"...tanks and mechanized Infantry face problems in confines of urban
areas that place them at a severe disadvantage when operating alone. Only
together can these forces accomplish their mission with minimal
casualties..."1
Task Force (TF) Baghdad's adaptation to fighting in the urban canyons
of Al Tharwa (Sadr City) and the cemeteries of An Najaf has been both
remarkable and significant. It has proven the reality of urban combat - we
can win and we can win decisively.
The new fight brings to light a cautionary message to the force - be
wary of eliminating or reducing the option of heavy armor; it has proven
decisive and has been the critical enabler that allowed TF Baghdad to win
every fight, everyday. The enemy we fight in streets and crypts is not
connected by a vast suite of electronics packages; instead, they use
proven kinetic techniques, such as the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), the
command-detonated improvised explosive device (IED), the mortar, and the
AK47 in an asymmetric fashion, using the concrete valleys of the cityscape
to their advantage.
This evolution in warfare is not a side note in history; it is a
foreshadowing of operations to come. The mass migration of humanity to
cities and the inability of third-world nations to keep abreast of basic
city services relative to growth, breeds discontent. It is a harvesting
ground for fundamentalist ideologues.
This article should serve as a note of concern to the force.
Eliminating or reducing heavy armor systems from inventory will remove
valuable assets that prove decisive when moving from a maneuver war to a
street war.
AI Tharwa: The Sadr City Box
During the April-June and August-October 2004 Shia uprising of Muqtada
Al Sadr's militia in Al Tharwa (Sadr City) and An Najaf, it became clear
that the ultimate task organization of choice depended on the enemy
threat. Patterns of employment of the combined arms team that both
solidified and challenged existing doctrine were also made clear.
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"The commander's independent sight systems
offset the protective measure of vehicles moving through the city
with hatches fully closed. The second sight afforded another field
of view, allowing the gunner to primarily observe enemy alleys.
Instead of the commander being relegated to what the gunner was
observing, or struggling to gain situational awareness through
vision blocks, he became an integral part of the vehicle and patrol
team by providing coverage of secondary enemy avenues of approach,
oriented forward of the vehicle or toward the opposite flank
vehicle's immediate rooftops, providing high-angle
coverage." |
The grid-like pattern of Al Tharwa presented an interesting tactical
challenge to the soldiers and leaders of 2d Battalion, 5th (2-5) Cavalry
Regiment (TF Lancer), 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort
Hood, Texas. As Muqtada's militia began actively attacking coalition
forces, TF Lancer worked rapidly to defeat the insurgent uprising while
protecting its soldiers.
As its primary avenue of approach, the enemy chose side street alleys,
which Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) and M1A2 system enhancement package
(SEP) tanks could not negotiate due to sheer width and obstacles such as
disabled civilian vehicles and air-conditioning units. As these vehicles
progressed throughout the city, the militia would attack their flanks,
seeking to disable them with IEDs, RPGs, and AK47s.
U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations In Urban
Terrain, Appendix C, states: "If isolated or unsupported by infantry,
armored vehicles are vulnerable to enemy hunter/killer teams firing light
and medium antiarmor weapons. Because of the abundance of cover and
concealment in urban terrain, armored vehicle gunners may not be able to
easily identify enemy targets unless the commander exposes himself to fire
by opening his hatch or by infantrymen directing the gunner to the
target."2
Initially, following standard doctrine, the task force moved throughout
the city in column or staggered-column formations, assigning typical
360-degree sectors of fire to cover all enemy avenues of approach.
However, with the vertical firing platforms of rooftops and the
coordinated attacks on both flanks through use of alleys, the task force
had to rapidly adapt to the emerging enemy threat.
The task force quickly learned to move throughout the city in protected
mode (buttoned up) and maximize the capability of the dual sights provided
by the M1A2SEP, equipped with the gunner's primary sight and the
commander's independent thermal viewer (CITV), and the M2/3A3 improved
Bradley acquisition subsystem (IBAS) with the commander's independent
viewer (CIV). As shown in Figure 1, their refined movement-to-contact
formation resulted in a rolling battleship of armored vehicles in a "box"
formation, moving in a deliberate, methodical progression through the main
streets of Al Tharwa, maximizing the protection of the armor packages.3
Success relied on the skill of the driver, the armor package of the M1A2
and the latest generation M2/3A3 and the dual sight capability afforded by
the vehicle upgrades.
Moving buttoned up in a pure mechanized/armor formation, the combat
patrol would reposition at the release point into a rectangular formation
of at least six armored vehicles. Moving vehicles parallel to each other
created an artificial set of interior lines to protect the exposed flank
of the opposite vehicle and allow a full three-dimensional, 360-degree
coverage of the constantly shifting battlespace.
The commander's independent sight systems offset the protective measure
of vehicles moving through the city with hatches fully closed. The second
sight afforded another field of view, allowing the gunner to primarily
observe enemy alleys. Instead of the commander being relegated to what the
gunner was observing, or struggling to gain situational awareness through
vision blocks, he became an integral part of the vehicle and patrol team
by providing coverage of secondary enemy avenues of approach, oriented
forward of the vehicle or toward the opposite flank vehicle's immediate
rooftops, providing high-angle coverage. See Figure 2.
Moving block by block, the patrol would travel at extremely slow speeds
to allow for acquisition of targets in the alleyways and proper handoff to
subsequent vehicle gunners. Although not quite a 'steady platform' for the
Bradley, the standard engagement was less than 200 meters - the proximity
to targets allowed for successful coax engagements. The CIV and CITV were
used to scan opposite rooftops, or forward and to the flanks of the
gunner's primary sector to allow immediate target handoff.
Drivers keyed off the front left vehicle for rate of movement and
worked as integral members of the team to identify targets, maintain
proper dispersion, and move to predetermined locations. At short halts,
drivers would establish a point of domination by immediately moving to
overwatch the closest alley, which was the most likely enemy avenue of
approach.
The success of the box in attriting enemy forces in Al Tharwa was
causal to the armor packages of the M1-series tank and latest generation
Bradley. This capability allowed absorption of the enemy's primary weapons
system (IED), and protected infantry dismounts that spent many hours
traveling in the backs of Bradleys, enslaved to the squad leader display
to maintain situational awareness. This same technique, used with lighter
skinned vehicles, would not have been effective in achieving the task
force's objectives during movement to contact due to asymmetric advantages
the enemy retains by fighting on their turf.
As always, the enemy has a vote and began adapting to the successful
employment of the Sadr City box. They began to move increasingly toward
using IEDs to disable vehicles and subsequently cause a catastrophic kill
by using RPGs and mortars. This prompted the task force to adopt a heavier
stance in the lead elements, stressing the use of the M1A2SEP to lead each
combat patrol. The tank, with its armor package, could take the brunt of
the effect of IEDs laid throughout the route. In some cases, crews could
identify detonation wires running from hidden IEDs through global
positioning systems (GPS) and CITV. Once identified, the crews could
'disable' the IED by destroying the detonation wires with direct fire or
by directly firing at the IED's point of placement. Stripping all
unnecessary equipment from the bustle rack and moving buttoned up allowed
follow-on Bradleys to service targets that succeeded in climbing on top of
tanks or getting within their deadspace.
Because of the close range of engagements in the city, the primary
weapons system on both the tank and Bradley became the coax, normally
zeroed at about 200 meters. Recon by fire of suspected IED locations was
authorized, but leaders always remained cognizant of collateral damage
through positive identification of targets. Because of the desire to
minimize collateral damage, a check in the system for using 25mm and 120mm
was developed by the task force, which forced company commanders to clear
fires for 25mm and battalion commanders to clear fires for 120mm.
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In war, bad things happen. The enemy objective in both Al Tharwa and An
Najaf was to disable a vehicle and exploit it for an information
operations success. Moving through the streets of Baghdad, it was
inevitable that a vehicle would become disabled, leading to specific
battle drills within the task force. The remaining vehicles in the box
would move to provide a wall of steel around the disabled vehicle;
infantrymen would dismount from the backs of the M2s to cover deadspace,
either by tying into the adjacent vehicles or occupying by force a
strongpoint position. M88s, escorted by a quick reaction force (QRF)
patrol, would move rapidly to the disabled vehicle and begin extraction.
The screen established by the initial patrol would protect the M88 crew as
they extracted the vehicle.
An Najaf: The Combined Arms Patrol
In An Najaf, the terrain dictated different tactics while fighting the
same enemy. What remained constant was the overwhelming domination of the
armor/mechanized combination as the enabler to support the decisiveness of
the mission.
In August, elements from the 2d Brigade Combat Team (Blackjack) and the
3d Brigade Combat Team (Grey wolf), 1st Cavalry Division, rapidly moved
south of Baghdad to An Najaf and fought the Muqtada's militia on different
terrain. Task Force 1st Battalion, 5th (1-5) Cavalry Regiment, 2d Brigade
Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, faced unique challenges as narrow
parallel trails through the cemetery and old city of An Najaf forced units
to attack with multiple, section-sized elements along adjacent trails,
which were often separated from mutual support.
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A combined arms section became the preferred maneuver element. The
section normally included a tank and Bradley attacking abreast, trailed by
an M1114. The tank often advanced slightly ahead of the Bradley to absorb
the initial energy of enemy ambushes. These ambushes and enemy engagements
ranged from IEDs, mines, and RPGs, to mortars and snipers. The Bradleys
would protect the flank and elevated shots against the tank, and the M1114
provided local and rear security for lead vehicles using its M240 machine
gun. Dismounted soldiers from the Bradley and Ml 114 would disperse to the
flanks of the section to eliminate enemy attempting to get into blind
spots of the armored systems. Due to the restrictiveness of the cemetery's
tombstones, mausoleums, and support buildings, maintaining visual contact
with friendly forces was extremely difficult, requiring crews to maintain
voice contact to keep vehicles and dismounted movement synchronized.
Situational awareness was also critical in the clearance of fires, as both
120mm mortar and 155mm artillery were employed. See Figure 3.
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''Because of the close range of engagements in
the city, the primary weapons system on both the tank and Bradley
became the coax, normally zeroed at about 200 meters. Recon by fire
of suspected IED locations was authorized, but leaders always
remained cognizant of collateral damage through positive
identification of targets. Because of the desire to minimize
collateral damage, a check in the system for using 25mm and 120mm
was developed by the task force, which forced company commanders to
clear fires for 25mm and battalion commanders to clear fires for
120mm." |
At times, narrow trails forced the tank to move to a flank, based on
traversing limitations, and allow the Bradley to engage and service
targets. To mitigate risk to the tank, the infantry would move to the
tank's flank to prevent the enemy from mounting from the rear. If infantry
were committed or unavailable, a sniper was emplaced to overwatch the
tank, providing the same protection and early warning. The final option
was to use the M2A3's CIV to cover the tank's position.
Like units in Al Tharwa, Task Force 1-5 Cavalry generally fought
buttoned up. The propensity for Muqtada's militia to engage through sniper
fire or by dropping hand grenades on crews from above, forced this tactic.
This tactic also allowed overwatch vehicles to engage targets that moved
within the vehicle's dead-space to its immediate front.
Without the armor protection afforded by the tank and latest generation
Bradley, Task Force 1-5 Cavalry's ability to achieve decisive success in
An Najaf would have been characterized by higher casualties and a longer
campaign. Used in conjunction with a combined arms dismounted infantry
team, the tank and Bradley, having devastating effects on Muqtada militia
largely attributed to the protection afforded by their armor packages,
forced the enemy's hand and led to capitulation by Muqtada al Sadr.
Southern An Najaf: The Lane Attack
Task Force 2d Battalion, 7th (2-7) Cavalry Regiment, attached to the
39th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, was assigned to the
southern sector of An Najaf, which was characterized by a narrow,
residential grid-like road network that, unlike Task Force 2-5 Cavalry in
Al Tharwa, prevented full lateral traversing of the M1A2SEP's main
gun.
C Company, Task Force 3d Battalion, 8th (3-8) Cavalry Regiment, 3d
Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, attached to Task Force 2-7
Cavalry, developed the 'lane attack' approach to application of armor in
urban environments that characterized the unit's area of operations. To
maximize the capabilities of the armor packages and the independent
sights, the unit created section level lanes or directions of attack.
Vehicles would move to "points of domination" (the intersections) to
maximize the ability to traverse the turret and use the CITV. The first
tank would orient low, forward, and to an unprotected flank. The second
tank would be two blocks back, clearing forward and high over the lead
tank. The CITV would cover an unprotected flank and rear. One block over,
on a parallel street, would be a second section-level direction of attack
that would be occupied by a wing tank section. This lateral dispersion of
forces in extremely canalized terrain created a set of interior lines that
afforded lateral security. Up to two platoons would be put on line, along
four lanes, with infantry (in M1114s) in a reserve role behind the center
echelon tank sections. See Figure 4.
Observation and Examination
Whether fighting enemy forces on home turf, on a commercial or
residential grid pattern such as in Al Tharwa or southern An Najaf, or on
irregular patterns of the cemetery or old city of northern An Najaf,
leaders can benefit by observing and examining these three separate units
and their invaluable successes:
Adaptable leadership. Throughout each experience, our leaders
consistently and rapidly adapted to enemy tactics and maintained the
initiative. Although there are similar doctrinal threads in the employment
of the combined arms team in each instance, it is the development and
implementation of an emerging set of tactics and techniques in direct
relation to enemy employment that led to its defeat.
Confidence in equipment. Current armor packages, the M1A2 SEP and the
latest generation M2/3A3 (with enablers) can take the brunt of enemy
weapons systems. They can survive first contact, which is critical to
tactical success. However, there is a small risk associated with
employment of current armor packages - enemy forces will exploit what they
perceive as weaknesses. Units must take this into consideration when
occupying or creating a positional advantage.
Independent sights. We no longer have the standoff envisioned in
fighting a war on the plains of Europe. Instead, we fight a dirty, close
fight against an asymmetric threat that uses crude weapons. It drives
units to move through the urban landscape buttoned up. The CITV and the
CIV give back to the vehicle and unit commanders capabilities lost by
operating in this posture. Units must train to conduct entire operations
with hatches closed.
Points of domination. Vehicles, sections, and units move to and occupy
positional points of domination (or advantage), normally an intersection,
where they can best take advantage of the capabilities afforded by the
M1A2 and latest generation M2/3A3 armor package (with enablers), the dual
sights, and weapons systems.
Create standoff. Create reaction time to allow servicing of targets. In
some cases, that 'standoff' is a function of location (see points of
domination). In other cases, it is a function of speed. Slowing movement
allows time for acquisition, drawing out enemy forces, and servicing
targets in the close confines of the urban landscape.
Create interior lines. Offensive and defensive box formations create
conditions to maximize the capability of the dual sights by eliminating
the need to secure a flank, which is protected by the vehicle to the
unobserved flank. This further offsets the enemy's propensity to execute
simultaneous attacks from multiple surface and elevated avenues of
approach.
We must continue the debate about the relevancy of armor. It would be
wise to listen to some of our own doctrine when examining future combat
systems. The trend is clear; the hardest place to fight and win - in the
city - will dominate future U.S. Army operations. We cannot rely solely on
a suite of electronics packages to offset the brunt of an enemy attack,
which will be characterized by crude but effective weapons and an inherent
terrain advantage due to the complexity of the city fight. The solution is
good planning, the resolve of leadership, and the confidence that the
equipment they fight in will protect our soldiers. The critical enabler is
lethal and survivable M1 and M2/3 armored packages, coupled with increased
situational awareness afforded by an independent commander's sight. These
systems must remain in our inventory for immediate employment by deployed
forces. Our tanks and Bradleys must not diminish in numbers but become
more capable through continuous upgrades that protect our soldiers and
allow them to dominate the unseen, often unnoticed enemy force that lurks
in the shadows of alleys.
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"Due to the restrictiveness of the cemetery's
tombstones, mausoleums, and support buildings, maintaining visual
contact with friendly forces was extremely difficult, requiring
crews to maintain voice contact to keep vehicles and dismounted
movement synchronized. Situational awareness was also critical in
the clearance of fires, as both 120mm mortar and 155mm artillery
were employed." |
[Sidebar] |
"Armored forces can deliver devastating fires,
are fully protected against antipersonnel mines, fragments, and
small arms, and have excellent mobility along unblocked
routes."4 |
"Armored vehicles can move mounted infantrymen
rapidly to points where, together, they can dominate and isolate the
cordoned area."5 |
"Decentralized armor support greatly increases a
small infantry unit's combat power. However, dispersed vehicles
cannot be easily and quickly concentrated."6 |
"Due to the length of the tank main gun, the
turret will not rotate if a solid object is
encountered."7 |
"Because of the complex terrain, defending
forces can rapidly occupy and defend from a position of
strength."8 |
[Footnote] |
Notes |
1 U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-06.11, Combined
Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington. D.C., 28 February 2002. Appendix C. |
2 Ibid. |
3 The box formation is not new to the first
team. In 1993, then Major General Wesley Clark introduced and
trained the box formation as the division commander. He contended it
offered the same advantages in the open terrain of the National
Training Center in fighting an enemy that were used the wadis and IV
lines to engage attacking forces from a position of advantage. |
4 FM 3-06.11. Appendix C. |
5 Ibid. |
6 Ibid. |
7 Ibid. |
8 U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-06. Urban
Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1
June 2003, p. 6-5. |
[Author Affiliation] |
by Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Major Patrick R. Michaelis, and Major Geoffrey A. Norman |
MG Peter W. Chiarelli is currently serving as
commanding general, 1st Cavalry Division and Task Force Baghdad,
Camp Al Taheer, Iraq. He received a B.S. from Seattle University, an
M.P.A. from the University of Washington, and an M.A. from the
United States Naval War College. His military education includes
Armor Officer Basic Course, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, the
United States Naval Command and Staff College, and National War
College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to
include commander, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry, 9th Infantry
Division, Fort Lewis, WA; G3 (Operations), 1st Cavalry Division,
Fort Hood, TX; Deputy G3 (Operations) and Director for Plans,
Training and Mobilization, III Corps, Fort Hood, TX; commander, 3d
Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis; executive officer to the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe, Belgium; assistant division commander (support), 1st Cavalry
Division, Fort Hood; and director, Operations, Readiness and
Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3, United States
Army, Washington, DC.
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MAJ Patrick Michael is is currently serving as
battle command officer, 1st Cavalry Division and Task Force Baghdad,
Camp Al Tahreer, Iraq. He received a B.A. from Texas A&M
University and an M. PA. from Harvard University. His military
education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer
Advanced Course, Cavalry Leaders Course, Scout Platoon Leaders
Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Airborne School,
Air Assault School, and Ranger School. He has served in various
command and staff positions, to include assistant professor, U.S.
Military Academy, West Point, NY; S4, A Troop commander, and
headquarters and headquarters troop commander, 1st Battalion, 7th
Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; assistant S3,
1st Squadron, 4th (1-4) Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt,
Germany; tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and troop XO,
1-4 Cavalry, Schweinfurt and Bosnia.
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MAJ Geoffrey Norman is currently serving as
course manager, Armor Captains Career Course, 3d Squadron, 16th
Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, KY, and recently returned from service
with 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Baghdad, Iraq. He
received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy. His
military education includes Combined Arms and Services Staff School,
Armor Officer Advanced Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Cavalry
Leaders Course, Airborne School, and Air Assault School. He has
served in various command and staff positions, to include small
group instructor, Armor Captains Career Course, Fort Knox; observer
controller, Cobra Team, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA;
troop commander, A Troop, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Camp Garry
Owen, Korea; tank platoon leader and battalion S4, 1st Battalion,
12th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, Texas. |
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