1. The Problem: According to Jewish, Christian, and Islamic tradition, hell is a pretty nasty place. Or, at the very least, it is a less desirable place to be than heaven—the inhabitants of which enjoy unalloyed bliss. Those who reside in hell have either failed to perform some good works or have failed to respond affirmatively and receive the offer of communion with God before death. And those who go to hell will be there for eternity. The traditional view of hell endorses the following three theses:
T1. Some persons are (or will be) in hell—that is, hell is (or will be) populated.
T2. Those persons who are consigned to go to hell will remain in hell forever.
T3. Heaven is a far superior place to be than is hell.
The problem that emerges for theists who believe in an afterlife is similar to what is encountered with the traditional problem of evil. The problem of hell, thus, emerges as a version of the problem of evil. Specifically, the problem of hell is a variety of the problem of evil that poses a unique problem for Jews, Christians, and Muslims who (a) believe in an afterlife, and (b) believe that some persons will experience eternal suffering, torment, and separation from God for an infinite period of time. An argument that clearly shows the analogous nature of the problem to the traditional problem of evil was formulated by Marilyn McCord Adams (herself a Christian theist—a philosopher at Yale and an Episcopal priest). Consider the following two propositions:
i. God exists, and is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
ii. Some created persons will be consigned to hell forever.
Adams argues in her essay, "The Problem of Hell: A Problem of Evil for Christians," that (i) and (ii) are logically incompatible in the same way that (i) and
iii. Evil exists
have been said to be logically incompatible. So she argues as follows.
iv. If God existed and were omnipotent, He would be able to avoid (ii).
v. If God existed and were omniscient, He would know how to avoid (ii).
vi. If God existed and were perfectly good, He would want to avoid (ii).
vii. Therefore, if (i), then not (ii).
Another argument has been offered by Theodore Sider (a philosophy professor at Rutgers who used to teach at the University of Rochester until about five years ago—he’s not a theist, but, interestingly, his father is a prominent—and rare—Leftist evangelical Christian leader). Sider argues that arbitrary cutoffs between damnation and salvation exist, and the arbitrariness of such cutoffs is inconsistent with the concept of a perfectly just God. Sider’s reasoning can be represented as follows.
1. There needs to be a criterion to determine whether or not someone goes to heaven or hell.
2. But on any criterion there are borderline cases.
3. To treat one person who barely ranks better than another and gets into heaven while the other goes into hell is manifestly unjust.
4. Any state of affairs like (3) is incompatible with divine justice.
5. If (4), then the traditional doctrine of hell is incompatible with divine justice.
6. So the traditional doctrine of hell is incompatible with divine justice.
2. Responses to the Traditional Doctrine of Hell: A plethora of views have been offered by theists in response to the problem of hell. Some have tried to defend the traditional doctrine of hell, others have suggested rejecting the doctrine altogether, while others advocate a myriad of alternative views of hell.
2.1. Rejecting Hell (Strong Universalism without Hell): Some endorse tossing any kind of hell. On such views, everyone gets into heaven right after death. Some have taken such views to offend against free choice, however. (A little anecdote: I have an atheist friend who is a lapsed Jew who once told me that he would not want to be forced into heaven—rather, he would want the option to keep as far away from God as he could. This doesn’t mean, of course, that, assuming there’s an after life, he favors the classical view of hell.) Very few people endorse this view given that it seems it would require that God totally change everyone’s character, again, doing violence to their agency.
2.2. Issuantism versus Retributivism: Among those who endorse the doctrine of hell there are two major camps. They regard the function of hell differently. The view one adopts here makes a big difference for what view of hell one endorses, if one endorses the doctrine at all.
2.2.1. Retributivism: Retributivists hold that hell is a place of punishment, where retributive justice is exacted against those who wind up in hell.
2.2.2. Issuantism: Hell is provided as a place for those who do not wish to be with God. It is not a place where retributive justice is exacted against the unrepentant. Rather, the provision of hell issues from God’s love for God’s creatures—God not desiring to force people to be with God.
2.3. Traditionalism: The traditional view of hell is the view of hell under scrutiny here. Some (like Jerry Walls) have tried to defend traditionalism. Traditionalists take it that there is no way out of hell, that hell is retributive, and that one resides there for all time. They argue, in effect, that the proper solution to the problem of hell is to treat it like the problem of moral evil. People misuse their free will. The good of having people use their free will to respond to God before death outweighs God adopting a different policy than the one described by traditionalism. The big problem with this view is that it falls prey to both Adams’ and Sider’s arguments rather quickly. For it seems arbitrary to cut off opportunities for repentance after death. Moreover, it seems unjust to punish people eternally for actions they performed in a finite amount of time and had finite consequences—the punishment is disproportionate to the crime. Some have tried to respond by saying that those in hell just keep sinning. But such a response holds out for everyone continuing to offend God and never having a change of heart, finishing their time, and then being reconciled with God.
2.4. Annihilationism: There are two versions of this. On a retributivist version, people do their time in hell, then God’s final act is to annihilate them. This avoids the charge of the punishment being disproportionate to the crime. On an issuant version, God allows people to choose to be annihilated—sort of like divine euthanasia (God as Kevorkian). They may stay in hell, however. The retributive view quickly falls prey to Sider’s objection. It may take the edge of Adams’ objection, but it still seems troublesome given that it cuts off opportunities for reunion with God at death.
2.5. Strong Universalism with Hell: On this view, everyone gets into heaven. On the retributivist version, agents are punished, then they all get into heaven. On the issuant version, hell just prepares those who are not ready to decide to go to heaven for heaven. In either case, God ensures that everyone gets in, even if God must finally override the freedom of agents. This view can do violence to the freedom of agents and it also closes final options to agents.
2.6. Weak Escapism: A view like this is endorsed by Jon Kvanvig, but he does not call it ‘weak escapism’. This is an issuant view of hell. On this view, hell is the experience of indecision between two logically possible choices—reunion with God in heaven or annihilation. Kvanvig speculates that no one actually gets out of this state, and that is what makes it genuinely hellish.
2.7. Strong Escapism: This is the view defended by Allen Plug and myself in our paper. On this view, the provision of hell issues from divine love—God not wanting to override human freedom. On this view it is metaphysically and psychologically possible for those in hell to leave at any time. It is argued that this is most consistent with God’s character (see the paper for the argument and objections). This view is consistent with God leaving the range of options for agents wide open—they may choose to be reconciled with God, choose annihilation, or choose to simply remain in hell (it is possible that all will choose one of the three—e.g., everyone decides to stay). It is also consistent with weak universalism, the idea that it is possible, perhaps even likely that all will be reconciled with God eventually. See the paper for both objections and responses to this view and how it responds to the Adams and Sider objections.