pending charges against of the Applicant is unlawful due to the fact that the Applicant’s right to a speedy trial has been denied and deprived contrary to the Federal, and State Constitutions, and Article 32.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Applicant is also a resident of the glorious Golden State of California, where the Defendant’s and even the People’s right to a speedy trial within 60 days was upheld by the California Supreme Court in 1991, and such a long delay as much as two years is impermissible, and that the Applicant did not receive a preliminary examination, examining trial, or other like proceeding within a speedy time. In California, even rapists, gangbangers, and vicious child molesters are tried faster over there.

The Applicant was charged with the felony offense of violating Health and Safety Code Sec. 481.115 Penalty Group 1, Possession of Controlled Substance. Said offense was alleged to have been committed on June 15, 1999, in Waskom, Texas on Interstate 20. The Applicant has yet to be indicted. Such substances were not on his person, nor in any of his luggage, nor within his care, custody, and control, on June 15, 1999, and any other date as explained as follows (as contrary to many of the facts of the Police Report, which Defendant and Appellant intends to prove as true at trial, and which is attached as Exhibit "A"):

"The vehicle was traveling at 84 MPH in a 70 MPH zone."

TRUTH:

Defendant and Applicant vaguely recalls that the driver and Co-Defendant, Johnny Gray, Jr., was only going about over 5 MPH over the speed limit. In fact, the Police Officers only had probable cause for only the crime of speeding only as to the driver, and it does not give carte blanche for the Police Officers to look for other crimes.

LIE NO. 2:

"[Defendant and Applicant] then gave me the ID card and he was identified as Frederick Henry Ramey, Jr., white male, DOB 1-24-65."

TRUTH:

Defendant’s and Applicant’s name is Henry Frederick Ramey, Jr., as it appeared on his ID card. He was also blessed with that name on about February or March 1965 by the Elders of the Bellflower 2^nd Ward, Norwalk California Stake of Zion of the Church of Jesus Christ Of Latter-Day Saints.

LIE NO. 3:

"… and that [Ramey and Gray] were going to new Orleans (sic) on a case that Gray had against the Grey Hound Bus lines (sic)."

TRUTH:

Both instant Defendants are clearly civil Plaintiffs in Gray v. Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc. (U. S. D. C., N. D. Ala. Case No. CV98-B-3085-S), which is attached as Exhibit "B", and which is pending in the United States District Court, Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division, located in Birmingham, Alabama, parallel to Waskom, Texas on Interstate 20. Defendant and Applicant, and Co-Defendant Gray was supposed to meet with Richard Smith of Rives & Peterson, Greyhound’s attorney, for the Early Meeting of Counsel the week of the arrest. Furthermore, just because both Defendants appear "ragged", does not mean that they are under suspicion. It was very hot the week of the arrest. Gray also had an Alabama civil case he was trying to appeal from the Circuit Court of Alabama, County of Jefferson.

LIE NO. 4:

"I then placed Gray under arrest for no operator’s license and placed him in the back seat of Officer Stacy Self’s unit who had just pulled up to back us up. I then asked Gray if he had any illegal drugs or guns in the vehicle…"

TRUTH:

Gray’s was not handcuffed until the officers made Gray go into one of his bags that had pills inside. In fact, there was a pat-down search where each Defendant was told to stand while either Chief Hickey and/or Officer Rogers patted our clothes for weapons; this happened when Officer Self came, and which Chief Hickey and Officer Rogers then gave Defendant Gray the speeding citation.

ILLEGAL AND DISCRIMINATING PROFILING NO. 1:

"I then placed Gray under arrest for no operator’s license and placed him in the back seat of Officer Stacy Self’s unit who had just pulled up to back us up. I then asked Gray if he had any illegal drugs or guns in the vehicle…"

INTERPRETATION:

It is clearly obvious that Chief A. C. Hickey, and Officers Charles S. Rogers, and Stacy Self, were clearly profiling Gray, an African-American. Just because Gray is an African-American does not mean that Gray was and is under suspicion. The only other reason for probable cause was for speeding. Why were these officers eager to search the car and arrest both Defendants without getting a warrant on a busy Freeway near a construction zone? If Gray was White, the Defendants would not have been arrested. Why was Defendant and Applicant also arrested? Because he was riding with a Black man? These officers should lose their office due to violating Secs. 543.005 and 543.008 of the Transportation Code in not releasing them after giving Gray his citation.

"As I inventoried the vehicle I could smell an odor of marijuana in the vehicle."

TRUTH:

Well, heck, the Defendant and Applicant must so high as a kite to write up this instant well-written and thought out Application, that after he was sent to the Waskom Police Station and then to the Harrison County Jail, Defendant and Applicant demanded that the Officers and Deputies, respectively, give him a blood and/or urine test. As a Mormon, Defendant and Applicant can pee cleanly with flying colors.

TRUTH NO. 1:

"I then asked Ramey who did [the marijuana] belong to and he said the same thing."

FACT:

Defendant and Applicant absolutely had no idea at the time who did the marijuana belonged to except that Defendant and Applicant did not possess and keep any marijuana anywhere. It either belonged to Co-Defendant Gray, Gray’s relatives, or the police officers themselves. Furthermore, the marijuana in the glove compartment was not accessible to this Defendant and Applicant, since he heard Chief Hickey asked Gray, "are these the keys to the glove box?"

ADMISSION NO. 1:

"I asked Gray about the pills and he told me he worked for a nursing home and would transport them for patients. Then I told Gray he had to be licensed to do that he changed his story saying his niece worked at the nursing home and gave them to him."

FACT:

Gray admitted he held the pills in question. Gray told Defendant and Applicant months earlier that he had at least five cases against the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority involving his bus injuries, the instant Federal Case against Greyhound in Birmingham, Alabama, and a Worker’s Compensation case against the Los Angeles Times for work injuries he sustained in the mid-1970’s. He went to some doctors, mostly in Los Angeles, but also to some in Birmingham to get his pills that were prescribed in his name. However, upon admission to bail, Defendant and Applicant was told by several people that some of the pills were stolen. In fact, Defendant and Applicant did not know some of the pills were not in Gray’s name until they were arrested. Defendant and Applicant does not know how Gray got the "stolen" pills if they were stolen at all, except that Defendant and Applicant did not steal the pills or knows where the pills were stolen from if they were stolen at all.

"I then asked Ramey about the pills and he stated he did not know anything about them."

FACT:

Gray admitted he held the pills in question. Gray told Defendant and Applicant months earlier that he had at least five cases against the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority involving his bus injuries, the instant Federal Case against Greyhound in Birmingham, Alabama, and a Worker’s Compensation case against the Los Angeles Times for work injuries he sustained in the mid-1970’s. He went to some doctors, mostly in Los Angeles, but also to some in Birmingham to get his pills that were prescribed in his name. However, upon admission to bail, Defendant and Applicant was told by several people that some of the pills were stolen. In fact, Defendant and Applicant did not know some of the pills were not in Gray’s name until they were arrested. Defendant and Applicant does not know how Gray got the "stolen" pills if they were stolen at all, except that Defendant and Applicant did not steal the pills or knows where the pills were stolen from if they were stolen at all.

"Both subjects refused to give any statements and talked of suing the Police Dept."

TRUTH:

Defendant and Applicant does not recall the entire conversation, but all that Defendant and Applicant can recall was a discussion of wrongful searches and seizures and cases, like Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). Furthermore, Defendant and Applicant, and Gray were not read our rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), so every statement alluded to any Defendant is null and void.

The Applicant is entitled to a dismissal if the Applicant is not indicted by the last day of the next full Court Term after he was arrested or is admitted to bail under Article 32.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and under the Federal, and State Constitutions. (See Nguyen v. State, 882 S. W. 2d 471 (Tx. App.-Houston [1^st. Dist.] 1994).)

The Applicant also challenges the ruling in Meshell v. State, (citation unavailable) Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1987), since the Applicant is entitled to a speedy trial under the Federal, and State Constitutions, and the right to a speedy trial under the Federal, and State Constitutions is inviolate, and supersedes the provisions in the State Constitution regarding the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and provisions related to a prosecutor’s duties.

The Applicant also challenges the factors listed in Barker v. Wingo (citation unavailable) in that it deprives persons in Texas their speedy trial rights while citizens of other states get to go to trial a lot speedier, such as California.

It is clear that the Applicant has always desired to seek review of his charge and that he has been denied the right to be indicted by the legal deadline only as a result of the prosecutor failure to secure an indictment by the legal deadline pursuant to the Federal, and State Constitutions, and Article 32.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Nguyen v. State, 882 S. W. 2d 471 (Tx. App.-Houston [1^st. Dist.] 1994).)

Because of the prosecutor’s wholly deficient performance in failing to secure an indictment by the legal deadline, and the concomitant prejudice Applicant has suffered due to what may be a two-year delay, the Applicant is, therefore, entitled to a dismissal of his felony charge pursuant to the Federal, and State Constitutions, and Article 32.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Nguyen v. State, 882 S. W. 2d 471 (Tx. App.-Houston [1^st. Dist.] 1994).)

The sole purpose of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is to determine the lawfulness of confinement or other custody (Ex Parte McGowen, 645 S. W. 2d 286 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1983)). Habeas Corpus relief is available to review jurisdictional defects or a denial of one’s fundamental or constitutional rights. (Ex Parte Russell, 738 S. W. 2d 644 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1986)). In seeking Habeas Corpus relief, the Applicant assumes his burden of proving his factual allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ex Parte Salinas, 660 S. W. 2d 97 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1983)).

The Applicant is entitled to a dismissal if the Applicant is arrested without probable cause, since he was only a passenger in the vehicle and did not have such substances on his person, nor in any of his luggage, nor within his care, custody, and control, on June 15, 1999, and any other date, since Gray admitted that the pills were his, and that the Applicant did not have access to the trunk since the keys were in Gray’s possession, and that the Applicant did not look inside the bag where all the pills were; all contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendment Right to travel and the Fourth Amendment right to an arrest with a warrant and probable cause within both the Federal, and State Constitutions. (See Leday v. State, 997 S. W. 2d 406 (Tx. App.-Beaumont 1999), and Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999).)

It is clear that the Applicant has always desired to seek review of his charge and that he has been denied the right to be arrested with a warrant and with probable cause only as a result of the police officers’ failure to secure a warrant with probable cause pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendment Right to travel and Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, as well as the State Constitution. (Leday v. State, 997 S. W. 2d 406, 410-413 (Tx. App.-Beaumont 1999), and Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999).)

Because of the police officers’ wholly deficient performance in failing to secure an arrest warrant with probable cause, and the concomitant prejudice Applicant has suffered due to what may be a two-year delay, the Applicant is, therefore, entitled to a dismissal of his felony charge pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendment Right to travel and Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, as well as the State Constitution. (Leday v. State, 997 S. W. 2d 406, 410-413 (Tx. App.-Beaumont 1999), and Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999).)

The sole purpose of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is to determine the lawfulness of confinement or other custody (Ex Parte McGowen, 645 S. W. 2d 286 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1983)). Habeas Corpus relief is available to review jurisdictional defects or a denial of one’s fundamental or constitutional rights. (Ex Parte Russell, 738 S. W. 2d 644 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1986)). Although there may be an adequate remedy at law, relief is warranted by 1) recent decisions that challenge unconstitutional practices, 2) a trial and appeal could take years to come, and 3) an imminent decision is necessary for bench and bar. (Gibson v. State, 921 S. W. 2d 747, 755 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1996). This type of relief is warranted in light of the Court of Appeals ruling in Leday v. State, 997 S. W. 2d 406, 410-413 (Tx. App.-Beaumont 1999), and Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999). In seeking Habeas Corpus relief, the Applicant assumes his burden of proving his factual allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ex Parte Salinas, 660 S. W. 2d 97 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1983)).

The Applicant is entitled to a dismissal if the Applicant is arrested based upon a search without a warrant and without probable cause, since he was only a passenger in the vehicle and did not have such substances that found in the illegal searches on his person, nor in any of his luggage, nor within his care, custody, and control, on June 15, 1999, and any other date, since Gray admitted that the pills were his, and that the Applicant did not have access to the trunk since the keys were in Gray’s possession, and that the Applicant did not look inside the bag where all the pills were; all contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendment Right to travel and the Fourth Amendment right to a search with a warrant and probable cause within both the Federal, and State Constitutions. (See Leday v. State, 997 S. W. 2d 406 (Tx. App.-Beaumont 1999), Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999), Sedani v. State, 848 S. W. 2d 314, 317-318 (Tx. App. Houston [1^st Dist.] 1993), Knowles v. Iowa, -- U. S. --, --, 119 S. Ct. 484, 487-488, -- L. Ed. 2d --, -- (1998), Walter v. State 997 S. W. 2d 853, 861-863 (Tx. App.-Austin 1999), Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979), Davis v. State, 947 S. W. 2d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), and Crockett v. State, 803 S. W. 2d at 312 (1991).)

It is clear that the Applicant has always desired to seek review of his charge and that he has been denied the right to have the car searched with a warrant and with probable cause only as a result of the police officers’ failure to secure a warrant with probable cause pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendment Right to travel and Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, as well as the State Constitution. (Leday v. State, 997 S. W. 2d 406, 410-413 (Tx. App.-Beaumont 1999), Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999), Sedani v. State, 848 S. W. 2d 314, 317-318 (Tx. App. Houston [1^st Dist.] 1993), Knowles v. Iowa, -- U. S. --, --, 119 S. Ct. 484, 487-488, -- L. Ed. 2d --, -- (1998), Walter v. State 997 S. W. 2d 853, 861-863 (Tx. App.-Austin 1999), Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979), Davis v. State, 947 S. W. 2d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), and Crockett v. State, 803 S. W. 2d at 312 (1991).)

Because of the police officers’ wholly deficient performance in failing to secure a search warrant with probable cause, and the concomitant prejudice Applicant has suffered due to what may be a two-year delay, the Applicant is, therefore, entitled to a dismissal of his felony charge pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendment Right to travel and Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, as well as the State Constitution. (Leday v. State, 997 S. W. 2d 406, 410-413 (Tx. App.-Beaumont 1999), Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999), Sedani v. State, 848 S. W. 2d 314, 317-318 (Tx. App. Houston [1^st Dist.] 1993), Knowles v. Iowa, -- U. S. --, --, 119 S. Ct. 484, 487-488, -- L. Ed. 2d --, -- (1998) Walter v. State 997 S. W. 2d 853, 861-863 (Tx. App.-Austin 1999), Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979), Davis v. State, 947 S. W. 2d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), and Crockett v. State, 803 S. W. 2d at 312 (1991).)

The sole purpose of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is to determine the lawfulness of confinement or other custody (Ex Parte McGowen, 645 S. W. 2d 286 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1983)). Habeas Corpus relief is available to review jurisdictional defects or a denial of one’s fundamental or constitutional rights. (Ex Parte Russell, 738 S. W. 2d 644 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1986)). Although there may be an adequate remedy at law, relief is warranted by 1) recent decisions that challenge unconstitutional practices, 2) a trial and appeal could take years to come, and 3) an imminent decision is necessary for bench and bar. (Gibson v. State, 921 S. W. 2d 747, 755 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1996). This type of relief is warranted in light of the Court of Appeals ruling in Leday v. State, 997 S. W. 2d 406, 410-413 (Tx. App.-Beaumont 1999), Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999), and Walter v. State 997 S. W. 2d 853, 861-863 (Tx. App.-Austin 1999). In seeking Habeas Corpus relief, the Applicant assumes his burden of proving his factual allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ex Parte Salinas, 660 S. W. 2d 97 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1983)).

The Applicant is entitled to a dismissal if the Applicant is not released after the citation was issued to the driver pursuant to Transportation Code Sec. 543.005, since he was only a passenger in the vehicle and absolutely had nothing to do with Co-Defendant Gray’s speeding; all contrary to Transportation Code Secs. 543.005 and 543.008. (See Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999), Sedani v. State, 848 S. W. 2d 314, 317-318 (Tx. App. Houston [1^st Dist.] 1993), and Knowles v. Iowa, -- U. S. --, --, 119 S. Ct. 484, 487-488, -- L. Ed. 2d --, -- (1998).)

It is clear that the Applicant has always desired to seek review of his charge and that he has been denied the right to be released after the citation was given to Co-Defendant Gray, the driver, only as a result of the police officers’ failure to release the driver and passenger pursuant to Transportation Code Secs. 543.005 and 543.008. (Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999), Sedani v. State, 848 S. W. 2d 314, 317-318 (Tx. App. Houston [1^st Dist.] 1993), and Knowles v. Iowa, -- U. S. --, --, 119 S. Ct. 484, 487-488, -- L. Ed. 2d --, -- (1998).)

Because of the police officers’ wholly deficient performance in failing to release the driver and passenger after the citation was given to Co-Defendant Gray, the driver, and the concomitant prejudice Applicant has suffered due to what may be a two-year delay, the Applicant is, therefore, entitled to a dismissal of his felony charge pursuant to Transportation Code Secs. 543.005 and 543.008. (Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999), Sedani v. State, 848 S. W. 2d 314, 317-318 (Tx. App. Houston [1^st Dist.] 1993), and Knowles v. Iowa, -- U. S. --, --, 119 S. Ct. 484, 487-488, -- L. Ed. 2d --, -- (1998).)

The sole purpose of the Writ of Habeas Corpus is to determine the lawfulness of confinement or other custody (Ex Parte McGowen, 645 S. W. 2d 286 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1983)). Habeas Corpus relief is available to review jurisdictional defects or a denial of one’s fundamental or constitutional rights. (Ex Parte Russell, 738 S. W. 2d 644 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1986)). Although there may be an adequate remedy at law, relief is warranted by 1) recent decisions that challenge unconstitutional practices, 2) a trial and appeal could take years to come, and 3) an imminent decision is necessary for bench and bar. (Gibson v. State, 921 S. W. 2d 747, 755 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1996). This type of relief is warranted in light of the Court of Appeals ruling in Leday v. State, 997 S. W. 2d 406, 410-413 (Tx. App.-Beaumont 1999) and Villalobos v. State, 999 S. W. 2d 132, 134-136 (Tx. App.-El Paso 1999). In seeking Habeas Corpus relief, the Applicant assumes his burden of proving his factual allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ex Parte Salinas, 660 S. W. 2d 97 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 1983)). Although relief of removing the police officers in the refusal to release the driver and passenger cannot be granted by this Writ, Applicant recommends this Court to request the District Attorney or Attorney General to start quo warranto proceedings against the involved officers for violating Transportation Code Sec. 543.005.

The Applicant submits that there are no unresolved controverted issues of fact to be resolved by an evidentiary hearing and that he is entitled to a dismissal of his felony charge as a matter of law in view of the allegations contained in this Application.

WHEREFORE, the Applicant prays that this Honorable Court make its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, find that the Applicant was 1) denied his right to a speedy trial under the Federal, and State Constitutions, and Article 32.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2) denied of his right to be arrested with an arrest warrant with probable cause under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, as well as the State Constitution, 3) denied of his right to be searched with an search warrant with probable cause under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, as well as the State Constitution, 4) denied of his right to be released after the driver was given his citation pursuant to Transportation Code Sec. 543.005, and 5) order that the felony charge be dismissed and the Applicant be acquitted of said felony charge.

Under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, I declare that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on ___________________, 1999, at Los Angeles, California.

_____________________________________________

HENRY FREDERICK RAMEY, JR.,

Declarant.

OHF-RAD 1889-1980;

EFH 1900-1945;

MBF 1926-1945;

AMF 1929-1945;

LMR-USA 1890-1945.