Defining a ‘unique body of water’ The Mediterranean region constitutes an interactive system of states and societies, whose mapping remains nebulous. Although ‘different definitions and different criteria often produce different regions’ [5], the problem of defining this ‘unique body of water’ is that those who raise the same type of questions fail to agree on a geographically bounded unit of analysis. But defining the Mediterranean requires taking into account that ‘mental maps’ and ‘imagined spaces’ are those that ultimately define communities and political regions [6]. Pre-1945 maps of the region may look today archaic, yet the way in which such maps are drawn offer a powerful policy tool for controlling its component territories. But broad concepts such as the ‘West’ or the ‘Orient’ that continue to divide the region cover no well-delineated territories. Their appeal is in the associations they conjure up, mixing geographical space with socio-economic interaction, as well as with political and cultural identity to draw an imaginary but identifiable divide [7]. A more studied analysis reveals that the region offers an efficient line of contact. After all, in the disorderly universe of politics, perceptions generate reality. The ability to manage such perceptions is thus crucial, especially given that there is hardly another topic that have caused such a clear-cut split among its students: Christian Europe and the Islamic world. Unlike most northern European countries that generally regard North Africa as an incongruent and ‘backward region’ of no great strategic interest, countries like Italy, Spain, France and Greece hold a different view. Likewise, for many North Africans, the dividing line between Europe and Africa lies in the Sahara and not the Mediterranean. Tempting as it may be to characterise the latter as ‘a kind of horizontal dividing line’ between the European North and ‘an arc of crisis’ located in the South, its division into Europe and ‘other’ fails to capture the dialectic between these distinct yet intertwined geographical spaces. A North-South conflict theoretical framework underestimates the realities of both North-North and South-South frictions and the sympathies that not only prevent the outbreak of autochthonous conflicts but also underlie Western European efforts to develop harmonious and balanced, albeit not symmetrical, relations across the Mediterranean [8]. While Calleya argues that the Mediterranean encompasses at least two ‘international regions’ (the EU and the Middle East) and three sub-regional groupings (southern Europe, the Mashreq and the Maghreb) [9], one could identify many variations in these divisions, presenting analysts with the problem of regional identity. From the perspective of international regionalism, although sub-regional constellations need a complex re-conceptualisation of wider regional dynamics, it is still useful to think of the Mediterranean as a single system (totality). Some of the many security considerations around the basin derive from similar trends such as unresolved questions of political legitimacy, slow growth to resurgent nationalism, religious radicalism, the search for regional dominance, arms supplies, strategic balances, etc. Another paradox arises when considering that it is security, rather than societal, economic or cultural considerations that legitimise a holistic approach to the study of Euro-Mediterranean politics [10]. True as it may be that security problems in the area can best be handled at the regional level, the question is how to achieve coherent patterns of interaction among Mediterranean states, as well as between them and the rest of the world so as to enhance regional stability [11].
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