ACTION THEORY PAGE (Always a Work In Progress)
Maintained by Andrei BuckareffThis webpage is devoted to contemporary action theory, including the free will debate, practical reasoning, moral responsibility, the nature of intention and intentionality (and folk psychology more broadly), mental causation, moral psychology, and the assorted standard topics of interest philosophers of action work on (e.g., intentional action, reasons for action, etc.). I have modeled this page after Keith DeRose's Epistemology Page . Like DeRose's page, this is a work in progress, only mine is in its infancy.
As one may notice, action theory is one of those unique areas in philosophy with a boundary that is difficult to fix. The concerns of action theorists overlap with those doing work in other areas of the philosophy of mind and metaphysics, as well as moral philosophy, the philosophy of religion, logic, epistemology, legal philosophy, and, with the recent growing interest in social action theory, social and political philosophy.
What I intend to do in the weeks and months to come is provide a list of some of the most important collections of essays compiled since 1990, as well as some good monographs on topics in action theory. These volumes and articles may serve as a good starting point for those interested in action theory. Also, the anthologies listed should be in the library of any philosopher interested in the issues discussed by action theorists. The list I've provided below is far from comprehensive. I've also put links to the webpages of some of the philosophers listed. Additionally, following DeRose's example to some extent, if a prominent figure in the field has not published anything for some time, I've included his or her name and the most recent article or monograph I could find by the author. Finally, I list some M.A. and Ph.D. programs that have faculty members doing work in the philosophy of action or related areas, as well as Brian Leiter's list of the top schools to do work in action theory.
Alfred Mele, John Bishop, Robert Audi, Michael Bratman, Jennifer Hornsby, Robert Kane
Hugh J. McCann, Donald Davidson, Judith Jarvis Thomson, John Martin Fischer, John Searle, Alvin Goldman
Recent Collections of Essays
B. Malle, L. Moses, and Baldwin eds., Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition(Cambridge: MIT, 2001)
Jan Bransen and Stefaan E. Cuypers, eds., Human Action, Deliberation and Causation (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998)
Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, eds.,Countours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2002)
Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997)
Laura Waddell Ekstrom, ed., Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000)
John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, eds., Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993)
John Heil and Alfred Mele, eds., Mental Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)
Robert Kane, ed., The Oxford Companion to Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2001)
G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela, eds., Contemporary Action Theory, 2 vols., (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997)
Georg Meggle and Andreas Wojcik, eds., Actions, Norms, Values: Discussions with Georg Henrik von Wright (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998)
Alfred Mele, ed., The Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
Timothy O'Connor, ed., Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
Derk Pereboom, ed., Free Will, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997)
J. Roessler, & N. Eilan, eds., Agency and self-awareness: Issues in philosophy and psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press)
James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives: Action and Freedom, Volume 14 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000)
James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Volume 4, 1990)
Edna Ullmann-Margalit, ed., Reasoning Practically (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)
R. Jay Wallace, ed., Reason, Emotion and Will (Aldershot, England: Ashgate,1999)
Gary Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)
Recent Articles and Monographs with Links to Some of the Authors
-"It isn't what you think: a new idea about intentional causation," Nous, 29 (1995): 115-126.
Elizabeth Anscombe (Deceased, January 2001) -Intention, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000)(This is a reprint. I'm personally quite excited to see this seminal work once again made available for young philosophers like myself to purchase.) Robert Audi, University of Nebraska-Lincoln -Action, Intention, and Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) -"Acting from virtue," Mind, 104 (1995): 449-471. -"Intending and It's Place in the Theory of Action" Contemporary Action Theory, Vol. 1, G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela (eds.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), pp. 177-196. John Bishop, University of Auckland -Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) Myles Brand, Indiana University -Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984) Robert Brandom, University of Pittsburgh -Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) -"Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning," Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, James Tomberlin, ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) Michael Bratman, Stanford University -Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) -Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) -"Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency" The Philosophical Review, (2000): 35-61. - "Valuing and the Will"Philosophical Perspectives: Action and Freedom, volume 14 (2000): 249-265. Sarah Buss, University of Iowa -"What Practical Reasoning Must Be If We Act For Our Own Reasons," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999) -"Weakness of Will," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1997) -"Autonomy Reconsidered," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) Hector-Neri Castaneda (Deceased) -Thinking and Doing, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1975)Kam-Yueng Cheng, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
-"Davidson's action theory and epiphenomenalism," Journal of Philosophical Research, 22 (1997): 181-195
Roderick Chisholm (Deceased) Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (La Salle: Open Court, 1976)-"Agents, Causes, and Events: The Problem of Free Will," Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, Timothy O'Connor, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)
-"Freedom and Action," Freedom and Determinism, Keith Lehrer, ed. (New York: Random House, 1966)
-"The Descriptive Element in the Concept of Action," Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964): 613-625
Timothy Cleveland, New Mexico State University
Trying without Willing: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997) Arthur C. Danto, Columbia University -Analytical Philosophy of Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1973) Donald Davidson, University of California, Berkeley (emeritus) -Essays on Actions & Events, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) Richard Double, Edinboro University Metaphilosophy and Free Will, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) The Non-Reality of Free Will, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990)-"Misdirection in the free will problem," American Philosophical Quarterly, 34 (1997): 181-195.
Fred Dretske, Duke University -Explaining Behavior (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988)-"The Metaphysics of Freedom," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 22 (1992): pp. 1-14
John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside -The Metaphysics of Free Will, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) Carl Ginet, Cornell University -On Action, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)"Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency," The Journal of Ethics 1 (1997): 85-98
Stewart Goetz, Ursinus College"Libertarian Choice," Faith and Philosophy, 14 (1997): 195-211
Bennett Helm, Franklin and Marshall College -Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) -"Emotions and Practical Reason," Nous 35 (2001): 190-213 Jennifer Hornsby, Birkbeck College, University of London -Simplemindedness (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) Actions (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980) Robert Kane, University of Texas -The Significance of Free Will, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)-"Free Will, Responsibility and Will-setting," Philosophical Topics 24 (1996), 67-90
-"Responsibility, Luck and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism," The Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 217-240
Jeanette Kennett, Monash University -Agency and Responsibility: A Common Sense Moral Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) -"Decision Theory and Weakness of Will," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1991): 113-130 Joshua Knobe, Princeton University -"Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language," Analysis 63 (2003): 190-193 -"Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation," Philosophical Psychology 16 (2003): 309-324. Hugh McCann, Texas A&M University -The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998)-"Intention and Motivational Strength," Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995): 283-296
-"Dretske on the Metaphysics of Freedom," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 23 (1993): pp. 619-630
Alfred Mele, Florida State University Motivation & Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) -Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) -Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) -Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987)-"Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses," Philosophical Psychology 16 (2003): 325-340.
-"Agents' Abilities," Nous 37 (2003): 447-470
-"Deciding to Act," Philosophical Studies 100 (2000): 81-108
-"Kane, Luck, and the Significance of Free Will," Philosophical Explorations 2 (1999): 96-104
Alfred Mele and Paul Moser
-"Intentional Action," Nous, 28 (1994): 39-68
Paul Moser , Loyola University Chicago"Reasons, Values, and Rational Action," Journal of Philosophical Research, Vol. 15 (1990), 127-51
Elijah Milgram, University of Utah -Practical Induction, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997)"Hume on Practical Reasoning," Iyyun 46 (1997):235-265
Carlos Moya, University of Valencia (Spain) -The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) Timothy O'Connor, Indiana University -Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)-"Why Agent-Causation?," Philosophical Topics 24 (1996): 143-158
-"Indeterminism and Free Agency: Three Recent Views," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993): 499-526
Derk Pereboom, University of Vermont-"Determinism Al Dente," Noûs 29 (1995): 21-45
Thomas Pink, King's College London -The Psychology of Freedom, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)-"Purposive Intending," Mind 100 (1991): 343-359
G.F. Schueler, University of New Mexico -Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)"Action Explanation: Causes and Purposes," Intentions and Intentionality, eds., D.B. Baldwin, B. Malle, L. Moses (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001)
-Desire: Its Role in Practical Reasoning and the Explanation of Action (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995) Frederic Schick, Rutgers University -Understanding Action, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991) John Searle, University of California, Berkeley -Rationality in Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) -"Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology," Philosophy 76 (2001): 491-514 Wilfrid Sellars (Deceased) -"Volitions Reaffirmed," M. Brand and D. Walton, eds., Action Theory (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976) -"Action and Events," Nous 7 (1973): 179-202 Charles Taylor, McGill University The Explanation of Behaviour, (London, UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964)Richard Taylor, University of Rochester (emeritus)
-Action and Purpose, (Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966)-"Agent and Patient: Is There a Distinction," Erkenntnis 18 (1982): 223-232
Irving Thalberg (Deceased) -Perception, Emotion, and Action (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977) -Enigmas of Agency: Studies in the Philosophy of Human Action (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1972)-"Do Our Intentions Cause Our Intentional Actions?," American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984): 249-260
Raimo Tuomela, University of Helsinki -Human Action and Its Explanation (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977) J. David Velleman, University of Michigan The Possibility of Practical Reason, (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000) -Practical Reflection, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989)Practical Reflection is available online at David Velleman's webpage
"What Happens When Someone Acts?," Mind 101 (1992): 461-481.
R. Jay Wallace, University of California, Berkeley -Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994) -"How to Argue About Practical Reason," Mind 99 (1990): 355-385 Daniel Wegner, Harvard University (Wegner has an extensive list of his publications with links to pdf files of many papers philosophers of action should find of interest -The Illusion of Conscious Will, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002) -"The Mind's Best Trick: How We Experience Conscious Will," Trends in Cognitive Science 7 (2003): 65-69 G.H. von Wright, University of Helsinki (R.I.P.) -Explanation and Understanding, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971) George Wilson, University of California, Davis -The Intentionality of Human Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989)Links to Websites
Elisabeth Pacherie's Action Theory Page
TED HONDERICH'S DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM PHILOSOPHY WEBSITE
Participate in Joshua Knobe's (Princeton University) experiments on the Concept of Intentional Action Intentionality Seminar in the Psychology Department at the University of Oregon taught by Dare A. Baldwin, Bertram F. Malle, and Louis J. Moses George Ainslie's Picoeconomics Website Collective Intentionality WebsiteRelevant Entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Action(George Wilson) Free Will(Timothy O'Connor) Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will(Randolph Clarke) Moral Responsibility(Andrew Eshleman) Personal Autonomy(Sarah Buss) Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action Philosophy of Action and Moral Psychology Bibliography (1995-1997) Compiled by Christian Perring Daniel Wegner's course on Conscious Will Luca Ferrero's 2002 Action Theory Seminar at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Luca Ferrero's 2003 Action Theory Seminar at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Elijah Millgram's Seminar on Practical Reasoning J. David Velleman's Philosophy of Action Seminar at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor J. David Velleman's Seminar on the Self The Royal Institute of Philosophy Conference on Action and Agency at Oxford University, September 13-15, 2002 Conference on the Will in Moral Psychology at the University of Edinburgh, July 1-2, 2002Studying Action Theory
Some Thoughts from a Tyro Action Theorist Doing Work in Epistemology
Those interested in doing action theory (including practical reasoning, free will, and moral psychology) need to think carefully about job prospects for those doing work in the philosophy of action. Unfortunately, action theorists are consigned to the philosophical kitchen, as it were, by those not doing work in the field. Some, particularly those incapable of divorcing themselves from academic trendiness, (mistakenly) think the field is dead. But a quick glance at the philosopher's index will prove otherwise. There is a lot of new work being published on topics in action theory or directly related to action theory. Admittedly as an area within the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of action has taken backseat to debates over consciousness and other topics. Nonetheless, it seems that work in the other areas in the philosophy of mind have implications for the philosophy of action and vice versa (particularly work on perception, self-knowledge, mental causation, and consciousness). Additionally, work in epistemology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy have implications for the work being done by action theorists, and action theorists may have much to contribute in turn.
In light of what I've said above, it seems that other young action theorists would do best by not specializing narrowly in the philosophy of action, but specialize in other areas as well, making the philosophy of action into a subspecialization or an area of specialization on par with another area. This doesn't mean that young action theorists shouldn't consider writing theses on topics germane to the philosophy of action; but it seems best that one should do so in a manner that allows for one's work not to be taken by outsiders as something that will only be of interest to a small group of specialists and will effectively marginalize one. For example, while I did my master's thesis at Texas A&M University on the etiology of free action under the direction of Hugh McCann, I was advised by some to make sure that I had other areas I was equally competent in and to consider writing a doctoral thesis in another area. Thus, I am doing my PhD thesis on doxastic voluntarism. This allows me to do something in another area while still continuing to do research in the philosophy of action.
None of what I'm saying should be taken as discouraging other students from doing work in action theory. I happen to be in a PhD program (University of Rochester) that is strong in epistemology, not action theory, so it makes sense for me to shift gears a bit. (Although I should note that I am fortunate enough to have a professor with interests in the philosophy of action and the free will problem--Richard Feldman--and another with interests in mental causation--David Braun, which allowed me to do my secondary area of specialization exam in the philosophy of action.) One needs to be creative if doing work in action theory for one's thesis to avoid being shunned, it seems. I suppose that if one is at one of the schools in the top twenty or in one of the top action theory schools, this is less of a problem. At any rate, these are my thoughts on the matter, informed somewhat by what some professors at different schools have told me.
M.A. Programs (with their rankings from The Philosophical Gourmet and relevant faculty members)
(I have only listed the top M.A. programs in the United States given that I believe these are the best places to go to school if you plan on doing an M.A. before applying to Ph.D. programs. See the Gourmet Report for reasons students may want to pursue an M.A. before entering a Ph.D. program.)
Georgia State University (David Blumenfield)
Northern Illinois University (Tomis Kapitan, Mylan Engel, Sharon Sytsma, William Tolhurst)
University of Missouri, St. Louis (Lawrence Davis, Eric Wiland)
Tufts University (Daniel Dennett)
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee ( Luca Ferrero )
How I Would Rank the M.A. programs for philosophy of action
Excellent: Northern Illinois University
Good: University of Missouri-St. Louis, Tufts University, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Notable: Georgia State University
I should note that all of these are excellent programs to consider applying to if you're interested in earning a M.A. before applying to a Ph.D. program. As I have mentioned above, I attended Texas A&M University for my M.A., and I am glad I went there before entering a Ph.D. program. Having gone to a small university with a small philosophy department, followed by earning a M.A. in theology, going to a good master's level program helped prepare me for the work I am now doing in a Ph.D. program. A further reason for going into a master's program first was I fared better when applying to Ph.D. programs with a M.A. in philosophy than I would have with my other degrees alone. Friends of mine from Texas A&M with backgrounds similar to my own are now at Bowling Green, Pittsburgh, MIT, Notre Dame, UCSD, North Carolina, and Rochester (another A&M alum is here with me). Of course, Texas A&M is now a PhD granting departmetnt. So I no longer rank them here.
I should mention the reasons I have for ranking the M.A. programs the way I have. Northern Illinois University has a prominent action theorist among its faculty, viz., Tomis Kapitan. Kapitan has focused mostly on the free will debate, but has published papers on intention and other core topics in action theory. Kapitan is by far the most prominent figure in the theory of action at NIU, and he is one of the leading voices in the free will debate today. So I suspect he would be a good person to work under if you want to explore the free will problem. However, given the quality of his work in other areas in the theory of action, he would be a good person to work under if you were interested in exploring other problems. Mylan Engels also works on free action, and his work in epistemology explores the boundaries between epistemology and the philosophy of action somewhat. Sharon Sytsma has published on moral psychology, as has William Tolhurst. Finally, NIU has a solid track-record when it comes to placing their graduates in good Ph.D. programs.
It should be clear why I have placed NIU in the top among M.A. programs for those interested in the philosophy of action. NIU has a top action theorist in its faculty who is still active in the field and they have other people in the faculty with interests in the philosophy of action or in related areas. Also, NIU has a solid faculty overall and would be a good place to get a solid foundation in the core areas of analytic philosophy before moving on to a Ph.D. program. On to the second tier of M.A. programs for action theory. I placed Tufts in the second-tier because only one faculty member does work in the philosophy of action or related areas, viz., Daniel Dennett. Furthermore, Dennett's work in the philosophy of action has been almost exclusively on the free will debate. So his research in the field has been fairly limited in scope. Nonetheless, Dennett is a prominent figure in the philosophy of mind, and other people do work in the philosophy of mind and related areas at Tufts (e.g., Stephen White, Mark Richard). Also, the overall reputation of the department as an excellent place to earn an M.A. gives some justification for my placing it where I have. The University of Missouri at St. Louis is a pretty new M.A. program. So it has not built up a reputation as a good place to earn an M.A. yet. However, it has a very good faculty, and one faculty member, Lawrence Davis, is a prominent action theorist. Also, Eric Wiland does work on practical reason and moral psychology. Robert Gordon lists the philosophy of mind and moral psychology as areas of specialization. Stephanie Ross also lists the philosophy of mind as an area of specialization (although no publications in the field are listed on her web page). Finally Piers Rawling works in Decision Theory. (Also, Davis has done work on decision theory in the past.) I suspect that this department will be worthy of being listed as "excellent" in the near future for those interested in the philosophy of action. The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee has two young action theorists, Luca Ferrero and Edward Hinchman(starting fall 2003), among its faculty. Ferrero is a recent Ph.D. from Harvard. I suspect that he will make significant contributions to the area in the near future. Hinchman is a recent Ph.D. from Michigan. He has a paper entitled "Trust and Diachronic Agency" that recently appeared in Nous>. Both Ferrero and Hinchman come from faculties that have strong figures in action theory and moral psychology (Korsgaard and Moran at Harvard, and Velleman, Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton at Michigan). They are members of a very good department with a good reputation when it comes to placing their graduates into Ph.D. programs. Other faculty with related interests are Carla Bagnoli (who has done work on practical reason), John Koethe, and Robert Schwartz (both of whom do work in the philosophy of mind). Finally, I have mentioned Georgia State as notable. Georgia State University has David Blumenfeld. Blumenfeld lists the free will problem among his areas of interest. He has published papers on free action that have appeared in prominent journals. Also, Barbara Montero is a philosopher of mind who, judging from her C.V. has interests in mental causation.Ph.D. Programs (with their rankings from The Philosophical Gourmet and relevant faculty members)
The Philosophical Gourmet List of Top Schools for the Philosophy of Action (including free will and determinism, agency and action, intention, etc.)
Excellent: Princeton, Stanford, University of California, Riverside, University of Michigan
Good: Birkbeck College (University of London), University of California, Berkeley, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, University of Notre Dame, University of Reading, University of Texas, Austin
Notable: Florida State University, Harvard, Indiana University, King's College London, New York University, Rutgers, University of Auckland, University of California, Davis, University of Georgia, University of Nebraska, University of Southern California
The Philosophical Gourmet List of Top Schools for Moral Psychology (including moral motivation, reasons for action, philosophy of the emotions, etc.)
Excellent: Australian National University, Harvard, New York University, University of California, Berkeley, University of Michigan
Good: Cambridge, Duke, Northwestern, Syracuse, University of Maryland, University of Pittsburgh
Notable: Brown, Georgetown, Ohio State, Stanford, University of California, San Diego, University of Nebraska, University of New Mexico, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, University of Reading, University of Texas, Austin, University of Toronto, University of Utah
The Departments and their Faculty Doing Work in the Philosophy of Action and Closely Related Fields
University of Arizona (Keith Lehrer [emeritus])
University of Auckland (John Bishop)Australian National University (Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, Michael Smith)
Brown University (Jaegwon Kim)
University of California, Berkeley (Donald Davidson [emeritus], R. Jay Wallace, John Searle)
University of California, Davis (Robert Cummins, George Wilson)
University of California, Riverside (John Martin Fischer, Paul Hoffman, Gary Watson)
University of California, Santa Barbara (Matthew Hanser)
Claremont Graduate University (Dion Scott-Kaukeres)
Columbia University (Bernard Berofsky, Arthur Danto [emeritus])
Duke University (Fred Dretske, Owen Flanagan)
Florida State University (Alfred Mele)
University of Georgia (Randolph Clarke)
Harvard University (Richard Moran, Christine Korsgaard)
University of Illinois-Chicago Circle (Abraham Roth)
Indiana University (Myles Brand, Timothy O'Connor)
King's College London (Tom Pink)
University of London (Jennifer Hornsby)
University of Massachusetts (Bruce Aune, Lynne Rudder Baker, Vere Chappell, Fred Feldman)
McGill University (Storrs McCall, Charles Taylor)
University of Maryland, College Park (Patricia Greenspan, Paul Pietroski)
University of Michigan (Stephen Darwall, Alan Gibbard, Peter Railton, J. David Velleman)
MIT (Judith Jarvis Thomson)
University of Nebraska (Robert Audi)University of New Mexico (G.F. Schueler)
University of North Carolina (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Susan Wolf)
University of Notre Dame (Peter van Inwagen, Ted Warfield)
Oxford University (Bill Brewer, J.D. Hyman, Christopher Peacocke, David Wiggins)
Princeton University (Harry Frankfurt, Gilbert Harman)
Purdue University (William Rowe)
University of Reading(Galen Strawson)
University of Rochester (Richard Feldman, David Braun)
Rutgers University (Alvin Goldman, Colin McGinn, Frederic Schick)
University of Southern California (Kadri Vihvelin, Gideon Yaffe)
Stanford University (Michael Bratman)
Texas A&M University (Hugh J. McCann, Colin Allen, Linda Radzik)
University of Texas, Austin (Robert Kane)
University of Utah (Elijah Millgram)
University of Virginia (Mitch Green, George Thomas)
University of Wisconsin-Madison (Berent Enc)