Constructing a socio-cultural Partnership The political aims of the EMP, following the signing of the Barcelona Declaration on 28 November 1995, were not extensively discussed to avoid drawing attention to the democratic deficit in the Middle East [52]. Although US foreign policy-makers saw the EU’s involvement in the region as a direct invasion of European diplomacy to an area firmly located within their traditional sphere of influence, all partner states stressed that, while the EMP was not to replace other regional initiatives, it would contribute to their success. Yet, no operational role was foreseen for the EMP in the ongoing Middle East Peace Process, although it was hoped that it could mark a positive economic impact. The Barcelona Conference managed to bring together Israeli and Syrian representatives at the same table, which was inconceivable for any previous initiative. The participation of these Arab countries bestowed a considerable degree of legitimacy to the meeting. A contributing factor was the euphoria that stemmed from the achievement of significant progress in the Oslo peace talks [53]. In an atmosphere of ‘high hopes and low motives’[54], the Conference became the ‘launching pad’ [55] for a regional process aiming to preserve peace and stability, set up a shared prosperity zone and promote a structured political dialogue among the partners. Although the Declaration is not in itself a historical turning point, as its main objective was not one of regional integration, it brought about a new co-operative spirit in political/security, economic/financial, and socio-cultural matters, aided by a follow-up mechanism. It is to the third area that we now turn. A Commission official described the inclusion of the socio-cultural dimension as a mini-revolution in itself [56]. Its scope was wide-ranging and ambitious, granting NGOs and civil society representatives a significant role in EMP affairs. As Colas put it: ‘The incorporation of civil society into the Barcelona process is a clear case of international regime formation, which seeks to respond to changes of intergovernmental elitism’ [57]. Linkages and networks between civil societies in both Mediterranean shores may lay the foundation for knowledge, understanding and mutual confidence, which are vital components to the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean social space. Co-operation among civil societies should not take the form of assistance or the imposition of the Western liberal-democratic model. Rather, it should incorporate the component civil societies in political decision-making and also take into account their respective particularities. The Declaration underlined that ‘the reinforcement of democracy and respect for human rights’ are indeed the essential elements of the entire project. But co-operation in these areas is also the most sensitive dimension of the EMP, for the debate on democracy and human rights in the region is linked to issues of identity, rights and reciprocal civilisational interaction. Certain sectors of North African and Middle Eastern public opinion suspect that the West wants to impose its civilisation and hegemony under the guise of universal democratic principles, whilst in the North, in parallel to the explosion of racism and xenophobia, the preconceived idea that there is an intrinsic incompatibility between (political) Islam and democracy has developed at both grassroots and elite level [58]. As Fahmy points out, potential differences may emerge in the various conceptions of democracy and human rights, and the only way for their resolution is through a cultural dialogue to reconcile the contending interpretations [59].