Many thanks to Sven Ortman for drawing my attention to the original article.
Captain B.H. Liddell Hart's lead article in the June 1956 issue of Military Review makes an interesting point when he discusses defence strategy for Europe:-
Yet, basically, the defending side, operating in its own territory, should not need as high a scale of supply and transport as an attacker coming from a long distance away and should be able to make effective defensive use of "local" types of force which require relatively little transport. It would be far better if a large proportion of the ground forces of the continental countries were built on a local militia basis, organized to fight in its own locality and maintain itself from local stores distributed in numerous small underground shelters. Such forces, a superior form of "Home Guard," would provide a deep network of defense, yet need much less transport than the present NATO type (Conventional Divisions), be much less of a target, be less liable to interception and become effective with far shorter training thus relieving the present burden of conscription. A portion of these type forces in rearward areas might be moved up as reinforcements to the forward layers of the defense if, and as, conditions allowed. With suitable planning, this can be achieved and such forces will not need the large scale of organic transport and equipment that makes the existing NATO-type divisions so vulnerable, as well as so costly. The "local" type forces should be backed by mobile forces composed of professional troops, mounted entirely in armored cross-country vehicles, streamlined in organization and trained to operate in "controlled dispersion" like a swarm of hornets. With such quality and mobility, fewer troops would be required than in the present NATO divisions and they would be better fitted for guerrilla-like war as well as for atomic war wherein mobile action would only be practicable for relatively small forces.
The threat of military invasion from the east may have decreased in Europe but many countries still face such threats, so let's consider this idea a little further. The concept of a modern Militia can be associated with the concept of a "true defence" force, i.e. one that is mainly concerned with the protection of a nation's people amd territory. The basic idea is for most of the relatively static components of a defence to be undertaken by Militia, freeing "Conventional/Professional" forces for more mobile formations. The large stocks of supplies that the militia districts will maintain will also allow the mobile forces to operate with less logistical tail. The term "Static" is probably a little misleading in this context. Militia infantry in reality will move around their area of operations quite a lot to evade the enemy's firepower and keep him off-balance. Artillery assigned to a Militia district will also move frequently. Several companies offer howitzers that can be mounted on truck-beds and these would be a useful form of SP artillery, especially if the carriers can be disguised as normal trucks to avoid enemy surveillance.
The term "Militia" often conjures up images of second rate or antiquated equipment but wherever possible this force should have the same equipment as conventional military formations, not least for purposes of morale and confidence. This does not rule out the use of certain older items of equipment when its use is suitable and it does not cause extra logistical complication. For example, in a fixed position M101 or M102 howitzers can be used in place of M119 if they have sufficient range to control the required area. A Militia force operating in its own territory has several potential advantages.
Extensive Local knowledge. Artillery will have pre-surveyed various firing positions and computed range cards for various potential targets.
High Motivation. Militia will be fighting for their own homes and land.
Secure underground communication cables.
Pre-prepared defensive positions. Rather than hastily dug trenches certain key areas will be controlled by concrete and earth bunkers. Suitable heavy armament may already be in place or more likely held close by in a secure location.
Large caches of stores and munitions, many of them hidden can be established in the area. Militiamen will not usually need to carry the heavy loads that conventional infantry are often burdened with. Hidden bases would also be constructed and their location only revealed to unit commanders in time of war or should guerilla operations become necessary.
Viet Cong style tunnel complexes for escape, shelter or protected movement.
Pre-laid sensors and possibly mines that can be activated during hostilities. Since explosives tend to deteriorate it is more likely that mines will be laid when needed, either by artillery or vehicles held by the Militia district command.
Underground railways for the movement of troops and supplies.
A Militia "Division" would be closely tied to a geographic area so there can be no realistic "standard" structure. In very open country the majority of Militia forces may be artillery, reconnaissance and Fire direction forces. In mountainous country light infantry and heavy mortars may be more useful. In an industrialized area or near an airfield a large proportion of the defensive troops would be SAM batteries.
An important element of the Militia will be CSS elements, both to support the combat elements of the Militia and any Armour, Mechanized, Airborne and Airmobile Brigades from the "Professional" forces. This is a further argument in favour of using the same equipment for both the Militia and Conventional units.
A Militia Division/District might include a Special Tactical Battalion. This would be a light infantry formation that serves as a counter insurgency, special recon, raiding, police support and quick reaction force. Probably this unit will be made up of Regular or Volunteer Reservists rather than Militia. It consists of three rifle companies with a strong support element of engineers, mortars, Automatic Grenade launchers, Recoilless rifles, ATGMs. This battalion includes an organic transport element that can move the companies by truck if necessary. In some areas this unit may also have APCs.
The Militia Division/District may also have a Local Tank Battalion including infantry and artillery components. This will also most likely be Regular or Volunteer Reservists.
All Divisions are likely to have a large pool of trucks. In peacetime these may be placed under local government control and used for public benefit- civil engineering, cheap transport of supplies for hospitals, etc. Militia drivers and their trucks may be leased to haulage and construction companies.
Other Militia units may also see peacetime applications such as Civil Defence and Disaster Relief. Chemical Defence units would be located in industrial areas so they are available to assist in the event of a large scale accident.
The gunner detachment (Forward Observers) and possibly the Sappers would be Volunteer Reservists, the equivalent of the TA (Territorial Army).
In rural terrain the mission of the Militia as outlined above by Simpkin suggests that a Militia unit could make considerable use of a fire-team level ATGW with a range of around 1,000m. The M47 Dragon appears to fit this discription, particulary in some of its updated forms. The Israeli Shipon-2 and possibly the French Eryx and Anglo-Swedish NLAW may also be suitable. These ATGW would be supplemented by large infantry Anti-tank weapons such as LAW-80 and M136/AT4. In more urban conditions the Militia unit is likely to greater numbers of shorter ranged Anit-tank weapons that are capable of launch from comfined spaces. Snipers, Heavy rifle grenades and Flamethrowers may also see more use in urban operations.
Militia would be backed up by Regular forces. Where terrain allows the Regular force would be mechanized. Enemy forces slowed by the Militia Sponge would be attacked by manoeuvering Regular forces or attacked with aircraft or artillery. If a Milita unit is over-run it goes to ground and then conducts guerilla, sabotage and information gathering operations in the enemy's rear, exploiting its knowlege of local terrain and supply caches.
Also of interest are Simpkin's suggestions for a "True Defensive" policy for the UK. An enemy attempting to establish a sizeable military presence will probably need to move it into the country by transport aircraft so sucess will depend on which side controls the landing areas. Simpkin suggests that the number of Military, Civilian and sporting airfields be decreased and these activities more centralized into a smaller number of easily defendable areas. Unused fields will be rendered inoperable and in time of war other likely landing areas such a long roads will be blocked.