Islamic fundamentalism is part of a wider religious resurgence sweeping across the Muslim world. It exists in a symbiotic relationship with other trends in Islam, the borderline between fundamentalism and the wider movements being blurred and flexible. Whilst contemporary Islamic fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon, it is rooted in the historically and spatially recurring cyclical phenomena of "reform" (islah) and "renewal" (tajdid) which provide the models and symbols that link modern fundamentalists to authentic elements in Islamic history. Based on these past renewals, contemporary Islamic fundamentalism is nevertheless distinct from them as it interacts with modern cultural, social, political and religious circumstances. Whilst stressing the unitarian and universalistic character of Islam, it is also coloured by local variations.

Some observers see Islamic fundamentalism as part of a trend in contemporary Islam toward a more orthodox and doctrinally homogeneous type of religion based on the sacred source-texts. This trend views local expressions of Islam as deviations from orthodoxy and seeks to suppress them. Modern means of communication have accelerated this process by opening up the periphery to the penetration of the centralizing forces. In this view, fundamentalism is the more radical wing of the wider movement which also includes madrassah-based traditional groups and sufi-type reform movements.

Contemporary "Islamic fundamentalism" is an umbrella term for a wide variety of movements and discourses committed to Islam as a total way of life and as a viable alternative to Western secular ideologies. Most are united in their goal of the Islamization of the total social and political system of their societies, states, and ultimately of the whole Muslim world, yet there is a great diversity among them arising from the variety of local circumstances in which they emerged and in which they operate.

Some observers would restrict the term "fundamentalist" to the politically active movements that see Islam as a modern political ideology. However, while these groups form the vast majority of Islamic fundamentalist movements, there are a number of other groups, some like tablighi jama’at with a very large memebrship, that also fit the fundamentalist criteria without being politically activist.

The goal of Islamic fundamentalists can be summarized as the re-establishment of a revived and authentic "true" Islam and its implementation in all areas of life. The best-known ideologue of the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Sayyid Qutb, defined the goal of fundamentalism as :

The differences between the large variety of movements stem from the argument on how best to achieve this goal, and includes apolitical individualist, political gradualist, and revolutionary approaches.

For the pietistic apolitical groups, the widespread renewal of individual Muslims will inevitably lead to the renewal of society and the state without the revived members having to sully themselves in the cesspool of worldly politics.

For the politically activist groups, the restoration is to be achieved by purifying society from un-Islamic practices, by a return to Islam’s original divine sources (Quran and Sunna) as the ultimate authority which must be re-interpreted and applied to modern contexts, and by the establishment of an ideal Islamic state modelled on that of the Prophet, the Rashidun, and the Companions. This threefold programme demands political activism, and will inevitably result in the transformation of both individual Muslims and of society in a comprehensive Islamic system (nizam Islami) adapted to the modern world, which will usher in a unified world-wide "Islamic state" (khilafa) in which the shari’a is the basis and sole source of all legislation.

Sidahmed and Ehteshami see no uniformity in the practical programmes of activists for implementing an ideal Islamic state, and they list a number of contemporary models: Khomein’s model of vilayat-e faqih; Hizb al-Tahrir's vision of a renewed Caliphate; and Qutb and Maududi’s concept of implementing God’s sovereignty (hakimiyya) in an Islamic government. One could add the taliban Afghan model and the Sudanese model of Hassan al-Turabi among others.

The basic concepts of contemporary Islamic fundamentalism were articulated mainly by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood; Abul-A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979), founder of the Jama’at-i Islami on the Indian subcontinent; and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), the main ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. However, some strands by-pass these contemporary thinkers, going back to pre-modern and classical sources. For instance, the Wahhabis are directly linked to the 18^th century reformer Abd al-Wahhab who based his system on the Hanbali school and on Ibn-Taymiyya, while the tablighi jama’ati go back to the Deobandi school and the 17^th century Sufi reformer Shah Wali-Allah of Delhi.

Observers recognize the complexity and multiplicity of the causes that gave rise to contemporary Islamic fundamentalsim, and offer a variety of weightings to the various factors. Most agree that colonialism and modernization are major causes of the resurgence.

Colonialism resulted in Western cultural dominance which imposed secularization, dependence, and a division of life into separate secular and religious spheres. The famous Indian poet Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) vividly expressed the commonly held view of the "soulless multilayered Western civilization" in its varied manifestations of capitalism, communism, secularism, and liberalism, draining Islam of its inherent vitality. In sharp contrast to the miserable present, he recreated the memories of Islam’s past glorious golden age. These two themes of anti-Westernism and nostalgia for the glorious past are characteristic of most contemporary fundamentalist movements.

Discussing the anti-Western theme, Tibi views fundamentalist movements as an expression, in Islamic idiom, of the deep resentment felt by many Muslims against Western political and cultural domination and its attendant modernism and secularism, perceived as threats to Muslim identity and self-esteem. Tibi claims that these movements offer "cultural authenticity, spiritual guidance, and practical help to those experiencing extreme frustration in their societies", and argues that these movements are "not a passing phenomenon - they are deeply rooted in Islamic history and culture and nurtured by the deep crisis in contemporary Muslim states." Tibi also states that during the colonial period Islam as a political ideology was backstaged as Western ideologies penetrated society. The failure of these Western ideologies to deliver following independence strengthened the fundamentalist movements with their call for a return to Islam as an authentic alternative political ideology.

On the same theme of anti-Westernism, Nasr comments that all fundamentalist movements share a common hostility to continued Western secular influences and their perceived corruption of Islamic societies, viewed as a continuation of colonialism and imperialism by other means. A primary goal is to purify Islamic societies from corruption by the "perceived endemic Western evils of secularism, atheism, alcohol, drugs, sexual permissiveness, and family breakdown". Heilman argues that Islamic fundamentalism "considers Western civilization and all it represents to be responsible for the corruption of what is good in the world." Western values are bankrupt and decadent and must be rejected as they lead to "moral anomie".

President Khatami of Iran sounds a less hostile note while admitting that Muslims have lost their once dominant position in world history because of the political, intellectual, and technological ascendancy of the West. He states that "It is a fact that the West has given humankind many achievements, and also brought it many problems and difficulties". The problems Muslims face are common to Third World societies, and have been exacerbated because while their private and social lives have been strongly influenced by the West, their culture belongs to another era. "The crisis in non-Western peoples and countries is due to the fact that the culture which rules our lives – or part of it – is inconsistent with the civilization which more or less forms the basis of our everyday lives. This contradiction, which the West suffers from less, is the source of the aggravated crisis in the lives of most of us non-Westerners".

While Islamic fundamentalists reject most of Western culture, they are nevertheless attracted by its scientific, technical and administrative advances which they perceive as neutral tools that must be internalized and used to resist Western imperialism, destroy its client regimes, and improve the lot of the masses. Rached Ghannouchi, leader in exile of the Tunisian Renaissance Movement Ennahda, states that "Tunisian Islamists have never rejected modernisation in the sense of rationalising politics, administration and the economy".

Voll sees Islamic fundamentalism as a response to Western induced modern social and cultural changes that "threaten to dilute Islamic identity by a syncretistic mix with un-Islamic elements". Esposito claims that the positive benefits of modernization benefited only a few, while the majority felt mainly its negative fallout – rural migration and rapid urbanization, the breakdown of traditional family values, and a general climate of disillusionment and despair. Dekmejian also stresses the negative social and economic effects of modernization which included the population explosion, the breakdown of traditional religious, and social values, high unemployment, and the sharp inequalities in wealth distribution. These overwhelmingly rapid economic, social and cultural changes resulted in an acute sense of dislocation, identity loss, alienation and anomie. Tibi too stresses the disruptive effect of rapid and uneven social change. The Western values and structures internalized by the political elites could not cope with the ruptures in society, and failed to achieve improvements in the social conditions of the masses. The resulting cultural anomie and crisis of identity are the social-psychological background to the Islamic resurgence.

Some observers, stress that fundamentalism is also partly a reaction to the failures of Islamic liberalism in the 19^th and 20^th centuries, as wel as to the failures of nationalism and socialism after independence. Fundamentalists compete both with the modernists, who accept a broad interpretation of Scripture and adopt some Western values, and with the secularist-liberals who argue for a democratic, pluralist state on the Western model. Fundamentalists reject these worldviews and seek a return to the original sources of Islam, whilst claiming the right to re-interpret them (ijtihad) and reapply them to contemporary contexts.

Another cause is the persistent crisis expressed by the weak legitimacy of the very idea of the nation-state as well as of the existing secular regimes. This crisis is evident in the pervasiveness of autocratic regimes and in the continuing segmentation of society along tribal, ethnic, and religious lines. The political, social, and economic failures of the secular state is seen as an important contributor to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as a mass-based response demanding radical change. Fundamentalists tend to blame the modern secular nation-state and its Westernized elites for all the ills of society.

The Arab defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, the Lebanese civil war in the mid-1970s, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 were catalysts in the spread of fundamentalism. They added to the sense of disillusionment, humiliation, impotence, and loss of self-esteem, with the resulting hostility aimed against local regimes that had failed to respond to the need of their societies, as well as against the superpowers and the West in general. Muslims of all classes and ages turned to fundamentalist Islam for a solution.

An important theme underlying all contemporary Islamist discourse is the sovereignty of God (hakimmiyya, siyada, rabbaniyya). God is the only ruler and legislator, humans are God’s obedient servants, and human rulers are legitimate only as God’s representatives when fulfilling the sharia requirements of rulership with their authority strictly limited by sharia regulations. This stress on the sovereignty of God has many important ramifications in a variety of spheres, but especially in politics, where it legitimizes critique of established regimes, and, taken to its logical extreme as among the most radical, can justify armed resistance and revolution. Fundamentalists thus view Islam as the ideology of political opposition to all regimes that do not submit to the sovereignty of God and of shari’a.

Fundamentalists analyse the contemporary Muslim world and judge it to be in a state of religious, moral, cultural, and political decline and corruption as a result of its departure from the "straight path" of Islam as revealed in Qur’an, sunnah and shari’a..

As an example of the fundamentalist analysis of society, Sivan points out that Rashid Rida, at the turn of the 20^th century, concluded that most so-called Muslims are merely "geographical Muslims" belonging to Islam only by virtue of the accident of being born to Muslim parents and of living in a Muslim country. Having no real belief, they readily submit to man-made and European-inspired laws that have replaced shari’a regulations.

Sayyid Qutb in his analysis of contemporary Musim society stated that "Islamic life" and the "existence of Islam itself" had stopped long ago in all parts of the world "when the last group of Muslims on earth ceased to govern all of their affairs by the Shari’ah of God"... Therefore there is a desperate need to renew it in our day. Though true Islam has stopped temporarily, it has deep roots in the "divinely created nature (fitrah) of people, and it will be revived – "the future belongs to this religion".

Muhammad Qutb, Sayyid Qutb’s brother, states that the Muslims of our time "are now far removed from the true nature of Islam. The image of Islam they present by their way of life is nothing more than the indistinguishable negative of of the true image of Islam as it was practiced by the early Islamic generations...". According to Muhammad Qutb, Western-style "deviant philosophical, social, political and economic doctrines now dominate the lives of contemporary Muslims, wearing the false disguise of a ‘modern human civilisation’, and poisoning Muslims much more than Westerners because Muslims have deserted true Islam and are unaware of its fundamental values. Hence the need for a "vigorous intellectual and practical ‘campaign of struggle’ to explain the true nature of Islam to modern-day Muslims so as to enable them to practice true Islam as the first Muslim generation did.

The proposed cure is a renewal of true Islam as authentic and indigenous total and comprehensive system that provides solutions to all problems. This has become an "article of faith" and a basic presupposition at all levels of Muslim society. It is to be achieved by combining a holistic, ideological interpretation of Islam with organizational activism, resulting in an integrated social and political Islamic system which will ensure authentic Islamic values as well as economic, political, and military success. This system is a "total way of life revealed in the Quran, exemplified in the model of the Prophet and the first Muslim state, and codified in the Shari’a which is the divine guide for a God pleasing society." Islamic fundamentalists are thus "solutionists" – their slogan is "Islam is the solution" (al-Islam huwa al-hall) and they see true Islam, defined by publicly ordained discourse based on shura, as the solution to all problems of life, including those of politics, state and society.

Sidahmed and Ehteshami argue that the common denominator of the Islamist movements is their commitment to the establishment of an Islamic shari’a state. Most fundamentalists emphasize that the political implementation of shari’a as the basic legal foundation of the state is the real criteria of Islamic revival. While accepting the total authority of Quran and sunna, fundamentalists, in contrast to traditional ‘ulama’, reject the ultimate authority of the four traditional legal schools (madhahib) and of later commentaries, which are selectively treated to accept only that which agrees with fundamentalist principles .

Acording to Mallat, all groups agree on a definition of the true Islamic state as a state ruled by shari’a, differing however, on what shari’a really is and on who decides its nature, content, and reinterpretation, as well as on the substance of the reinterpretation itself. Mallat sees this emphasis on legal form in Islamist discourse as one of the most striking features of Islamic fundamentalism. The appeal to shari’a and its elevation to the supreme criterion of a true Islamic government and system results in much of the contemporary Islamic discourse being couched in legal language, even though most Islamist leaders are lay persons and not shari’a specialists (‘ulama’, fuqaha’). However, in contrast to the Sunni resurgence, in the Shi’a renewal juriconsults are at the heart of the movement. For fundamentalists the shari’a is both the sole source of law, and the model for individual and regime behaviour. Because shari’a is widely accepted among most Muslims as a sort of "common law" encompassing all areas of life, it offers a rich source of relevant solutions to the many problems facing Muslims today. While fundamentalists ignore some areas of shari’a they concentrate their intellectual efforts in reinterpreting its public constitutional laws, its labour laws, and its laws concerning economic relations and banking.

Salvatore claims that the term shari’a in fundamentalist discourse is not limited to the legal system of Islam, but is rather an ambiguous and reified, "functional abstraction" that can be understood as "the symbolic medium of Islam’s unfolding in human history". The call for the implementation of shari’a has become the core of fundamentalist demands, its corollary being the need for an Islamic state that will end all arbitrariness of rule defined as not ruling fully in accordance with shari’a.

In their efforts to transform Islamic societies, fundamentalists contrast sharply with traditional Islam in their ideological emphasis on the state. Most fundamentalists see the state as the instrument for implementing their vision of an authentic total Islamic system based on sharia and as the guarantor of its survival. Their efforts are therefore concentrated on capturing the state and its centres of power – either legally within the democratic framework, or violently by a revolution or a coup d’etat.

Many fundamentalists, especially sunnis, stress the notion that there is no priesthood in Islam, and challenge the monopoly of the traditional ‘ulama’ on interpreting the texts and traditions. Many accuse the ‘ulama’ and the religious establishment as being puppets of the secularist regimes unable to provide the needed decisive leadership to the disenfranchised masses. On the other hand, many lower-rank ‘ulama’ have joined fundamentalist movements. Also, many radical movements, have in addition to their amirs, a ‘alim as spiritual guide to issue fatwas on issues of urgency to them.

In Shi’a fundamentalism, especially of the Khomeini type, most view the ‘ulama’ as the vanguard of the revolution and the ones ordained by God to lead and govern in an Islamic system. An exception was Ali Shari‘ati who denounced the Shi’a ‘ulama’ establishment in unequivocal terms.

A corollary to the anti-ulama sentiments is the fact that the interpretation of the sacred texts in contemporary fundamentalism tends to be dominated by self-educated laymen like Mawdudi and Qutb whose innovative interpretations are often in sharp variance to the classical traditions of the ‘ulama’. Tibi claims that their success has been so great that today one there are hardly any pure traditionalists left in the Islamic world - fundamentalist patterns of thought have become so prevalent that even the religious establishment can no longer be viewed as exclusively traditionalist. However, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a very well-known and popular Egyptian fundamentalist ‘alim, justifies the centrality of ‘ulama’ and fuqaha’ for Islam by virtue of their expertise and technical skills in defining true Islam, especially in identifying its basic fundamentals (‘usul) and differentiating them from the non-essentials (furu‘), as well as in preserving fundamentalists from false extremism.

Roy argues that the return to the original texts and to the model of the Prophet is a modernistic tendency which helps fundamentalism evade the intermediate historic tradition, thus aiding the integration of modernity. Roy sees in this process a similarity to the Protestant Reformation which had also encouraged a return to the original sources and had become a catalyst of political and economic modernity.

A central belief of most fundamentalists is that the "pious individual" is the foundation of any just and perfect society, and should therefore be the main concern of the Islamic state. It is the unconditional surrender of the individual to God and his shari‘a by an act of faith, that is tha basis of Islamic movements, and it is the total of the creative efforts of individual Muslims that will bring about the expected reformation of society and state. This attainment of the Islamic ideal presupposes the virtue of the majority, if not of all, individuals in society, and especially of the leaders. This virtue however can only be attained by the individual when living in a truly Islamic society governed by virtuous rulers under shari’a. This concept thus provides an additional motivation for establishing an Islamic order – the perfection of all members of society. Laura points out the circular reasoning of this concept, as leaders would not be virtuous enough while society is un-Islamic, and individuals cannot gain to that supreme standard of virtue unless ruled by an Islamic order.

Roy argues that the fundamentalist paradigm of the first community is both unitarian (tawhidic) and universalistic. It is unitarian in that it rejects the particularistic segmentation of the nation-state on basis of class, ethnicity, or tribalism, and it does not differentiate between separate religious, political or legal spheres. The paradigm is universalistic because it does not consider the Islamic system in terms of the territorial nation-state, but in terms of a universal stae-system for the good of the worldwide community of believers (the ’umma).

As a result of this two-sided paradigm, Mallat sees two strands in the contemporary Islamist quest for utopia: the universalistic strand "opposes the nation-state and demands a suprastatal Islamic order based on the shari’a concept of dar al-Islam in contrast to dar al-harb", aiming at a union of all Muslim nations into one single entity covering the whole umma. The other, particularistic trend, "accepts the legitimacy of the existing nation-states in their present boundaries but would put them to the test of shari’a, concerning itself with changing details of the state laws and constitutions to make shari’a the sole source of legislation and ensure that all laws conform to it".

Zebiri sees an inherent tension underlying contemporary Islamic discourse between the theoretical ideal with its tendency to utopianism, and its practical implementation which requires an accommodation of the ideal requirements of religion to the social and political reality of each specific context. Utopianism in this discourse manifests itself in the "obssession to aggressively defend Islam by presenting it in idealistic terms as the best possible system for mankind, authentic, admirable, and logically satisfying, bearing ideal qualities of moderation, tolerance, comprehensiveness and much more". Another aspect of utopianism Zebiri notices is "the often naive belief that the very act of the establishment of an Islamic system of government will automatically overrule all known facts of human behaviour and ensure a golden age of perfect justice and righteousness".

The Arab success in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the world-wide impact of the Arab oil embargo, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Mujahideen resistance to the Soviets resulting in Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, th establishment of the Islamic regime in Sudan, the successes of the FIS at the polls in Algeria, as well as the successful resistance to the Russians in Chechneya in the early 1990s, have all produced a new-found sense of pride and power and "intensified the fundamentalist drive to a reassertion of Islam, of Muslim cultural identity, and of traditional family values".

Dekmejian characterizes contemporary Islamic fundamentalism as pervasive – fundamentalist groups have sprung up in Muslim communities all over the world; polycentric – it possesses no central leadership, but is composed of a multitude of movements; and persistent – it has evidenced great tenacity and the ability to survive and grow in face of determined opposition over most of the twentieth century. Most Islamic fundamentalists see the multiple matrix of Islamic movements and groups around the world as ultimately united, in spite of their many differences in ideology , strategy and tactics, in the aim of purifying Islamic society and recreating a borderless Islamic superstate (khilafa) in which God’s sovereignty is practically acknowledged by the imposition of shari‘a as the only legal source of legislation. Thus, in spite of differences in ideology, tactics, and methods, they are all seen as striving towards the same goal, the differences being on how to achieve this goal – through peaceful gradual stages or by a sudden and violent revolution.

A large proportion of Muslim populations around the world, in some cases the majority of a nation’s population, are involved in the contemporary Islamic resurgence that is re-Islamizing street and power centres. Organizes in a wide variety of charitable associations, they form an alternative civil society based on fundamentalist Islam. They engage mainly in education, medical and social welfare services, as well as outreach to all levels of society through mosques, Islamic study circles, charismatic preachers, publishing and the media. They are also very active in professional and student associations and trade unions. Whilst members come from all levels of society, the nucleus of the movement is formed by people with a background of modern education and technology, often from recently urbanized families or from the impoverished middle-classes, able to participate in the political processes of their countries and lobby for a further Islamization of the constitution, the legal system, and of social institutions. Their success is evident in the fact that since the end of the 1970s most Muslim states have reintroduced shari’a principles into their constitutions (Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Sudan, Pakistan, Malaysia).

Fundamentalist Islamic movements differ among themselves on a variety of issues. Most are politically activist, while a few are politically quietist. Some are elitist, whilst others are populist. Some are opposed to any cooperation with non-fundamentalists, whilst others are willing to co-operate on the tactical level.

Most observers divide Islamic fundamentalism into two broad political streams, based on how they evaluate contemporary Muslim society and on how they plan to Islamize it and gain control of political power. A third group not often mentioned in discourse on Islamic fundamentalism, is composed of the non-politcal political movements like tablighi jama’at which dissociate themselves fom all political activities and focus on purifying themselves and perfecting their mode of Islam. Political reform will be achieved only when all individuals in the entire society are spiritually reformed.

The broader political groups with a large membership, exemplified by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jama’at-i-Islami, are seen as mainline, inclusivist, moderate, gradualist and reformist. They emphasize the importance of educating and transforming society from the bottom up, a gradual process which will absorb the majority of the population into the new society and automatically lead to the development of an "Islamic order" and a true Islamic state. The change will come in stages initiated through the preaching and inviting of individuals to true Islam (da’wa), and the peaceful infiltration of education, the media, civil society and political institutions while pressuring the regimes to introduce sharia. These movements are also categorized as accommodationist and pragmatic - accepting democracy as compatible with Islam, accepting the principle of power-sharing, and willing to participate in the contemporary political process in their countries with the ultimate goal of peacefully re-establishing shari’a.

Mumtaz Ahmad lists four major emphases of the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan which characterize many other politically engaged mainline movements. These include first, the reinterpretation of Islamic sources to make them relevant to modern Muslim societies; second, the creation of a tightly organized elite group as the spearhead of social and political transformation; third, the implementation of gradual incremental changes in civil society and state legislation as part of the move toward a totally Islamic entity; and fourth, the eventual establishment of an Islamic state based on shari’a.

The radical revolutionary groups, with a much smaller membership, are exclusivist and apply Qutb’s reinterpretation of the concepts of jahiliyya and takfir to the leadership of society and state claiming it is apostate and must be replaced - if necessary by force. They focus on overthrowing the government rather than on transforming society – only Islamic state power can truly Islamize society from above. They also stress the importance of separating from apostate society in order to establish a pure model community which can capture the reins of power. It is a divine duty, incumbent on all true Muslims, to struggle for the overthrow of corrupt political and religious elites, the establishment of a true Islamic government, and the imposition of Islamic law.

The most extreme revolutionary groups hold that society as a whole has become apostate, and accuse both societies and governments in Muslim countries of being hopelessly corrupt and un-Islamic, deserving the labels of kufr (unbelief), zulm (oppression), and taghut (tyranny), and thus being legitimate targets of violent jihad. They allow no compromise with such societies, claiming revolution and the use of force is the only way to replace the infidel regimes with an Islamic government.. These radical revolutionary groups are relatively small in membership, but effective in political agitation and violence aimed at destabilizing the regimes in power. They are also militant against the "Christian West" viewed as an extension of the Crusades and perpetuating a centuries-old conspiracy to eliminate Islam. Violence against Western governments and their representatives, including local Christians, is viewed as legitimate self-defence.

Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of the Tunisian al-Nahda (Ennahda) movement, living in exile in London, staes that the mainstream of Islamic fundamentalism is not rigid and unchangeable, but rather reformist and innovative. Due to the reppressive political regimes in Muslim states, some Islamic fundamentalists, a minority, have indeed revived the khawarij heritage of extremism and rigidity, but they do not represent the vast majority of the Islamic movement which is moderate and reformist, looking more at the present and to the future rather than to the past. It is theWestern media who selectively magnify the aberrant forms and claim they typify the whole. In Ghannouchi’s view, true Islam is pluralistic, accepting differences in creed and sect. It rejects violence and compulsion as:

Moussalli points out that the divergent views of the two wings of Islamic fundamentalism are in fact results of external forces, namely the "inclusive democratic and exclusive authoritarian policies of most Middle Eastern states, and of whatever international powers exist at the time". These forces "reinforce and in fact create that dual nature of fundamentalist political behaviour".

Sidahmed and Ehteshami maintain that the extremist groups are essentially "the childern of the mainstream movements". They claim that the differences between the two are not ideological but pragmatic: both aim at realizing an Islamic order and state, and the difference is on how to achieve that goal. Sidahmed and Ehteshami also argue that there are no clear lines of demarcation between the mainstream and the extremist groups, only "points of engagement and disengagement". The attitude of the mainstream movements to violence depends on pragmatic tactics and on the environment in which they operate. For example, Hasan al-Banna founded the Ikhwan’s secret organization which was involved in terrorism in the 1940s and early 1950s. Turabi’s National Islamic Front, although an offshoot of the Muslim Brethren, and at the time a partner in the Sudanese government, supported the coup which overthrew the regime and made it the real leader in Sudan. On the other hand in states such as Egypt and Jordan tmainstream movements have been content to participate in the democratic process. They conclude that mainstream movements are simply more pragmatic than the more dogmatic extremists.

Tamimi lays the eruption of violence by the extremist groups squarely on despotic state violence which involves physical torture, exclusion of Islamists from the political life, a systematic programme of enforced secularization, and psychological warfare and a humiliation campaign against Islamists. This state repression and the virtual lack of basic human rights marginalizes the mainstream moderated movements and empowers the radical groups who react with acts of violence to challenge the regimes. These again use the army and security forces to quell the extremists, and a regular cycle of violence and counter-violence is firmly established and becomes a way of life. Tamimi claims that the level of political violence "is directly proportional to the level of despotism".

Whilst some Islamists are ideologically fixed, many individuals and movements tend to oscillate between the two poles of violent struggle on the one had and of active engagement in the peaceful Islamization of society on the other. Some endeavour to engage in both simultaneously. The influx of Saudi money into a wide spectrum of Islamic fundamentalist groups has had the effect of promoting a stronger emphasis of the Wahhabi-Saudi version of fundamentalism: puritanical, focusing on shari’a and on women’s issues, populist, less revolutionary, yet violently anti-Western. Roy defines this type as "neo-fundamentalism" though "fundamentalist-traditionalism" may be a better term.

Traditions of reform (islah) and revival (tajdid) have been part of Islamic history since the early era of the khariji and shi’a controversies. Both traditions called for a return to the fundamentals of Islam as expressed in its source documents of Quran and Sunna: islah stressing the importance of conforming individual and communal lives to the standards of shari’a, while tajdid called for a return to the original ideal model of Islam and for the right to interpret the sources (ijtihad). By the end of the 10^th century AD, classical Islamic scholars had established a codified body of commentary and interpretation accepted by the consensus of the community as the basis of imitation (taqlid) for future generations, and they closed the gates of ijtihad (although a few revivalist scholars such as al-Ghazali and ibn-Taymiyya continued to practice the right of ijtihad).

Revivalists argued that the causes of political, military and economic weakness were the moral and spiritual decay resulting from the ‘umma’s departure from true Islam. Revivals were often led by charismatic figures who assumed the roles of renewers of the faith (mujaddid) or of the messianic saviour (mahdi), both elaborated in the hadith.

Most observers see Islamic revivalism since the 17^th century as going through three major phases: tajdid (renewal), salafiyya (return to pious forbears), and sahwa (awakening), and centred on the two major areas of the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent. Whilst the labels are open to questioning, the three waves are well established. Choueiri specifies them as Islamic Revivalism (1744-1885), Islamic Reformism (1839-1954), and Islamic Radicalism (1945 and onward). The exact delineation in time is somewhat arbitrary and the periods overlap to some extent, but they do represent real phases in the development of Islamic revivalism. Most fundamentalist thinkers combine elements from all three phases, the specific mix determined by their background and local circumstances.

Revival movements arose across the Islamic world during the pre-modern era as a reaction to cultural, religious, political and economic decline in a period when most Muslim states were weakening under increasing Western Imperialist pressures. Revivalists were convinced that Islam was integral to state and society. They criticized establishment Islam’s departure from the original model as well as the practice of taqlid and syncreticism which led to the decline of the community, and they claimed that Islam could regain its original strength only by purging itself of un-Islamic innovations (bid’a) including impure practices such as saint worship and magic, by returning to the fundamentals of Islam as found in the Quran and Sunna - the straight path of true Islam and its shari’a, and by recreating the model of Muhammad and the early Muslim community while guided by the practice of ijtihad. True Muslims must separate themselves from unbelievers, and even from other Muslims who would not accept the call to reform, so as to build a righteous and pure society that can engage in the necessary moral and military struggle (jihad) to re-establish true Islam in its rightful place in the individual, society and state. These ideas strongly impacted all subsequent revivalist and reformist movements.

On the Indian subcontinent the early Sunni revival was based on the renewal movement (tajdid) in the Naqshbandi Sufi order and on Ahmad Sirhindi’s (1564-1624) teachings which were a reaction to the syncretistic tendencies of several Mughal rulers. Later Shah Wali-Allah of Delhi (1702-1762) became the forerunner of modern reform movements, endeavouring to unite Muslims around a reapplication of shari’a applied to present circumstances through pious personal endeavour at reinterpretation (ijtihad). Renewal meant a return to pristine Islam, a condemnation of blind imitation (taqlid), and a reopening of the gates of ijtihad. His aim was to rediscover the forgotten original precepts of ideal Islam as preserved in its revealed pure sources.

In the Arabian Peninsula ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) founded a puritanical and militant reform movement based on the Hanbali madhab and on ibn-Taymiyya’s teachings, and ensured its survival by his alliance with the house of Saud. Al-Wahhab saw traditional Islam as degenerate version of true pristine Islam corrupted by blind imitation (taqlid), Shi’a elevation of their Imams to the role of mediators, and Sufi popular folk religious practices, especially saint-worship, which he condemned as innovation (bid’a) and idolatry (shirk). The Arabian society of his time he compared to the pre-Islamic jahiliyya period, nominal Muslims he regarded as jahili, and he opposed ‘ulama’ and rulers who tolerated these corrupt innovations. Only a return to Qur’an and Sunnah in a pious interpretative attempt (ijtihad) to understand and implement their fundamentals could reinstate true Islam. He emphasized the doctrine of the transcendental unity of God (tawhid) as the basis of a radical monotheism expressed by a political system legitimized by its strict enforcement of pure Quranic doctrine and lifestyle. His aim was not to conserve all Islamic traditions, but to renew the abandoned original model - only principles of Qur’an and Sunna were ultimately binding, decisions of later medieval scholars were not authoritative. ‘Abd al-Wahhab applied takfir, declaring Muslim opponents as non-Muslims, to justify jihad against them.

In response to Western imperialism, Sufi-led movements of renewal calling for jihad against the foreign powers as well as purification and reform of Islam emerged also in other peripheral areas such as the Sudan (mahdism 1882-1898), and Libya (Sanussiyya 1837-1931), demanding and implementing - for a while successfully, until dismantled by superior British and Italian forces - independent Muslim states based on the sharia. Similar movements emerged also in the Maghreb ( ‘Abd al-Qader 1808-1883), and in Sub-Saharan Africa (Usman dan Fodio, Umar Tal).

Contemporary Islamic fundamentalism emerged out of the modern reform movement of the 19^th and early 20^th century, which challenged Western colonialism and its political and cultural dominance by initiating radical reforms in Islam. Foreshadowed by Sir Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) in India, and initiated by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), the reform movement resulted in one strand of its thought leading to the Salafiyya movement founded by Rashid Rida (1865-1935). The reformers searched for a solution to the political and religious crisis caused by Western imperialism, and for an answer to the question of what had gone wrong with Muslim society. Against the secularists who blamed traditional Islam for the decline, and advocated the separation of religion from the state on the Western model; and the conservatives who advocated a rejection of the West, non co-operation with the new rulers, and an isolationist withdrawal into traditional religion; the reformers offered an alternative both to Westernized secular adaptation and to conservative rejectionism. They initiated a process of internal self-criticism, of redefining Islam, and of proving its relevance to the new context by a synthesis of Islamic and modern concepts. They instilled in Muslims a pride in their past glory, reviving their shattered sense of identity and their confidence. They also emphasized the progressive and rational character of Islam that enabled it to integrate modern culture and accommodate change. The reformers rejected common law (adat, urf), popular sufi practices, as well as the classical compendiums of the ulama and the four legal schools (madhahib).

Al-Afghani was a political activist who aroused Muslims to resist imperialism, revive their lost glory, and liberate their states from colonial rule by uniting the umma (pan-Islamism), reforming a decadent and superstitious Islam that had succumbed to Western influences, and by utilizing Western science and philosophy. He tried to bridge the gap between modern secularists and religious traditionalists, stressing that reason had been integral to early and classical Islam and that Islamic essentials are compatible with science. Islam is a comprehensive way of life encompassing the societal and political as well as the personal spheres. It is a dynamic and progressive religion of reason and science capable of responding to modern contexts. Islam is the real source of the ummah’s strength and Islamic identity and solidarity must be vigorously reasserted. The stagnation (jumud) of Islam must be rejected, and the gates of ijtihad reopened so as to break the ulama’s monopoly on religion and to formulate new responses to changing circumstances based on the original sources.

‘Abduh, who became rector of al-Azhar and chief sharia judge (mufti) of Egypt, advocated reform by a return to the pure sources. He saw the causes of stagnation in Muslim society as lying in un-Islamic practices and superstitions, fatalism, and rigid scholasticism (taqlid); the corruption of the ‘ulama’ and their subservience to the political leadership, as well as their inability to distinguish between the unchanging core of Islam and its external layer which was open to change. He stressed the unity of God (tawhid) as the foundation of Islam’s integrated worldview, saw no conflict between Islam and modernity, and stressed that religion and reason were not contradictory, but complemented each other as the two sources of Islam. Indeed, Islam had early on bequeathed rationality to the West but had then neglected it. ‘Abduh wanted to reform society through discovering the real intent of Islam’s unchanging fundamental principles and then implementing them in educational and social reforms, as well as through selectively appropriating aspects of the West not contrary to Islam. Whilst regulations of worship (‘ibadat) were unchangeable, precepts concerning social affairs (mu‘ammalat) were open to re-interpretation and change. Abduh also utilized the Maliki principle of public welfare (maslaha) to issue legal decrees (fatwas) reforming polygamy, bank interest, and women’s issues.

Rida carried on Afghani’s and ‘Abduh’s call for a reinterpretation of Islam and the development of a modern Islamic legal system. However he gradually became more critical of the West and its growing cultural impact on Egypt, and more sympathetic to Wahhabism. He too rejected the blind acceptance of medieval formulations of law, and wanted to regenerate Islam by going back to the model of the pious ancestors (salaf) – Muhammad, his Companions, and the rashidun Caliphs - which included the practice of a pure and rational Islam free from superstition, as well as a just and prosperous Islamic society and state. Islam was self-sufficient and comprehensive and had no need to imitate the West, but must return to its original sources. He stressed that full implementation of Islamic law required the existence of a truly Islamic government which could only be a restored Caliphate. This government would function through compulsory consultation (shura) between the ruler and the representatives of the community, the "people who lose and bind" (‘ahl al-hall wal-‘aqd).

Following Rida, the Salafiyya movement sought to free Islam from traditionalism and restore its initial vitality by rejecting taqlid and popular sufism, by returning to the example of the pious ancestors (salaf), and by reclaiming Islam as the religion of reason, nature and science. Salafiyya was influenced both by the reformist stress on reinterpreting the origins in order to face the modern world, and by Wahhabist puritanism. It became very influential across the Muslim world, shaping the activist ideology of future fundamentalists from Morocco to Indonesia. It advocated an active reinterpretation of the sources, and educational and social reforms as a prerequisite to halting the internal decline and gaining independence from the West. Salafis established schools and welfare programmes, published books and magazines, and harnessed Islam to mobilize the masses in support of the nationalist liberation movements.

Out of the Salafi movement emerged the Muslim Brotherhood, the first activist grass-roots contemporary Islamic fundamentalist movement, founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in 1928. Banna combined a drive to reform Islam along salafi lines with efforts to practically ameliorate the condition of the deprived masses by mutual-aid and self-help. He demanded Muslims go back to the practice of the early normative period of Islam, and claimed that only the Quran and the best attested hadith should be the sources of shari’a. Banna saw Islam as an integrated, self-sufficient, and comprehensive social and political system based on tawhid which must be implemented in an Islamic state - there could be no separation between state and religion. It was the implementation of shari’a that made a government truly Islamic – so this implementation was a primary goal of the movement. The constitution of the Islamic state was the Qur’an, and its government was to operate through consultation (shura).

Banna had connections to Sufism, and used the sufi-tariqa model for organizing the Brotherhood whilst rejecting Sufi "superstitions". At first the Muslim Brotherhood concentrated mainly on moral and social reform, establishing educational and welfare programs, but following its rapid growth it became more politically activist and founded a secret military arm. It developed a tightly-knit organization with a network of branches subdivided into secret cell groups and a missionary network that spread into Syria, Palestine and the Sudan. Members were recruited from rural and lower-class backgrounds, as well as from the urban middle classes, and received intensive ideological and physical training. Banna outlined a gradualist strategy in three stages: the propaganda (preparation) stage aimed at educating the people; the recruiting and training (organization) stage; and finally the stage of action. Whilst tactics might change, the strategic objectives of the Brotherhood remain unchanged: to receive explicit political recognition so as to be able to operate freely in the social and political arena, and to implement shari’a in an Islamic state.

On the Indian subcontinent Mawdudi (1903-1979), influenced by Banna, was the catalyst for a similar awakening. He founded the Jama’at-i Islami in 1941 as an elitist vanguard organization aimed at establishing an Islamic order, both a "holy community" and a political party. His goal was the complete transformation of the individual and of society and politics in line with his Islamic ideology, a transformation that would be attained gradually through the efforts of a highly motivated vanguard of enlightened Muslims acting as catalysts of the revolution. A return to the pure original Islam is essential, as is a total obedience to sharia. Political power is the real guarantee of a pure Islam, therefore it is essential that Muslims be involved in politics and aim at control of the state. The Islamic state was seen as the panacea to all the problems of Muslims in India and worldwide. In Mawdudi’s thought, Islam became an ideology aimed at dominating the political structures of state and society, a total system that incorporated original Islam with modern concepts, "…producing an internally consistent and yet hybrid ideological perspective". The Islamic state is based on God’s sovereignty (hakimiyya), as God is the only sovereign ruler and lawgiver, man being his vice-regent (khalifa), who must submit to God’s divine law (shari’a) as revealed in Islam’s original sources, the Quran and Sunna, which are the only binding authority. Man cannot legislate – only interpret and apply God’s law which is both reasonable and in accordance with nature. Any submission to man-made rules is polytheism (shirk) as it sets up man in God’s place. Anything that does not conform to shari’a is wilful idolatrous ignorance - jahiliyya. Where the sources do not give clear guidance, individual ijtihad is required to enact rules that conform to the original intention of God and to the spirit of Islam. Mawdudi criticized the ‘ulama’ for their blind imitation (taqlid) of tradition and advocated a re-construction of original Islam. He also attacked the West as degenerate for setting up man as the centre of sovereignty thus usurping God’s place. At the same time he disavowed violence and advocated a gradualist approach to achieving power.

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jama’at-i-Islami claim that Islam is a total ideological system that must dominate all public (political, societal, economic), as well as personal matters and private worship. Both combined religion with social and political activism and both established effective organizations willing to participate in the political system as a means of implementing their vision of an Islamic system of government based on shari’a. Society will be Islamized only through social and political action. It is not enough for society to be composed of Muslims – it must be Islamic in its basic structures. Both legitimize their ideology by basing it on a "return" to the original texts and to the model of the first Muslim community.

In Egypt, Nasser, after a brief honeymoon with the Brotherhood, imprisoned and tortured many of its leaders. Some Brotherhood members, radicalized by Nasser’s terror and Qutb’s writings in the 1960s, formed the radical Islamic groups that advocated violent jihad to achieve dominance in the state. Sayyid Qutb was executed by Nasser, but his writings (especially Ma’alim fi al-tariq, translated as "Signposts on the Road" or "Milestones"), became the main ideological source of contemporary radical Islamic movements, providing them with the criteria by which to judge contemporary regimes and societies.

Qutb was influenced by Mawdudi’s writings but constructed a khariji-like revolutionary ideology. He stressed both God’s sovereignty and governance (hakimiyya) and the unity of God (tawhid) - with the resulting unity in nature, religion, society, and state - as the foundation of the integrated and comprehensive Islamic system. Qutb transformed the meaning of the Islamic term hijrah (emigration) from a simple description of the Prophet’s historic migration from Mecca to Medinah to signifying a definite stage in the development of all true Muslim societies – hijrah is the response of true Muslims to the state of jahiliyya prevalent in their society. They must withdraw from society in order to create a vanguard of committed activists able to take over society when the right time comes.

Qutb’s central mobilizing concept was a reinterpretation of jahiliyya, which changed from a historical description of pagan pre-Islamic society to a description of the neo-pagan conditions prevalent not only in the modern non-Islamic world, but also in all contemporary Muslim societies, which were thus labelled un-Islamic (takfir is the term used for this ritual condemnation) and therefore legitimate targets of violent jihad by true Muslims – it is a duty to revolt against a state proclaimed as kafir. There has never been a true Islamic state or a true Muslm society since the end of the rashidun era, history is a mere parenthesis between the decline from the ideal state and its imminent reconstitution. Most violent extreme groups of today like Al-Jama’at al-Islamiyya, the various takfir and jihad groups, Hamas, the Islamic Liberation Front, the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) and many more, were born out of the Muslim Brotherhood as reinterpreted by Qutb.

Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb are seen as the main ideologues of Islamic fundamentalism, both emphasizing God’s sovereignty and rule (hakimiyya), which includes his being the sole legislator for humanity, and demanding that all human legislation be based on his revealed will as found in the Quran and shari’a. This was later developed by other thinkers to mean that Western science and technology must also be Islamicized, and modernization must be implemented in an Islamic way.

The third stage is the contemporary Islamic revival that emerged during the 1970s in opposition to the all-pervasive secularized state, replacing nationalism with Islam as the basic core identity of society. The disillusionment with the post-independence authoritarian national-socialist military regimes, exacerbated by the 1967 defeat in the war against Israel and the perceived bankruptcy of secular ideologies, contributed to the emergence of Islam as the only credible ideology. There was also a widespread resentment to the manipulation and co-optation of establishment Islam by corrupt secular governments. Fundamentalist symbolism, drawn from an Islamic heritage to which many could still relate, appealed to many. In a number of Muslim countries such as Egypt and Algeria fundamentalism is supported at grass-roots level by some ‘ulama’ frustrated with the religious establishment, and concerned at the increasing secularization of Muslim states .

Following Nasser’s death, a return to Islam was seen by many in Egypt as the only solution. Sadat manipulated Islamic symbols, and encouraged the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups to help him crush the leftist Nasserist opposition. Islamic associations grew rapidly and penetrated student unions and professional associations. On the fringes of the Brotherhood emerged the violent organizations, the Jama’at, such as Takfir wal-Hijra, al-Jama’at al-Islamiyya, and Jama’at al-Jihad which, following the regime crackdown on Islamists, assassinated Sadat in 1981. Since then the regime has tried both to co-opt and to suppress the radical groups, but sporadic violence is endemic.

The Islamic awakening in the 1970s and 1980s had a dynamic impact on the general public, evident in the increased participation of large segments of the population in religious rituals such as mosque attendance and the Ramadan fast, as well as in the donning of Islamic garb by women and the growing of beards by men. Modern-educated Muslims became assertive in affirming their faith and its relevance to modern life. There was a proliferation of religious literature and of numerous Islamic associations seeking to "Islamize" society, while charismatic preachers gained immense popularity as they utilized modern media forms (radio, cassettes and TV). The dramatic re-emergence of Islam in public life throughout the Muslim world led governments and opposition groups to strengthen their legitimacy and mobilize support among the masses by manipulating Islamic symbols and ideology.

The growing interest of Muslims in shaping their lives according to shari’a is also seen in the religious question and answer columns of newspapers and magazines, in which ulama’ answer questions raised by the public. Even official government organs devote space to issues of ritual detail especially as pertaining to women. Fundamentalists tend to be specific in the areas of ‘ibadat (worship) giving detailed instructions on the ritual of prayers, sanctions for violations of the fasting days, and facets of sexual and social life, whilst being rather vague on the details of how to run a modern state.

The 1980s and early 1990s were dominated both by Iran’s Islamic revolution and its efforts to export the revolution, and by extremist violent minority movements expanding their oppositional activities in the Muslim world whilst creating bases in the West and networking with each other. Extremist groups (such as al-Jihad, Hizbullah, Salvation from Hell, Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Liberation Organization, etc.) continue to advocate violence and acts of terrorism to destabilize the kafir regimes and to seize power and establish an Islamic state by force of arms. For example, Egypt’s al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya attacked government security forces, well-known secularists, Coptic Christians and foreign tourists, and engaged in international terrorism as in the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New-York. They also sent their members to help fight jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya. The Gulf war further radicalized these groups, endorsing their perception of the West as trying to re-colonize Muslim states, and enraging their sensibilities by the stationing of non-Muslim soldiers in Saudi Arabia which polluted the Muslim Holy Places.

In contrast to the radicals, the moderate Islamic movements continued to operate as a social and political force within the system, managing to attract a growing number of the leftist and secular intelligentsia. Islamic political parties participated in the democratic process wherever allowed to do so. A new generation of modern professionally educated and Islamically oriented elites has emerged seeking to implement Islamic alternatives in society along two axes: preaching (da’wa) to convert and transform individuals and help them return to Islamic practice in daily life, and the creation of Islamic spaces in society – Islamic neighbourhoods, schools, clinics, banks, and mutual-aid networks. Their success is evident in the domination of Islamic discourse in the media and in the public sphere, in the adoption of Islamic dress, the segregation of the sexes, the rise of Islamic banking and economy, the free mosques (free that is of government control), the Islamic domination of professional associations and student unions, and in the great number of Islamic organizations active in welfare and education.

By the end of the 1980s there were a number of markers signifying the growing impact of fundamentalism: Islamization of daily life had become routine and normal in most Muslim countries, with a large variety of fundamentalist groups lobbying for a final implementation of a total Islamic system with varying degrees of success; there was a growth of pan-Islamic international organizations committed to the vision of the one umma undivided by artificial borders; and finally there was a growing interaction and networking between a large variety of movements around the world.

Wahhabi Saudi Arabia which sees itself as the first truly Islamic state in modern times and as leader of the Muslim world, has been very active politically and economically in supporting a wide variety of Islamic groups all over the world. The Qur’an was accepted as the only constitution (though following the Gulf War a basic law of governance has been issued), and a puritanical cultural system was enforced on society. Oil wealth has been used to support both moderate and extremist Muslim groups in Egypt, Sudan, North Africa and Afghanistan, as well as in the Far East and the West. At the same time, internal dissent has resulted in fundamentalist opposition groups forming, accusing the Saudi regime and royal family of corruption and hypocrisy, and aiming at instituting an Islamic Republic in Saudi Arabia.

Where fundamentalists have more recently come to power as in Iran and Sudan they experienced a shift from general theoretical considerations to the practicalities of having to deal with the specific details of running the state and the economy as well as with the internal opposition and Western suspicions. A new Islamic constitution had to be devised adapting Western parliamentary forms to Islamic principles. In Iran ultimate authority was shifted from parliament to the highest juriconsult as the representative of the Hidden Imam. Fundamentalist governments imposed modesty in dress and segregation of the sexes in public, some forms of huddud punishments, the abolition of banking interest (riba), and the introduction of Islamic economic and financial forms. They varied in their treatment of religious minorities, but all have revived the dhimmi status to some extent. For instance, in Iran the Islamist regime has violently persecuted the Bahai minority, harassed the small Protestant minority, and treated the large Armenian community with some respect. In the Sudan the new regime has prolonged and intensified the civil war between the government and the mainly Christian and animist South. In Pakistan increased Islamization has meant that the Ahmadiyya were declared a non-Muslim community. A main marker of Islamic states is the radical shift in the core communal identity from a secular pluralistic nationalism to the new ruling elite’s version of Islam, leaving deviant Muslim groups and non-Muslim minorities as unequal partners.

Shifts from moderate gradualism to activist radicalism are exemplified in the Sudan by Dr Hasan ‘Abdallah al-Turabi who has led the Muslim Brothers since 1964. After Numayri’s downfall in 1985, Turabi’s newly founded National Islamic Front (NIF), successor to the Muslim Brotherhood, became the third largest party in the 1986 elections, and participated in the coalition government led by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. It then shifted from an accommodating to a revolutionary mode and supported the military coup of June 1989 which overthrew the democratically elected government and replaced it with the military-Islamist regime under ‘Umar Hasan al-Bashir. Whilst Turabi stresses consultation (shura) as Islamic democracy that guarantees pluralism within the bounds of Quran and Sunna, the NIF actually controlls the reins of power behind al-Bashir, and saw to it that all its opponents got dismissed from state and public service. Turabi states that establishing the Islamic State system in Sudan is a first step which will inexorably lead to the ultimate unity of the whole Muslim umma under one central Islamic government (khilafa).

The Afghan wars proved a catalyst for radical Islamic movements all over the Muslim world as they sent volunteers (mujahideen) to help fight the Soviet occupying forces. A measure of co-operation was forged between the widely divergent groups in spite of the many internal conflicts. The continued fighting after the Soviet withdrawal, and the emergence of the Taliban movement are evidence of the complex local religious, cultural, ethnic and political elements involved in contemporary fundamentalisms. Many of the Afghan veterans returned to their home countries after the Soviet withdrawal, instigating a radicalization of Islamic groups and a marked increase in violent activities. Their influence was especially felt in Egypt, Sudan, and Algeria as an increase in the level of violence aimed at destabilizing the regimes. Many Afghan veterans moved on to other flashpoints such as Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kossovo in a jihad to defend threatened Muslim communities against the "Crusader" West.

An interesting devlopment in the last decades of the 20^th century is the relocation of the centres of many extreme movements from their countries of origin to the West due to the reppression of radical fundamentalism in many Muslim states. Many leaders and activists were exiled or went into volntary exile to Europe or to the USA and set up their bases there utilizing the relative freedom of operation granted them in the secular-liberal-democratic West. From there they oversee their wide-flung networks of members around the world, link up with each other and propagate their doctrines back into their home countries by the modern means of the fax, e-mail and the internet.

Most Muslim states today exist in a state of crisis due to the failures of the regimes and their secular, nationalist and socialist programmes. As a result, the legitimacy of regimes and elites has been weakened, and opposition is expressed mainly in Islamic idiom. Governments have responded to Islamization both by repression and liberalization. Some observers claim that weak secular governments relying heavily on security forces can tolerate only a "risk free democracy" that does not threaten their power, and that their indiscriminate suppression of Islamists is the main cause of radicalization and extremism. While some governments and experts see all Islamic activism as a major threat to the stability of the state, others distinguish between populist movements that are willing to participate within the system, and the rejectionists who seek to topple governments through violent revolution. As regimes become more Islamically sensitive they seek to co-opt the religious establishment and the moderate Islamists while suppressing the more radical groups.

Some governments tentatively opened up their political systems allowing Islamic parties to participate in elections and emerge as the leading opposition (Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Turkey, to some extent Egypt and Tunisia), as well as to join ruling coalitions (Jordan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Turkey) and co-operate with parties and professional syndicates with common goals. The electoral success of Islamic movements caused governments and military establishments in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Turkey, to later change tack and engage in political repression, restricting Islamic political representation or banning it altogether, charging that religious extremists exploit the democratic system to first gain power, but then dismantle democracy by establishing a totalitarian system. Iran and Sudan are used as examples of fundamentalism’s unacceptable attitudes to democracy, pluralism, and the rights of minorities and of women.

Where Islamic movements are permitted to participate in the democratic process, their participation creates a tension between their pure ideological orientation and the necessary pragmatism required to entice voters and form tentative alliances within the political game. Nasr sees this process as inevitably leading to a check on the growth of Islamic revivalism and activism as the movements are transformed into political institutions tied to the system while the competition between the various Islamist moevements diversifies Muslim political expression and engenders factionalization.

For example in Algeria, Salafism had been instrumental in nation building and in the anti-colonial struggle for independence. Its objectives were the purification of Islam from marabout practices and the creation of an educational system based on Islam and Arabic as opposed to both French cultural imperialism and Berber local particularism. The crisis of unfulfilled expectations of the 1970s and 1980s gave rise to fundamentalist movements opposed to the FLN regime, stressing Islamic authenticity, justice and development, and encouraged by extensive links to the Muslim Brotherhood and the jama’at in Egypt, Iran’s Islamic revolution, and Sudan’s Turabi. In the early 1990s the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won municipal and parliamentary elections and seemed ready to take over power democratically from the secular-socialist FLN regime when the military intervened. The cancellation of the elections and the prohibition of Islamic parties in 1992 led to increased violence that has taken on the marks of a civil war which is still raging and which has taken the lives of almost 100,000 by 1998. Whilst the FIS was mainly moderate and gradualist, many fringe groups drew their inspiration from the jama’at that advocated violent revolution to break the jahili system and take over power in the state.

In Turkey the growing Islamic movement was expressed by the Refah party which became the largest party in parliament after the elections of 1996 and its leader Necmetin Erbakan became Turkey’s first Islamicist Prime Minister. The military however continued its traditional role of safeguarding Attaturk’s secular legacy first by forcing the Islamic prime minister to resign from office in 1997, then in January 1998 by getting the constitutional court to outlaw his Refah party and ban him from politics for five years. The long-term results of this move are difficult to predict but might include a radicalization of Islamic groups and a slide to the violence experienced by Turkey in the 1970s or to that prevalent in Algeria today. The situation in Turkey is especially complex due to the Kurdish problem and the Sunni-Alevi cleavage.

In Pakistan there was a growing trend of Islamization pushed by jama’at-i Islami’s agitation for an Islamic state based on shari‘a. Following the loss of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), and growing disillusionment with Western-inspired development in the 1960s and 1970s, Bhutto, in spite of his socialist leanings, began to manipulate Islamic symbols and turned to the oil-rich Gulf states for aid. This prepared the ground for Zia’s military regime to introduce elements of an Islamic system (nizam-i-Islam) along Mawdudi’s lines. Pakistan’s deep involvement in Afghanistan backing the Sunni Mujahideen also strengthened its own Islamic groups. Of growing concern was the increased violence between Sunni and Shi’a extremists, fuelled by Iranian-Pakistani rivalry for influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Shi’i fundamentalism whilst drawing from some common roots with Sunni revivalism, as in Afghani’s activism, yet went its own specific way centred especially on Iran and tending to be more clerical and more leftist than its sunni counterpart. It grew partly out of traditionalist opposition to Westernization led by the anti-constitutionalist ‘ulama’ starting in the early 1920s.

Clerical opposition to the secularizing policies of Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah, combined with the activities of the Islamist-Marxist fedayan-i Islam, the sufi-existentialist ideology of ‘Ali Shari’ati (1933-1977), and finally the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989) to dramatically change Shi’ism from its traditional passive mode to an activist revolutionary stance. ‘Ali Shariati laid the intellectual groundwork for the revolution, whilst Ayatollah Khomeini emerged in the tradtional eschatological shi’a role of the brave ‘ulama’, linked to the hidden Imam, opposing the illegitimate and unjust ruler. He succeeded in rallying the masses with a messianic fervor that mobilized tham agaisnt the Shah’s regime, with millions joining the mass protests that finally brought it down in 1979.

A new regime emerged, very different in many ways from the Sunni version of an Islamic khilafa, but in line with the millenarian Shi’i expectation of the return and rule of the Hidden Imam. Shi’i fundamentalism was much more ulama-controlled than the sunni version, and Khomeini’s innovative ideology of the Islamic state, the wilayat al-faqih (governance by the jurist), demanded that the highest shi’a cleric, as the only legitimate successor to Muhammad, ‘Ali, and the Shi’a Imams, and the only representative of the Hidden Imam, be the one to rule in his name until his return. The establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran had a great impact on all Shi’a centres around the Muslim world – Southern Lebanon, Southern Iraq, the Gulf, and the Indian Subcontinent.

Indeed, Mallat sees the success of the Iranian revolution as the main catalyst for world-wide Islamic fundamentalism, both Sunni and Shi’i, as it was the first modern state in which Islamic fundamentalism succeeded in taking over power and implementing its vision of authentic Islam. The new Islamic state had both to formulate an Islamic constitution with appropriate institutions, and change the economic system in line with Shi’a Islamic discourse, thus offering a model to other Islamists still struggling to attain power in other states.

Gellner argues that Khomeini actually sunnified shi’ism by initiating a shift from the cult of personality (of the shi’a imams) to a cult of law. Rather than wait passively for the return of the hidden Imam, his vice-regents, the ruling faqihs, actively implement their interpretations of Islamic law and their views of radical Islam.

Especially following Khomeini’s death the regime entered a consolidation phase, balancing its revolutionary fervour and its efforts at exporting the Islamic revolution abroad, with the necessity of developing a functioning governmental system and balancing the various pressure groups within the new ruling elite, and creating better international relations. The election of Khatami as president in 1997 points to some developing moderation and pragmatism as Iran tries to consolidate its power, assert its influence in its geographical neighbourhood (the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia) and reach accommodation with rivals such as Saudi Arabia and even the USA. However, Iran is still the main backer of Shi’a fundamentalist groups in the Islamic world, especially in Lebanon and Afghanistan.

Whilst violent groups implicated in revolution and terrorism catch the eye of the world media, there are other movements who concentrate on the development of their own vision of true Islam within their own ranks as an alternative pure society and engage in peaceful da’wa to expand their movement. Jama’at al-Tabligh (or Tablighi Jama’at) is the largest and best known of these quietist, low profile groups. A "..quietist, apolitical movement of spiritual guidance and renewal…", it was founded in the 1930s in India by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1944) with its headquarters in Nizamuddin near Delhi. Originally its aim was to purify the Islam of Muslim villagers endangered by Hindu syncretism. It is now a grassroots movement that encompasses millions of adherents in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the West. Similar to politically activist fundamentalist movements it has a literalist interpretation of scripture and works for the revival of pristine Islam, yet it is very different in most other aspects.

Coming out of the Deobandi position, its philosophy is to call Muslims to renewed individual commitment to Islam by focusing on elements of the faith easily understood by the masses, rather than on legal technicalities. It stresses spirituality, good intentions, good deeds, and missionary activity (da’wa) whilst motivating members by stressing the rewards offered those who implement these principles. Members are expected to devote a tenth of their time in active da’wa in new localities, seen as a re-enactment of the hijrah (while helpful locals represent the ansar). The main activity is the da’wa tour in which a mobile unit (jama’at) of about ten men under an emir travel to proselytize, leaving their families and work for the duration of the tour. This break with routine transforms the activists as they experience the close group fellowship, the face-to-face "evangelism", and the concentration on prayer. It is meant to instil a spirit of vulnerable humility in which the believer learns to be totally dependent on God.

Tablighi Jama’at emphasizes six simple fundamentals: 1. The significance of tawhid and the proclamation of faith (the kalima) – exploring the true meaning of the shahadah. 2. The absolute centrality of prayer (salat). 3. The necessity of both religious learning (‘ilm) and mystic remembrance (dhikr) to enhance God-consciousness. 4. Treating all Muslims with love, respect and politeness (ikram ul-Muslimeen). 5. Purity of intention and motive as most pleasing God (ikhlas al-niyya). 6. Spending time in the path of Allah in mission and struggle (da’wa and jihad), especially by conveying the message of Islam through house visitation. Members have to give testimonies of their experiences in applying these principles and in winning converts.

Simple lifestyle, simple dress, and simple speech further the levelling of social differences. The aim of the jama’a is to win the hearts of the Muslim masses and reform individuals without imposing Islam by force. It believes that once this goal has been attained and the majority of society consists of true Muslims, governments will automatically improve by falling in line with grassroots reality. Concentrating on the reform of the individual, tablighi jama’at avoids political involvement, public conflicts and protests. In spite of its size, and continuous expansion, the tablighi jama’at remains an informal association with no written constitution and no formal hierarchy.

At the end of the 20^th century Islamic fundamentalists have become active participators in mainstream Muslim society all over the world, led by a new class of modern-educated elites. For many Muslims Islamic revivalism is a social rather than a political movement aimed at implementing a more Islamically oriented society. For most fundamentalists, however, the establishment of an Islamic system does necessitate the creation of an Islamic state, and the mainstream Islamic fundamentalist movements have become major actors within the system while the violent radicals continue to confront the state. The moderates demand participation as equals in the democratic process, while the extremists threaten violence and revolution.

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