Central to the Malta process was the need for a renewed political commitment to ensure a close balance in all three baskets, although some partners felt that progress in the first basket was overtaking progress in the remaining two. The Malta Conclusions attempted to redress this imbalance, albeit partially, by indirectly slowing down progress in the first basket [63]. In general, the Malta Conference was unsuccessful in revitalising the Arab-Israeli peace talks and in reviewing progress in the implementation of the Barcelona provisions. But at the rhetoric level, the first Euro-Mediterranean Review Conference stressed that the Partnership is an ‘irreversible process’, albeit not too well equipped to confront the challenges of a turbulent region. In this context, it is fair to suggest that cultural relations have been subject to extensive scrutiny due to the absence of any visible progress post-1995, despite the appearance of a strongly stated political commitment to placing the socio-cultural dimension on an equal footing with the other two. The 1998 Rhodes Ministerial Conference confirmed the priorities of the cultural Partnership. This strategy was outlined also in subsequent meetings in Stockholm and Palermo, and was based on the following objectives: focussing activities on a small number of thematic framework programmes; increasing public involvement; and encouraging the establishment of networks of cultural operators at a regional level so as to foster exchanges of experience and further develop joint endeavours.
Towards a Euro-Mediterranean regime
Jünemann defines the EMP as ‘the climax of a political process that started shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but more than that it marks the starting point of a new era of interregional relations’ [64]. Keeping in mind Edwards and Philippart’s view that the EMP has led to a process whose analysis and interpretation encompasses different theoretical possibilities [65], its philosophy has been summarised by Derisbourg as non-paternalistic, based on recognition of interdependencies, shared interests and the right to development and freedom, the need for decentralised co-operation, as well as the importance of the private sector and of a continuous dialogue at both intergovernmental and civil society levels [66]. A new phase in Euro-Mediterranean relations has thus emerged, consisting of openness, prior dialogue and joint tasks from policy-design to implementation. As Jünemann reiterates, however, ‘the Barcelona concept aims at a careful westernisation of the Mediterranean, gradually converting it into an area of economic and political influence’ [67]. Regarding the commitment to democracy and human rights, it seems that some non-EU partners will at some stage face the reality that the other participants, European or not, might actually insist on the preservation of the principles and norms agreed in Barcelona. But although the political conditionality underlying the economic and financial Partnership ‘allows the EU to suspend its commitments in cases of failure concerning democracy or respect of human rights, offering an apparently effective instrument to influence the process of democratisation ... it exposes the MPCs to the good will of the Europeans, thus offending their demand for equal partnership’ [68].
