Kevin Winters
PHI 415 001
March 17, 2002
In their work, The Mormon Concept of God,[1]
Beckwith and Parrish set as their prime argument against the LDS conception of
God the concept of an actual infinite. This argument Beckwith and Parrish
applies to three concepts: time, objects and God’s knowledge.[2]
We will address each argument in that order.
Traversing an Actual Infinite of Time – Beckwith and Parrish provide the following argument: “As we pointed out in the critique of Aquinas’ argument, if one cannot in principle reach a day which occurred an infinite number of days ago, this only goes to prove the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite.”[3] Thus, “whether one is talking about either starting a count from the number one or a beginningless series of events, it is an actual infinite number that is alleged will be or has been traversed.”[4]
There can be found at least one major argument against the latter assertion: time, as it may be conceived, does not constitute an infinite set. There are two theories of time that one must bring into this argument: A-theory and B-theory. According to the A-theory of time, all that is actual is the present moment. According to B-theory the past, present and future are all actual at any particular time one may examine them along the temporal continuum. On either account of time, Beckwith and Parrish’s argument fails. If we propose an A-theory of time then there is not an infinite set to traverse because all that is actual is the present. If we propose a B-theory of time then even Beckwith and Parrish must admit to the reality of an actual infinite if they hope to claim that the saved will dwell with God for eternity, for the future, which is without end, must be present in some real sense for the B-theory to have any coherence. Furthermore, if Beckwith and Parrish were to adopt the B-theory of time then they would necessarily have to admit to an actual infinite in the material world, inherently refuting their next objection.
Infinite number of Gods and intelligences – Beckwith and Parrish present their next argument, of the impossibility of an infinite number of objects, under the topic of Gods and intelligences. They present their argument with the following:
And since according to Mormon metaphysics the gods are always in the process of taking primal intelligences and putting them on the path of eternal progression, therefore, at any one time each god is starting a primal intelligence on the path of eternal progression. But since all infinites are equal, if there are an infinite number of primal intelligences, each god could be matched to a primal intelligence, which means that all the primal intelligences would be ‘used up.’”[5]
The very first point that one must bring up in relation to this argument is that all infinites are not equal. For example, let α stand for all cardinal numbers (i.e., {1, 2, 3, 4, …}) and let β stand for all even cardinal numbers (i.e., {2, 4, 6, 8, …}). If we place these in a one-to-one correspondence we find that α, though transfinite, is greater than β (i.e., α > β):
|
α = |
{1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
…} |
|
β = |
{2 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
10 |
12 |
14 |
16 |
18 |
20 |
…} |
Put another way, for every aggregate of β there are, in effect, two aggregates of α, or, rather, there are essentially half as many transfinite aggregates in β as there are in α. We would find the same true of γ that stands for all cardinal numbers divisible by three (i.e., {3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, …}), wherein α > β > γ, despite all being transfinite, ad infinitum. Thus, not all infinites are equal and it could very well be the case that, in relation to this objection, we have a transfinite set of godsintelligences = αα, giving us an infinite cardinal set per transfinite cardinal aggregate. From the above, Beckwith and Parrish’s argument does not necessarily follow.
God’s Omniscience – here Beckwith and Parrish take another approach that, in effect, misrepresents the LDS view. They propose, formally, the following argument:
There are a few inherent misconceptions within some of Beckwith and Parrish’s argument as given. I will deal with two: an absolutistic view of time and space and the claim of infinite omniscience.
Time and Space – one has to wonder what Beckwith and Parrish consider to be “the limits of time and space.” It seems that if anything has been learned in physics within the last century it is that time and space are not absolute. Space-time, as it has been termed, is capable of acceleration and deceleration depending on the physical state of the subject in question.[7] So, the question from here would be, “which particular limits of space-time would the LDS conception of God necessarily and contingently entail?” It appears, at first glance, that arguments could be made for something of a “transcendence” of space-time, though probably not of the magnitude that the classical Christian conception necessitates.
Infinite Omniscience – after devoting a substantial chapter to “Mormon Finite Theism,” Beckwith and Parrish propose an LDS conception ((5) above) of infinite omniscience. This move is puzzling to me since it would appear that the LDS philosopher who would take a “finitistic” conception of God would be under no necessity to say either that God does “know everything” and that that knowing is “instantaneous and simultaneous.” This, in light of the above, would give a good deal more leeway in the LDS conception of God than our Evangelical friends appear to be willing to give.
It is my contention that Beckwith and Parrish’s arguments in relation to an infinite set of time, objects and omniscience fail on various grounds, not the least of which are faulty premises/assumptions. It is admitted that a fuller discourse would need to be given for a truly adequate response, but the above, for the time being, will suffice.
In chapter 2 of The Mormon Concept of God, Beckwith and Parrish attempt to elucidate what they see as the “finite theism”[8] of LDS theology. I will start by saying that it is not fully true that “finitists emphasize the finite aspects of God.”[9] I would feel hard-pressed to state that any LDS finitist place God’s limitations first in their conception of Him. It might be better stated, “Finitists comprehend the limitations placed on God but would argue strenuously that such limitations do not make God impotent.” Furthermore, to make distinctions between “finitistic theism,” as attributed to the LDS, and “infinite theism,” which the authors claim to represent, is a falsification. All truth be told, only the Eastern Brahman (to my knowledge) fully fulfills the term “infinite,” as he/it is not limited even by logical contingencies and constitutes the whole of reality, placing him/it fully “in control,” at least as the Eastern religions conceive of “control.” Thus, it is utterly fallacious for Beckwith and Parrish to consider their theism fully “infinite” rather than “finite” in the strict philosophical sense. That being said, I will proceed with a few areas wherein I feel Beckwith and Parrish have not adequately described the LDS conception of God.
Organizer of the World – in this section Beckwith and Parrish rightly describe some of the ontological limitations placed on God due to the LDS metaphysical conception. In LDS theism, God is necessarily limited by autonomous intelligences, eternal elements, and the laws of nature. Where Beckwith and Parrish fail to account for the LDS view is their statement that “they [the LDS] deny that God has anything to do with sustaining the universe.”[10] This statement is amazing in that two pages later Beckwith and Parrish quote B.H. Roberts as saying:
But radiating from his presence, as beams of light and warmth radiate from the sun, is God’s spirit, penetrating and permeating space, making space and all worlds in space vibrate with his life and thought and presence: holding all forces—dynamic and static—under control, making them subserve his will and purpose.[11]
Thus, God plays a very central role in “sustaining the universe” for it is His power that prevents entropy to occur with the composite elements.[12] Furthermore, as implied in their words on the LDS concept of miracles,[13] it must be understood that God works within a much wider range of laws than we currently comprehend, further decreasing the limitations placed on Him by laws-in-themselves.
Limited in Knowledge – I believe Beckwith and Parrish are correct in stating that “God is omniscient because He knows everything that can possibly be known,”[14] but that begs the question of what “can possibly be known.” For example, if we were to assume (for the sake of argument) that absolute foreknowledge and libertarian free-will are incompatible then, due to the limitation of logical consistency placed on God by classical theism God would still be under the auspice of the term “omniscient” despite His not knowing absolutely our future acts. Further, if we assume that arguments stating that God cannot create a world wherein there is no evil (theodicy) then we must assume, by that very limitation, that God does not know how to accomplish such a task. Thus, I will propose that any argument to the effect that the finitistic view of God does not constitute true omniscience is question begging in relation to the ontology that one will uphold.[15]
Not Omnipresent in Being – Beckwith and Parrish rightly argue that “Since God has a physical body, and hence is limited by time and space, God’s being cannot be present everywhere.”[16] Furthermore, “when a Mormon says that God is omnipresent he is asserting that God’s influence, power, and knowledge is all-pervasive, but that the focal point of God’s being (that is, his body) exists at a particular place in time and space.”[17] In this critique, Beckwith and Parrish need to be careful in their terminology. To assert, for example, that, being opposite of the LDS conception, the God of classical theism is “present everywhere” would be equivalent to placing Him, and His Being, within space. God could not, in the popular sense, be “big enough to fill the whole universe but small enough to enter into ones heart” without being spatial and, hence, temporal. Thus, on this aspect, I would suggest Beckwith and Parrish be more careful in explicating classical doctrines for in failing to do so they may find themselves placing God completely outside of time and space and yet being present through His power and knowledge, which is dangerously close to the LDS conception of God.[18]
Mutable – on this point I have only one objection. Beckwith and Parrish state that “the God of Mormonism is radically mutable in comparison to the God of traditional theism.”[19] To this I can only state that anything that is less than absolute, less than completely infinite, will be “radically mutable” when compared to something that is completely absolute and infinite. But here, as earlier, one must state that the classical conception of God can hardly be considered entirely Absolutistic or infinite as logical limitations present incredible restrictions that would greatly lessen the classical God from, say, the Eastern conception of Brahman, who is the totality of reality and is not inhibited by logical restrictions. Beckwith and Parrish unwittingly step in the path of their own argument when they posit any limitation on God.
Contingent and One of Many Gods – on this issue Beckwith and Parrish make a few mistakes, among which we only have time for one in particular. Their conception that “Being the greatest conceivable being, there neither are nor can be other Gods with which He [the God of classical theism] must compete.”[20] The main difficulty with this statement is the assumption that God, being either infinite or finite,[21] cannot have equals, posing limitations on the power that He possesses,[22] or, if He did, that there would be some form of competition between the equals. On the latter, it would be held that since God’s exercise of the “powers of heaven” are limited in that “the powers of heaven cannot be controlled nor handled only upon the principles of righteousness”[23] then such a thing as “competition” would not enter into the picture.[24]
Naturally, much more could be said, and has been said, in critique of Beckwith and Parrish’s presentation of the LDS concept of God. As it stands, we have shown that many of their assertions either rest on dubious concepts that no LDS theist would propose and/or they beg the question of the nature of reality, which naturally predisposes them against the LDS conception. Still, this work has opened the door for further dialogue between LDS and Evangelicals, for which reason it should be praised, despite its shortcomings.
[1] Beckwith, Francis J. and Stephen E. Parrish, The Mormon Concept of God: A Philosophical Analysis (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen Press, Ltd., 1991).
[2] Their argument also includes a refutation of the mathematical “incoherence” of the infinite set, interspersed with a number of independent, but pertinent, arguments. As space does not permit it here, and as it stands as the most refuted claim in current reviews, we will leave it be and refer the reader to the reviews already given.
[3] Ibid., p. 58.
[4] Ibid., p. 59; emphasis mine.
[5] Ibid., p. 61.
[6] Ibid., p. 72.
[7] Some would even argue that the terms acceleration and deceleration are incoherent due to the relative nature of time, giving us no objective base by which to accelerate or decelerate.
[8] Beckwith, Francis J. and Stephen E. Parrish, The Mormon Concept of God: A Philosophical Analysis (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen Press, Ltd., 1991), p. 35.
[9] Ibid., p. 36.
[10] Ibid., p. 40.
[11] Roberts, B.H., Seventy’s Course in Theology: Third Year and Fourth Year (Salt Lake City, UT: The Caxton Press), 4: 70-71, quoted in Beckwith and Parrish, The Mormon Concept of God, p. 42; emphasis mine.
[12] We can say that the basic elements by which the physical world is constituted exist in spite of God’s wish but their combinations into physical objects and the sustaining of those combinations can be attributed directly to God’s power and will.
[13] The Mormon Concept of God, p. 41.
[14] Ibid., p 41.
[15] It should be noted that, as stated in the first paragraph of this paper, the classical conception does not constitute true omniscience as the logical limitation imposes inherent restrictions on what God can and cannot know.
[16] Ibid., p. 42.
[17] Ibid., p. 43.
[18] We could add that this is another possible interpretation of Aquinas’ words as given by Beckwith and Parrish.
[19] Ibid., p. 44.
[20] Ibid., p. 45.
[21] If such a distinction truly can be made between the two conceptions of God, rather than simply distinguishing between levels of finitude.
[22] The assumption here is that as God’s power is infinite then there would be no limitations on how He might dispense it or how thinly He might be able to spread it among other beings as it is inherently inexhaustible. We might add that this argument also rests on some fundamental, and fallacious, conceptions in relation to the ontological argument.
[23] Doctrine and Covenants 121:36.
[24] Just as surely as the concept of an “evil God” is self-contradictory given the LDS concept of God.
