Iraq Really Was a Tyranny:

There is almost no evidence of broad popular support for Saddam Hussein, although the Iraqis scarcely showed an overwhelming welcome to US and British forces. The Popular Army did not emerge as a meaningful force. Virtually all of the resistance in the south came from loyalist cadres and forces Saddam had used to reestablish control over the south after the uprisings in 1991. The same factors meant (hat Saddam could not develop a popular defense of Baghdad, and his cadres could only fight in scattered areas and without cohesion and coordination. The regular - heavily conscript - army. showed far less commitment to the regime than the Republican Guards.      

Iraq Had Rival, Politicized, Bureaucratic, and Compartmented Forces

At the start of the war, Iraq was still, the most effective military power in the Gulf, despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle.

Iraq still had armed forces with around 389,000 full time actives. Its army had some 350,000 actives, including some 100,000 called-up reservists, before it began a serious build-up in reaction to US and British deployments, and an inventory of some 2,200- 2,600 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons.

The Air Force had 20,000 men and over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. It had a 17,000-man air defense command with over 850 surface to air missile launchers and some 3,000 anti-aircraft guns. Iraq had a small 2,000 man navy with nine small combat ships and an unknown number .of mines and Silkworm land-based anti-ship missiles

However, Iraq's overlapping structure of forces and security elements were often better at watching each other and securing the regime than fighting. There was little coordination except at the local level, and command and control could not direct cohesive action, Iraq also suffered from the fact that it rebuilt its post-Gulf War forces more around internal security missions, regime stability, and static defense against Iraq than the lessons of the Gulf War.

Iraq remained the most effective military power in the Gulf, despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle. Iraq still has armed forces with around 389,000 full time actives. Its army had some 350,000 actives, including some 100,000 called-up reservists, before it began a serious build-up in reaction to US and British deployments, and an inventory of some 2,200-2,600 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons.

The Iraqi Air Force had 20,000 men and over 300 combat aircraft with potential
operational status. It had a 17,000 man air defense command with over 850 surface  to air missile launchers and some 3,000 anti-aircraft guns, and a small 2,000 man navy with nine small combat ships and an unknown number of "mines and Silkworm land-based anti-ship missiles.

Large parts of the Iraqi force structure were designed to cover the Iranian border, secure the Kurdish security zone, and fight a low-level battle against the Shiites in the south. Others were designed to protect the regime against other elements of the armed forces. The result was a garrison force optimized around the wrong missions.

 

The Iraqi air force and ground-base air defense forces, in turn, came to emphasize
survival and operations against low-level US and UK air operations in the Northern and Southern "No Fly Zones." They did design their tactics and operations to deal with large- scale operations.                                              

 

The Problem of Sanctions and Equipment Modernizations

The UN embargoed all arms shipments to Iraq after august-1990. Iraq was extremely dependent on arms imports, in spite of grandiose efforts to create its own arms industry. It not only needed the latest technology to compensate for poor military organization and training, it used imports to flood forwards supplies and replacement equipment to make up for its lack of effective combat recovery and repair and a modem and efficient logistics system.

Sanctions and the impact of the Gulf War had a major impact on Iraqi war fighting
capabilities. Iraq was not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any. Major equipment — with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic "dogfight" air-to- air missiles and erratic smuggling of e radars, night vision devices, munitions, and spare parts through Syria.

Iraq's inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces meant that much of its large order of battle was obsolescent or obsolete, it had uncertain combat readiness, and much of its equipment was difficult to sustain in combat. It also limited the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers, and then sustain coherent operations.

Iraq did, maintain much of the clandestine arms purchasing network that it set up during the time of the Iran-Iraq War. It had prior experience in buying from some 500 companies in 43 countries, and set up approximately 150 small purchasing companies or agents. Intelligence experts felt that Iraq also had an extensive network of intelligence agents and middlemen involved in arms purchases.

Iraq probably obtained some air defense equipment from countries like the Ukraine and China, and may have been able to smuggle in some spare parts through Syria, Turkey, and Jordan. Deliveries through Syria became significant after mid-2001, and included parts and weapons assemblies for MIG and Shukoi aircraft, armor, and land-based air defenses.

Nevertheless, Iraq was not been able to restructure its overall force restructure to
compensate for its prior dependence on an average of S3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It did not visibly deployed any major new weapon system after 1991, or show it could recapitalize any aspect of its force structure. About two-thirds of its remaining inventory of armor and its aircraft became obsolete by Westerns standards.

 

Iraqi Wartime Preparations Emphasized the Wrong Ideology and Psychological Operations

 

Iraq circulated literature to its field commanders and troops that emphasized defensive warfare, did not prepare them or air and missile attack, and which called for Jihad and Islamic martyrdom, rather than effectiveness tactics and combat. It called on Iraqi units for chemical warfare to be used against them and for dispersal rather than rapid response.

 

Instructions to units like the 51st Division near Basra emphasized reliance on faith and sacrifice, tactics like climbing palm trees for reconnaissance purposes, using alternative methods of communication, living on farms and digging wells, and other impractical activities totally unrelated to modem warfare.

The "Suicide Effect"

Rather than train properly for asymmetric warfare, troops were often given pointless ideological nonsense. While martyrdom and suicide attacks present problems for conventional forces, and some extremist elements will support and carry out such operations, large-scale military forces are more likely to take every opportunity to desert or avoid fighting. Ideological extremism motivates a small number of ideological extremists, not popular forces and modem armies.

 

Iraqi Command and Control was Never Effective, and Iraq Could Never
Recover in the Face of Airpower and the Speed of the Coalition Advance

 

It is unclear just how much of the Iraqi collapse was the result of attacks on its C4I
assets, the ability of allied airpower to paralyze its operations, and the slow-moving
nature of Iraq's land forces. Iraq was driven out-of balance by the speed of US maneuver, however, and by the flanking movement through the Western edge of the Euphrates and then the drive along the Eastern edge of the Tigris.

 

Once the US approached Baghdad it could neither maneuver quickly enough to establish a cohesive defense in depth or cope with US penetrations, and its decision-making cycle fell steadily behind the realities on the ground. By the time the US entered Baghdad, it had lost force cohesion and committed its best forces - the Republican Guards - in a piecemeal way in meeting engagements that virtually ensured its destruction.

 

A Blind Force as Well as One Without a Brain

Iraq had no satellites, minimal UAV assets, no survivable reconnaissance assets, poor artillery radar capability, no other airborne intelligence assets, and conducted minimal active reconnaissance. If its C4I problems deprived it of a functioning brain, its lack of modem ISR assets effectively left it blind in most aspects of combat beyond visual range.

 

Iraqi Irregular Warfare Tactics Were Unexpected but More an irritant than Effective  

Iraq seems to have badly exaggerated the potential importance of its tactics in trying to drawn US and British forces into the cities in the south and the value of using irregular forces. In practice, these tactics produced clashes and occasional successes, but the US quickly adjusted its tactics to bypass most cities, secure key bridges and route's, and give the pacification of cities secondary importance.

 

While the regime was often creative, it failed at fundamentals like blowing bridges,
creating large popular army forces that could present a serious threat to the US flanks, blowing oilfield, etc. Rather than fright or paralyze US and British forces, it largely succeeded in making them angry and delaying the humanitarian effort.

It is also becoming clearer that the regime fundamentally misjudged the popular support it could obtain from its own people and deployed arms caches in facilities for the Popular army at a massive level without being able to call up, arm, and deploy such forces. This may partly have been a function of time and disorganization at the top, but-it seems clear that many - if not most - of the  popular army simply did not support the regime and had no willingness to fight.

 

Misuse of Urban Warfare:

One ironic sub-lesson is that the bypasses and road nets that avoid cities greatly reduce their importance as potential defenses and barriers, and the best way to win an urban war is to avoid one.                                      

Iraq Failed to Use Its Weapons of Mass Destruction

There is no way to no how many weapons Iraq had or what its plans might be. The war caught Iraq, however, at the moment it was trying to prevent a conflict by complying with the IAEA and UNMOVIC and where it may have destroyed many of its holdings or dispersed them too far to recover.⁴⁴

Allied air power probably paralyzed any efforts to recover most such weapons, and
certainly destroyed many potential delivery systems. US, UK, and Australian  Special Forces were much better organized and equipped for the mission than in 1991, and much better supported with intelligence. The impact of eight years of UNSCOM and IAEA activity may also have done much to force Iraq to destroy its holdings.

There is also the possibility that Iraq felt sufficiently secure from an actual invasion so it shifted to a strategy of research and development and reliance on dual-use facilities to produce more weapons in the future. If so, it never had the chance to produce such weapons. The lesson unfortunately, is that there has never been an assurance Iraq could not use such weapons or that any other proliferating nation will not use them in the future.

 

Iraq Failed to Use Its Missiles Effectively

Missile, like bombs, are not terror weapons unless they can be used in sufficient numbers or with sufficient lethality to have major killing or destructive effects. -Iraq was never credited with more than 12-25 surviving Scuds and its Al Samoud II and Ababil missiles and rockets lacked the range, accuracy, and lethality to be much of a threat. Missile defenses and attacks on delivery systems further degraded a largely symbolic capability.

 

 

Failure to Use Water Barriers

 

For whatever reason, Iraq move too slowly to make use of water barriers, blew only a few bridges and often only partially and failed to defend against bridging and crossings as effectively as it should.

 

Force Protection

 

Iraq left many of its soldiers without meaningful protection gear and body armor, wasted committed personnel in suicide attacks, and could not evacuate personnel effectively. Attacks against unprotected civilians are one thing; attacks against alert and well- protected soldiers are another. Committing forces without proper personal protection does not produce martyrs, simply needless casualties.

 

THE VALUE OF ALLIES AND BUILD-UP TIME

The Iraq War also provides some important about regional friends and allies. In spite of all of the tensions between the US and the Arab world over-terrorism and the Second Intifada, the Untied States obtained sustained support from Kuwait,- Oman, and Qatar and quiet support from Saudi Arabia. This illustrated both the general value of alliances, and the dangers of assuming that force transformation is a substitute for foreign bases and the support of foreign states.

Access to allied territory in the Gulf allowed the US and Britain to deal with the key logistic problems in their build-up by slowly delivering virtually all of the supplies and major land combat equipment used by sea over the period from June 2002 to February 2003.

 

They had access to the critical bases in the Gulf that they needed for operations. Their allies in the Gulf then f made substantial adjustments to accommodate a democratic Turkey's refusal to allow the US to create a northern front or use facilities in that country. Other Arab allies also helped. Egypt allowed free transit through the Suez Canal, and Jordan quietly allowed US operations in the south as well as over flight operations.

 

In short, no discussion of the lessons of the Iraq War should ignore the continuing value of alliances and foreign bases, and the need for coalition partners. Equally, it should not ignore the value of decades of military relations and engagement with friendly' Arab states, and the willingness of those states to support the US even when they sometimes opposed the war or this presented serious problems in terms of domestic political opinion. It is all too easy for the US to be blinded by the beauty of its weapons and ignore these lessons. Regardless of force transformation and any "new way of. war, US strength remains dependent on coalitions, even when these are coalitions of the partly willing.