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We Must Maintain Our Strategic Orientation to the Labour Party: Why and How

[With Ed George; October 1991; International Socialist Group internal discussion document]1


Introduction2

This document is a contribution to the discussion on our Labour Party work which began in earnest with the Walton by-election and is developing in the pre-conference period. It is clear that there is widespread dissatisfaction with our entry tactic inside the organisation and a number of documents have argued for a turn to fraction work. We feel that this is a mistaken response to the very real problems that we face working in the Labour Party at present. It is caused in no small part by our failure to adequately discuss our Labour Party strategy and the abstract, routinist way that the leadership has presented its positions, which often bear little resemblance to the real problems faced by our comrades on the ground. Developing a real discussion on our strategic understanding of the Labour Party is now an urgent task

A number of documents have stressed the importance of Trotsky's writings on the Labour Party in the 1930s. Our starting point in putting this document together was to return to the writings of Lenin and Trotsky on the British labour movement in order to try and understand the method that they applied. Our first section is the result of this reading and we have tried to present the positions of Lenin and Trotsky in their own words, along with the necessary background information. We do this not to try and line up these 'great men' on our side but because we believe that their writings contain many helpful insights and an important general method. The clarity and precision of their positions reflects their practical involvement in the October revolution and the building of the Communist International. Our limited experience by comparison means that we have in no way 'gone past' Lenin and Trotsky and that we still have much to learn from them. We would very much welcome comrades' opinion on our selection of material and suggestions of any additional material that we may have missed.

 

Lenin and the Communist International

Lenin prepared the pamphlet Left Wing Communism - an Infantile Disorder for the Second Congress of the Third International held in 1921. He argued strongly against the idea that communists should lay down abstract principles such as: 'no to the old trade unions', 'no links with reformism' or 'no compromises'.

In the section on Britain he welcomed the disgust and anger felt towards the reformist leaders by thousands of revolutionary workers. For Lenin this was: 'truly the "beginning of all wisdom", the basis of any socialist and communist movement and of its success.' But such sentiments were not sufficient in themselves to win the mass of workers from reformism. For this Lenin argued:

that the British Communists should participate in parliamentary action, that they should, from within parliament, help the masses of the workers see the results of a Henderson and Snowden [i.e. Labour - eds.] government in practice, and that they should help the Hendersons and Snowdens defeat the united forces of Lloyd George and Churchill. To act otherwise would mean hampering the revolution, since revolution is impossible without a change in the views of the majority of the working class, a change brought about by the political experience of the masses, never by propaganda alone.' [1920, 'Left Wing Communism - an Infantile Disorder', in Lenin on Britain (Moscow, 1973), 397]

Lenin suggested that the British communists should propose an electoral block with the Labour Party, with the seats shared out on the basis of a special ballot. The sole condition for such an alliance would be to:

retain complete freedom of agitation, propaganda and political activity. Of course, without this latter condition, we cannot agree to a block, for that would be treachery; the British communists must demand and get full freedom to expose the Hendersons and the Snowdens in the same way (for fifteen years - 1903-17) the Russian Bolsheviks demanded and got it in respect of the Russian Hendersons and Snowdens, i.e., the Mensheviks.' ['Left Wing Communism', 399]

Should the Labour leaders reject such a block:

We would put up our candidates in a very few but absolutely safe constituencies, namely, constituencies where our candidatures would not give any seats to the Liberals at the expense of the Labour candidates. We would take part in the election campaign, distribute leaflets agitating for communism, and, in all constituencies where we have no candidate, we would urge the electors to vote for the Labour candidate and against the bourgeois candidate. [...]

At present, British Communists very often find it hard even to approach the masses, and even to get a hearing from them. If I come out as a Communist and call upon them to vote for Henderson and against Lloyd George, they will certainly give me a hearing.

[...] with my vote, I want to support Henderson in the same way as a rope supports a hanged man [...]. ['Left Wing Communism', 400-401]

Lenin was at this time undecided about whether the Communist Party should seek affiliation to the Labour Party as he felt he lacked the necessary information.

I have too little material at my disposal on this question, which is highly complex because of the unique character of the British Labour Party, whose very structure is so unlike that of the political parties usual in the European continent. It is beyond doubt, however, first, that in this question, too, those who try to deduce the tactics of the revolutionary proletariat from principles such as: 'The Communist Party must keep its doctrine pure, and its independence of reformism inviolate; its mission is to lead the way, without stopping or turning, by the direct road to the communist revolution' - will inevitably fall into error.

[...] the task consists in learning to apply the general and basic principles of communism to the specific relations between classes and parties, to the specific features in the objective development towards communism, which are different in each country and which we must be able to discover, study and predict. ['Left Wing Communism', 402]

A major debate on affiliation then took place at the Second Congress, with the British Socialist Party, which favoured affiliation, represented by McLean and the anti-affiliationists by Pankhurst and Gallagher. During these discussions Lenin came out strongly in favour of the British Communist Party affiliating to the Labour Party. He made the following points in a speech.

We must say frankly that the Party of Communists can join the Labour Party only on condition that it preserves full freedom of criticism and is able to conduct its own policy. [...] With regard to the British Labour Party, it is simply a matter of collaboration between the advanced minority of the British workers and their vast majority. Members of the Labour Party are all members of Trade Unions. It has a very unusual structure, to be found in no other country. It is an organisation that embraces four million workers out of the six or seven million organised in Trade Unions. They are not asked to state what their opinions are. [...] Here we have collaboration between the vanguard of the working class and the rearguard, the backward workers. [...] If the minority is unable to lead the masses and establish close links with them, then it is not a party and worthless in general.

[...] If the majority [of British communists - eds.] is against it, we must organise a separate minority. [1920, 'Speech on the Role of the Communist Party', in Lenin on Britain, 449-50]

In a later speech at the same Congress he stressed:

[...] we can consider a party to be a workers' party only when it is really linked up with the masses and fights against the old and quite corrupt leaders. [...] 

the conditions now prevailing in Britain are such that, should it so desire, a political party may remain a revolutionary workers' party even if it is connected with a special kind of Labour organisation of four million members, which is half trade union and half political and is headed by bourgeois leaders. In such circumstances it would be highly erroneous for the best revolutionary elements not to do everything possible to remain in such a party. [...] 

The British Communist Party must retain the freedom necessary to expose and criticise the betrayers of the working class, who are much more powerful in Britain than in any other country. [1920, 'Speech on Affiliation to the British Labour Party', Lenin on Britain, 462-64]

The motion to propose affiliation was included in the Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Communist International, drafted by Trotsky (but attributed to Lenin in Lenin on Britain!, 423-24), and passed by 54 votes for, 24 against and 2 abstentions. The newly formed British Communist Party duly applied and was turned down. Individual membership of the Labour Party by communists was still possible until the Liverpool Conference of 1925.

 

Trotsky on the British Labour Movement

Trotsky provided this succinct analysis of the nature of the British labour movement in a debate with French syndicalists:

Up to now, we have not mentioned the Labour Party, which in England, the classic country of trade unions, is only a political transposition of the same trade union bureaucracy. The same leaders guide the trade unions, betray the general strike, lead the electoral campaign and later sit on ministries. The Labour party and the trade unions - these are not two principles they are only a technical division of labour. Together they form the fundamental prop of the British bourgeois. The latter cannot be overthrown without overthrowing the Labourite bureaucracy. [1929, 'The Errors in Principle of Syndicalism', in Leon Trotsky on the Trade Unions (New York, 1969), 29]

Such a view did not lead him to downplay the importance of the trade unions in any way: he stressed their importance in Where is Britain Going?, written in 1925; and again in 1933:

The trade union question remains the most important question of proletarian policy in Great Britain, as well as in the majority of old capitalist countries. The mistakes of the Comintern in this field are innumerable. No wonder: a party's inability to establish correct relations with the class reveals itself most glaringly in the area of the trade union movement. [1933, 'The ILP and the New International', in Trotsky's Writings on Britain, vol. 3 (London, 1974), 75]

In 1925 the Soviet trade unions formed an alliance with the leadership of the British trade unions called the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Committee (ARC). The betrayal of the 1926 General Strike by these very same leaders, the lefts included, caused Trotsky to call for a break with the ARC. In the subsequent debates Trotsky elaborated his approach to united fronts and alliances with left reformists.

A basic principle of this tactic is: 'With the masses - always; with the vacillating leaders - sometimes, but only as long as they stand at the head of the masses.' [1926, 'Resolution on the General Strike in Britain', in Leon Trotsky on Britain (New York, 1973), 255]

In particular cases, the tactic of the united front can lead to temporary agreements with this or that left group of reformists against the right wing. But such agreements must not in any circumstances be transformed into a lasting political block [...]

While giving all-round support to the movement of the truly revolutionary minority and particularly while giving support to acceptable candidacies of representatives of this minority for this or that position in the trade union movement (always on the basis of a specific practical programme), the British Communist Party must not in any circumstances or under any conditions identify itself with the Minority Movement or merge the organisations. The British Communist Party must maintain full freedom of criticism with respect to the Minority Movement as a whole as well as with respect to its individual leaders, their mistakes and vacillations. [1927, 'Amendments to the Resolution on the Situation in Britain', in Leon Trotsky on Britain, 260-2]  

The possibility of betrayal is always contained in reformism. But this does not mean to say that reformism and betrayal are one and the same at every moment. Not quite. Temporary agreements may be made with reformists whenever they take a step forward. [1928, 'A Balance Sheet of the Anglo-Russian Committee', in Leon Trotsky on Britain, 300]

He summed up this period, and made a perceptive observation on the thinking of the British working class, in a letter written in 1931:

The British proletariat, the oldest, with the most traditions, is, in its thinking methods, most empirical, carries in its chest two souls, and turns, as it were, with two faces to historical events. The contemptible mercenary and servile bureaucrats of the trade unions and the Labour Party give expression to all that is rotten, humiliating, serf-like and feudal in the British working class. Against this, the task of the Communist Party consists in giving expression to the potential revolutionary qualities of the British working class, which is very great and capable of developing immense explosive powers. But in the very critical period of British history, 1925-27, all the policies of the British Communist Party and the Comintern consisted in the slave-like assimilation of the trade union leadership, its idealisation, blotting out its treason, and fastening the confidence of the working class to it. The young British Communist Party was because of this deeply demoralised. [...]

The British workers think slowly, since their consciousness is filled with the rubbish of centuries. But they think. Single articles, appeals, slogans, generally pass them unnoticed. However, whole periods of politics (Anglo-Russian Committee, 'Third Period') in no respect pass without trace, at least, with the most progressive, militant, critical and revolutionary section of the working class. [1931, 'The First British Trotskyists' [Letter to Reg Groves], in Trotsky's Writings on Britain, vol. 3, 61-63]

On a later article, he further examined the attitude of many workers to their trade unions.

The trade unions were formed during the period of growth and rise of capitalism. They had as their task the raising of the material and cultural level of the proletariat and the extension of its political rights. This work, which in Britain lasted over a century, gave the trade unions tremendous authority amongst the workers. The decay of British capitalism, under the conditions of decline of the world capitalist system, undermined the basis for the reformist work of the trade unions. Capitalism can continue to maintain itself only by lowering the standard of living of the working class. Under these conditions trade unions can either transform themselves into revolutionary organisations or become lieutenants of capital in the intensified exploitation of the workers. The trade union bureaucracy, which has satisfactorily solved its own social problems, took the second path. It turned all the accumulated authority of the trade unions against the socialist revolution and even against any attempts of the workers to resist the attacks of capital and reaction.

From that point on, the most important task of the revolutionary party became the liberation of the workers from the reactionary influence of the trade union bureaucracy.

[...] As was said, the trade unions now play not a progressive but a reactionary role. Nevertheless, they still embrace millions of workers. One must not think that the workers are blind and do not see the change in the historic role of the trade unions. But what is to be done? The revolutionary road is seriously compromised in the eyes of the left wing of the workers by the zigzags and adventures of official communism. The workers say to themselves: the trade unions are bad, but without them it might be even worse. This is the psychology of one who is in a blind alley. Meanwhile, the trade union bureaucracy persecutes the revolutionary workers ever more boldly, ever more impudently replacing internal democracy by the arbitrary action of a clique, in essence, transforming the trade unions into some sort of concentration camp for the workers during the decline of capitalism.

[...] It is absurd to think that it would be possible to work against the trade union bureaucracy with its own help, or only with its consent. Insofar as it defends itself by persecutions, violence, expulsions, frequently resorting to the assistance of government authorities, we must learn to work in the trade unions discreetly, finding a common language with the masses but not revealing ourselves prematurely to the bureaucracy. It is precisely in the present epoch, when the reformist bureaucracy of the proletariat has transformed itself into the economic police of capital, that revolutionary work in the trade unions, performed intelligently and systematically, may yield decisive results in a comparatively short time. [1933, 'The ILP and the New International', in Trotsky's Writings on Britain, vol.3, 75-77]

 

The ILP Split from the Labour Party

When Labour leader Ramsey MacDonald formed a coalition government with the Tories and Liberals in 193 the Independent Labour Party (ILP) split from Labour. Trotsky devoted considerable energy to winning the ILP's base to revolutionary Marxism. His comments touched on many aspect of revolutionary strategy and concrete application in Britain at that time. He began by examining whether it was correct for the Trotskyists (who called themselves Bolshevik-Leninists at this time) to join, or enter, the ILP.

I shall try to examine the principled conditions for and against the entry [...]

In its present state, the ILP is a left-centrist party. It consists of a number of factions and shadings that are indicative of the different stages of evolution from reformism to communism. Should the Bolshevik-Leninists enter into the official Communist Parties, which they had long designated, and with full reason, as centrist organisations? For a number of years, we have considered ourselves Marxist factions of centrist parties. A categorical answer - yes, yes; no, no - is insufficient also in this case. A Marxist party should, of course, strive to full independence and to the highest homogeneity. But in the process of it formation, a Marxist party often has to act as a faction of a centrist and even reformist party. Thus the Bolsheviks adhered for a number of years to the same party with the Mensheviks. Thus, the Third International only gradually formed itself out of the Second.

Centrism, as we have said more than once, is a general name for most varied tendencies and groupings spread out between reformism and Marxism. In front of each centrist grouping it is necessary to place an arrow indicating the direction of its development: from right to left or from left to right.

[...] Left flanks have separated from the reformist camp, which has grown considerably in numbers. These flanks also have a centrist character, but they move towards the left and, as demonstrated by experience, are capable of development and yielding to Marxist influence. Let us recall once more that the Third International originated from organisations of this sort. (1933, 'Letter to the British Section', in Trotsky's Writings on Britain, vol.3, 87-88]

The ILP broke away from the Labour Party. That was correct. If the ILP wanted to become the revolutionary lever, it was impossible for the handle of this lever to be left in the hands of the thoroughly opportunist and bourgeois careerists. Complete and unconditional political and organisational independence of a revolutionary party is the first prerequisite for its success.

But while breaking away from the Labour Party, it was necessary immediately to turn towards it. [...]

The Leninist method of the united front and political fraternisation with reformists exclude each other. Temporary practical fighting agreements with mass organisations even headed by the worst reformists are inevitable and obligatory for the revolutionary party. Lasting political alliances with reformist leaders without a definite programme, without concrete duties, without the participation of the masses themselves in militant actions, are the worst type of opportunism. [1934, 'For the Fourth International', in Trotsky's Writings on Britain, vol.3, 94]

The ILP split from the Labour Party chiefly for the sake of keeping the independence of its parliamentary faction. We do not intend here to discuss whether the split was correct at the given moment, and whether the ILP gleaned from it the expected advantages. We don't think so. But it remains a fact that for every revolutionary organisation in England its attitude to the masses and to the class is almost coincident with its attitude to the Labour Party, which bases itself upon the trade unions. At this time the question of whether to function inside the Labour Party or outside it is not a principled question, but a question of actual possibilities. In any case, without a strong faction in the trade unions, and, consequently, in the Labour Party itself, the ILP is doomed to impotence even today. Yet, for a long period, the ILP attached much greater importance to the 'united front' with the insignificant Communist Party than to work in mass organisations. The leaders of the ILP consider the policy of the opposition wing of the Labour party to be incorrect out of considerations which are absolutely unexpected: although 'they (the Opposition) criticise the leadership and policy of the party but, owing to the block vote and the form of organisation in the party, they cannot change the personnel and policy of the Executive and Parliamentary Party within the period necessary to resist capitalist reaction, fascism and war'. The policy of the opposition in the Labour Party is unspeakably bad. But this only means that it is necessary to counterpose to it inside the Labour party another, correct Marxist policy. This isn't so easy? Of course not! But one must know how to hide one's activities from the police vigilance of Sir Walter Citrine and his agents, until the proper time. But isn't it a fact that a Marxist faction would not succeed in changing the structure and policy of the Labour party? With this we are entirely in accord: the bureaucracy will never surrender. But the revolutionists, functioning inside and outside, can and must succeed in winning over tens and hundreds of thousands of workers. The criticism directed by the ILP against the left-wing faction in the Labour Party is of an obviously artificial character. [1935, 'The Middle of the Road', in Trotsky's Writings on Britain, vol.3, 107]

United fronts [with the CP - eds.] for certain specific actions could have been of some use, of course, but the most important united front for the ILP is with the Labour Party, the trade unions, the co-operatives. [1936, 'Once Again the ILP' in Trotsky's Writings on Britain, vol.3, 123]

By 1936 Trotsky was convinced that the ILP was a lost cause and that the Trotskyists should focus their attention on the Labour Party. He began by explaining the relationship between the Labour Party, the mass of workers and the revolutionaries.

It is argued that the Labour Party already stands exposed by its past deeds in power and its present reactionary platform. For example, by its decisions at Brighton. For us - yes! But not for the masses, the eight million who voted Labour. It is a great danger for revolutionists to attach too much importance to conference decisions. We use such evidence in our propaganda - but it cannot be presented beyond the power of our own press. One cannot shout louder than the strength of his own throat. [1935 'Once Again the ILP' in Trotsky's Writings on Britain, vol.3, 118-119]

He explained how the revolutionaries should join the Labour Party and work within it.

[...] it may be necessary to enter as individuals first and spend one, two or three months in exploring the avenues of work. The important thing is to get in. [...] Our subsequent actions will depend on our progress within the Labour Party. It is very important that we do not lay ourselves open at the beginning to attacks from the Labour Party bureaucracy, which will result in our expulsion without having gained any appreciable strength. [...] It is as well to remember that as the political situation develops, revolutionary work will become increasingly dangerous and we will be better protected within the broad masses of the Labour Party than in the isolated and rotting corpse of the ILP. [...] A situation may rapidly arise requiring one or two of our best speakers to bring forth our complete revolutionary position thus deliberately inviting expulsion for themselves, as martyrs are useful to every movement.

[...] The fact that Lenin was not afraid to split with Plekhanov in 1905 and to remain as a small isolated group bears no weight because the same Lenin remained inside the Social Democracy until 1912 and in 1920 urged the affiliation of the British Communist Party to the Labour Party. While it is necessary for the revolutionary party to maintain its independence at all times, a revolutionary group of a few hundred comrades is not a revolutionary party and can work most effectively at present by Opposition to the social patriots within the mass parties. In view of the increasing acuteness of the international situation, it is absolutely essential to be within the mass organisations while there is a possibility of doing revolutionary work within them. Any such sectarian, sterile and formalistic interpretation of Marxism in the present situation would disgrace an intelligent child of 10. [1936, 'Interview with Collins', in Trotsky's Writings on Britain, vol.3, 138-141]

Finally, a point from a discussion with C L R James, on how revolutionaries should advocate a Labour government, without spreading illusions about it.

James: We have had difficulty in Britain with advocating a Labour government with the necessary reservations.

Trotsky: In France in all our press, in our archives and propaganda, we regularly make all the necessary reservations. Your failure in Britain is due to lack of ability; also lack of flexibility, due to the long domination of bourgeois thought in Britain. I would say to British workers, 'You refuse to accept my point of view. Well, perhaps I did not explain well enough. Perhaps you are stupid. Anyway I have failed. But now, you believe in your party. Why allow Chamberlain to hold power? Put your party in power. I will help you all I can. I know that they will not do what you think, but as you don't agree with me and we are small, I will help you put them in. [1939, Trotsky's Writings on Britain, vol.3, 144]

 

A Summary

It is possible to draw out a number of themes from the previous sections:

1. Rejection of any abstract principles and the need to make a real analysis of relation of class forces, the existing mass organisations, the consciousness of the masses and strength of the vanguard.

2. Having made this analysis the task of a revolutionary group is to find the most effective way to draw closer to the masses and fight the right-wing leaders.

3. In Western Europe this means a central strategic orientation to the existing workers' parties and trade unions. This may not always involve entry but it does mean a consistent political orientation to these organisations. The reformist parties may stand exposed to us, the revolutionary minority, but they are not to the mass of workers. It is only through their own practical experience that these workers will break from reformism.

4. The mass organisations gained their credibility from their reformist work during the rise of imperialism and the more recent post-war boom. Imperialism in crisis can no longer grant such reforms. Fearful and unwilling to break with capitalism, the bureaucracy is forced to attack the very gains it previously secured. Such a policy will inevitably produce political crises in the workers' movement, which will eventually find organisational expression in the form of splits and fusions.

5. Where legitimate hatred of reformism leads newly radicalised workers to draw incorrect tactical conclusions, we reserve the right to comradely criticism. Our aim is to win them to the most effective strategy and tactics to take their struggle forward.

6. Temporary agreements with left reformists are acceptable and necessary. They should be organised on a clear basis and should not be turned into lasting political blocks.

7. The revolutionary group must always maintain full freedom to criticise the reformists and centrists. Temporary suspension of a public profile is nevertheless acceptable in order to prevent premature expulsion from the mass organisations without having made gains. A concrete assessment must be made in each case.

8. In Britain our strategic orientation must address the special nature of the labour movement. We struggle against a single Labourist bureaucracy which operates a technical division of labour. The specific focus of this struggle will shift between the Labour Party and the trade unions - but it remains a political fight against the bureaucracy as a whole.

9. The ineffectiveness of the left reformists is not a sufficient reason to reject Labour Party work. This only means that we should advance a more effective method of conducting the fight in the Labour Party.

Of course there is a danger of taking the above as a series of timeless principles. The Britain in which we now work is very different from that analysed by Lenin and Trotsky. The mass illusions in reformism which previously existed have given way to cynicism in many workers. The rise of the Scottish and Welsh national questions and the autonomous movements of women, black people and lesbians and gays present new challenges and opportunities. All these developments must be integrated into our politics and practice. We would argue that this can best be done within the general framework outlined above.

 

Appendix 

There is an ancient, evolutionary-liberal epigram: every people gets the government it deserves. History, however, shows that one and the same people may in the course of a comparatively brief epoch get very different governments (Russia, Italy, Germany, Spain, etc.) and furthermore the order of these governments doesn't at all proceed in one and the same direction: from despotism - to freedom, as was imagined by the evolutionist liberals. The secret is this, that a people is comprised of hostile classes, and the classes themselves are comprised of different and in part antagonistic layers which fall under different leadership; furthermore every people falls under the influence of other people who are likewise comprised of classes. Governments do not express the systematically growing 'maturity' of a 'people' but are the product of the struggle between classes and different layers within one and the same class, and, finally, the action of external forces - alliances, wars and so on. To this should be added that a government, once it has established itself, may endure much longer than the relationship of forces which produced it. It is precisely out of this historical contradiction that revolutions, coup d'etats, counter-revolutions, etc. arise.

The very same dialectical approach is necessary in dealing with the question of the leadership of a class. Imitating the liberals our sages tacitly accept the axiom that every class gets the leadership it deserves. In reality leadership is not at all a mere 'reflection' of a class or the product of its own free creativeness. A leadership is shaped in the process of clashes between the different classes or the friction between the different layers within a given class. Having once arisen, the leadership invariably rises above its class and thereby becomes predisposed to the pressure and influence of other classes. The proletariat may 'tolerate' for a long time a leadership that has suffered a complete inner degeneration but has not yet had the opportunity to express its degeneration amid great events. A great historic shock is necessary to reveal sharply the contradiction between the leadership and the class. The mightiest shocks are wars and revolutions. Precisely for this reason the working class is often caught unawares by war and revolution. But even in cases where the old leadership has revealed its internal corruption, the class cannot improvise immediately a new leadership, especially if it has not inherited from the previous period strong revolutionary cadres capable of utilising the collapse of the old leading party. [1940, 'The Class, the Party and the Leadership', in Leon Trotsky, The Spanish Revolution (1931-39) (New York, 1973), 357-358]

 

The Political Forces in the Workers' Movement3

Any attempt to relate the method outlined above to the present situation must begin with an assessment of the political forces within the workers' movement. Without this any application of specific tactics outlined by Lenin or Trotsky would become an abstract application of the dogmas of 'great men'.

It is clear that Kinnock and Willis represent a new low in class collaboration and capitulation for British working class leadership in recent times. Whilst they have not yet committed betrayals of the scale of 1914 or 1926 the consequences of their politics lead inevitably in that direction. The continued decline of British imperialism in the context of a world recession allows no place for consensus labourism. Having solved their own social problems the Labour Party and trade union leaderships now clearly take the side of the bourgeoisie. In defence of the present system they have become reformists without reforms. They gladly accept an increased police role in the workplace through deals with management and in the councils through enthusiastic implementation of Tory policies. But the bankruptcy of their methods constantly undermines their position, many workers are leaving the trade unions and Labour Party, their illusions replaced by a bitter cynicism.

Yet it would be wrong to deduce from these twelve years of betrayals any fundamental change in the nature of the TUC or the Labour Party. The Labour Party remains a 'bourgeois workers' party' and still retains that unique feature which motivated Lenin and Trotsky to give it such close attention - the membership of millions of workers through their trade unions. Sections of the leadership may well make moves to weaken these links, or even to break them, but this has not happened yet. Given the material and subjective obstacles, however, such a development would be highly unlikely in the short term.

This is not to deny that enormous changes have taken place within the party. The political shift to the right has been accompanied by increasing attacks on party democracy. Since the early eighties various sections of the left have been the target of witch-hunts; this is currently reaching new proportions. We have seen supporters of Militant and Socialist Organiser witch-hunted along with poll tax and anti-war activists. This trend is set to deepen with the exclusion of Fields and Nellist and the wholesale expulsion of hundreds more Militant supporters (if they don't leave first!). There is a very real possibility of the complete elimination of the democratic space which still exists within the Labour Party, a possibility which we must discuss and prepare for now.

The defeat of the two most significant mass struggles against Thatcherism was key to creating this situation in the Labour movement. The miners' strike was the most significant challenge to new realism that we have yet seen. Its defeat not only weakened the left and destroyed the NUM as a political force but greatly strengthened the new realist right. Similarly the poll tax posed the possibility of widespread struggle by millions of workers outside the control of the bureaucracy. Yet an organised and effective mass movement was only sustained in Scotland and this weakness allowed the Tories to effect an orderly retreat. Whilst they were in a sense defeated, their army remains intact. The victorious army, which was never more than a rabble, is however completely disintegrated and directionless. These two key struggles, both defeated, were key to the consolidation of the current right wing leadership. This has produced two effects amongst activists and the broader working class:

(1) Demoralisation - membership of the Labour Party has declined and the active membership still further. People have been ground down by ten years of Thatcherism and see no way of fighting back. Within the broader working class a similar desperate demoralisation has occurred, which in the current economic situation is accompanied by lumpenisation and petty-bourgeoisification of whole strata, particularly the youth.

(2) Leftism - Lenin observed that 'Anarchism was not infrequently a kind of penalty for the opportunist sins of the Labour movement'. Never was this more true than today. The growth of Anarchist groups, again particularly amongst the youth, and their role in the poll tax movement testify to this. Anyone who has read Class War recently will see a marked change from the left wing Viz of some years ago. The growth of the SWP indicates a similar phenomenon along with Militant's new left turn.

Of these latter developments by far the most important for us is the left turn of the Militant. We have previously characterised the Militant as a rightward-moving centrist organisation whose main strategy was winning the leadership of the Labour Party. They coupled serious accommodations to British chauvinism with deep seated sectarianism to groups and movements outside their control. Maintaining entry through the 70s made them well placed to take advantage of the left developments in the Labour Party in the early 80s and they grew parasitically out of Bennism. Despite this the current learnt none of the positive lessons of this period such as the need for the Labour movement to struggle for women's and black liberation and the need for building united fronts. Notwithstanding these major weaknesses the Militant has always had a larger working class base than the other left organisations and have shown considerable political acumen in their chosen areas of work.

They saw the potential of the Poll Tax as a motivator for real struggle much earlier than any other group and enthusiastically turned towards it. Despite their initial successes, particularly in Scotland, the campaign soon grew too big for them. After a severe fright with the Trafalgar Square riots they effectively closed down the British Federation. Unable to see mass mobilisations through to the end they began resorting to increasingly ultra-left tactics in the regions. Working in this way for over a year and increasingly recruiting on this basis could not but leave its mark on an organisation such as the Militant which lacked a sound programmatic basis. A temporary position of working outside the Labour Party due to the failures of the Labour Party leadership quickly became the norm. The centre of gravity of the organisation swung away from the Labour Party and trade unions and their politics were bound to follow suit.

When the Tories retreated on the Poll Tax the Militant were forced to call it a major victory. They did this in order to save face, motivate their new base and cover up for the fact that they were in no position to inflict a real defeat on the government. We must be clear that this position is totally false, this was no defeat for the government, still less a rout and can best be described as a forced retreat. Thus the whole political analysis on which the Militant base their new turn is completely false.

We would characterise this new position as an ultra-left reflex by a centrist organisation, carried out under the worst possible conditions. It is in no way a positive break from the Labour Party by a class-struggle or revolutionary group. Analogies with the ILP in the 30s are not appropriate in our opinion. We lay the blame for such leftism on Kinnock and Willis, it is their failure to act in the struggle against the Poll Tax that creates some support for such desperate acts in the working class. Nevertheless it would be completely wrong of us not to explain why we think Militant are making a big mistake, which could be very damaging for the left and effectively aid and strengthen the right wing leaders. It is very difficult to say how far Militant will take their new project or how effective it will be in winning some small forces. With the exception of Scotland and Liverpool it seems unlikely that they will get very far.

The seriousness of this development and the very real possibility of a split in the organisation demands a specific orientation to the Militant and its base. This means discussions with their new periphery on their completely mistaken assessment of the political situation and the importance of the labour movement and discussions with their more experienced cadre on how their new turn breaks with the one positive aspect of Militant's politics, their orientation to the Labour Party. If we can show ourselves to be a small but serious group which attempts to develop its programmatic clarity, which tries as far as possible to root itself in the Labour Party and trade unions and which seeks to fight the right wing in the most effective way possible then we can expect to make small but significant gains from the Militant. Should their project find support, with a new influx of people changing the character of the organisation, then we should consider fraction work but we don't think this is currently posed.

The most important left reformist current which exists at present is the Socialist Movement (SM). It will be an important element of our work in the short term and as such demands careful analysis. Its leadership on a British state level is composed of left Labour MPs, left intellectuals around the Socialist Society, individual left activists and ourselves. There is also input from left greens and some Scottish and Welsh nationalists. As such the organisation is extremely heterogeneous and its politics remain very unclear. Such lack of clarity and purpose is reflected in its inability to organise action around key issues such as the Poll Tax and the Gulf War. The nature of the SM in Scotland appears to be very different and is excluded from the following comments due to a lack of information on our part. (This is true for the whole document, though the situation in Scotland seems to be of a very particular and advanced nature which demands urgent prioritisation by our organisation.)

The terminal crisis of Stalinism has further contributed to muddying the thinking of many activists in the SM. The ideas of 'open structures', 'broad movements', 'consensus' and 'anti centralism' dominate its political thinking, reflecting the ideological confusion of this period. Of course these reactions are in some ways healthy. Many people will turn to the SM as an antidote to the bankruptcy of Stalinism and the chauvinism, tedium and lack of democracy in the official labour movement. But if the SM is truly to break with the bad practices of the past and serve as an effective instrument to fight the right-wing its leadership must be placed under the control of its activists. Leaving the effective leadership of the movement in the hands of an unrepresentative London clique, which 'knows best' what to do, is just as undemocratic and ultimately stifling as the 'old' methods. Whilst the SM remains in its present state, lacking any centralising political priorities around which to organise campaigns, the building of local SM groups will be impossible.

The debates around the SM paper illustrate many of the problems that exist. The first two issues are frankly dreadful. The last thing the British left needs is an attractive looking but politically vacuous paper with special offers on organic wine. The paper in its present form reflects and gives voice to all the worst aspects of the SM, the best aspects, particularly the Socialist Movement Trade Union Committee (SMTUC), are completely swamped. It was a mistake to support the launch of the Socialist before even minimum clarity about its political basis was achieved. We certainly should not be accommodating to this lack of clarity by supporting its campaign for an 80% reduction in arms spending in an editorial of our paper. Our position remains, 'not a penny not a person for imperialism's wars', and not '20 per cent of a penny 20 per cent of a person for imperialist defence'.

The real strength of the SM is the SMTUC. This is an excellent project which shows in exemplary fashion how to work with left reformists to most effectively attack the right-wing. The initiative would not have been possible without the support of the Labour MPs and illustrates how our Labour Party and trade union work can compliment each other. Its strength lies in having a clear campaigning priority which directly addresses the key issue facing trade union activists. It is the only organised force opposing new realism in the unions today, around which left trade unionists can regroup in order to fight back. We should take pride in the fact that we were central to launching this initiative, which finds a real resonance with trade union activists. It is striking that the SWP, with many times as many members, is completely unable to develop such a campaign, hampered as it is by a false understanding of the British labour movement.

Despite our criticisms we are in no way suggesting that we should withdraw from the SM, the demise of which would be a defeat for the left and mean the end of important campaigns like the SMTUC. Neither are we suggesting that we should simply work in the SMTUC. What we do need is to more openly voice our differences with the SM and its leadership, whilst making clear what we see as its strengths and proposing a way forward. At present we acknowledge major problems in our pre-conference bulletins but act as completely uncritical cheer-leaders for the SM and its press in our own newspaper. This miseducates our periphery on the nature of the SM and our role within it.

 

Appendix: Trotskyist Tactics in the 1930s

A discussion of the early history of British Trotskyism is fraught with difficulties. The subject is very poorly documented. Contemporary accounts of factional disputes arc often obscured by their over-heated polemical style. Equally, more recent histories, often written by participants in the events they describe, can be highly partisan and subjective.

Despite these problems we agree with Barclay et al4 of the need for a 'serious attitude to the history of the struggle in Britain to build a Trotskyist organisation.' The early British Trotskyists had to grapple with many problems that have a relevance for us today. What attitude to the Labour Party? How do you survive as a revolutionary organisation of tens or hundreds of people - 'against the stream' - in an advanced capitalist country? On what basis do you fuse with, or split from, other (would-be) revolutionary groups?

Barclay et al go on to draw on the experiences of British Trotskyists in the 1930s to illustrate their own understanding of the nature of our own Labour Party work. They state that the:

Revolutionary Socialist League, the British section of the Fourth International [...] was able to combine harmoniously in one leadership the 'open work' of C L R James and the Marxist Group (with their paper Workers' Fight) with the 'entry work' of Harber and Jackson (with their paper Militant).

And that:

In summer and autumn of 1938, the British section of the Fourth International, the Revolutionary Socialist League (mark one) used its resources to present its line by two separate methods simultaneously. The 'open work' was around the journal Workers' Fight, which C L R James edited. It openly reported the formation of the Fourth International. [...] The paper devoted to [entry] work, on the other hand, the [...] Militant, devoted attention to the conflicts in the working class as they expressed themselves in the Labour Party in order to hold together the left there.

This is not quite the whole picture. The Revolutionary Socialist League (RSL), 'mark one', was founded in February 1938. It was the result of a fusion of two groups: the Marxist Group of C L R James, which had recently turned from entry in the ILP to an 'open group' perspective and the Marxist League of Harry Wicks and Reg Groves, which had been engaged in entry in the Labour Party, specifically in the Socialist League and its successor the Socialist Left Federation. Wicks was later to comment that the fusion '[...] was not politically prepared.' [Sam Bornstein and Al Richardson, Against the Stream (London, 1986), 269]

There were another three significant Trotskyist organisations in Britain at this time: the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), a syndicalist-influenced organisation based in Scotland; the Militant group of Harber and Jackson in the Labour Party, formed in 1936 out of the Marxist Group, and the Workers' International League (WIL), a split from the Militant group which had emerged by the end of 1937.

In the summer of 1938, in the run-up to the founding conference of the Fourth International, James Cannon and Max Shachtmann arrived in Britain from the international leadership to try and sort out this mess and form a unified British section. After discussions with the individual groups a conference was called in 1938 where they were presented with a 'Peace and Unity Agreement'. The RSP, RSL and the Militant group all signed; the WIL refused. The new organisation took over the name Revolutionary Socialist League. This RSL (actually mark 2) is the one referred to by Barclay et al.

The WIL were highly critical of the fusion process:

At this conference the 'Peace and Unity Agreement' was drawn up and presented by the American comrades. There was no political discussion of the differences of tactics and perspectives for Britain, which had separated the groups for years [...]

We [the WIL - eds.] claimed that the so-called 'unification' was not an unification at all but was merely a prelude to further splits because of two fundamental factors: there was no unified tactic and therefore no unified body; with two tactics in operation without a majority decision, it was impossible to work as an unified body. ['The WIL View', Revolutionary History, Spring 1988, 23]

The cracks soon began to appear. The RSP never even made it as far as the first conference in February 1939, having been excluded from the new organisation for making sharp criticisms of the leadership. The conference itself began with the expulsion of a number of leading comrades, prompting a walk-out of 16 delegates, to set up a new organisation comprising a majority of the 'open' section. They were soon followed by Gerry Bradley, Henry Sara and Harry Wicks, all serious cadre who had been active in the movement for many years. The subsequent evolution of the RSL was dogged by factionalism, splits, expulsions and resignations. At the fusion conference the membership stood at 170, one account puts the figure for the summer of 1943 at 23 [Sam Bornstein and Al Richardson, War and the International (London, 1986), 42].

The degeneration of the RSL cannot be put down solely to the difficulties of operating in war-time. The other major Trotskyist organisation, the WIL, managed to grow, build a base and avoid the factional chaos that dogged the RSL. In March 1944 the WIL and what was left of the RSL fused to form the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP). The WIL current was by far and away the dominant section of the new organisation, both numerically and in terms of political maturity.

Barclay et al present their view of 'fraction work' (a legitimate tactic under the right conditions) by calling on the example of the RSL. Our reading of the facts suggests that this particular combination of 'open' and entry work was not an example of a carefully thought out tactic to enable the best intervention in the class struggle but rather an organisational compromise which failed to address and resolve deep political differences within a common organisation.


Notes

1 Written in October 1991 for the pre-conference discussion period of the International Socialist Group (ISG), the then British section of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, this text was reproduced in 1994 for a Socialist Outlook discussion meeting on the subject of how revolutionaries should orientate to the British Labour Party, and also in 1995, when it was again submitted to an ISG pre-conference. In its original 1991 form the text contained a discussion of other positions being put forward in the pre-conference debates, as well as some practical proposals regarding education and propaganda - omitted here, as they were in the text's 1994 and 1995 incarnations, because of their ephemeral nature. The bibliographical appendix, incorporated in the later versions of the text, has here been omitted since it is now out of date. The appendix referring to the early history of the British Trotskyist movement, a subject in the original - 1991 - debates to which the text addresses itself, although omitted from the later versions, has here been retained. The section of the original text which drew a balance sheet of the political forces within the contemporary labour movement was updated for the 1994 version of the text, but omitted from its 1995 version: the section included here is that from the original document - the 1994 updated version is appended as a footnote. The 1994 version of the text opened with a different introduction to the other versions: this latter is here appended as a footnote. The references for all the previous versions of the text were in-text: all footnotes to be found here, therefore, have been subsequently added by ourselves - either to clarify issues of the nature of those addressed in this note, or to give additional background information that may not be readily known by the present-day reader, or the reader from outside the British state.

2 The 1994 version of the text carried the following introduction:

There is now a widespread discussion on the left about the changes being imposed on the Labour Party by the Blair leadership. For some organisations, such as the Socialist Workers' Party, Tony Blair is just another example of a reformist, sell-out Labour leader. Whilst for others, including Militant Labour, Blair is in the process of transforming the Labour Party into a new liberal party.

Our starting point in writing this document was to return to the writings of Lenin and Trotsky on the British labour movement in order to try and understand the method that they applied. We have tried to present the positions of Lenin and Trotsky in their own words, along with the necessary background information. We do this not to try and line up these 'great men' on our side but because we believe that their writings contain many helpful insights and an important general method.

The clarity and precision of their positions reflects their practical involvement in the October revolution and the building of the Communist International. By comparison, our limited experience means that we have in no way 'gone past' Lenin and Trotsky and that we still have much to learn from them. We would very much welcome comments on our selection of material and suggestions for any additional material that we may have missed.

3 In the 1994 version of the text this section was updated as follows.

It is clear that Blair and Monks represent a new low in class collaboration and capitulation for British working class leadership in recent times. Whilst they have not yet committed betrayals of the scale of 1914 or 1926 the consequences of their politics lead inevitably in that direction. The continued decline of British imperialism in the context of a world recession allows no place for consensus labourism. Having solved their own social problems the Labour Party and trade union leaderships now clearly take the side of the bourgeoisie. In defence of the present system they have become reformists without reforms.

They gladly accept an increased police role in the workplace through deals with management and in the local councils through enthusiastic implementation of Tory policies. But the bankruptcy of their methods constantly undermines their position, many workers are leaving the trade unions and Labour Party, their illusions replaced by a bitter cynicism.

Yet it would be wrong to deduce from these fifteen years of betrayals that there has been a fundamental change in the nature of the TUC or the Labour Party. The Labour Party remains a 'bourgeois workers' party' and still retains that unique feature which motivated Lenin and Trotsky to give it such close attention - the membership of millions of workers through their trade unions.

Sections of the leadership are moving to weaken these links, or even to break them, but this has not happened yet. Given the material and subjective obstacles, however, such a development is highly unlikely in the short term.

This is not to deny that enormous changes have taken place within the party. The political shift to the right has been accompanied by increasing attacks on party democracy. Since the early eighties various sections of the left have been the target of witch-hunts; this is currently reaching new proportions. We have seen supporters of Militant and Socialist Organiser witch-hunted along with poll tax and anti-war activists. There is a very real possibility of the complete elimination of the democratic space which still exists within the Labour Party, a possibility which we must discuss and prepare for now.

The defeat of the two most significant mass struggles against Thatcherism was key to creating this situation in the Labour movement. The miners strike was the most significant challenge to new realism that we have yet seen. Its defeat not only weakened the left and destroyed the NUM as a political force but greatly strengthened the new realist right. Similarly the poll tax posed the possibility of widespread struggle by millions of workers outside the control of the bureaucracy.

Yet an organised and effective mass movement was only sustained in Scotland and this weakness allowed the Tories to effect an orderly retreat. Whilst they were in a sense defeated, their army remains intact. The victorious army, which was never more than a rabble, ended up completely disintegrated and directionless. These two key struggles, both defeated, were key to the consolidation of the current right wing leadership. This has produced two effects amongst activists and the broader working class.

(1) Demoralisation - membership of the Labour Party has been declining and the active membership still further. People have been ground down by ten years of Thatcherism and see no way of fighting back. Within the broader working class a similar desperate demoralisation has occurred, which in the current economic situation is accompanied by lumpenisation and petty-bourgeoisification of whole strata, particularly the youth.

(2) Leftism - Lenin observed that: 'Anarchism was not infrequently a kind of penalty for the opportunist sins of the Labour movement' (in Left Wing Communism). Never was this more true than today. The growth of anarchist and new age protest groups, primarily amongst youth, was initially focused on the anti-poll tax movement. The new protest movements have complete contempt for established political parties and have vigorously campaigned on environmental issues, in defence of raves and against the Criminal Justice Act. The growth of the SWP indicates a similar phenomenon along with Militant's left turn.

The terminal crisis of Stalinism has further contributed to muddying the thinking of many left-wing activists. The ideas of 'open structures', 'broad movements', 'consensus' and 'anti-centralism' dominate their political thinking, reflecting the ideological confusion of this period. Of course these reactions are in some ways healthy, many people turn to these ideas as an antidote to the bankruptcy of Stalinism and the chauvinism, tedium and lack of democracy in the official labour movement. The fact remains that they are inadequate to meet the tasks ahead.

Despite all this, the Labour Party remains of central importance. Developments in the party have a direct influence on the trade unions and the wider protest movements. It is only necessary to consider issue like Clause IV and one-member, one-vote to see how the Labour Party influences the debates in the trade unions.

Similarly, as the beginnings of a public sector strike wave seem to be developing, the ASLEF [British train drivers' trade union] strikers look to the Labour Party for support, and are disappointed when it is not forthcoming. In Wales, the key battles on the Assembly question will be fought within the Labour party and affiliated trade unions.

Despite the many and varied attacks on party democracy in recent years, there remains a democratic space in the Labour party which we should utilise. The left which exists is small but in many ways it is far more serious, and better linked to the trade unions and outside struggles, than in previous years.

The real prospect of a Blair government and the many hopes and illusions that this engenders, makes this the very worst time to leave the Labour Party. Whatever the outcome of the next election, it will have enormous ramifications in the British labour movement. Now is the time to stay in and fight the right wing leaders, not let them off the hook.

4 One of the currents in the ISG at the time, led by the late John Archer.

 

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