Important security issues appear to be products of the new world (dis)order. The Gulf crisis of 1990/91 was the first major international conflict to be recorded in the era of Pax Americana post-Cold War, questioning the capabilities of European institutions, the impact of independent national diplomacies and the future of multinational crisis management. The Gulf crisis interrupted Europe’s newly-founded complacency about its own security, as it clearly showed that, without the US, Europe lacks the military capability to confront or deter its enemies in its southern flank [18]. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait also highlighted the fragility of Arab unity. Not only did it disprove the myth that Arabs do not attack their brethren, but also exposed the poorer countries’ resentment towards the opulent life-style of the oil-rich monarchies and the shallowness of security arrangements in the Arab world [19]. At the same time, the initial euphoria of a universal collective security system hardly outlived the aftermath of the Gulf War, as the Yugoslav crisis destroyed the illusion of what US President Bush called a ‘new world order’. Although the aftermath of the Gulf War sparked an interest in issues of conflict-resolution in the Mediterranean [20], soon after the termination of the civil war in Lebanon, there was a return to traditional power-relations; the most striking examples being the stagnated Cyprus problem and the erratic Middle East Peace Process. As Jervis rightly points out, in international relations, it is the threat itself as much as the perceptions of threat that guide policy-makers [21]. Today, most analysts agree that the Mediterranean does not present Europe with a major military threat [22], as the growing arms races in the region and its militarisation are mainly intended for use on a south-south scale. Not surprisingly, then, EU states are more concerned about losing control over their energy supplies and growing illegal migration. Similarly, they are preoccupied with increased instability in parts of North Africa and the weakness of democratic institutions. Although issue-specific disputes are not to be ruled out, the main security risk is linked to the new challenges posed by radical movements and the growing north-south economic asymmetries. Nor do southern Mediterranean countries perceive any direct military threat from Europe, for they tend to associate ‘security’ chiefly with domestic concerns. Still though, the international management of domestic crises exacerbates anti-Western feelings: ‘Even talking about it may have a destabilising effect’ [23]. This perception stems from a chain of events that have fuelled a deep sense of strategic insecurity in the Arab world. The Gulf War, the international isolation imposed on Iraq and Libya, and the overwhelming US preoccupation with Israeli security have convinced the Arabs that the West may not hesitate to strike out against them should its interests require so. Most North African regimes are sceptical of Europe’s willingness to play a decisive role in Mediterranean security [24], while they are suspicious of NATO’s involvement in the region [25], despite its initiative for a ‘Mediterranean Dialogue’ [26]. For their part, finally, EU states exhibit a relative difficulty in dealing with Mediterranean security, in contrast to dealing with similar problems in other transformative regions. Islamophobia and modernity in a changing world Mediterranean security is full of misunderstandings about distorted perceptions and images of Islam, as well as about the threat of terrorism used by extremist nationalist movements. Other issues stem from the appropriation of Islam for political ends and the tensions arising from questions regarding universal values and norms of human rights. These misunderstandings emanate as much from mutual ignorance, as they do from intended confusion. One should also guard against the simplification often suggested in the media that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ is a violent and merciless force orchestrated by Iran with the help of other radical regimes [27]. As Essid points out, ‘there is still a need to define and redefine terms which reduce dialogue to a series of parallel monologues and, at several levels, reinforce misunderstandings’ [28]. It is thus of great value that any meaningful debate about Islam should dispel the clouds of deliberate myth-making and revengeful rhetoric that are particularly detrimental to a mutually rewarding dialogue.
Site hosted by Angelfire.com: Build your free website today!