The Mediterranean has been described as a dense network of diversities and dividing lines between different political and socio-economic (sub)systems, cultures and regimes, languages, forms of expression, and religious denominations. For a penetrating understanding of the Mediterranean to be reached, one has to recognise that the region has always been a crossing point for conflict and co-operation, unity and diversity. Current discourses assert that the Mediterranean exists as an ‘entity’ or ‘unity’; a view which chimes well with Braudel’s, in that the Mediterranean formed a large-scale unity, whose history could be understood only by looking at the factors that tied its coastal parts together [12]. But as Aliboni asserts, the special bonds of Mediterranean solidarity will continue to form part of an open-ended debate [13]. In this context, Lister makes the point that the question of a Mediterranean ‘ideal’ of unity is rarely explicitly spelled out; rather, ‘it is usually a vague expression of goodwill and shared history’ [14]. Being a heterogeneous synthesis of religious and ethnic groups along the lines of a ‘heterarchy’, and of unequal economic development, a plurality of regimes, divergent perceptions of security, and uneven demographic growth, Mediterranean complexity occupies a prominent position between order and disorder. For our purposes, the Mediterranean is defined as a heterarchical regional space, where geography, history and politics intermesh with culture and religion with enormous complexity, resulting in a composite system of partial regimes, each reflecting a particular sense of being and belonging. Threat (mis)perceptions From a macro-historical perspective, Mediterranean fragmentation constitutes the major obstacle to substantive regional co-operation. Contemporary analysts point to both real and potential conflicts that originate in or impact upon the region. In revisiting their respective causes, Balta distinguishes between conflicts that originate in the distant past and conflicts that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century [15]. Potential conflicts are divided into three categories: those inherited from colonialism (mainly territorial), those stemming from deeply divided societies (e.g., Lebanon), and those originating in minority issues (e.g., Basques, Corsicans, Kurds, etc). Conflicts inherited from the past are closely associated with the three monotheistic denominations affecting Mediterranean societies. These inheritances exemplify the denominational fractures among Christianity, Judaism and Islam, as well as the schisms between the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox camps, and between the Sunnis and Shiites. Such conflicts are the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Greco-Turkish rivalry, and the continuing division of Cyprus. Following Spenser’s analysis, the prevailing view during the Cold War was that the Mediterranean represented ‘a region of importance because of its proximity, potential instability and hence exploitation by the erstwhile Soviet Union, but of less importance as an “out of area” region in NATO terms’ [16]. Post-1989, however, the emphasis shifted from global assessments of security issues to regional ones. Lesser argues that in the new strategic environment, problems and interests have shifted towards the South [17]. Although the aftermath of the Cold War gave the impression that certain protracted conflicts might be resolved, the easing of East-West tension was not followed by a similar trend in Mediterranean politics. Rather, the removal of the bipolarity and with it the view that wanted the Mediterranean to serve as a sub-theatre of superpower antagonism introduced an idiosyncratic fragility at both regional and sub-regional level.